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Foreword 
The main purpose of the British Documents on the End of Empire Project (BDEEP) 
is to publish documents from British official archives on the ending of colonial and 
associated rule and on the context in which this took place. In 1945, aside from the 
countries of present-day India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma, Britain had over 
fifty formal dependencies; by the end of 1965 the total had been almost halved and by 
1985 only a handful remained. The ending of Britain's position in these formal 
dependencies was paralleled by changes in relations with states in an informal 
empire. The end of empire in the period at least since 1945 involved a change also in 
the empire as something that was more than the sum of its parts and as such formed 
an integral part of Britain's domestic affairs and international relations. In pub-
lishing official British documents on the end of empire this project is, to a degree, 
the successor to the two earlier series of published documents concerning the end of 
British rule in India and Burma which were edited by Professors Mansergh and 
Tinker respectively .1 The successful completion of The transfer of power and The 
struggle for independence, both of which were based on British records, emphasised 
the need for similar published collections of documents important to the history of 
the final stages of Britain's association with other dependencies in Africa, the Middle 
East, the Caribbean, South-East Asia and the Pacific. In their absence, scholars both 
from sovereign independent states which emerged from colonial rule, as well as from 
Britain itself, lack an important tool for understanding and teaching their respective 
histories. But BDEEP is also set in the much wider context of the efforts made by 
successive British governments to locate Britain's position in an international order. 
Here the empire, both in its formal and informal senses, is viewed as an instrument 
of the domestic, foreign and defence policies of successive British governments. The 
project is therefore concerned with the ending of colonial rule in individual 
territories as seen from the British side at one level, and the broader political, 
economic and strategic considerfitions involved in that at another. 
BDEEP is a sequel, not only to the India and Burma series but also to the still 
earlier series of published Foreign Office documents which continues as Documents 
on British Policy Overseas (DBPO). The contemporary volumes in DBPO appear in 
two parallel series covering the years 1945 to 1955. In certain respects the 
documents published in the BDEEP volumes will complement those published in 
DBPO. On issues where there is, or is likely to be, direct overlap, BDEEP will not 
provide detailed coverage. The most notable examples concern the post-Second 
World War international settlements in the Far East and the Pacific, and the 
immediate events of the Suez crisis of 1956. 
1 Nicholas Mansergh et al, eds, Constitutional relations between Britain and India: the transfer of power 
1942-47, 12 vols. (London, 1970-1983); Hugh Tinker, ed, Constitutional relations between Britain and 
Burma: the struggle for independence 1944-1948, 2 vols, (London, 198~1984). 
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Despite the similarities, however, BDEEP differs in significant ways from its 
predecessors in terms both of presentation and content. The project is of greater 
magnitude than that undertaken by Professor Mansergh for India. Four major 
differences can be identified. First, the ending of colonial rule within a dependent 
empire took place over a much longer period of time, extending into the final years of 
the twentieth century, while having its roots in the Second World War and before. 
Secondly, the empire consisted of a large number of territories, varying in area, 
population, wealth and in many other ways, each with its own individual problems, 
but often with their futures linked to those of neighbouring territories and the 
growing complexity surrounding the colonial empire. Thirdly, while for India the 
documentary record for certain matters of high policy could be encapsulated within a 
relatively straightforward 'country' study, in the case of the colonial empire the 
documentary record is more diffuse because of the plethora of territories and their 
scattered location. Finally, the documents relating to the ending of colonial rule are 
not conveniently located within one leading department of state but rather are to be 
found in several of them. As the purpose of the project is to publish documents 
relating to the end of empire from the extensive range and quantity of official British 
records, private collections and other categories of non-official material are not 
regarded as principal documentary sources. In BDEEP, selections from non-official 
material will be used only in exceptional cases to fill gaps where they exist in the 
available official record. 
In recognition of these differences, and also of the fact that the end of empire 
involves consideration of a range of issues which operated at a much wider level than 
that normally associated with the ending of colonial rule in a single country, BDEEP 
is structured in two main series along with a third support series. Series A represents 
the general volumes in which, for successive British governments, documents 
relating to the empire as a whole will be published. Series B represents the country 
or territory volumes and provides territorial studies of how, from a British 
government perspective, former colonies and dependencies achieved their independ-
ence, and countries which were part of an informal empire regained their autonomy. 
In addition to the two main documentary series, a third series - series C - will be 
published in the form of handbooks to the records of the former colonial empire 
which are deposited at the Public Record Office (PRO). The handbooks will be 
published in two volumes as an integral part of BDEEP and also as PRO guides to the 
records. They will enable scholars and others wishing to follow the record of the 
ending of colonial rule and empire to pursue their inquiries beyond the published 
record provided by the general studies in series A and the country studies in series B. 
Volume One of the handbooks, a revised and updated version of The records of the 
Colonial and Dominions Offices (by R B Pugh) which was first published in 1964, is 
entitled Records of the Colonial Office, Dominions Office, Commonwealth Relations 
Office and Commonwealth Office. It covers over two hundred years of activity down 
to 1968 when the Commonwealth Office merged with the Foreign Office to form the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Volume Two, entitled Cabinet, Foreign Office, 
Treasury and other records, focuses more specifically on twentieth-century depart-
mental records and also includes references to the records of inter-departmental 
committees, commissions of inquiry and international organisations. These two 
volumes have been prepared under the direction and supervision of Dr Anne 
Thurston, honorary research fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in the 
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University of London. 
The criteria which have been used in selecting documents for inclusion in 
individual volumes will be explained in the introductions written by the specialist 
editors. These introductions are more substantial and contextual than those in 
previous series. Each volume will also list the PRO sources which have been 
searched. However, it may be helpful to outline the more general guiding principles 
which have been employed. BDEEP editors pursue several lines of inquiry. There is 
first the end of empire in a broad high policy sense, in which the empire is viewed in 
terms of Britain's position as a world power, and of the inter-relationship between 
what derives from this position and developments within the colonial dependencies. 
Here Britain's relations with the dependencies of the empire are set in the wider 
context of Britain's relations with the United States, with Europe, and with the 
Commonwealth and United Nations. The central themes are the political constraints, 
both domestic and international, to which British governments were subject, the 
economic requirements of the sterling area, the geopolitical and strategic questions 
associated with priorities in foreign policy and in defence planning, and the 
interaction between these various constraints and concerns and the imperatives 
imposed by developments in colonial territories. Secondly, there is investigation into 
colonial policy in its strict sense. Here the emphasis is on those areas which were 
specifically - but not exclusively - the concern of the leading department. In the 
period before the administrative amalgamations of the 1960s,2 the leading depart-
ment of the British government for most of the dependencies was the Colonial Office; 
for a minority it was either the Dominions Office and its successor, the Common-
wealth Relations Office, or the Foreign Office. Colonial policy included questions of 
economic and social development, questions of governmental institutions and 
constitutional structures, and administrative questions concerning the future of the 
civil and public services and of the defence forces in a period of transition from 
European to indigenous control. Finally there is inquiry into the development of 
political and social forces within colonies, the response to these and the transfer of 
governmental authority and of legal sovereignty from Britain to its colonial 
dependencies as these processes were understood and interpreted by the British 
government. Here it should be emphasised that the purpose of BDEEP is not to 
document the history of colony politics or nationalist movements in any particular 
territory. Given the purpose of the project and the nature of much of the source 
material, the place of colony politics in BDEEP is conditioned by the extent to which 
an awareness of local political situations played an overt part in influencing major 
policy decisions made in Britain. 
Although in varying degrees and from different perspectives, elements of these 
various lines of inquiry appear in both the general and the country series. The aim in 
both is to concentrate on the British record by selecting documents which illustrate 
those policy issues which were deemed important by ministers and officials at the 
time. General volumes do not normally treat in any detail of matters which will be 
fully documented in the country volumes, but some especially significant documents 
do appear in both series. The process of selection involves an inevitable degree of 
2 The Colonial Office merged with the Commonwealth Relations Office in 1966 to form the Common-
wealth Office. The Commonwealth Office merged with the Foreign Office in 1968 to form the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office. 
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sifting and subtraction. Issues which in retrospect appear to be of lesser significance 
or to be ephemeral have been omitted. The main example concerns the extensive 
quantity of material deyoted to appointments and terms of service - salaries, 
gradings, allowances, pension rights and compensation - within the colonial and 
related services. It is equally important to stress certain negative aspects of the 
official documentary record. Officials in London were sometimes not in a position to 
address potentially significant issues because the information was not available. 
Much in this respect depended on the extent of the documentation sent to London by 
the different colonial administrations. Once the stage of internal self-government 
had been reached, or where there was a dyarchy, the flow of detailed local 
information to London began to diminish. 
Selection policy has been influenced by one further factor, namely access to the 
records at the PRO. Unlike the India and Burma series and DBPO, BDEEP is not an 
official project. In practice this means that while editors have privileged access (in 
the form of research facilities and requisitioning procedures) tci the records at the 
PRO, they do not have unrestricted access . For tiles which at the time a volume is in 
preparation are either subject to extended closures beyond the statutory thirty years, 
or retained in the originating department under section 3(4) of the Public Records 
Act of 1958, editors are subject to the same restrictions as all other researchers. 
Where necessary, volume editors will provide details of potentially significant tiles or 
individual documents of which they are aware and which they have not been able to 
consult. 
A thematic arrangement of the documents has been adopted for the general 
volumes in series A. The country volumes in series B follow a chronological 
arrangement; in this respect they adopt the same approach as was used in the India 
and Burma series. For each volume in both series A and B a summary list of the 
documents included is provided. The headings to BDEEP documents, which have 
been editorially standardised, present the essential information. Together with the 
sequence number, the tile reference (in the form of the PRO call-up number and any 
internal pagination or numeration) and the date of the document appear on the first 
line.3 The second and subsequent lines record the subject of the document, the type 
of document (letter, memorandum, telegram etc), the originator (person or persons, 
committee, department) and the recipient (if any). In headings, a subject entry in 
single quotation marks denotes the title of a document as it appears in the original. 
An entry in square brackets denotes a subject indicator devised by the editor. This 
latter device has been employed in cases where no title is given in the original or 
where the original title is too unwieldly to reproduce in its entirety. Security 
classifications and, in the case of telegrams, times of despatch and receipt, have 
generally been omitted as confusing and needlessly complicating, and are retained 
only where they are necessary to a full understanding. In the headings to documents 
and the summary lists, ministers are identified by the name of the office-holder, not 
the title of the office (ie, Mr Lyttelton, not secretary of state for the colonies).4 In the 
same contexts, officials are identified by their initials and surname. In general 
3 The PRO call-up number precedes the comma in the references cited. In the case of documents from FO 
371, the major Foreign Office political class, the internal numeration refers to the jacket number of the 
file. 
4 This is an editorial convention, following DBPO practice. Very few memoranda issued in their name were 
actually written by ministers themselves, but normally drafted by officials. 
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volumes in series A, ambassadors, governors, high comm1sstoners and other 
embassy or high commission staff are given in the form 'Sir E Baring (Kenya)'. 
Footnotes to documents appearing below the rule are editorial; those above the rule, 
or where no rule is printed, are part of the original document. Each part of a volume 
provides a select list of which principal offices were held by whom, with a separate 
series of biographical notes (at the end) for major figures who appear in the 
documents. Minor figures are identified in editorial footnotes on the occasion of first 
appearance. Link-notes, written by the volume editor and indented in square 
brackets between the heading and the beginning of a document, are sometimes used 
to explain the context of a document. Technical detail or extraneous material has 
been extracted from a number of documents. In such cases omission dots have been 
inserted in the text and the document is identified in the heading as an extract. 
Occasional omission dots have also been used to excise purely mechanical chain-of-
command executive instructions, and some redundant internal referencing has been 
removed, though much of it remains in place, for the benefit of researchers. No 
substantive material relating to policy-making has been excised from the documents. 
In general the aim has been to reproduce documents in their entirety. The footnote 
reference 'not printed' has been used only in cases where a specified enclosure or an 
annex to a document has not been included. Unless a specific cross-reference or note 
of explanation is provided, however, it can be assumed that other documents referred 
to in the text of the documents included have not been reproduced. Each part of a 
volume has a list of abbreviations occurring in it. A consolidated index for the whole 
volume appears at the end of each part. 
One radical innovation, compared with previous Foreign Office or India and 
Burma series, is that BDEEP will reproduce many more minutes by ministers and 
officials. 
All government documents are reproduced and quoted by permission of the 
Controller of HMSO. All references and dates are given in the form recommended in 
PRO guidelines. 
* * * * 
BDEEP has received assistance and support from many quarters. The project was 
first discussed at a one-day workshop attended by over thirty interested scholars 
which, supported by a small grant from the Smuts Memorial Fund, was held at 
Churchill College, Cambridge, in May 1985. At that stage the obstacles looked 
daunting. It seemed unlikely that public money would be made available along the 
lines provided for the India and Burma projects. The complexities of the task looked 
substantial, partly because there was more financial and economic data with which 
to deal, still more because there were so many more territories to cover. It was not at 
all clear, moreover, who could take institutional responsibility for the project as the 
India Office Records had for the earlier ones; and in view of the escalating price of the 
successive India and Burma volumes, it seemed unlikely that publication in book 
form would be feasible; for some while a choice was being discussed between 
microfilm, microfiche and facsimile. 
A small group nevertheless undertook to explore matters further, and in a quite 
remarkable way found itself able to make substantial progress. The British Academy 
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adopted BOEEP as one of its major projects, and thus provided critical support. The 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies served as a crucial institutional anchor in taking 
responsibility for the project. The Institute also made office space available, and 
negotiated an administrative nexus within the University of London. Or Anne 
Thurston put at the disposal of the project her unique knowledge of the relevant 
archival sources; while too keeper of the Public Records undertook to provide all the 
support that he could. It then proved possible to appoint Professor Michael Crowder 
as project director on a part-time basis, and he approached the Leverhulme Trust, 
who made a munificent grant which was to make the whole project viable. Almost all 
those approached to be volume editors accepted and, after consultation with a 
number of publishers, Her Majesty's Stationery Office undertook to publish the 
project in book form. There can be few projects that after so faltering a start found 
itself quite so blessed. 
Formally launched in 1987, BOEEP has been based since its inception at the 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies. The work of the project is supervised by a 
Project Committee chaired by Professor Andrew Porter, Rhodes professor of imperial 
history in the University of London. Professor Porter succeeded Professor Anthony 
Low, formerly Smuts professor of the history of the British Commonwealth in the 
University of Cambridge, who retired in November 1994. At the outset Professor 
Michael Crowder became general editor while holding a visiting professorship in the 
University of London and a part-time position at Amherst College, Massachusetts. 
Following his untimely death in 1988, Professor Crowder was replaced as general 
editor by Professor Oavid Murray, pro vice-chancellor and professor of government at 
the Open University. Mrs Anita Burdett was appointed as project secretary and 
research assistant. She was succeeded in September 1989 by Or Ashton who had 
previously worked with Professors Mansergh and Tinker during the final stages of the 
India and Burma series. Or Ashton replaced Professor Murray as project director and 
general editor in 1993. When BOEEP was launched in 1987, eight volumes in series 
A and B were approved by the Project Committee and specialist scholars were 
commissioned to research and select documents for inclusion in each. Collectively, 
these eight volumes (three general and five country)5 represent the first stage of the 
project which begins with an introductory general volume covering the years 
between 1925 and 1945 but which concentrates on the period from the Second World 
War to 1957 when Ghana and Malaya became independent.6 
It is fitting that the present general editor should begin his acknowledgements 
with an appreciation of the contributions made by his predecessors. The late 
Professor Crowder supervised the launch of the project and planned the volumes 
included in stage one. The volumes already published bear lasting testimony to his 
resolve and dedication during the project's formative phase. Professor Murray played 
a no less crucial role in establishing a secure financial base for the project and in 
negotiating contracts with the volume editors and HMSO. His invaluable advice and 
5 Series A general volumes: vol1 Imperial policy and colonial practice 1925-1945 (published 1996); vol 2 
The Labour government and the end of empire 1945-1951 (published 1992); vol 3 The Conservative 
government and the end of empire 1951-1957 (published 1994). 
Series B country volumes: vol 1 Ghana (published 1992); vol 2 Sri Lanka; vol 3 Malaya (published 
1995); vol 4 Egypt and the defence of the Middle East; vol 5 Sudan. 
6 Research is currently in progress for a second stage covering the period 1957-1964. 
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expertise during the early stages of editing are acknowledged with particular 
gratitude. 
The project benefited from an initial pump-priming grant from the British 
Academy. Thanks are due to the secretary and Board of the Academy for this grant 
and for the decision of the British Academy to adopt BDEEP as one of its major 
projects. The principal funding for the project has been provided by the Leverhulme 
Trust and the volumes are a tribute to the support provided by the Trustees. A major 
debt of gratitude is owed to the Trustees. In addition to their generous grant to cover 
the costs of the first stage, the Trustees agreed to a subsequent request to extend the 
duration of the grant, and also provided a supplementary grant which enabled the 
project to secure Dr Ashton's appointment. 
Members of the Project Committee, who meet annually at the Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, have provided valuable advice and much needed encourage-
ment. Professor Low, chairman of the Committee, made a singular contribution, 
initiating the first exploratory meeting at Cambridge in 1985 and presiding over 
subsequent developments in his customary constructive but unobtrusive manner. 
Professor Porter continues in a similar vein and his leadership and experience are 
much appreciated by the general editor. The director and staff of the Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies have provided administrative support and the congenial 
surroundings within which the general editor works. The editors of volumes in stage 
one have profited considerably from the researches undertaken by Dr Anne Thurston 
and her assistants during the preparation of the records handbooks. Although 
BDEEP is not an official project, the general editor wishes to acknowledge the 
support and co-operation received from the Historical Section of the Cabinet Office 
and the Records Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He wishes 
also to record his appreciation of the spirit of friendly co-operation emanating from 
the editors of DBPO. Dr Ronald Hyam, editor of the volume in series A on The 
Labour government and the end of empire 1945-1951, played an important role in 
the compilation of the house-style adopted by BDEEP and his contribution is 
acknowledged with gratitude. Thanks also are due to HMSO for assuming publishing 
responsibility and for their expert advice on matters of design and production. Last, 
but by no means least, the contribution of the keeper of the records and the staff, 
both curatorial and administrative, at the PRO must be emphasised. Without the 
facilities and privileges afforded to BDEEP editors at Kew, the project would not be 
viable. 
S R Ashton 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies 
October 1995 
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S of S dominion affairs 
S of S India (and Burma from 1937) 
Mr S Baldwin 
Mr AN Chamberlain (28 May 1937) 
Sir Samuel Hoare 
Mr A Eden (22 Dec 1935) 
Viscount Halifax (21 Feb 1938) 
Mr A N Chamberlain 
Sir John Simon (28 May 1937) 
Mr M J MacDonald 
Mr J H Thomas (22 Nov 1935) 
MrW G A Ormsby-Gore (28 May 1936) 
Mr M J MacDonald (16 May 1938) 
Mr J H Thomas 
Mr M J MacDonald (22 Nov 1935) 
Lord Stanley (16 May 1938) 
Mr M J MacDonald (31 Oct 1938) 
Sir T Inskip (Viscount Caldecote er 1939) 
(29 Jan 1939) 
Mr A Eden (3 Sept 1939) 
Marquess of Zetland 
(e) Coalition government 10May 1940-23May 19451 
Prime minister and minister of defence Mr W S Churchill 
Lord president of the Council Mr A N Chamberlain 
Sir John Anderson (3 Oct 1940) 
Mr C R Attlee (Lab) (24 Sept 1943) 
, Lord privy seal Mr C R Attlee (Lab) 
Sir Stafford Cripps (Lab) (19 Feb 1942) 
Viscount Cranborne (22 Nov 1942) 
S of S foreign affairs Viscount Halifax 
Mr A Eden (22 Dec 1940) 
Chancellor of Exchequer Sir Kingsley Wood 
Sir John Anderson (Nat) (24 Sept 1943) 
S of S colonies Lord Lloyd 
1 All Conservative unless otherwise indicated. 
Lord Moyne (8 Feb 1941) 
Viscount Cranborne (22 Feb 1942) 
Mr 0 F G Stanley (22 Nov 1942) 
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S of S dominion affairs 
S of S India and Burma 
Resident minister North-West Africa 
Resident minister Middle East 
Resident minister West Africa 
Viscount Caldecote 
Viscount Cranborne (3 Oct 1940) 
Mr C R Attlee (Lab) (19 Feb 1942) 
Viscount Cranborne (24 Sept 1943) 
MrL SAmery 
Mr H M Macmillan (30 Dec 1942) 
Mr 0 Lyttelton (19 Feb 1942) 
Mr R Casey (Ind) (19 Mar 1942) 
Lord Moyne (28 June 1944) 
Sir Edward Crigg (21 Nov 1944) 
Viscount Swinton (8 June 1942) 
Mr H Balfour (21 Nov 1944) 
(f) Caretaker government 23 May -26 July 1945 
Prime minister 
S of S foreign affairs 
Chancellor of Exchequer 
S of S colonies 
S of S dominion affairs 
S of S India and Burma 
Mr W S Churchill 
Mr A Eden 
Sir John Anderson 
Mr 0 F C Stanley 
Viscount Cranborne 
Mr L SAmery 
2. Parliamentary under-secretaries of state for the colonies 
WC A Ormsby-Core (1924) 
W Lunn (June 1929) 
Or T Drummond Shiels (Dec 1929) 
Sir Robert Hamilton (1931) 
Earl of Plymouth (1932) 
3. Civil servants 
(a) Secretary to the Cabinet 
(b) Colonial Office 
(i) Permanent under-secretary 
of state 
Earl De La Warr (1936) 
Marquess of Dufferin and Ava (1937) 
Mr C H Hall (1940) 
Mr H M Macmillan (1942) 
Duke ofDevonshire (1943-1945) 
(Sir) Maurice Hankey (CCMC 1929) 
(1916-1938) 
Sir Edward Bridges (1938--1947) 
Sir Samuel Wilson (1925--1933) 
Sir John Maffey (1933-1937) 
Sir Cosmo Parkinson (1937-1940) 
Sir Ceorge Cater (Feb-May 1940) 
Sir Cosmo Parkinson (1940-1942) 
Sir Ceorge Cater (1942-1947) 
xxi 
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(ii) Deputy under-secretary of state 
(iii) Assistant under-secretary of state 
Sir Gilbert Grindle (1925-1931) 
Sir John Shuckburgh (1931-1942) 
Sir William Battershill (1942- 1945) 
Sir Arthur Dawe (1945-1947) 
SirWilliam Battershill (1941-1942) 
(Sir) Cecil Bottomley (KCMG 1930) 
(1927-1938) 
(Sir) G Tomlinson (KCMG 1934) 
(1930-1939) 
Sir Alan Burns (1940-1941) 
S Caine (1944-1947) 
G L M Clauson (1940-1951) 
G Creasy (1943-1945) 
(Sir) Arthur Dawe (KCMG 1942) 
(1938-1945) 
G E J Gent (1942-1946) 
C J Jeffries (1939-1947) 
T I K Lloyd (1943-1947) 
Sir Henry Moore (1937-1940) 
(Sir) Cosmo Parkinson (KCMG 1935) 
(1931-1937) 
Sir John Shuckburgh (1924-1931) 
NOTE: Ministers and officials from other departments, colonial governors, ambassa-
dors and high commissioners, and the chiefs of staff and their deputies are identified 
where necessary either in link-notes and footnotes to individual documents or in the 
biographical notes in part II of this volume. 
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Introduction 
The general editor's foreword which appears at the beginning of this volume and 
which is reproduced in all BDEEP volumes in stage one of the project observes that 
the ending of colonial rule within a dependent empire had 'its roots in the Second 
World War and before'. This first general volume is therefore published as a prelude 
to the End of Empire series as a whole. Its main purpose is to provide a broad 
illustrative overview of how, and in what form, those issues of colonial and imperial 
significance which assumed far greater prominence in the years after 1945 appeared 
from a metropolitan perspective over a twenty-year period beginning in 1925. On a 
number of key issues the editorial commentary provided in this introduction and in 
the link-notes to individual documents extends back to 1919 and even earlier in 
order to provide the necessary context. 
The year 1925 is an appropriate point of entry for a number of reasons. At a general 
level , Britain's return to the gold standard and the settlement of European security 
issues at Locarno stimulated a contemporary sense that the upheavals of the 
post-war years were finally over. Although it proved to be short-lived, this apparent 
return to normality brought with it a new confidence and opened space for initiatives 
in colonial and imperial affairs. Specifically, within Whitehall, 1925 was the year in 
which the Colonial and Dominions Offices were separated and the date from which 
the Colonial Office began to revise its own internal arrangements for conducting the 
affairs of the dependent empire. Simultaneously, and in a manner which bore 
testimony to an official recognition that some change was needed to address 
emergent needs, the mid-to-late 1920s saw moves towards the adoption of a more 
systematic policy of colonial development. 
In selecting material over a twenty-year period across a range of complex issues 
involving such diverse territories as the empire exhibited, the editors have, of 
necessity, been ruthless in deciding what to include and what to leave out. Not all 
territories and issues are covered in the volume and, of those that are, not all are 
covered in equal measure. Of the two components of policy conveyed in the volume's 
title, the editors freely acknowledge a balance in favour of the colonial empire. 
Imperial issues naturally figure predominantly in the documents on defence and to a 
lesser extent in those on the 1932 Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa and 
Britain's financial relations with the United States during the Second World War. 
Elsewhere there is only limited coverage of relations with the dominions and still less 
of Britain's relationship with the greatest of its imperial possessions, namely India. 
The evolving Commonwealth dimension, however, has not been overlooked and the 
limited coverage of India (effectively a single document selected as an exception from 
the records of the former India Office) might be justified on the grounds of the 
documentary space already occupied by the twelve volumes of the Transfer of Power. 
In the treatment of the colonial empire readers will observe a further narrowing of 
the selection process. A large number ofdocuments, either on particular territories 
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or on specific colonial problems, are drawn from files relating primarily to Africa and 
secondly to those concerned with the Caribbean. This is not to suggest that other 
territories were of lesser importance and significant items have been included, in 
various contexts, on the Middle East, the Mediterranean, South Asia (Ceylon as well 
as India) and South-East Asia. But in a strictly colonial sense Africa and the 
Caribbean occupy so much space because, increasingly over the period in question, 
they were regarded by officials as the areas exhibiting the most pressing problems. By · 
contrast, although part of their responsibility and one occupying what many 
regarded as a disproportionate amount of therr time, the major problem of Palestine 
was never viewed by CO officials as a colonial issue in the same sense (4, para 30). It 
was complicated by international and security considerations, the two aspects of the 
problem which are illustrated in the documents reproduced here (18, 19). 
In selecting documents, the editors have made particular use of what can be 
described as 'position papers' in which officials addressed policy issues by surveying 
the background to a problem over a number of years. They considered an issue in 
terms of when, how and in what form it had arisen, what measures had been adopted 
since and with what degree of success, and what alternative ways of handling the 
problem might now be considered. Such items are staple fare in a BDEEP general 
volume but here, where the brief is so wide, they are especially valuable. Several 
examples have been reproduced. They include a paper written in 1942 by Charles 
Jeffries examining, over the period since the First World War, the effectiveness of the 
changes which had been made in the organisation of the Colonial Office in relation to 
its steadily widening functions (4). Arthur Dawe produced lengthy historical surveys 
of British policy in Cyprus and East Africa. His 1929 analysis of Cyprus rapidly 
became part of received official wisdom about the problems of this important 
Mediterranean possession (45). By contrast, his survey of the political problems of 
East Africa written in 1942 drew plaudits for the depth of its analysis but few converts 
for the solution which it suggested (65). Rather more influential in reinforcing 
British policy on the central issue of development was the critique of the 1929 
Colonial Development Act submitted from Nigeria in 1939 by the governor, Sir 
Bernard Bourdillon (95). It is also possible to detect the influence of non-official 
opinion in the memorandum written by Sir Reginald Coupland in 1933 on relations 
with the Irish Free State in the context of the evolution of the Commonwealth (52), 
and in the account of a meeting held in 1939 between the secretary of state for the 
colonies and a group of prominent outside experts to discuss future policy in Africa 
(56). Elsewhere the documents included range from the polished and carefully 
compiled reports by advisory committees and departmental memoranda submitted 
to the Cabinet, to the minutes by ministers and officials which were hurriedly 
scribbled in response to a particular situation or event. Collectively they illustrate, 
not only the principal metropolitan concerns evident in discussion of what policy 
should be, but also the atmosphere within which actual policy decisions were made. 
An unmistakable change in tempo distinguishes the documents in the early years 
covered by the volume from those which appear towards the end. At the outset the 
pace seems leisurely and the official outlook often suggests more than a degree of 
complacency. By the end the pace is urgent and the outlook one of intense concern. 
How and why official attitudes towards the empire had thus been transformed are 
the main concerns of the documents reproduced here. 
The volume is divided into five chapters. Chapter one contains a short sequence on 
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metropolitan reorganisation, public relations and the Colonial Service. This first 
chapter has been the subject of the most ruthless editorial pruning. Of the many 
possibilities for inclusion only six documents have been selected. Chronologically 
they are restricted to the period 1939 to 1944 but the majority approach the subjects 
under consideration from a historical perspective and this is why they have been 
chosen. The six documents cover three main issues. The first concerns official 
perceptions of public attitudes towards the dependent empire in Britain. Here the 
documents highlight what officials viewed as the shortcomings of parliament and the 
neglect of empire within the British educational system. The second considers how 
the CO functioned as a government department and the environment within which 
its officials conducted their affairs. The third examines the future of the Colonial 
Service in terms of its functions, recruitment and training. Chapter two, on defence 
and international relations, covers two broad themes. Both are concerned with 
Britain's status as a great power and the extent to which its colonial and imperial 
possessions made Britain vulnerable. By focusing on the inter-war period and then 
the strategic situation at the end of the Second World War, the first theme considers 
the question of establishing, over a wide range of commitments, the main priorities 
in British defence planning. It is in this context that relations with the dominions are 
most extensively documented. The second theme examines the extent to which, by 
the end of the Second World War, the British government was prepared to submit its 
conduct as a colonial power to some form of international accountability. Chapter 
three considers political change and constitutional reform within the empire. 
Examples are drawn from the Mediterranean, South and South-East Asia, the 
Caribbean and, in a Commonwealth context, the Irish Free State. However, the 
majority of the documents concentrate on the debate about political development in 
Africa and, in particular, on the concepts of indirect rule and trusteeship. Chapter 
four concerns economic policy. The issues documented range from imperial and 
colonial trade to industrialisation, to the introduction of wartime controls, the 
growth of colonial sterling balances and Anglo-American financial relations, but 
focus, in particular, on the evolution of British colonial development policy. The 
final chapter on social policy and colonial research focuses on educational develop-
ment and labour relations, both being regarded by officials as the two key issues with 
which they were concerned. It also includes material on research, the social impact 
of the Second World War, medical policy and nutrition, urban development and the 
ever-sensitive issue of race relations. 
In preparing the volume the editors have been the beneficiaries of advice and 
guidance from several colleagues. They are indebted above all to Michael Lee and 
Paul Rich. In the areas of metropolitan reorganisation and the emergence within the 
CO of a development and welfare ethos in the years immediately before and during 
the Second World War, the volume owes much to the documents selected from the 
research originally undertaken by these two colleagues. Acknowledgement should 
also be made in the same two areas of policy to Martin Petter who, together with 
Michael Lee, succeeded in bringing documents to the attention of scholars long 
before the detailed class lists currently· in use at the PRO became available. 
Invaluable suggestions and advice have been forthcoming from the following: Mandy 
Banton, Car! Bridge, Arthur Burns, Kingsley de Silva, David Fieldhouse, Robert 
Holland, Ronald Hyam, John Kent, David Killingray, David Lowe, Roger Louis, Peter 
Marshall, David Murray, Andrew Porter, Susan Parnell, Richard Rathbone, Anthony 
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Stockwell and Michael Twaddle. For the final selection of documents and the 
commentary which introduces them the editors alone are responsible. 
* * * * 
Metropolitan reorganisation, public relations and the Colonial Service 
The traditional objective of colonial administration, rooted in nineteenth-century 
usage and practice, was to preserve local individuality. In 1927, two years after the 
creation of a separate Dominions Office;1 Leopold Amery, secretary of state for the 
colonies between 1924 and 1929, reflected on that part of his ministerial inheritance 
which now dealt exclusively with the colonial empire when he addressed the Colonial 
Office Conference: 
I deal in this Office with some thirty-six different Governments, each entirely separate 
from the rest, each administratively, financially, legislatively, self-contained .... Each 
colonial government and each colonial service, has grown up on the spot by a 
continuous process of local evolution . .. each government and each service, therefore, 
is autochthonous, racy of the soil, adapted to local conditions and intuitive in its 
understanding of these conditions and in its sympathy with the population it 
administers. 2 
No attempt was made to impose uniformity on the units of the colonial empire, 
varying as they did in political structure and social character. Sound administration 
and financial probity were the watchwords of colonial administration. Except in cases 
of abuse or scandal, Whitehall's studied non-interference left many colonies out of 
sight and some out of mind. Historically, the functions of the Colonial Office were 
said by one official to be 'essentially negative' (4) and this was reflected in its early 
organisation. Leaving aside work relating to the dominions and with the exception of 
the General Department, which dealt primarily with establishment matters and 
protocol, up until the end of the First World War the organisation of the CO was for 
all practical purposes geographical. Most administrative staff in London tended to 
work in watertight geographical departments with little or no interchange either of 
personnel or of ideas. Few attempts were made to co-ordinate the activities of the 
geographical departments. The Office as whole moved slowly, thus conveying the 
impression that the geographical departments were as remote from each other as 
from the colonies with which they dealt. Officials spent most of their time examining 
those aspects of local administration-mainly relating to finance and personnel-
upon which colonial governors required the sanction of the secretary of state before 
they could act. The task of the CO administrative officer was to ensure that in 
spending money, colonial governments did not deviate from the principles of sound 
administration and a balanced and self-supporting budget. Once a governor had 
satisfied the CO on these grounds he was left free to introduce far-reaching political 
and administrative measures-or indeed to let matters drift-without consulting the 
secretary of state. This bureaucratic attention to the minutiae of financial detail was 
the root cause of an inherent weakness in colonial administration. In the poorer 
colonies especially, financial stringency thwarted local initiative and frequently led to 
stagnation. Without recourse to the much frowned upon Treasury grants-in-aid, the 
poorer dependencies were practically debarred from submitting proposals for 
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economic or social improvement which involved substantial expenditure. 
This laissez-faire approach to colonial affairs began to unravel in the years 
following the First World War. With the introduction of the mandates system 
colonial problems could no longer be viewed in isolation as local problems. The 
concept of the 'dual mandate' implied that colonial powers had assumed two specific 
responsibilities: they had a duty to safeguard the interests and well-being of colonial 
peoples and an obligation to the world community to ensure that the resources of 
their colonial possessions were developed and exploited for the benefit of all nations. 
Of equal significance there was a growing recognition that while individual colonies 
had their own particular problems demanding solutions appropriate to local 
conditions, many of these problems were fundamentally similar and capable of 
solution on a much wider and co-ordinated basis. African experience was crucial 
here. Through such bodies as the Tropical African Medical and Sanitary Committee, 
established in 1909 to advise the secretary of state, and the Tropical Services 
Committee, set up in 1910 to work out a scheme for a unified civil service for Africa 
as a whole, attempts had been made to deal more comprehensively with certain 
aspects of tropical African administration. Progress in this direction was interrupted 
by the First World War but in 1923 an Advisory Committee on Native Education in 
Tropical Africa was appointed and in 1929 its terms of reference were extended to 
cover the whole of the colonial empire. Following the 1929 Colonial Development 
Act, a Colonial Development Advisory Committee was set up to consider and report 
on applications for assistance from the new Colonial Development Fund. A further 
innovation was the introduction of specialist subject advisers. Between 1925 and 
1930 agricultural, economic and financial, educational and medical advisers were 
appointed and the post of labour adviser was created in 1938. The advisory 
committees and subject advisers were followed by the creation within the CO of 
specialist subject departments . In 1934, and as a consequence both of the Develop-
ment Act of 1929 and the representation of the colonies as a unit at the Ottawa 
conference of 1932, the General Department was renamed the General Division 
within which a separate Economics Department was established. Five years later, in 
the wake of the disturbances in the West Indies and in anticipation of the 1940 
Statement and subsequent Act on Colonial Development and Welfare, a Social 
· Services Department was established as an addition to the General Division. 
Simultaneously the old isolationist barriers were breaking down. In response to the 
Warren Fisher Report on the Colonial Service in 1930, steps were taken to 
implement a policy of unification. Contact between the CO and colonial governments 
was now more direct and more frequent. Junior CO administrative staff were 
required to serve for two years in a colony and some gained additional experience 
when they were appointed as secretaries of commissions. Subject advisers and more 
senior officials made more regular tours of the colonies. The exchanges were a 
two-way process with a number of colonial civil servants, including some who had 
held governorships, being imported into the CO as 'beachcombers'. The early 
impetus for the more significant of these reforms came from Amery and Sir Samuel 
Wilson, permanent under-secretary of state at the CO between 1925 and 1933, who 
chaired a number of committees on Colonial Office reorganisation.3 However, the 
most significant expansion on the subject side of the Office occurred after 1939 as 
the resources of the empire were mobilised for the war effort. No fewer than ten 
new subject departments were created between 1940 and 1945.4 
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With previous experience as the CO establishment officer and with continuing 
responsibility for personnel matters in his capacity as assistant under-secretary of 
state, Charles Jeffries surveyed the background to these changes and pondered their 
implications in a memorandum written in 1942 (4). He identified two major 
problems. First, with its new commitment to development and welfare, the CO was 
developing 'a corporate mind and outlook'. The danger here was that by initiating 
policies and issuing directives deemed appropriate to the empire as a whole, the CO 
was undermining the traditional freedom and independence of colonial administra-
tions. Traditionalists within the CO, of whom Sir Arthur Dawe was perhaps the prime 
example, blamed the emphasis now placed on the outpourings of the subject 
departments of the office. 'The unfortunate Governors', he minuted 'are scourged 
with theories and crowned with memoranda which too frequently have no relation to 
the practical problems to which their activities should be directed'.5 But notwith-
standing the views of a traditionalist such as Dawe, the second problem identified by 
Jeffries was that the influence of the old traditions still remained. The CO was still 
too preoccupied with 'financial and administrative questions of minor importance'. A 
disproportionate amount of t ime and energy was still spent 'struggling with knotty 
points about somebody's pension or the dismissal of an engine-driver, while broad 
political, social and economic issues raise their heads on every side'. There was 
plenty of goodwill, plenty of good advice and any amount of efficiency but until the 
non-essentials were disentangled from the essentials, the CO would 'never properly 
tackle the Colonial problem, still less convince anyone else that it is doing so'. In 
short, a radical overhaul of the organisation, its working methods and even its 
accommodation (3) were identified as urgent priorities.6 
Convincing public opinion, both at home and abroad, that the colonial empire was 
a 'good show', that its problems were being tackled with 'energy and vision', that the 
welfare of the people and not the balancing of the budget was the object of policy, and 
that the CO and the colonial administrations worked in partnership as a team, 
became a major preoccupation of officials in London from the late 1930s. The CO 
could no longer remain aloof from outside opinion and function in this respect as if it 
were, in Jeffries's words, 'a law unto itself'. The Office had to recognise that colonial 
affairs had become a major issue in both home and international affairs and that 
political and social aspirations in the colonies themselves were becoming more 
insistent and more vocal. Putting its message across to both parliamentary and 
public opinion in Britain was a particularly frustrating task. Domestic interest in the 
colonies manifested itself largely through the activities of pressure groups like the 
Fabian Colonial Bureau and The League of Coloured Peoples. It did not extend to 
parliament where, throughout the twenties and thirties, the low attendance during 
debates in the House of Commons on colonial affairs bore witness to parliamentary 
indifference. Whenever parliament did rouse itself-over scandals or abuses, or over 
disturbances in colonial territories which made headline news in the press-it gave 
vent to its feelings in a critical and, in CO eyes at least, ill-informed manner. 
A variety of expedients were suggested to provide both for more sustained and 
better informed parliamentary interest. During his second tenure at the CO between 
1938 and 1940, Malcolm MacDonald favoured a Parliamentary Committee for 
Colonial Affairs. As parliament tended to concentrate on those matters said to be in 
need of reform, MacDonald felt there was little opportunity to 'draw attention to the 
many things in our Colonial administration which reflected credit upon us'. His 
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colleagues in Cabinet sympathised but saw difficulties. A committee for colonial 
affairs might encourage demands for similar committees on foreign affairs or Indian 
policy. It would also embarrass the Treasury as it seemed inevitable that a committee 
dealing with the colonies would put forward demands for increased expenditure.7 
Objections were also raised to the suggestion that the secretary of state should be 
advised by a Colonial Advisory Council consisting in part at least of non-official 
experts. Intended as a means to enable parliament to become more effective in 
performing its responsibilities to the colonies, an advisory council was viewed in 
Whitehall as a body which would not only cut only across parliament's responsibility 
for formulating colonial policy but which might even minimise parliament's 
authority.8 The most radical proposal was that the colonies should be directly 
represented at Westminster. More than anything else, it was argued, the presence of 
colonial representatives would inject an air of reality into parliamentary debates. 
Objections, both theoretical and practical, combined to thwart this particular 
proposal. While the French system of direct colonial representation in the Chamber 
of Deputies in Paris was deemed inappropriate (it ran counter to the British 
conception of colonies evolving as separate constitutional entities), the practical 
problems of deciding how many colonies might be represented, upon what basis and 
in a manner which would ensure that they did not become significant factors in 
purely domestic politics (the history of Irish members was an unhappy precedent 
here) appeared incapable of solution (2). 
With no immediate means available of stimulating parliamentary interest, the CO 
turned its attention to the long-term. School children and teachers were targeted in 
an effort to 'educate the rising generation'. Correspondence, especially in the letter 
columns of The Times, revealed the state of popular ignorance about the colonies in 
British schools. In response, CO officials considered the merits of scholarship and 
fellowship schemes to enable students and teachers to acquire direct experience of 
life in the colonies. They also complained that under the current syllabus and 
examination system operating in British schools, 'every subject under the sun is 
treated except our Colonial Empire'. This late 1930s equivalent of a debate over the 
national curriculum extended to the president of the Board of Education who 
admitted that teaching about the empire in schools left much to be desired and 
· suggested that the fault lay with those who taught geography (1).9 
Complaints about parliamentary indifference and public ignorance of colonial 
affairs were frequently matched by criticism of the CO itself. 'A deplorably poor 
department' was the verdict of the New Statesman and Nation in an editorial of 13 
May 1939 commenting on the problem of Jewish immigration into Palestine. 
Responding in an editorial on 18 May 1939, East Africa and Rhodesia considered that 
this was an 'unjust overstatement' and that the CO had improved 'out of all 
recognition' since the reforms initiated by Amery over a decade ago. None the less, 
the Office was 'still not as far-sighted, as receptive of new ideas, as well-informed, and 
as efficient as residents in and connected with the British East and Central African 
dependencies would wish'. In short, the CO still tended 'to undue complacency, often 
to unjustifiable trust in precedent and to compromise instead of ordered planning' .10 
Such criticisms persuaded CO officials that they needed 'a proper Department of 
Public Relations and Intelligence'. As Dawe commented: 'This nowadays, is part of 
the equipment of every up-to-date Department of Government: and we fall markedly 
behind other offices in this respect.'ll In July 1940 Noel Sabine, a Colonial Service 
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officer seconded to London from Kenya, was appointed acting public relations officer 
at the CO. By concentrating on the contribution made by the colonies to the war 
effort, Sabine's early initiatives were designed to educate public opinion in Britain 
about the purposes of the CO's new policy of development. This strategy came 
unstuck as a result of the military setbacks during the winter of 1941-1942 and the 
onset of the American alliance. Publicity for economic and social development was 
no longer sufficient; the war had raised questions of what the improvement was for 
and where it was leading. Moreover the audience to be addressed was now much 
wider. In February 1942, with Singapore about to fall, representatives of the CO and 
Ministry of Information met to consider ways of educating American public opinion 
about the colonial empire. As the political dimension assumed greater importance 
the work of the CO public relations officer was established on a more permanent 
footing. In November 1942 Sabine was given the rank of assistant secretary and a 
proper department of his own. By 1945 the CO public relations officer headed a 
department of about a dozen officials with responsibility for dealing with publicity in 
the UK, the dominions, the United States and other allied countries, and for 
co-ordinating policy with the Ministry of Information and the BBC. 
Beyond its own organisation and public image, the other major administrative 
issue of concern to the CO during the war was the future of the Colonial Service. In a 
memorandum written in February 1943 Sir Ralph Furse, director of recruitment to 
the Colonial Service, leaned heavily on theatrical metaphors to describe what sort of 
service would be required in the post-war world (5). Furse highlighted the defects in 
the existing system of training for the service and outlined the major reforms needed 
to remedy them. He emphasised that the service would have to adapt to two new 
factors: 'The service will have to deal with a new type of coloured man and must 
absorb and acclimatize a new type of white officer.' The 'educated native' was bound 
to become 'the future mouthpiece and leader of his people'. If he could not be used 
intelligently 'we are heading for trouble'. Equally the new demands which would be 
made of the Colonial Service dictated that it could no longer remain the exclusive 
preserve of the 'public school system~. Fresh qualities and qualifications were needed 
and the Jjasis of recruitment must be broadened. As regards numbers, the CO 
anticipated a significant expansion of the Colonial Service at the end of the war (6). 12 
Defence and international relations 
Several factors might explain why, in the 1930s, the British government went to 
such extraordinary diplomatic lengths in an effort to avoid entanglement in another 
European conflict. There was the military argument that Britain was not ready for 
war. There were the economic and financial arguments that war, if it came about, 
might bring Britain to the verge of bankruptcy as it had so nearly done between 1914 
and 1918. There was the political argument that the British people, or the great 
majority of them, were not as yet convinced that the political problems of Central 
and Eastern Europe had any bearing on the defence of the United Kingdom. But 
there was also the equally compelling strategic argument that war in .Europe might 
threaten the security of the British empire. As the Chiefs of Staff observed in 
February 1935: 
... without in any way wishing to minimise the potentialities of Germany, we would 
urge that the broad principles on which our Empire strategy has always been based 
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should not be forgotten, nor the lessons of history overlooked. 
The greater our commitments in Europe the less will be our ability to secure our 
Empire and its communications ... . 13 
The economic and financial arguments and those concerning the state of British 
public opinion can each be traced to the legacy of the Great War. The same applies to 
the arguments about the vulnerability of the empire, but not in a manner which 
would have been recognised by the casual onlooker when the armistice was signed in 
1918. The empire, and especially India and the white dominions, had been a source 
of enormous strength to Britain during the Great War. Moreover, u~der the system 
of mandates established under the auspices of the League of Nations at the end of the 
war, the empire expanded, at the expense of Germany in Africa and the Pacific and of 
the Ottoman empire in the Near and Middle East, to the extent that it now covered 
nearly one-quarter of the earth's surface. Despite these outward appearances to the 
contrary, the British government harboured no illusions about the security of the 
empire. Indeed, during the war, a good deal of the planning for peace had proceeded 
upon the assumption that the empire needed to be larger if it was to become safer. 
For an imperial visionary like Amery, if military plans were co-ordinated with 
measures of economic integration, the empire seemed to offer limitless opportuni-
ties. In his capacity as assistant secretary to the Imperial War Cabinet, he outlined 
his views in a lengthy memorandum in April1917. Referring to what he described as 
'that great southern half of the British Empire' which Jay in an irregular semi-circle 
around the Indian Ocean and embraced South Africa, East Africa, Egypt, India, 
Australia and New Zealand, he wrote: 
The self-governing Dominions in this region are still too thinly populated to be able to 
cope by themselves with any serious naval or military menace. India, for all her 
immense population, has not yet reached the stage either of economic or political 
development in which she could make an effort capable of coping with the immense 
forces which one of the modern world states can put forth. To secure the safety of this 
region during the next generation it is imperative that its seas should be kept clear of all 
hostile naval bases, that potential armies of invasion should be kept as far away as 
possible, and that the intercommunication by railway and by air, as well as by sea, 
between the different portions of the Empire which it comprises, should be as fully 
developed as possible. The retention of German East Africa, of Palestine and Mesopota-
mia, and of the German Pacific Colonies, is the indispensable means of securing this 
end. The retention of German South West Africa, in so far as it is essential to the safety 
and peace of South Africa itself, may be included in the same category of conditions vital 
to the peaceful growth and development of the Southern British Empire. 
The additional economic resources which can be created in the Southern Empire, 
thus enlarged and linked together, is very considerable. East AfriCa, developed as a 
single economic unit from the Zambesi to the head waters of the Nile, contains great 
potentialities. The restoration of Mesopotamia to its former prosperity is only a question 
of setting the old irrigation system in working order again and finding new population, 
whether by natural increase or by immigration. It is hardly necessary to draw special 
attention to the possibilities of development in India, and in the Dominions of the 
Southern Hemisphere.14 
For Amery, the empire was Britain's means of economic salvation in a world destined 
to be dominated by stronger powers. He declared in Cabinet in February 1919: 'We 
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are in fact no longer the sort of country that can compete industrially in the open 
market except in certain industries .... It really comes to this, that we both carry out 
our social reform and develop an immense trade, but mainly if not entirely within 
the Empire' .15 
During the final stages of the war, Sir Henry Wilson, chief of the imperial general 
staff, had likewise been an advocate of imperial expansion, though not, it should be 
said, because he shared Amery's imperial sentiment. With the collapse of Russian 
power in 1917 Wilson feared a German advance into the Caucasus, which in turn 
raised the spectre of a new threat to India in the shape of an Islamic state in Central 
Asia based on Turkey but under German protection. In 1918, in an effort to counter 
this danger, British forces were pushed north from Mesopotamia into the Caucasus 
and from southern Persia towards the Caspian Sea. 
Events at the end of the war conspired to thwart these grandiose plans to establish 
control over an area in Central Asia from the Don to the borders of India. Confronted 
by unrest and insurrection in Ireland, India and the newly acquired territories in the 
Near and Middle East, the military now acknowledged that in defence terms at least, 
the empire was as much a liability as it was an asset. The problem was not confined to 
the heartlands of the empire. A report in July 1920 by the Imperial General Staff on 
the empire's military liabilities commented: 
Cases are ... frequently occurring of demands for regular troops for the maintenance of 
internal order in various parts of the smaller Colonies .. . . The liability on these counts 
is much greater than before the war, since, as in India, there are few coloured races in 
the Empire who have not to some extent fought for us in a white man's war, have been 
trained to arms and imbued with fresh ideas on the subject of race equality. A state of 
things has thus been produced in almost every part of the Empire for which no parallel 
can be found in pre-war conditions ... . Wherever we look we find our garrisons beset by 
potential dangers which may far exceed their strength, and in the sum our liabilities are 
so vast, and at the same time so indeterminate, that to assess them must be largely a 
matter of conjecture.16 
Revolution in Russia and the threat of revolution at home added to the military's 
headaches. Men and money were needed in large quantities to keep the simmering 
pot from boiling over. The Treasury did not have the money, nor the War Office the 
men. 
This post-war crisis of empire was settled in two ways. First, in a geopolitical 
sense, the government called a halt to further British expansion. Secondly, in the 
troubled areas of empire, new forms of management were established to enable 
Britain to relinquish non-essentials and yet preserve the principal instruments of 
imperial authority. In the Middle and Near East informal control was substituted for 
direct administration. Egypt achieved qualified independence in 1922 and Iraq, a new 
British mandate, followed suit ten years later. The war in Ireland was ended by the 
1921 treaty which partitioned the country and created in the south the Irish Free 
State. In India the nationalist campaign of non-co-operation was suspended in 1922, 
leaving the government free to concentrate on the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms 
which were conceived with the intention of confining Indian nationalism to the 
periphery of provincial politics. Simultaneously, and in order to deal with the 
financial crisis which gripped Britain at the end of the war, retrenchment became the 
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order of the day on the home front. In preparation for cuts both in taxation and in 
public expenditure, the services were instructed in 1919 to draft their estimates on 
the assumption that Britain would not be engaged in a major war over the next ten 
years. Expenditure on the armed forces was ruthlessly cut back, from £604 million in 
1920 to £111 million in 1922. 
The forces unleashed by the Great War combined to undermine the power of the 
British empire in other ways. Political and financial pressure in India led, not only to 
a cut in the size of the Indian army but also to restrictions being placed on the use of 
Indian troops for service outside the subcontinent. The white dominions were 
anxious to free themselves of any constraints on their foreign and defence policies. At 
the Imperial War Conference of 1918 the dominions opposed the Admiralty's 
proposals to establish an imperial navy under the control of an imperial naval 
authority. Sir Robert Borden, the Canadian prime minister, voiced dominion feelings 
when he observed that the Admiralty's proposals 'did not sufficiently recognise the 
status of the Dominions, and would therefore offend the newly-awakened sense of 
nationhood in Canada and other members of the Commonwealth'Y Isolationist 
sentiment was more evident in Canada and South Africa than it was in Australia or 
New Zealand and this was demonstrated in their different responses to British 
appeals for assistance during the Chanak crisis in 1922.18 But in their refusal to be 
associated with the Locarno Treaties of 1925 and the pledge given by Britain to 
guarantee the French and German borders, the dominions were as one in signalling 
their aversion to any further involvement in the affairs of Europe. None of the 
dominions could divorce themselves completely from British foreign policy: the ties 
of trade, finance and ultimately defence were too strong. The status and mutual 
relationship between Britain and the dominions were defined at the Imperial 
Conference of 1926: 'They are autonomous communities within the British Empire, 
equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic 
or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely 
associated as Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.' 19 One practical 
consequence of this new definition of dominion status was that the dominions were 
now the sole judges of the nature and extent of their military obligations and their 
co-operation in any future war: there could be no question of compulsory duties. 
Dominion aversion to any further military commitments in Europe was shared by 
the military establishment in Britain itself. The Locarno guarantees were essentially 
the work of the Foreign Office which believed that there could be no permanent 
peace in Europe unless French fears for their own security were removed. When 
reminded by the FO that the most effective guarantee was one that would serve as a 
visible deterrent, the Chiefs of Staff responded: 
The size of the forces of the Crown maintained by Great Britain is governed by various 
conditions peculiar to each service, and is not arrived at by any calculations of the 
requirements of foreign policy, nor is it possible that they ever should be so calculated. 
Thus, though the Expeditionary Force, together with a limited number of Air Force 
Squadrons, constitute the only military instruments available for immediate use in 
Europe or elsewhere outside Imperial territory in support of foreign policy, they are so 
available only when the requirements of Imperial Defence so permit. 
It follows that so far as commitments on the Continent are concerned, the Services 
can only take note of them .... 20 
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The extent to which in the post-war years Britain's overall defence policy was still 
dictated by the requirements of imperial defence was revealed in the summary of 
defence plans by Sir Maurice Hankey, Cabinet secretary and secretary of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence, in January 1926 (7). Only three brief paragraphs 
were devoted to military commitments in Europe. The army especially continued to 
view its priorities as the guarding of frontiers and the maintenance of imperial 
garrisons. Hankey highlighted the restrictions now placed on the use of the Indian 
army and identified, as the most crucial defence priorities, the security of the Suez 
Canal, the protection of the south Persian oilfields and the defence of Iraq against 
possible Turkish aggression over the disputed territory of Mosul. Air power played an 
increasingly important role in the maintenance of imperial communications. In 
imperial air defence policy as in the sphere of commercial aviation, Iraq occupied a 
key position similar in almost every respect to that held by the Suez Canal in naval 
policy (8). 
Of the three branches of the services, the heaviest burden rested with the navy. In 
1926 the Chiefs of Staff described the maintenance of sea communications as 'the 
first principle of our system of imperial defence'.21 It was a recognised principle of 
policy that Britain did not have the resources to maintain a fleet of sufficient size 
simultaneously to protect the United Kingdom and to defend. all corners of the 
empire. Naval policy in the 1920s operated within the strategic framework of a 
'one-power standard'. The main fleet, wherever situated, was to be a mobile force, 
equal in strength to the fleet of any other nation. The yardstick by which to measure 
equality was the size of the American navy. Unable to sustain an arms race against 
the United States, Britain embarked on a policy of naval disarmament at the 
Washington Naval Conference of 1921- 1922. A fixed ratio in capital ships of 5:5:3 
between, respectively, the United States, Britain and Japan was agreed, and there was 
to be a ten-year 'naval holiday' covering replacements and new construction. To 
achieve this agreement Britain had to abandon its pre-war alliance with Japan which 
had served as a guarantee of the empire's regional security in East Asia since 1902. 
The termination of the Japanese alliance was a decisive turning point in Britain's 
inter-war defence policy. It was a decision that some highly placed officials were later 
to regret (11, 14). 
The principle established at Washington of parity with the United States in capital 
ships was extended to cruisers, destroyers and other surface vessels at the London 
Naval Conference of 1930. The Admiralty argued that Britain's need for cruisers was 
proportionately greater than in the case of other powers because of the empire's 
dependence on seaborne commerce. But Admiralty plans for a light cruiser force of 
seventy ships-twenty-five operating with the fleet, forty-five on trade protection-
ran counter to American strategic perceptions which envisaged a smaller but heavier 
force of fifty cruisers. Economic considerations dictated the Labour government's 
abandonment of the British position at the 1930 conference. Throughout the 1920s 
and early 1930s these same economic pressures, allied with a climate of opinion in 
favour of disarmament, produced a situation in which Britain did not build even to 
the limits prescribed by the naval treaties. 
The end of the Japanese alliance left a gap in Britain's Far Eastern defences. In 
1921 the Admiralty proposed that a base should be provided in the Far East from 
which the main fleet could operate and which could defend itself during the six 
weeks that it might take the fleet to sail out. The island of Singapore was chosen. 
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From an Admiralty viewpoint, the justification for the Singapore base was that Japan 
was now a potential threat to British trade and commerce in the Far East. But a 
potential threat was not an immediate threat. The Committee of Imperial Defence 
advised and the Cabinet accepted in 1925 that 'in existing Circumstances aggressive 
action against the British Empire on the part of Japan within the next ten years is not 
a contingency seriously to be apprehended'. 22 Work on the base was long-delayed and 
frequently interrupted. It was only after Japan made its first forward moves in East 
Asia-invading Manchuria in 1931 and attacking Shanghai in 1932-that a decision 
was made to accelerate work at Singapore in order to complete the ba~e (9). 
A base at Singapore, even one that was fully operational, would serve no purpose 
unless a fleet was available to be sent out. The Singapore strategy assumed the 
absence of a naval threat in Europe or indeed anywhere else in the empire beyond the 
Far East. Germany was the first to upset these calculations. In 1934 Sir Ernle Chat-
field, chief of the naval staff and author of the famous epigram-'we have got most 
of the world already, or the best parts of it, and we only want to keep what we have 
and prevent others from taking it away from us'23-pondered his own particular 
dilemma: 'If we have to send out to the Far East an adequate fleet, how is our security 
in Home Waters to be. obtained, and what is the minimum strength of our naval 
forces in those waters that can be accepted?' (10) . Speaking on behalf of the Treasury, 
Sir Warren Fisher, the permanent secretary, questioned many of the assumptions 
upon which the Admiralty based its naval calculations. In the process he revealed 
himself to be strongly anti-American and in favour of improved relations with Japan 
(11). Treasury views that defence policy had to be calculated upon the basis of what 
Britain could afford to pay carried great weight in Cabinet. In 1934 a modest 
rearmament programme was sanctioned. It was designed to enable Britain not to 
fight a war but to prevent one. The deterrence of air power was identified as the 
principal means of holding Germany in check (13). 
The problem with deterrence was that it did not work. Nor did the alternative of 
attempting to moderate German ambitions in Europe by holding out the prospect of 
a settlement of Germany's colonial claims (20). Furthermore, in 1935, a new threat 
emerged from an entirely different quarter. The Italian invasion of Abyssinia 
threatened the lines of imperial communication in the Mediterranean which in turn 
exposed Britain's vulnerability in the Middle East. The problem now confronting the 
planners of Britain's foreign and defence policies was articulated in November 1935 
by the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence: 
We consider it to be a cardinal requirement of our national and imperial security that 
our foreign policy should be so conducted as to avoid the possible development of a 
situation in which we might be confronted simultaneously with the hostility, open or 
veiled, of Japan in the Far East, Germany in the West, and any Power on the main line of 
communication between the two .... 24 
A year later Hankey, who chaired the Defence Requirements Committee, offered his 
own thoughts on 'the pass to which our post-war foreign policy has brought us'. 'We 
seem', he wrote in a despondent memorandum, 'to have lost nearly all our old friends 
among the nations' (14). 
The risks to which the Far East might be exposed in the event of war in Europe had 
not gone unnoticed in the antipodean dominions. In the light of the new situation 
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created by the explosion of Italian power in the Mediterranean, the governments of 
Australia and New Zealand expressed concern that Britain might not, after all, be 
able to fulfil its previous pledges to send a fleet to the Far East in the event of an 
emergency.25 It was against this background that the Imperial Conference assembled 
in London in 1937. For Britain the conference was an opportunity to elicit dominion 
views on the international situation, ease Australasian anxieties and facilitate wider 
defence co-operation. In all three respects the outcome was not particularly 
satisfactory (15, 16). The dominions were informed that in the event of war, 'The 
security of the United Kingdom and the security of Singapore would be the keystones 
on which the survival of the British Commonwealth of Nations would depend' and 
that this situation demanded recognition of the principle 'that no anxieties or risks 
connected with our interests in the Mediterranean can be allowed to interfere with 
the despatch of a fleet to the Far East'.26 In discussion of naval policy, the prime 
minister of New Zealand asked some rather pertinent questions and received from 
the British side a very evasive response (17). 
Irrespective of whatever was said to the dominion representatives at London in 
1937, over the next two years the order of Britain's imperial defence priorities was 
reversed. The Mediterranean and, by extension, the Middle East, assumed much 
greater importance. Following the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, a new treaty with 
Egypt was defined as an urgent priority. This was negotiated in 1936 (12) but 
elsewhere in the Middle East imperial authority was becoming increasingly difficult 
and expensive to maintain. Disturbances in Palestine, over the future of which the 
Foreign and Colonial Offices held widely differing views (18, 19), pinned down no 
fewer than eighteen battalions of the British army. The deepening crisis in Europe 
reinforced the importance of the Middle East. In October 1938, confronted 
simultaneously with a deteriorating situation in Palestine and with a threat of war in 
Europe over Czechoslovakia, the Chiefs of Staff advised that 'the first commitment of 
our land forces, after the security of the United Kingdom, should be the security of 
Egypt and of our interests in the Middle East'. They regarded 'with grave concern the 
possibility of the spread of disaffection to other Moslem countries, involving us in a 
steadily increasing military commitment in the Middle East' _27 
The trend continued in 1939 when the British government finally overcame its 
long-standing reluctance to approve the creation of a full scale continental army. In 
February 1939, in preparation for staff conversations with their French counterparts, 
the Chiefs of Staff outlined plans for a war against Germany and Italy (21). The war in 
Europe would be one of attrition and essentially defensive. The Mediterranean 
afforded the only opportunity for offensive operations. Reinforcements would be 
needed in Egypt which was identified as the base from which attacks could be 
launched against the Italian empire, the weakest point in the enemy's defences. This 
concentration on the Mediterranean explains why, following the German occupation 
of Prague in March 1939, less effort was expended on plans to assist inaccessible 
Poland in Eastern Europe and rather more on efforts to thwart a German advance 
into South-East Europe and beyond to the Eastern Mediterranean. Military alliances 
were sought with Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia, countries which formed a 
protective shield around the Eastern Mediterranean and from which British air and 
naval power in the Middle East might be projected to launch counter-attacks, 
particularly from the air, against the vulnerable flanks of the axis powers; 
An evolving Mediterranean strategy raised doubts over the pledges which Britain 
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had repeatedly made in relation to the Far East. In their appreciation for staff talks 
with the French, the Chiefs of Staff agreed that if Japan intervened it would be 
'imperative' to send a British fleet to Singapore. They also agreed that the eventual 
outcome of a global war would depend 'on our ability to hold on to key positions and 
upon other powers, particularly the United States of America, coming to our aid' 
(21). Winston Churchill, still on the backbenches, offered his own robust and 
optimistic assessment of the naval situation in a memorandum on sea power which 
he sent to Neville Chamberlain in March 1939. Churchill endorsed the Mediterra-
nean strategy: 'On no aq:ount must anything which threatens in the Far East divert 
us from this prime objective'. He regarded the base at Singapore as virtually 
impregnable and dismissed as a 'vain menace' the notion that Japan would send a 
fleet and army to capture it (22) . Churchill's ruminations on grand strategy were of 
little comfort to the Admiralty. A naval appreciation in April 1939 concluded that it 
was 'not possible to state definitely how soon after Japanese intervention a Fleet 
could be despatched to the Far East'. Neither was it possible 'to enumerate precisely 
the size of the Fleet that we could afford to send' (23) .28 
Following the outbreak of war in Europe and as anticipated by the Chiefs of Staff, 
in order to escape this predicament Britain looked increasingly for support to 
Fisher's erstwhile bete noire, the United States. British strategic planners met their 
American counterparts at the ABC (America-Britain-China) talks in Washington 
between January and March 1941. The initiative rested with the Americans who were 
becoming uncomfortably aware of the economic threats posed by Germany and 
Japan. America's geographical isolation was no longer a guarantee of absolute 
security and in order to draw up contingency plans for the possibility of a two-ocean 
war against different enemies in the Atlantic and the Pacific, the military in America 
pressed for exploratory staff talks with British planners. They wanted information 
especially about the disposition of the British fleet and the ABC talks were a sequel to 
the informal naval conversations which had been a feature of Anglo-American 
relations since 1938. 
Also attended by observers from Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the ABC talks 
were held in great secrecy. For their own domestic political reasons, the Americans 
repeatedly emphasised that they were completely non-committal. Agreement, 
however, was reached (ABC-1) that Germany was the main threat to both countries, 
that the defeat of Germany and Italy were priorities, that the Atlantic lifeline should 
be maintained and that a defensive, deterrent policy should be pursued against 
Japan. But there were also significant areas of disagreement. The Americans 
questioned the wisdom of the British decision to concentrate so much of their scarce 
resources in the Middle East and Mediterranean and heated exchanges took place 
over strategy in the Far East. Admiralty delegates at the talks urged the Americans to 
send a fleet to Singapore. The Americans categorically refused and Churchill, now 
prime minister but still complacent about the threat posed by Japan, overruled his 
naval staff by insisting that the point should not be pressed. 'The first thing is to get 
the United States into the war', he observed, 'We can then settle how to fight it 
afterwards.'29 The outcome of this aspect of the talks was a convoluted compromise 
which acknowledged that the United States was primarily concerned with the 
Atlantic and which consigned the defence of South-East Asia to Britain. To contain 
Japan, and to assume thereby overall defence responsibility in the Pacific, the US 
would keep its main fleet at Pearl Harbor. However, in order to relieve the pressure 
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on Britain and thus enable the Royal Navy to send a fleet to Singapore, the Americans 
agreed to transfer some units from Hawaii to the western Atlantic.30 Based as it was 
on the hypothetical supposition that the United States would enter the war, the 
status of the ABC-1 agreement was rather ambiguous. None the less, important 
repercussions followed. Britain and America set up military missions in each other's 
capitals and by October 1941, following the transfer of a number of American naval 
units from the Pacific to the Atlantic, the Defence Committee of the War Cabinet in 
London was in a position to authorise th.e despatch of a small fleet to Singapore. 
These operational plans had been drawn up against a backdrop of the German 
blitzkrieg in Western Europe, the first forward moves by Japan in South-East Asia 
and the ominous arrival of German forces in North Africa. The summer of 1940 had 
seen the fall of France, the neutralisation of the French fleet and the Italian 
declaration of war. Commencing their offensive in September 1940, Japanese forces 
had occupied northern lndo-China in November and, by agreement with the Vichy 
government in France, they were to gain control of air bases in southern lndo-China 
in July 1941. As the Japanese advanced the Chiefs of Staff became restive. In the 
spring of 1941 they advised that reinforcements should be diverted from the Middle 
East. Churchill, however, was adamant. Rommel's Afrika Corps had arrived at Tripoli 
in February 1941 and by April British troops were in headlong retreat from the 
Aegean as the German army overran Yugoslavia and pressed further south into 
northern Greece. Confronted by these pincer movements the prime minister issued a 
directive in April 1941 which defined the successful defence of Egypt as a matter 
upon which 'the life and honour of Great Britain depends'. 'It is not to be expected', 
the directive continued, 'that the British forces of the land, sea and air in the 
Mediterranean would wish to survive so vast and shameful defeat as would be 
entailed by our expulsion from Egypt' (25). 
Instead, Britain experienced what Churchill especially regarded as a vast and 
shameful defeat in the Far East. The Japanese assault on northern Malaya which 
began in December 1941 culminated on 15 February 1942 when the beleaguered 
garrison at Singapore surrendered. Approximately 130,000 British empire troops 
were lost either as casualties or as prisoners of war. Although Australian observers 
had been present at the ABC talks in Washington, controversy still surrounds the 
question of the extent to which the Australian government had since been consulted 
and kept informed over allied strategy to regard Germany as the primary enemy, 
irrespective of any hostile move made by Japan. In Australia itself the reaction to the 
Japanese offensive was one of panic. John Curtin, the prime minister, declared at the 
end of 1941 that his country now looked to America, 'free of any pangs as to our 
traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom'.31 Preparing his audience for 
the worst in a confidence debate in the House of Commons on 27 January 1942, 
Churchill reflected on the inescapable but ultimately insoluble defence dilemma 
which had confronted Britain over the previous ten years: 
There never has been a moment, there never could have been a moment, when Great 
Britain or the British Empire, single-handed, could fight Germany and Italy, could wage 
the Battle of Britain, the Battle of the Atlantic and the Battle of the Middle East-and at 
the same time stand thoroughly prepared in Burma, the Malay Peninsula, and generally 
in the Far East. .. . 32 
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To which in Churchill's case a postscript should be added. In February 1943 Sir 
Robert Craigie, British ambassador at Tokyo when war was declared, submitted a 
long memorandum reviewing events during the six months preceding the Japanese 
attack against Pearl Harbor. He wrote in a critical vein, blaming the governments of 
Britain and the United States for the subsequent disasters. Churchill commented: 'A 
more one-sided and pro-Japanese account of what occurred I have hardly ever read.' 
He ordered that it should be 'most scrupulously kept secret' and minuted: 
He . . . writes of the breach with Japan as if it were an unmitigated disaster . .. . It was 
however a blessing that Japan attacked the United States and thus brought America 
wholeheartedly and unitedly into the war. Greater good fortune has rarely happened to 
the British Empire than this event which has revealed our friends and foes in their true 
light, and may lead, through the merciless crushing of Japan, to a new relationship of 
immense benefit to the English-speaking countries and to the whole world.33 
Britain's alliance with the United States proved in the event to be something of a 
mixed blessing. The two sides were frequently in dispute over military strategy, 
especially over the timing of the opening of a second front in Europe. Moreover, as 
revealed in the discussion below on economic policy, Anglo-American co-operation 
between 1942 and 1945 concealed an underlying economic rivalry based on different 
perceptions of financial and trading relationships. Yet for the British government 
perhaps the most uncomfortable aspect of the trans-Atlantic alliance was the 
knowledge that the Americans were severe critics of European imperialism. The 
effect of American opinion and pressures on the Indian question has already been 
documented in the Transfer of Power series. The documents reproduced in the 
present volume focus on the question of how Anglo-American differences affected 
Britain's position and standing as a colonial power. 
Churchill's meeting with President Roosevelt and the Atlantic Charter which both 
leaders signed off Newfoundland in August 1941 provide a familiar starting point for 
the policy debate over the future of the colonial empire which continued in Whitehall 
throughout the war. Article 3 of the charter-pledging respect for 'the right of all 
peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live'-called for 
clarification in relation to policy goals for India and Burma on the one hand, and the 
colonies on the other. Unable to agree a common formula for both, the ministers 
responsible placed the issue before the War Cabinet where it was decided that the 
prime minister should make a statement in parliament. Speaking in the House of 
Commons in September 1941, Churchill maintained that article 3 was intended to 
apply only to those countries in Europe under German occupation and that British 
policy goals for the empire had already been stated in declarations which were 
'complete in themselves' and 'free from ambiguity'. Churchill's statement caused 
considerable embarrassment in the Colonial Office. When pressed by MP's to make 
public the declarations officials discovered that the Office had 'no complete list of 
our pledges and commitments' (26, 27). 
The intrusion of American influence into the affairs of the British empire was first 
seen in the West lndies, indirectly at the time of the riots of 1937-1938 but more 
substantially in 1940-1941 over the lease of bases (24) and over an American 
proposal that a joint commission should be established in the Caribbean to 
co-ordinate policy on development and welfare (28, 34). However, it was not until 
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America's entry into the war that the problem of defining the political aims of 
colonial policy became urgent. Opinion in the United States tended to attribute the 
collapse of the European colonial powers in the Far East to defects inherent in the 
colonial system itself. Whether, in this part of the world, there could be any return to 
the status quo ante at the end of the war was now a live issue. In their efforts to 
deflect American criticisms officials in the Colonial Office found themselves at odds 
with their counterparts in the Foreign Office. The CO position was articulated in two 
minutes written on the same day in June 1942 by Edward Gent, the assistant 
under-secretary of state with superintending responsibility for the Far Eastern and 
Public Relations Departments. In his first minute Gent accepted the need for a policy 
declaration which would 'face frankly the political problem & will not take refuge in 
economic ideals of material betterment' (29). In his second he took the Foreign 
Office to task for its apparent readiness to subscribe to 'uninformed' American 
criticism of British colonial administration in the Far East (30). 
Lord Cranborne, secretary of state at the CO, mounted a forceful defence of the 
British record in the Far East in a letter he wrote to Anthony Eden, the foreign 
secretary, in August 1942. Britain, Cranborne argued, should not be left to shoulder 
the entire blame for the military collapse and he described the United States as the 
'chief sinner'. Responding a senior Foreign Office official revealed that FO priorities 
were rather different from those of the CO (31). 
An attempt to reconcile these differences was made at an inter-departmental 
meeting attended by ministers and officials from the Colonial, Dominions, Foreign 
and India Offices in September 1942. The meeting was set against the background of 
the forthcoming conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, originally scheduled 
for the United States but actually held at Mont Tremblant, Quebec, in December 
1942. Guidance was required for the British delegation, especially in view of an 
American proposal, put forward by Cordell Hull, the secretary of state, that Britain 
and America should make a joint declaration of aims in regard to colonial affairs. 
Discussion at the meeting turned on the question of the extent to which, at the end 
of the war, Britain might be prepared to submit its colonial administration to some 
form of international accountability. Two alternatives were considered: first, that 
colonial powers should retain direct responsibility in their own territories within a 
framework which would provide for some unspecified form of supervision; secondly, 
that colonial powers should surrender direct control and administration to an 
international body. Clement Attlee, the Labour leader and dominions secretary who 
chaired the meeting, argued in favour of the second alternative. He was particularly 
insistent that the burden of defending colonial territories should become an 
international responsibility. Amery, now secretary of state for India and Burma, and 
Cranborne were equally forceful in their advocacy of the first alternative. Amery 
argued that Britain had a 'moral responsibility' for the welfare of the inhabitants of 
its own colonial territories. Cranborne drew a distinction between colonies in the Far 
East and those in Africa. Any attempt to establish an international regime for the Far 
East should not, he insisted, be regarded as a precedent for the rest of the colonial 
empire. Cranborne's belief that this could be avoided because of 'the much less direct 
interest of the United States in Africa' was not a view that was shared by officials in 
the Foreign Office (32). 
Although this meeting of ministers and officials ended inconclusively, a response 
had to be made to Hull's proposal for a joint declaration. In December 1942 Attlee, 
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Eden, Cranborne (now lord privy seal) and Oliver Stanley (Cranborne's successor at 
the CO) presented to the War Cabinet a joint memorandum on colonial policy. In it 
they explained that recent events in the United States had raised the colonial 
question 'in an acute form'. A statement of government policy was therefore needed 
to counter the feeling in America 'that there is something archaic in the conception 
of the British Colonial Empire and that some new system ought to be substituted for 
it more in accordance with the spirit of the times'. The enlightenment of American 
opinion was said to be only part of the problem: the American government had to be 
persuaded, not only to commit itself to a general scheme for colonial defence but also 
to recognise that colonial powers had an 'unquestioned right' to administer their 
colonies, including those 'temporarily lost' to Japan. On this issue, in order to 
present a common front against the Americans, Attlee had evidently fallen into line 
with his ministerial colleagues. It was important, the memorandum continued, that 
Britain should assume the initiative. Hull had introduced the term 'parent states' in 
his proposal for a joint declaration and it was now suggested that regional 
commissions should be established to enable parent states to consult and collaborate 
in those regions of the world in which they had common interests. The commissions 
would also include representatives of other countries having major defence or 
economic interests in the regions concerned. Suitable regions were identified as, 
first, the Far East; secondly, Africa; and, thirdly, the western Atlantic. If agreement 
could be reached with the Americans on the general declaration of policy, it would 
then be possible to open discussions on how it might be applied to the particular 
problems of the Far East (33). 
Britain's strategy fell at the first hurdle. It proved impossible to reach agreement 
on the wording of a joint Anglo-American declaration. American insistence on the 
word 'independence', their notion of a definite timetable for constitutional progress 
and their proposal to establish an International Trusteeship Administration to 
safeguard, on lines not dissimilar to the 1919 mandates system, the interests of 
territories not as yet ready for full independence, left Sir George Gater, permanent 
under-secretary of state at the Colonial Office, 'with a feeling of complete hopeless-
ness'. Of the American draft of the declaration, Gater commented: 'It is only 
necessary to think of applying its principles to Colonies like Mauritius to realize its 
full absurdity.' If the Americans were 'firmly attached' to their draft, Gater advocated, 
as the 'only dignified course', that Britain should abandon the idea of a joint 
declaration and make a unilateral one instead. To the chagrin of the Foreign Office, 
which remained anxious to move forward in step with Washington, Stanley delivered 
what amounted to a unilateral declaration of policy during the course of a debate on 
Colonial Supply in the House of Commons in July 1943 (36). 
It was clear from the abortive discussions over the wording of a joint declaration 
that the Americans were committed to some form of international supervision for 
the colonial order at the end of the war. Over the future of the Italian colonies in the 
Horn of Africa, the Foreign Office likewise supported the principle of international 
trusteeship, much to the irritation of the Colonial Office (35). Throughout 1944 the 
CO devised an alternative approach to the problem of trusteeship which took final 
shape in a memorandum submitted to the War Cabinet at the end of the year. 
Entitled 'International aspects of colonial policy', the memorandum outlined a 
project designed to promote the well-being of colonial peoples within the wider 
framework of the world community. It advocated 'partnership' in place of 'trus-
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teeship' and called for an end to the system of mandates. Parent states, the 
memorandum insisted, must be free to determine the pace of political change within 
their own territories. But parent states also had to be mindful of their obligations to 
the international community on matters of defence and on social, economic and 
commercial policy. International co-operation in colonial affairs would therefore be 
achieved through consultative regional commissions with no executive or supervis-
ory powers, and through functional agencies of the new (United Nations) World 
Organisation. Accountability in colonial affairs would be achieved through an 
International Colonial Centre, essentially a central library receiving reports on 
administrative matters from parent states (37). Introducing this ambitious project to 
the War Cabinet, Stanley explained that it was important 'that we should take the 
initiative and should not wait for the Americans to make the first move, lest they 
should put forward schemes which were unsatisfactory from our point of view, but 
might attract support'.34 Widely circulated throughout Whitehall, the memoran-
dum's true purpose was revealed in a comment by a Foreign Office official: 
In reading this memorandum it is very difficult to avoid being influenced by ... the 
Colonial Office's bugbears .... The Colonial Office bugbears are (1) opposition in 
principle to international administration ... ; and (2) opposition to outside interference 
in constitutional relations (which is the very thing the Americans cannot keep their 
tongues and pens, if not their hands off); and (3) an intense dislike of the mandates 
system . . .. 35 
Foreign Office scepticism about the project elaborated by the Colonial Office was not 
misplaced. The proposal to abolish the system of mandates emerged as the major 
stumbling block. On this crucial issue opposition was encountered from the two 
quarters-the United States and the dominions-upon whose support the successful 
outcome of the project in its entirety depended. 
At the end of 1944 Washington informed London that questions concerning 
colonial trusteeship were certain to be raised at the United Nations Security 
Conference, scheduled to be held at San Francisco in the spring of 1945. Decisions 
were required about the future of the Italian colonies and the Japanese mandated 
islands. A suspicious Churchill detected in this American approach a potential threat 
to British territory (38) but at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 the prime 
minister put his signature to a protocol which defined three categories of trus-
teeship. Although Churchill subsequently offered his own interpretation of the 
significance of the protocol (39), the Yalta commitment, together with the attitude of 
the dominions, especially Australia and New Zealand, both of whom were committed 
to the continuation of the mandates system, effectively undermined the Colonial 
Office proposals. Stanley surveyed the damage in his report to the War Cabinet in 
March 1945. He was contemptuous of the American stand over mandates which he 
described as a cloak to cover their occupation of the Japanese islands after the war. 
Britain now faced a dilemma. To present the British proposals for regional 
commissions at San Francisco without support from the United States and the 
dominions, with the probable exception of South Africa, would mean 'throwing the 
whole Colonial Empire open to discussion by this motley assembly', a procedure 
which Stanley described as 'hazardous in the extreme'. The only course open now 
was to abandon the regional commissions and the International Colonial Centre and 
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to accept the continuation of mandates, on condition that the terms of the mandates 
were revised to eliminate their worst features and that there could be no question of 
extending trusteeship to non-mandated British territories (40). Heated exchanges 
between ministers and dominion representatives at a Commonwealth meeting in 
London in April 1945 confirmed that after the war Britain would be fighting a 
rearguard action to defend its colonial policies before the court of international 
opinion on the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations (41). 
The issue of accountability was not confined to the colonial empire in a formal 
sense. It was also relevant to the post-war problems of defence in the Middle East. In 
a memorandum for the War Cabinet in April 1945, Eden posed two important 
questions: first, should responsibility for the defence of the Suez Canal be vested in 
Britain 'in perpetuity', and, secondly, was it desirable, 'for political and strategic 
reasons', that Britain should play 'the predominant part' in the defence and political 
control of the Middle East? Eden explained that differences of opinion had emerged 
in the War Cabinet's Suez Canal Committee, with some ministers, notably Attlee, 
arguing on grounds of cost in favour of international control of the canal. The 
foreign secretary disagreed and urged affirmative answers to the two questions which 
he had placed before the War Cabinet. He described the Middle East as one of the 
most important strategic areas in the world, the defence of which (echoes of 
ghurchill in 1941) was 'a matter of life and death to the British Empire'. Exclusive 
British control in the Middle East was not, according to Eden, incompatible with the 
organisation of post-war security by means of international co-operation. Peace 
could not be ensured unless the United Nations assigned to the great powers special 
defence responsibilities in their own areas. Hence: 'The position of the United States 
in relation to the Panama Canal is identical with our own in relation to the Suez 
Canal as is the position of Russia with regard to certain areas of Eastern Europe' 
(42).36 
Support for Eden's position was forthcoming in the form of a memorandum by Sir 
Edward Grigg, the resident minister in Cairo, at the beginning of July 194537 but no 
Cabinet decisions about the Middle East were made before the general election. 
Significantly, however, the emphasis which the Foreign Office and the resident 
minister placed upon the strategic importance of the Middle East contrasted with the 
recommendations of the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff, a sub-committee of the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee. In June 1945, in a report on the security of the British 
empire, the PHPS submitted a major review of imperial defence which was projected 
to the years 1955-1960 and which assumed that the Soviet Union would constitute 
the principal threat to British interests. The report elevated 'the Indian Ocean area' 
into second place behind the defence of the United Kingdom but above the Middle 
East in the order of Britain's defence priorities. The Indian Ocean was said to form 'a 
vital link' in the chain of imperial communications and India especially was 
identified as an important base and as a source of industry and manpower. The PHPS 
believed that in the event of war with the Soviet Union, the Middle East would be 
subject to an immediate threat and that the oilfields in Persia and Iraq, described as 
'our most important strategic interest in the area', would be 'indefensible'. Sea and 
air communications in the Middle East, which might in any case be disrupted 
because of military operations in Europe, were therefore of lesser importance than 
those which ran through the Indian Ocean and the PHPS concluded: 'Defence 
requirements in the Middle East must not be met at the expense of requirements in 
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India and the Indian Ocean' (43). The pre-1939 debate over defence priorities in the 
Middle East and the Far East had therefore resurfaced. From the middle of 1945 the 
resolution of these differences became the responsibility of the new Labour 
government. 
Political change and constitutional reform 
Nowhere is the diversity of the empire better illustrated than in the debates which 
took place on the questions of political change and constitutional reform. There were 
admittedly some common themes. Over much of Africa, the Caribbean and 
South-East Asia, political change was seldom viewed in isolation. Questions of 
constitutional advance dovetailed with economic issues and with the pressures 
created by changes in the international climate and in defence strategy. During the 
Second World War especially, regional approaches to political problems dominated 
much of the debate through schemes for closer union in East Africa and South-East 
Asia, amalgamation in central-southern Africa and federation in the Caribbean. On 
the specific question of political reform, the example of the British experience in 
India served as a warning. A good deal of the debate about political change in tropical 
Africa seems to have been informed by a concern to avoid the mistakes which had 
been made in India. A number of colonial officials subscribed to the view that too 
many concessions had been made too soon to the Indian intelligentsia. Representa-
tive institutions in India, whether at the centre or in the provinces, were said to be 
unrepresentative~ They pandered to the ambitions of a vocal minority, played no part 
in the lives of the mass of the people, and encouraged a sense of political power 
divorced from political responsibility. In short, India should not be the model for the 
colonial empire. In Africa especially, traditional forms of authority and administra-
tion should be nurtured and developed. 
But if regional panaceas and preferences for traditional institutions emerge as 
common themes, no attempt was made to devise a blueprint or masterplan for 
political development in the empire as a whole. As we have already seen, general 
statements of policy were conspicuous either by their absence or by their obscurity. 
Uncertainty as to the future inhibited the detailed definition of political objectives. A 
secretary of state might proclaim in 1943 that Britain was pledged 'to guide Colonial 
people along the road to self-government within the framework of the British 
empire',38 but this simple statement of purpose, made in wartime and intended 
primarily for foreign consumption, concealed a myriad of as yet unresolved issues. It 
was not simply a question of timing or of anticipating generational advances towards 
self-government. Vital questions remained unanswered about the very nature of 
self-government. Would traditional authority survive in Africa or would the baton 
·pass, as it had in India, to the Europeanised intelligentsia? Were Malta and Cyprus 
part of western political culture in which parliamentary institutions could take root? 
If the 'paramountcy' of African interests guided British policy in Kenya, what role 
was envisaged for the already politically active European settler and Indian 
commercial communities? Similarly, in South-East Asia, was Malaya to be governed 
primarily in the interests of the Malays, or did the Indian and Chinese communities 
have equal rights? To what extent, in central-southern Africa, would the Union of 
South Africa influence political developments in neighbouring territories? And in the 
Caribbean, if officials were right in their view that the majority of the British 
territories could never aspire to individual independence, how might the alternative 
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of a political federation be reconciled with centuries of isolation, mistrust and 
mutual ignorance? Although policy towards India and the evolution of the Common-
wealth are treated here, the documents in this chapter focus primarily on the 
above-mentioned issues of colonial significance as they had developed during the 
twenty years up to 1945. 
Political reform in the colonial empire in the inter-war years was not a constant 
process of evolution with territories advancing by stages towards representative 
forms of government and increased responsibility. While some territories trod the 
evolutionary path others found themselves moving in the opposite direction. 
Constitutions might be revoked and direct British rule reinstated. The Mediterra-
nean and South Asia at the beginning of the 1930s provide illustrations of these 
forward and reverse thrusts. The suspension of representative institutions in Cyprus 
and Malta contrasted with the extension of constitutional reform in Ceylon. 
Parliamentary forms of government in Cyprus and Malta were said to have been 
given a fair trial but were now deemed unworkable. External pressures were evident 
in both cases. Maltese politicians were thought to be too susceptible to the influence 
of Italian nationalism, while in Cyprus the official view was that Greek loyalties were 
focused on the movement for union with Greece. Again in both cases the conclusion 
drawn was that too much emphasis had been placed on constitutional development 
and too little on economic and social improvement. A drastic remedy was suggested 
in Malta's case where the object of British policy was described in 1934 as the 
abolition of parliamentary government 'once and for all' (53). Cyprus fared no better. 
The Cypriots were said to have 'an oriental mentality' which made them ill-equipped 
for responsible government. Under the constitution of Cyprus, obstruction by the 
elected Greek members had denied the executive the legislative power with which to 
conduct effective government. It was a classic example of power being divorced from 
responsibility. The constitution had given too much prominence to 'the noisy 
anti-British section of the community' who led the movement for union with Greece. 
The Cypriots were unable to appreciate 'the Anglo-Saxon system of conciliation'. 
They regarded concessions as signs of weakness or surrender. Accordingly they had 
to be treated with a firm hand under a system of 'benevolent autocracy' (45). 
In seizing the opportunity afforded by the disturbances of 1931 to suspend the 
Cypriot constitution, policy-makers were aware of the contrast with Ceylon upon 
which a new constitution was bestowed in the same year. Sinhalese politicians could 
be accommodated because they had no desire to break the imperial connection. But 
the relation of political power to political responsibility remained the central issue in 
the case of Ceylon. The Donoughmore Commission reported in 1928 that Ceylon was 
not ready for full responsible government and recommended instead an executive 
committee system of government designed to give members of the legislature 
administrative experience and political education apart from political responsibility. 
This novel experiment in the arts of constitutional government was accompanied by 
startling changes in the composition of the electorate. The first general election held 
in 1931 under the Donoughmore constitution was based on universal adult 
suffrage-twenty years ahead of India and only two years after it had been introduced 
in Britain. The extension of the franchise to the Indian immigrant community was 
the cause of considerable controversy which no doubt contributed to a sense of 
unease in some quarters in the CO. The permanent under-secretary of state 
expressed his dislike of the reforms which bore the hallmarks of a 'leap in the dark' 
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(47). In Ceylon pressures built up almost immediately for constitutional revision. 
They were resisted (51).39 
Political reform in India and, from a dominions' perspective, relations with the 
Irish Free State, raised the question of the preservation of imperial unity in its most 
acute form. Diehard critics of government policy attacked the Government of India 
Act of 1935 as an abject surrender to Indian nationalism but this was not the spirit in 
which the Act was conceived. Under the system of dyarchy established in India at the 
end of the First World War, Britain had embarked on a strategy of political 
management designed to win fresh allies and to steer Indian political activity away 
from the central levers of power and towards the safer areas of provincial 
government. The same strategy underpinned the 1935 Act. Dyarchy in the provinces 
was to be extended to full provincial self-government and at the centre a federation of 
British Indian provinces and Indian princely states was to be established. For 
Conservative policy-makers, federation was viewed as the means by which Britain 
might 'give a semblance of responsible government and yet . . . retain ... the 
realities and verities of British control' (48) . The federal edifice was constructed in a 
manner designed to ensure that foreign affairs and defence and up to eighty per cent 
of federal revenues would remain under 'exclusive' imperial control. Extended 
communal representation and princely nominees in the federal legislatures were the 
constitutional mechanisms intended to deny power at the centre to the Indian 
National Congress. The establishment of an Indian federation was viewed as a process 
which would take 'years' to complete. In the meantime, the central government of 
India would remain unchanged and self-government in the provinces would act as a 
continued diversion. Provincial preoccupations were expected to weaken the grip of 
an all-India movement and undermine Congress as an all-India party. The federal 
provisions of the 1935 Act were never implemented but self-government operated in 
the provinces between 1937 and 1939 in a manner not far removed from expecta-
tions. Although, in terms of trade and investment, Britain's economic interests in 
India declined between the wars, financialll0 no less than politically it was the 
Second World War which upset British calculations over the future of the subconti-
nent. 
More immediate questions about the evolution of the Commonwealth arose in the 
context of relations with the Irish Free State. The Statute of Westminster of 1931 
provided formal legal recognition of the independent status of the dominions which 
had been enshrined in the definition agreed at the Imperial Conference of 1926. At 
the time the leaders of the older dominions-Canada, Australia, New Zealand and 
South Africa-seemed content that the 1931 legislation had put an end to the 
constitutional issues about independence and equality which had so dominated their 
domestic politics since the end of the First World War. But when Eamon de Valera, 
the leader of Fianna Fail, came to power in Dublin after elections in February 1932, 
the Irish Free State emerged as a striking exception to this Commonwealth 
consensus. Under pressure from his own supporters to act immediately to implement 
his electoral mandate, de Valera embarked on a course which made collision with 
London inevitable. His government first cancelled the annuities which were payable 
as compensation to British landlords whose Irish estates had been appropriated. 
under land reforms. It then proceeded to formulate a bill to remove the oath of 
allegiance to the King from the internal constitution. In retaliation, Ramsay 
MacDonald's National Government introduced a Special Duties Bill in July 1932 
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which was designed to reduce Free State imports into Britain. Dublin responded in 
kind with a similar measure of its own. De Valera was also warned that if he did not 
drop his legislative proposals, British ministers would refuse to negotiate any 
agreements with their Free State counterparts at the Ottawa conference. In his 
handling of relations with de Valera, MacDonald was mindful of his own tenuous 
position as prime minister. He could not afford to alienate the right-wing, anti-Irish 
element within the Conservative Party. The controversies over India also influenced 
the government's response to the Irish situation. Although de Valera seems to have 
been more concerned to remove the remaining symbols of Irish inferiority than to 
sever all ties with the imperial connection, for many British policy-makers the Irish 
leader now ranked equally with Gandhi as the malign and irrational face of colonial 
nationalism. 
The economic dispute was not finally resolved until January 1938,41 by which time 
the Free State had enacted an External Relations Bill which removed all references to 
the King in internal affairs but retained the constitutional link with the Crown in 
respect of relations with foreign countries. De Valera was fortunate in the timing of 
this legislation. It attracted little public attention in Britain because, by December 
1936, the country was immersed in the drama of the abdication crisis. In contrast to 
its earlier refusal to negotiate, the British government's willingness to settle the 
economic dispute was largely influenced by the deteriorating international situation. 
On the crucial constitutional issue, the Cabinet's Irish Committee resolved that 
there could be no question of expelling the Free State from the Commonwealth42 
and, at the Imperial Conference of 1937 (from which, for the first time, the Free 
State was a conspicuous absentee), other dominion leaders made plairi their view 
that de Valera's constitutional changes made no difference to the Free State's 
membership of the Commonwealth.43 
Within Whitehall, the Dominions Office had already begun the process of 
clarifying and rationalising the significance of the External Relations Bill in terms of 
its implications for the conception of the Commonwealth as a whole. In framing a 
new definition of Commonwealth membership, the DO drew on ideas long since 
evident within its own cadres but which had found lucid expression in a memoran-
dum written in 1932 at the beginning of the breach with de Valera by Reginald 
Coupland, Beit professor of the history of the British empire at Oxford (52). A short 
visit to Dublin had convinced Coupland that it was necessary above all 'to eliminate 
the imperial factor from Irish politics'. His memorandum urged an immediate 
negotiated settlement of the economic dispute, coupled with a lengthy exposition of 
why Britain should not resist by force a Free State decision to establish a republic 
and so withdraw from the Commonwealth. He set out his terms for a settlement in 
the form of a British declaration which included recognition of the right, not of 
'secession' from the Commonwealth but of 'freedom to dissociate'. Far from 
weakening the unity of the Commonwealth, Coupland argued that some such 
declaration was needed 'for its final consolidation'. It would, he suggested, streng-
then Britain's position in India 'and make it more likely that the Indian leaders will 
ultimately acquiesce in India remaining within the empire'. In significant ways, 
Coupland's memorandum anticipated, not only the post-1949 conception of the 
Commonwealth but also the manner in which, by acting first, Britain might 
pre-empt demands made by colonial nationalists. Coup land recognised that, in some 
quarters, his ideas would be received as 'defeatist', 'fantastic' and even 'heretical'. 
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When they were written in 1932 the Dominions Office regarded them as politically 
impossible. But by 1936 officials were prepared to explore them in a manner which 
prefigured the idea that the existence of a dominion as a republic was not necessarily 
incompatible with Commonwealth membership. A DO memorandum of December 
1936 observed: 
The essence of the Commonwealth . . . is that it is an association of free and equal 
nations between whom war is ruled out as a means of settling differences, and which are 
able to solve all their own problems not by any form of coercion ... but by discussion 
and mutual arrangement ... and to co-operate together to solve the problems of the 
world. Hence the real value of the Commonwealth is that it may well save the world, not 
only by its exertions (the effect of which must exceed the sum total of those of its 
members taken individually) but by its example of the proper method of conducting 
relations between different states .... Can Mr de Valera's idea be said to offend against 
this? On the other hand would not acceptance of the idea, by indicating the flexibility of 
the British Commonwealth, be a demonstration of wise statesmanship and of the value 
attached to membership of the Commonwealth which would add enormously to its 
international intluence?44 
The management of political change in colonial Africa was an altogether different 
proposition. In the eyes both of CO officials and colonial administrators, sub-Saharan 
African nationalism had yet to make its presence felt and the most vocal and 
troublesome advocates of political reform were European settlers and their Asian 
commercial competitors in East Africa. However, the debate about the future course 
of African political development was already in progress. Much of it concentrated on 
the concepts of indirect rule and trusteeship. 
The theory and practice of indirect rule derived from the policies adopted in 
Northern Nigeria by Lord Lugard during his governorship between 1912 and 1919. 
Lugard put forward three arguments to justify his policy of administration through 
native authorities (chiefs or councils or a combination of both), armed with native 
courts and native treasuries: first on grounds of cost, because the large staff needed 
for the direct administration was not available; secondly, on grounds of precedent, 
because a similar policy (though with a marked difference in the status of the chiefs 
concerned) had been successful in the princely states of India; and finally on grounds 
of expedience, because, with only limited knowledge of local conditions, it would 
have been 'absolute folly' to attempt 'drastic' reforms which would dislocate the 
traditional administration.45 
'Liberty and self-development', wrote Lugard in 1922 in The dual mandate in 
British tropical Africa, 'can best be secured to the native population by leaving them 
free to manage their own affairs through their own rulers'. Britain had set itself 'the 
high ideal of leading backward races', by their own efforts and in their own way, 'to 
raise themselves to a higher plane of social organisation'. It was a mission that could 
not be rushed. Educated communities formed 'a minute proportion of the popula-
tion of British Tropical Africa', the vast majority of whom were still in 'the primitive 
or early tribal stages of development'. The era of complete independence was 'not yet 
visible on the horizon of time' and the 'danger of going too fast with native races is 
even more likely to lead to disappointment, if not to disaster, than the danger of not 
going fast enough'. 'Festina lente', wrote Lugard, is a motto which the Colonial 
Office will do well to remember in its dealings with Africa'.46 
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In its practical application indirect rule assumed several forms which were 
sometimes based on an inadequate understanding of the complex political and social 
organisations of the local inhabitants. Events in south-eastern Nigeria in 1929 
illustrate this point. Following the rapid conquest of south-eastern Nigeria in the 
early years of the twentieth century, the British imposed upon the village-orientated 
Igbo and lbibio peoples a native authority system which was quite alien to local 
custom. Believing that the Igbo and lbibio were formerly ruled by chiefs who had 
been eclipsed under the impact of the slave trade, the British established a series of 
native court areas, each presided over by a chief who received a warrant to rule. The 
warrant chiefs were seldom chosen from the traditional village leaders and more 
often than not they were appointed because they had rendered assistance during the 
occupation. Together with their aides, the native court clerks, the warrant chiefs 
dominated the native courts and also exercised executive authority. In both 
capacities many chiefs were either incompetent or corrupt. The explosions over the 
issue of taxation in 1929, which became known as the Aba riots, were in effect a 
violent rejection of an alien system. The main conclusion drawn by the British was 
that if indirect rule was to work in Eastern Nigeria, the government needed more 
knowledge about the political institutions of the inhabitants (49). Over the years 
1931- 1932, intensive anthropological investigations were undertaken in Eastern 
Nigeria. By 1935 some 200 reports had been produced, as a result of which new units 
of native authority were recognised. In only a few instances did the new units 
comprise a chief or a chief in council; for the most part they consisted of group or 
village councils which were more in harmony with the indigenous village-based 
polities. 
In the wake of the Aba riots a sceptical voice was raised in the CO over the future of 
indirect rule. Having digested the report of the main commission of inquiry, and the 
extensive minuting thereon generated by officials within the West Africa Depart-
ment, Dr Drummond 'shiels, parliamentary under-secretary of state during the 
second Labour government, commented: 'I am confirmed in many of my doubts 
about indirect rule, native courts etc, but I notice that the Nigerian administrators 
are not converted. This search for the "natural" leaders of the people has something 
of pathos in it.' 47 However, the views of Shiels did not reflect the official outlook. In a 
memorandum on 'Native policy in West Africa', written independently of the Aba 
riots but at the same time, JEW Flood, head of the West African Department, 
observed: 
... It is difficult to forecast the future. It looks as if the system of Government through 
the Chiefs would stay & develop. In that case there will probably grow up a Chiefs 
Council in both Nigeria and the Gold Coast. There is already an arrangement for 
conferences of Emirs in the Northern Provinces [of Nigeria], and it looks as if the next 
step would be to put some of them on the Council, either nominated or elected by 
themselves. Then probably the Council will grow by degrees and become more directly 
representative. In the Gold Coast there are already Chiefs elected by the Provincial 
Councils & that will probably grow. 
In both places one tendency will be for the Coast towns to lose their importance. This 
will mean the decay of the influence of the 'civilized' native who will be replaced-! 
hope-by the Chief. So in Sierra Leone, Freetown has far too much importance & the 
Protectorate too little. 
But all this will take Time, Money & Education.48 
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As Flood indicated, the Gold Coast was already progressing along these anticipated 
lines of development. The maintenance of traditional authority was the principal 
objective of a new constitution established in the Colony of the Gold Coast during the 
governorship of Sir Cordon Guggisberg (1919-1927). An enlarged Legislative 
Council retained its official majority but consisted of fourteen unofficial members, 
six of them chosen by provincial councils of chiefs. Guggisberg explained what lay 
behind his reforms when he addressed the council in March 1927: 'It was at the 
preservation of native institutions that I aimed when devising what is the outstand-
ing feature of the new Constitution-the Provincial Councils. These Provincial 
Councils are really the breakwaters defending our native constitutions, institutions, 
and customs against the disintegrating waves of Western civilisation.'49 
Similarly, in Tanganyika, the governor, Sir Donald Cameron (1925-1931) was 
equally concerned 'to develop the native on lines which will not westernise him and 
turn him into a bad imitation of a European'.50 Indirect rule in Tanganyika was also a 
mechanism of self-defence against the 'closer union' ambitions of European settlers, 
especially in Kenya, and their Conservative supporters in Britain who wanted to forge 
a new dominion in East Africa under settler control. For Cameron closer union 
involved sacrificing African interests to those of Europeans. Indirect rule was 
therefore a means of insulating Africans and creating limited areas of African 
self-government beyond settler influence. Native administrations were to be the 
training grounds for African political development. Equally, however, they were to be 
the counter"balance against the competing 'nationalist' influence of Europeanised 
Africans. The Indian experience entered Cameron's political calculations. He warned 
that if purely western forms of government were established: 
[T)he day will come when the people of the Territory will demand that the British form 
of administration shall pass into their hands-we have India at our doors as an object 
lesson. If we aim at indirect administration through the appropriate Native Authority-
Chief or Council-founded on the people's own traditions and preserving their own 
tribal organisation, their own laws and customs purged of anything that is 'repugnant to 
justice and morality' we shall be building an edifice with some foundation to it, capable 
of standing the shock which will inevitably come when the educated native seeks to gain 
possession of the machinery of Government and to run it on Western lines . .. . If we 
treat them properly, moreover, we shall have the members of the Native Administration 
on our side.51 
For Cameron indirect rule was not a negative policy. of divide and rule, nor was it an 
end in itself. His defence of native administrations was not an attempt to prejudge 
the question of the lines upon which African political education development might 
ultimately develop. As governor of Nigeria between 1931 and 1935 he found himself 
in conflict with some of the more conservative exponents of indirect rule with whom 
he was completely out of sympathy. 
In 1914 the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria had been amalgamated with the 
Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria to form the Colony and Protectorate of 
Nigeria. In succeeding years British officials in the north exploited the ideology of 
indirect rule to assert the distinctive character of the emirates and to resist what they 
called government from Lagos. Anxious to keep unification 'a dead letter', they 
seemed determined to undermine the 1914 amalgamation. They were said by the CO 
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to make a 'fetish' of indirect rule and to invest it with the status of a dogmatic faith 
under the tenets of which 'the chief end of all things is to keep the clock permanently 
stopped and Northern Nigeria cut off from the rest of the world' (46). Cameron 
believed that a policy of drift had allowed dangerous separatist tendencies to emerge 
in the north. British officials seemed to be encouraging the creation of autonomous 
territorial magnates, a notion which Cameron deemed totally contrary to the 
principles established by Lugard. Northern conceptions of indirect rule (an express-
ion Cameron studiously avoided in his own political treatise)52 had grave implica-
tions for the political future of Nigeria. They suggested that the northern emirates 
would eventually become independent units and that they would only enter a 'United 
Nigeria' by the channel of federation. For Cameron any attempt to anticipate 
Nigeria's political future was premature. It was, however, essential to avoid measures 
which would hamper Nigeria's development as a unitary state. Although convinced of 
the superiority of the British system of administration, he defied his critics to 
suggest that he was 'lukewarm' in his support of 'native administrations and native 
institutions'. But it was too early to judge, he argued, 'whether and how the system 
of western political institutions, such as the ballot box and the Legislative Council, 
will be developed in Nigeria, or whether the tendency will be towards the formation, 
step by step, of a Native Council for the whole of the Protectorate or the greater part 
of it' (50). Administrators in the north, on the other hand, maintained that 
Cameron's views would tilt the balance in favour of western political development. 
CO officials had a certain sympathy for the views of the northern administrators but 
found it expedient to back Cameron. They were equally aware that Cameron's 
quarrels with his northern officials had raised a fundamental question in relation to 
indirect rule. As one of them put it: '(I]s the emphasis to be laid on the ultimate 
potentialities of the Native Administrations or upon their present limitations?' 
The future of indirect rule was the subject of a wide-ranging academic debate in 
the 1930s, the essence of which was captured in 1938 when Lord Hailey's 
monumental African Survey was published. 53 Hailey argued that the system of 
indirect rule exhibited both unsolved problems and some noticeable points of 
weakness. The latter stemmed from the growing emphasis now placed on providing 
expanded social services. To rely for the provision of these on native administrations 
would be to make them dependent on 'inexperienced and inexpert bodies'. The 
weaker units especially would be 'strained beyond their powers by the tasks now laid 
upon them'. The unsolved problems related to the question of how the maintenance 
of indirect rule could be reconciled 'with the growth of a large educated native 
population'. It would not be possible to absorb educated Africans within the 
framework of native authorities and Hailey suggested that they should be employed 
in greater numbers within the administrative and technical services of the central 
governments.54 But the most difficult problem of all was that of integrating the 
system of indirect rule with parliamentary institutions. 'It is increasingly clear', 
Hailey argued, 'that Africans must before long be given a material addition to their 
very limited representation on Legislative Councils'.55 Beyond observing that the 
maintenance of indirect rule was 'not an end in itself' and that it would be 'rash at 
this stage' to pronounce judgement on the relative value of indigenous and 
parliamentary systems,56 the African Survey had no solution to offer on this 
all-important problem. But however circumspect in print, Hailey was rather more 
forthcoming in conversation at the CO when he suggested that 'every territory 
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connected with Great Britain would turn towards the parliamentary model'.57 For 
CO officials, the publication of the Survey was not a turning point in history but its 
careful study of the existing position could not go unnoticed. Nor could the 
recommendations of the Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission which were pub-
lished in 1939. On lines not dissimilar to those already operating in the Gold Coast, 
the commission's advocacy of regional or provincial councils suggested one possible 
means of 'meeting the difficulty of integrating the indirect rule system with the 
Parliamentary system' (54). 
With the outbreak of war, the question of African political development became a 
matter of intense concern to the secreta!)' of state, Malcolm MacDonald. Anticipating 
that the war would stimulate African political consciousness, MacDonald thought it 
was time 'that we got our minds clearer as to the objects of our native policy in 
Africa'. He asked the most fundamental of questions: 'What exactly were we driving 
at in our policy of "indirect rule"? ' (55). It was essential that native authorities and 
legislative councils should not be allowed to develop on divergent lines. The issues at 
stake were not confined to the future of indirect rule in a West African context. There 
was also the problem of adjusting relations between different racial communities in 
the East African colonies. In all such cases there was a pressing need to decide the 
objectives of policy: wrong steps taken for the wrong reasons would be difficult to 
retrace afterwards. 
MacDonald had already decided upon the need for a further inquiry in Central 
Africa to establish wfiether it would be possible to harmonise the African policies of 
Southern Rhodesia on the one hand with those of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
on the other. Unless such harmonisation could be achieved, the goal of eventual 
amalgamation would be unattainable. Linking Central African issues to his wider 
views on the question of African political development, the secretary of state 
persuaded Hailey to undertake another fact-finding mission in Africa. He also 
summoned a meeting at the Carlton Hotel in London. Attended by such luminaries 
as Lords Hailey and Lugard, Professors Coupland and Hancock, and Dr Huxley and 
Margery Perham, the meeting delivered a wide-ranging discussion on several aspects 
of current African economic and political problems (56) . Margery Perham, supported 
by Lugard, Hailey and Coupland, warned of the dangers of making premature 
concessions to the African intelligentsia. She considered that African political life 
was moving on two planes: the plane of the tribes, 'which corresponded to realities', 
and what she described as the plane of the 'big state system' based on legislative 
councils and the civil service, which had been 'imposed artificially from above'. The 
intelligentsia were set on capturing 'the state system'. To avert this it was necessary 
to connect the two planes by creating large regional councils of native administra-
tions. Perham's views that the objective should be 'to speed up the political education 
of the native authorities and to head off the intelligentsia from the state system', 
drew a sceptical response from the CO's educational and legal advisers. As a result of 
the Carlton Hotel meeting, MacDonald called for a 'seething of thought' in the Africa 
Division of the Colonial Office (57). A schedule of inquiries to be initiated was 
compiled. Several were said to be underway already. An exception was the 
appointment of Africans 'to the major offices of Government'; MacDonald requested a 
statement of ideas and a departmental committee was established. The committee 
suspended its investigation in June 1940.58 With the fall of France there were other 
more pressing economic priorities. A similar fate befell some of the other subjects 
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listed for investigation. The proposed inquiry into land policy for instance was never 
implemented. 
Planning for African political development during the war was never the exclusive 
preserve of the Colonial Office. Governors had their own opinions, which sometimes 
ran ahead of, and sometimes behind, those of officials in London. Sir Bernard 
Bourdillon, governor of Nigeria after Cameron between 1935 and 1943, posed the 
same question as MacDonald and arrived at the conclusion that, in Nigeria's case, 
there was nothing necessarily incompatible in the parallel development of indige-
nous and representative institutions. Providing indigenous institutions were not 
seen as an end in themselves, that they did not become fossilised and that they 
retained, crucially, the support of the people, Bourdillon could see no reason why the 
instruments of indirect rule and those of an elected parliament 'should not be 
complementary parts of one harmonious system, nor why the eventual representa-
tive Government should not be representative of and function through acknowledged 
Native Authority'. 
Bourdillon declined to outline what sort of parliamentary system he envisaged. He 
was clear about the long-term objective. The Nigerian was to be given an increasing 
share of responsibility for his own affairs in a manner designed to enable him to 
attain, 'at however a distant date', responsible self-government. But he wanted to 
keep an open mind about the method. His experience in Ceylon had given him what 
he described as 'a wholesome and ineradicable horror of constitution-mongering'. 59 
He preferred natural growth to artificial experiments. With the aim of policy 
established he believed that immediate effort should be concentrated on dealing with 
those difficulties which might hamper its smooth evolution. 
Two main difficulties were identified: the lack of homogeneity in Nigeria's political 
culture and the danger of a 'clash between the conservative, less educated, portion of 
the population and the largely detribalised and semi-Europeanised intelligentsia'. To 
overcome the first Bourdillon advocated a policy of regional development with the 
establishment of regional councils in the northern, western and eastern provinces 
and a central council in Lagos. As a means of promoting harmony and dealing with 
the second he suggested a range of measures which included increased employment 
of Africans in senior posts, increased responsibility for native administrations at local 
level, and the appointment of an African unofficial member to the governor's 
Executive Council.60 
Having been involved in the inquiries initiated by MacDonald, Sir Alan Burns, 
governor of the Gold Coast between 1941 and 1946, was one step ahead of his 
Nigerian counterpart. Burns discussed various proposals for reform before he left 
London. They included the appointment of two Africans to the Gold Coast Executive 
Council, an increase in the number of elected Africans on the Legislative Council of 
the Colony, extension of the council's jurisdiction to Ashanti, and the appointment of 
African district commissioners.61 Despite objections from the governor of Sierra 
Leone, Burns had little difficulty persuading the CO to approve the appointment of 
the first African district commissioners in the Gold Coast (61). He had a much harder 
task persuading the CO to accept his recommendation to appoint unofficial African 
members to his Executive Council. Largely on advice from Hailey, his first despatch 
on the question was rejected. Arguing from Indian experience, Hailey suggested that 
it would be a mistake to associate Africans with the central government too early; 
reform from the bottom up, not from the top down, was the recommended line of 
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development for Africa. Burns refused to accept defeat and reminded the CO that he 
was receiving daily evidence 'of the increasing feeling of the Africans against 
Europeans, and against the Government which Europeans represent'. Opinions were 
sought from the other West African governors. Bourdillon supported Burns and 
made a similar recommendation of his own. The CO eventually gave way and the first 
African appointments to the Executive Councils of the Gold Coast and Nigeria were 
made in September 1942.62 
.The CO emerged from their exchanges with Burns convinced of the need for 
co-ordinated political planning in West Africa to match that already achieved in the 
military and supply spheres through the appointment of Lord Swinton as resident 
minister in July 1942 (64). A memorandum in February 1943 by 0 G R Williams, 
head of the West Africa Department, echoed Burns by emphasising the dangers 
inherent in the frustrated ambitions of 'the small body of politically-minded' West 
Africans. Williams suggested that political development in West Africa should be 
co-ordinated with measures for social and economic improvement. Political advance 
should not be allowed to proceed without the social base, especially in the field of 
education, needed to sustain it. Increased opportunities for Africans, in administra-
tion and the public services, should be made dependent on increased educational 
facilities. 63 CO thinking in this respect merged with the recommendations made by 
Lord Hailey in his reports on Native Administration and Political Development in 
British Tropical Africa, 1940-1942. Upon the basis of Hailey's reports Williams 
sketched the outline of a tentative plan in five stages for West African constitutional 
development (70). Stages one to three involved an extension of the powers of 
municipal councils and an increase in the numbers of elected members, the 
introduction of 'younger and better-educated' members into native authorities and 
the development in the rural hinterlands of regional or provincial councils. Several 
years, even generations, were expected to elapse before stages one to three had been 
completed. Only then would it be possible to move on stage four-unofficial 
majorities in legislative councils, and to stage five-distantly described as 'towards 
self-government'. When Williams's memorandum was discussed by the secretary of 
state and officials in July 1943 Hailey injected a surprising note of boldness. He called 
for a statement that responsible government was the ultimate aim of policy and 
suggested means of associating Africans with executive councils in a semi-ministerial 
capacity. Both were deemed impractical (71). 
In one part of West Africa the Hailey-Williams proposals were overtaken by events. 
In terms of educational achievement, political maturity and economic development, 
the Gold Coast had long been regarded as the most advanced of the West African 
territories. Under a new constitution established in 1946 it became the first tropical 
African with an unofficial majority in its central legislature. Of the eighteen elected 
members in the new Legislative Council, only five were directly elected by the 
municipal populations of the leading towns. The remaining thirteen were indirectly 
elected by the provincial councils of the Gold Coast Colony and the Ashanti 
confederacy. These electoral colleges represented the authority of the chiefs. Burns, 
who presided over the reforms between 1944 and 1946, described the Gold Coast 
chiefs as 'a stabilising element quite different from the type of ballot box politicians 
representing the municipalities'.64 In West Africa's model colony, Guggisberg's 
'breakwaters' were still standing firm against the waves. 
The guiding principle of inter-war colonial policy in the setting of the different 
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racial communities of East Africa was theoretically one of trusteeship. As Sir Arthur 
Dawe demonstrated in his memorandum of July 1942, the policy had been 
conspicuous by its impotence (65). Dawe traced the background to the East African 
political problem as it had developed since the early 1920s. The white settler 
community of Kenya had repeatedly frustrated the efforts of the government in 
London to reach a political accommodation designed, on the one hand, to reconcile 
the conflicting interests of the settlers and the Indian mercantile community and, on 
the other, to maintain Kenya primarily as an African state. The doctrine of the 
paramountcy of 'native interests' enunciated in 1923 by the secretary of state, the 
Duke of Devonshire, had become in Kenya an 'unreal figment'. All attempts to find a 
solution based on closer union or federation in East Africa had failed. Successive 
commissions of inquiry and white papers had each taken their place in the 'Valhalla 
reserved for extinct Kenya projects'. The settlers had become so entrenched that to 
ask why the secretary of state did not pass a law restoring to the Maasai the lands 
taken from them in the Kenya Highlands65 was the equivalent of asking why the king 
in Britain did not issue an order-in-council abolishing the trades unions. 
Settler intransigence was matched by their increasing impatience with, and 
intolerance of, their political subordination to the Colonial Office. Dawe warned of 
the dangers that during the war the settlers might either take the law into their own 
hands or become susceptible to the expansionist ambitions of South Africa. He 
therefore outlined his own version of a federal scheme which divided East Africa into 
five provinces. One of the five-the Kenya Highlands-would become a white settler 
state with a large measure of self-government. Harold Macmillan, parliamentary 
under-secretary of state at the CO, challenged Dawe's assumption that the highlands 
were 'a white man's country' and proceeded to offer his own radical solution to the 
Kenyan problem which was based on nationalisation of land and the introduction of a 
Soviet system of farming (66). 
The war lent added impetus to the debate over East Africa. With the loss of 
colonies in South-East Asia, East Africa assumed increasing importance as an 
alternative source of supply, especially for the Middle East. In Kenya the settlers were 
quick to exploit the situation. Settler pressure led to the creation of a Civil Defence 
and Supply Council in March 1942. Uganda joined the council in April and 
Tanganyika in June. The secretary of state, Lord Cranborne, and his officials 
expressed concern at these developments which seemed to portend 'a white 
self-governing Dominion backed by the whole force of white public opinion' (62). 
As Dawe's memorandum indicated, the war also fuelled speculation that South 
Africa was bent on an expansionist course. On the question of integrating the High 
Commission Territories into the Union, Britain stood firm (44) . But the expectation 
that development aid and pro-British European settlement might enable Britain to 
use the Territories as a means both to ameliorate the severity of South Africa's 
segregationist policies and to maintain within the Union a balance of political forces 
bound in sentiment and loyalty to the Crown, had not materialised in the manner 
intended. In March 1941 the CO briefed Lord Harlech, the high commissioner 
designate to South Africa, on the Union's expansionist ambitions. The root of the 
problem was said to lie in the possibility that South African nationalism might take, 
at some future time, a strongly anti-British course. With General Smuts in power 
there was no immediate danger but a 'disquieting situation' would arise if the 
extreme nationalists gained the upper hand. East and Central Africa would be 
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exposed to powerful anti-British pressure which it might be too late to control (58). 
Relations with South Africa had to be balanced with great care: 'On one side we 
must co-operate with General Smuts and foster the Union war effort. On the other, 
in doing so, we must endeavour to deflect from the north the expansionist danger'. 
Concern to hold the line at the Zambesi explained why officials in London were 
anxious to dissuade Smuts from supporting a motion passed by the Southern 
Rhodesian parliament in May 1943 to the effect that the governments in Salisbury 
and Pretoria should co-operate in arranging a pan-African conference for planning 
and co-ordinating the development of central-southern Africa. The CO viewed the 
proposal as the 'opening shot' in a South African campaign to establish predomi-
nance over territories to the north. British plans for social and economic develop-
ment in Africa were said to be in danger of being overtaken by events (68). 
In an effort to retain the initiative in East Africa, a variety of expedients were 
considered to facilitate closer union. Sir Henry Moore, governor of Kenya between 
1940 and 1944, favoured a unitary scheme but the CO rejected this on the grounds 
that the balance of political power would lie with the European minority. Having 
been one of the first to express concern at the prospect of a demand for a white 
dominion, Cranborne, now dominions secretary, reversed his position and expressed 
support for a 'white controlled self-governing administration' under a governor-
general (69). This was even more unacceptable than Moore's scheme. Oliver Stanley, 
Cranborne's successor, suggested another federal alternative, with an official 
majority in the central legislature but a non-official majority in the Kenya provincial 
legislature. Clement Attlee, the Labour leader, objected and warned that his party 
would never accept a non-official majority in Kenya (72). Opposition to a representa-
tive form of closer union was also expressed by the governors of Tanganyika and 
Uganda. Both feared Kenyan domination, urged that each of the East African 
territories should be free to develop politically on its own lines, and shared a 
traditional view of trusteeship based on paternalism. For the foreseeable future they 
preferred no change in the essentially bureaucratic nature of their respective 
governments.66 Not until the appointment of Sir Philip Mitchell as the governor of 
Kenya in December 1944 was the logjam breached and an attempt made to integrate 
East Africa by emphasising, through the mechanism of a High Commission, 
economic links and common services instead of closer political union (76). Even 
then fears of domination by the Europeans of Kenya were never far from the surface 
(78). 
For much the same economic and political reasons closer union or, more 
specifically, the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland, was also a 
significant issue in central-southern Africa. The Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commis-
sion declared in favour of amalgamation when it reported in 1939 but stopped short 
of recommending immediate measures whereby it could be implemented. With 
Southern Rhodesia on the one hand and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland on the 
other pursuing divergent 'native' policies on such matters as the employment of 
Africans in industry and the administrative services, amalgamation was not as yet a 
feasible proposition, however attractive the economic benefits appeared to be. The 
Europeans of Southern Rhodesia, led by Sir Godfrey Huggins, the prime minister, 
nurtured an ambition to create in central-southern Africa a new white-dominated 
dominion governed by a Cabinet and a single legislature and administered by an 
expanded Rhodesian civil service. For the CO and DO these aspirations were 
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politically impossible and administratively implausible. Political opinion in Britain 
demanded protection for African interests in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and 
the application of pressure to improve the position of Africans in Southern Rhodesia. 
Whitehall officials were also doubtful whether 70,000 Europeans in Southern 
Rhodesia, aided by about 15,000 Europeans in the two northern territories, could 
produce the manpower, either in parliament or in the civil service, capable of 
governing a greater Central African state consisting of over five million Africans. The 
official view was that any new state founded upon such inflammable foundations 
would soon find itself in difficulties which would lead to one of two consequences: a 
resumption of direct British authority or gravitation towards South Africa. 
As in the case of East Africa it was the second possibility that British officials were 
most anxious to avoid. The Europeans of Southern Rhodesia had voted against 
incorporation in South Africa in a referendum held in November 1922 prior to the 
grant of internal responsible government. Whitehall feared a change of heart if all 
avenues to the north were blocked. While stopping short of amalgamation or 
federation, means had therefore to be found of promoting some sense of closer 
union. Out of these concerns emerged the proposal to establish a Central African 
Council to discuss matters of common interest to the three territories and to 
promote co-operation in the administrative and technical services. An announce-
ment about the council was made in October 1944 and it met for the first time in 
April1945. For Huggins the council fell well short of expectations and it was received 
by his Cabinet as 'a very mixed blessing' (75). 
The Caribbean was another area in which economic problems were deemed 
capable of solution within a regional context. The historical precedents were not 
encouraging. Attempts had been made since the late nineteenth century to promote 
co-operation through various federal experiments. These had been thwarted by a 
sense of isolation and poor communications which in turn engendered local 
particularism. Many of the islands had constitutions of considerable antiquity of 
which they were proud and jealous. While they might welcome an extension of the 
opportunities to make progress towards self-government within their own territor-
ies, experience suggested that they were unlikely to welcome the replacement of 
irrtperial control by federal control, especially if this enabled Jamaica, the largest of 
the islands, to dominate. Hence the observations of Edward Wood (later Lord 
Halifax) when parliamentary under-secretary of state at the CO in 1922 to the effect 
that the establishment of West Indian political unity was likely to be 'a plant of slow 
and tender growth.'67 
A West Indian Conference was convened in London in May-June 192668 but closer 
practical co-operation between the individual islands remained an elusive concept. In 
1931 a commission was appointed to consider the feasibility of closer union between 
Trinidad on the one hand and the Leeward and Windward Islands on the other. For 
the eo the crisis generated by the collapse of sugar prices during the depression had 
created an economic situation which made it necessary to explore every means of 
promoting greater administrative efficiency. The commission reported in 1933 that 
Trinidad was opposed to closer union and therefore confined its recommendations to 
suggesting ways in which the Leeward and Windward _ islands might co-operate. 
Accepted by the CO, the commission's recommendations were rejected by the 
legislatures of the islands concerned on the grounds that the expenditure required 
would be prohibitive.69 
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Thereafter the issue of federation in the Caribbean remained in abeyance until 
February 1940 when the government published a statement of the recommendations 
of the West India Royal Commission.70 Here it was suggested that a practical test of 
the advantages of federation should be made by combining the Leeward and 
Windward Islands in one federation on the lines of that already existing in the former 
group.71 The commission also defined the object of policy within the individual 
colonies as the introduction of universal suffrage but its members were divided over 
whether this should be introduced immediately or by stages. Sir Cosmo Parkinson, 
permanent under-secretary of state at the CO, visited the Caribbean in 1942-1943 
and reported back that except in the case of Jamaica, where the details of a new 
constitution had already been agreed, there was no real need for constitutional 
advance. While accepting the commission's view that the people of the West Indies 
should be associated more closely with the work of government, Parkinson echoed 
CO experience elsewhere by suggesting that it would be a mistake to concentrate on 
the development of self-governing institutions at the centre. More emphasis, he 
suggested, should be placed on the development of local government and community 
social work. On the question of federation, Parkinson suggested that a despatch 
should be sent to the governors of the West Indian colonies inviting their opinions 
(67). 
Reluctant at first to press ahead with the recommended consultation procedure, 
the CO was forced to act because of the difficulties created by American pressures. 
Officials in the West Indian Department believed that time was not on Britain's side 
in the Caribbean. Internationally the Americans were setting the pace and unless the 
British West Indies could demonstrate greater unity they ran the risk of being 
overwhelmed by the economic predominance of their larger neighbours. Internally 
the work of the comptroller's organisation and various proposals to establish 
common services had encouraged a sense of financial and administrative unity but 
Britain could not afford to be 'backward on the political side' . In the eyes of the 
younger and more politically minded West Indians, American-led regional initiatives 
were suspect. Fears of American domination were matched by fears that Britain 
would use regionalism as an excuse to delay the grant of self-government in 
individual colonies. Believing that, with the exception of Jamaica, none of the 
colonies could survive as self-governing units, officials urged federation as the only 
means by which the British West Indies could enjoy an effective voice in Caribbean 
affairs (73). Accordingly, a despatch was sent to the governors in July 1944. Their 
replies suggested that federation would be opposed by the white planter groups and 
supported by the liberal and professional classes. Bahamas preferred to remain apart. 
Elsewhere the governors seemed agreed on two fundamental points: the need for 
Britain to provide a stronger lead and the importance of financial stability as a 
prerequisite to political independence (77) . 
Of all the planning exercises for post-war political reform conducted in Whitehall 
during the Second World War the most radical concerned the future of South-East 
Asia. Britain's empire in this part of the world was based on the colony of the Straits 
Settlements (Penang, Malacca and Singapore), nine protected Malay states (of which 
four were linked in a federation), and three Borneo protectorates (the sultanate of 
Brunei, a kingdom ruled by the white rajas of Sarawak, and North Borneo 
administered by a chartered company). It had long been accepted in the CO that the 
pre-war political arrangements within the Malayan peninsula were an impediment to 
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administrative rationalisation. It was equally accepted that they were socially 
divisive. British pledges to uphold the sovereignty of the Malay sultans and to 
preserve for the Malays a privileged position in society had become increasingly 
difficult to reconcile with economic realities. Foreign capital and a steady influx of 
Chinese and Indian immigrants had paved the way for the rapid exploitation of 
Malaya's resources of rubber and tin. Citizenship and the role of non-Malay elements 
in administration and political life were live issues (59). 
The collapse of 1942 provoked, as we have already seen, a fevered debate about 
causes and responsibility. American criticism especially struck a raw nerve. An 
empire unable to defend its own people or win their allegiance had lost, in American 
eyes, not only prestige but also that legitimacy claimed for its very existence. The 
apparent failure of the local populations to rally to the cause in the face of the 
Japanese onslaught was received by the British colonial authorities with a mixture of 
pained surprise and sour recrimination. Typical were the views of Sir Shenton 
Thomas, governor of the Straits Settlements and high commissioner for the Malay 
states: 'For the most part the Asiatic population up country has thrown up the 
sponge on the first sign of enemy activity. They just go away and do nothing. 172 
During the inquests which followed much of the responsibility for the indifference of 
the local populations was said to rest with the defects of British administration and 
the inadequacies of its personnel. Members of the Malayan Civil Service, past and 
present, were divided in their responses to these accusations. Some were prepared to 
admit that there had been shortcomings; others rejected and resented the charges 
made against them (60, 63). 
The loss of empire in South-East Asia had one redeeming feature. It enabled the 
planners in Whitehall to make a clean break with the past in their plans for the 
future. From 1943, and in conjunction with the War Office which was involved 
because upon reoccupation the region would first be administered by the military, 
the Eastern Department of the Colonial Office drafted the outlines of a new deal for 
South-East Asia. The disparate entities of the pre-war political structure were to be 
replaced by consolidated administration under direct British control. A peninsular 
union was to be formed in Malaya by amalgamating the nine Malay states with 
Penang and Malacca. Singapore was to be maintained as a separate colony and Crown 
Colony government was to be established in Sarawak and North Borneo. Over the 
whole a governor-general would be appointed to co-ordinate British colonial policies 
throughout the region. In the long-term this administrative rationalisation was seen 
as the means by which the plural societies of the Malaysian region would eventually 
be transformed into a self-governing nation as a dominion of South-East Asia. 
The Malayan Union was the most radical and controversial part of the proposed 
package. Although it involved a long-term commitment to Malayan self-
determination, the assumption of direct British rule effectively constituted a new 
imperialism. In fresh treaties to be concluded at the end of the war the rulers of the 
Malay states would be required to surrender their sovereignty to the Crown. Indian 
and Chinese immigrants who had made Malaya their permanent home were to be 
given equal rights with the Malays under a common citizenship scheme. The aim was 
to revise the treaties in such a way that while the social and religious position of the 
sultans would remain unimpaired, greater unity in administration could be achieved 
and the sultans prevented from denying rights of citizenship to non-Malay elements 
(74). No advance publicity for the Malayan Union was made available during the war; 
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as a radical departure from previous policy the details remained a closely guarded 
secret. Other departments in Whitehall were, however, consulted. The Foreign 
Office, War Office and India Office all emphasised that much would depend on 
presentation. The assumption of direct British rule and the sensitive issue of Malay 
sovereignty would require careful handling if the purpose of the new policy was not 
to be misunderstood or misrepresented. Cabinet approved the proposals in May 1944 
but the Malayan Union was destined to become a shortlived experiment. Predictably 
perhaps the question of Malay sovereignty emerged after the war as the major 
stumbling block. 73 
Economic policy 
In 1895 Joseph Chamberlain, secretary of state for the colonies, declared that the 
British were 'landlords of a great estate'. In Chamberlain's view-and that of the 
generation of imperial-minded politicians who, like Amery, came to the fore during 
the Great War-the successful development of this 'estate' would secure both British 
and colonial prosperity. Policy-makers believed that the expansion of colonial 
agriculture and mining was the best way of achieving the necessary colonial 
economic progress. In the decade before the Great War colonial trade grew faster 
than world trade, 74 but there were marked differences in economic growth across the 
empire. There were thriving tin and rubber industries in Malaya and the Straits 
Settlements; flourishing tea and rubber exports from Ceylon; and expanding cocoa 
and groundnut agricultural export industries in Britain's West African colonies. 
Generations of imperial management had failed to improve the fortunes of some 
West Indian islands, however, brought down by the growth of competition in their 
staple export industry, sugar, while the pace of development of Britain's 'new' East 
African territories was far from satisfactory. Scholarly assessments of the successes 
and failures of British policy in these years have varied markedly75 not least because, 
if the late nineteenth century and early years of the twentieth century saw the 
development of new ideas and greater emphasis on the importance of imperial 
assistance to the advancement of colonial economies, policy was nevertheless 
formulated and implemented within financial, institutional and conceptual con-
straints which in retrospect appear to have rendered it severely limited. Officials 
assumed, for instance, that the development of colonial transport and communica-
tions would be undertaken by private enterprise. Thus imperial assistance had been 
confined to measures such as the Colonial Loans Act, 1899, and the Colonial Stock 
Act, 1900, intended to help the colonies attract investment.76 But these provisions, 
which aimed at helping the colonies towards eventual self-sufficiency, had proved of 
only limited value to colonial governments unable to meet the costs of repayment. 
The limitations of past colonial development policy also reflected the lack of 
appropriate machinery and expertise within the CO; the Office's Economic Depart-
ment was not created until 1934. Moreover, as we have seen, the CO, far from 
attempting to impose metropolitan policy on colonial governments, sought to 
preserve local autonomy and individuality. Consequently patterns of revenue-raising, 
agricultural production and mining activity varied widely, shaped by local conditions 
as much as by metropolitan initiatives. 
This remained the case throughout the period covered by this volume and 
economic policy from 1925 owed much to Chamberlainite concepts of Britain's 
relations with its empire as well as to the imperial ideologies of the Great War and 
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after. Between 1919 and 1945, however, the British government began to intervene 
in colonial economies to a far greater extent than hitherto, anticipating later 
development initiatives.77 Thus the inter-war years, far from seeing the unravelling 
of empire, were characterised by moves towards closer imperial economic integra-
tion and the assumption of greater metropolitan financial and administrative 
responsibility for colonial economic development. The introduction of wartime 
controls contributed towards this pattern of greater imperial intervention. However, 
as the documents demonstrate, many of these departures were-especially beyond 
the eo-regarded as no more than palliatives for domestic problems, colonial 
discontent and international criticism. Moreover such initiatives were neither 
constantly pursued nor uniformly successful either in terms of their ability to 
support the British economy or to deliver colonial prosperity. 
The documents with which this chapter opens illustrate the context in which 
important reforms in Britain's development policy were introduced. New initiatives 
in these years culminated in the Colonial Development Act, 1929, establishing for 
the first time a fund to which colonial governments could apply for financial 
assistance for development; an idea which had been advanced by Amery repeatedly 
from the early 1920s. The Colonial Development Act was preceded by measures 
relating to Britain's East African territories, which had been less successful than the 
West African colonies in attracting private investment. Under existing arrangements, 
only Kenya, the one British East African territory which had 'colony' status, was able 
to benefit from the Colonial Stock Act; all other territories were dependent for 
development upon grants-in-aid or loans-in-aid advanced in cash out of current 
revenues. Kenya and Uganda received some assistance in the early 1920s,78 but in 
1925 the East African Commission, chaired by William Ormsby-Gore (later Lord 
Harlech), concluded that current arrangements represented a 'far from satisfactory 
method of financing large public works'. 79 The improvement of communications was 
crucial to the future development of the region. The Commission recommended the 
introduction of an East African Transport Loan Guarantee Bill of £10 million.8° For 
Amery, keen to secure further development funds, this was all grist to the mill. 
Proposals for an East African guaranteed loan were placed before the Cabinet in 
October 1925 (79) and the decision made to provide a guaranteed loan of £10 million 
for East Africa, and a £4.5 million loan for Palestine. This represented a considerable 
advance on previous development measures, but fell short of the systematic policies 
favoured by Amery. Treasury and CO differences over the degree of Treasury 
supervision of the development loan delayed its implementation until December 
1926. 
The CO's success in obtaining Cabinet agreement to the Palestine and East African 
Guaranteed Loan reflected in part growing interest amongst a wide political 
constituency in the potential of colonial development policy to relieve domestic 
unemployment. At the CO there was concern, however, that harnessing colonial 
development to schemes for the relief of unemployment was likely to result in a 
concentration on projects yielding short-term benefits for Britain rather than 
long-term assistance to the colonies. Amery, moreover, remained keen to establish a 
general development fund, which would relieve the CO of the need to go cap-in-hand 
to the Treasury to obtain support for each proposed development project. CO and 
Treasury differences surfaced in 1928 when the Office was approached by a new 
committee on unemployment and requested to provide details of colonial projects 
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likely to be 'rapid in action, and give the maximum amount of employment, if 
possible away from the distressed areas (e.g. coal, cotton)'.81 A memorandum was 
drawn up in the CO in response to the request, but it was never sent to the Treasury. 
Instead Amery argued for greater CO freedom from Treasury control of funds 
provided for colonial development and pressed for the creation of a development fund 
to meet interest charges on development loans. Treasury supervision and the 
government's failure to provide help with interest payments on colonial loans had, 
Amery suggested, constrained colonial development under the East African Loans 
Act. The Treasury denied this and deemed his proposal for a block grant 'so 
preposterous that it is hardly necessary to argue it seriously' (81). A proposal made by 
the Commission on the Closer Union of the Dependencies in Eastern and Central 
Africa that a development fund be created to make payments to colonial administra-
tions after scrutiny by a competent body82 was viewed more favourably by Treasury 
officials. The idea of a fund was adopted as Conservative policy, although it was the 
new Labour government which put a bill before parliament. The Colonial Develop-
ment Act, 1929, established a fund of some £1 million per annum to be administered 
by a Colonial Development Advisory Committee (CDAC). Assistance was to take the 
form of either capital grants or the provision of interest payments on loans raised by 
colonial governments. The Act specified that assistance was only to be given to 
projects promoting commerce with, or industry in, the United Kingdom. 
The severity of domestic unemployment and a vision of the complementary 
relationship between Britain and her empire informed other aspects of imperial 
policy in these years. In addition to seeking to stimulate employment in the UK 
through colonial development, the government sought to alleviate the problem of 
the unemployed by encouraging their emigration overseas. The Overseas Settlement 
Committee was established in 1919 and in 1922 state assistance was provided for 
Britons emigrating to the dominions under the Empire Settlement Act. Throughout 
the 1920s those in government continued to regard emigration as a solution to 
prevailing difficulties (80). In the House of Commons in July 1928, following the 
Cabinet's receipt of a report by the Industrial Transference Board established to 
consider the problem of Britain's unemployed, Prime Minister Baldwin spoke 
eloquently of the opportunities for Britons overseas. He advised MP's to 'look to 
generations to come' and suggested that 'nothing strikes anyone, I think, on a visit to 
Canada or any other Dominion more than the opportunity given to the children-
the room, the space'.83 Nevertheless reports from the dominions received before and 
after Baldwin's comments showed the picture he presented to be unduly optimistic. 
'Of "great open spaces", flowing with milk and honey, I saw no sign either in 
Australia or in New Zealand', wrote one DO official in early 1929.84 The Empire 
Settlement Act was renewed in 1937, but emigration overseas never fulfilled the 
hopes of those who endorsed it; between 1930 and 1938 there was net immigration to 
Britain. 85 Other opportunities for imperial co-operation also opened up in the 1920s 
with the development of air travel. This, like other advances in communications, was 
of obvious strategic significance, but the British government also sought to secure 
from it an economic dividend with the creation of a commercial company, Imperial 
Airways.86 Most significantly perhaps Britain also moved towards the adoption of 
preferential measures advocated by Joseph Chamberlain and the tariff reformers 
since the turn of the century. In 1919 preferences were granted on some imperial 
imports to Britain; and in 1920 some twenty-six colonial governments reciprocated, 
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responding to Britain's request that greater preference be accorded to British exports 
in their tariff arrangements. The adoption of preferential tariff agreements was 
accompanied by measures to promote imperial products in Britain. The Empire 
Marketing Board, established in 1926, was authorised to undertake market research 
and provide publicity for imperial exports.87 The allocation of a fund for the 
fulfilment of its tasks served as a precedent for the new Colonial Development Fund, 
but the Board proved to be of limited success and was wound up in 1932. A Colonial 
Empire Marketing Board was formed in 1937. As the economic problems of the 1920s 
continued into the early 1930s, Britain retreated further from its traditional free 
"'\rade policy, establishing tariffs against imports in 1931 as a temporary measure 
u'htil reciprocal trade agreements could be negotiated between Britain and the 
dominions at the Imperial Economic Conference, planned for the summer of 1932 at 
Ottawa. 
At the conference British ministers secured agreements for increased preference 
to the UK. Their efforts contributed to an increase in trade between Britain and the 
empire, with the proportion of British domestic exports going to empire destinations 
rising from 43.5 per cent in 1930 to 49.85 per cent in 1938 (106). However, the 
importance of the conference was conceived in political as much as in economic 
terms. Reporting to the Cabinet on his return to Britain from Ottawa, the chancellor, 
Neville Chamberlain, noted 'how thin the bonds of empire had worn', and added that 
'he did not think that the bonds could have survived but for this Conference, which 
had strengthened the sense of belonging to a great Commonwealth and of the 
advantages to be derived therefrom' (84). In particular, as lord president of the 
Council, Stanley Baldwin, noted, it was hoped that the 'imminent danger of the 
absorption of Canada into the economic orbit of the United States of America, with 
all the serious consequences entailed thereby, such as the closing of Canada to 
British trade and ultimately to British immigrants' had been averted.88 The price 
paid for these successes was-at least in the eyes of a Dominions Office representa-
tive at Ottawa, Sir G Whiskard-not inconsiderable, with British ministers succumb-
ing to dominions pressure. The Australian and Canadian premiers demanded some 
concessions, 'brutally and as if they were dictating terms to a beaten enemy, as 
indeed they were- and all were at once conceded' (83). Behind Whiskard's scathing 
reports of the pusillanimous stance of his minister and the other British delegates at 
Ottawa, lay the DO's fear that the agreements might result in price increases and so 
lead the public to reject imperial preference once and for all. Moreover, the extent to 
which British and dominion economic interests were complementary is question-
able, and whilst some British ministers deemed their efforts at Ottawa successful in 
papering over the cracks which were appearing in imperial solidarity, the agreements 
served to split the Cabinet at home. Led by Sir Herbert Samuel, the Liberal members 
of the government declared the agreements more likely to contribute to the 
'disruption rather than to the unity of the Empire' and announced their decision to 
resign should the Government ratify the agreements before the coming World 
Economic Conference. Samuel reminded the prime minister, Ramsay MacDonald, 
that: 'Thirty per cent. of our external trade is with the Empire, seventy per cent. is 
with the rest of the world. For the , revival of industry and the decrease of 
unemployment it is absolutely essential that at the forthcoming [World Economic] 
Conference we should be free to make agreements for the lowering or removal of all 
barriers against British goods, whether in the form of tariffs, quotas or exchange 
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restrictions'.89 Subsequent attempts by Cabinet colleagues to persuade the Liberals 
of the merits of the Ottawa agreements and to hold the national government 
together proved unsuccessful.90 
The Ottawa agreements had other far-reaching consequences. The adoption of 
imperial preferences was, as we shall see, identified by the United States as an 
obstacle to the development of world trade. The agreements, which were generally 
held to apply to the colonies as well, had the additional effect of exacerbating the 
problem of burgeoning industrial development in Britain's Far Eastern territories. 
The imposition of duties against Japanese imports entering colonial and British 
markets provided manufacturers from Hong Kong and Singapore with a significant 
advantage over their principal competitors. The industrialisation taking place raised 
the spectre of cheap Far Eastern manufactures competing with British exports in 
colonial, and even domestic, markets. Far Eastern industrialisation represented a 
tiny fraction of colonial economic activity which elsewhere remained overwhelming-
ly centred on the production of agricultural and mineral exports, but concern was 
expressed amongst officials that other colonies might eventually follow the Far 
Eastern pattern. This concern, together with the need to define policy towards Hong 
Kong and Singapore, led in 1934 to the first major examination of colonial industrial 
development. The inter-departmental committee established to consider appropriate 
responses to the development of secondary industries in the colonies concluded that 
some industrial development was inevitable, but did not see any need to 'accelerate 
such development'.91 The assimilation of colonial conditions of employment to those 
of the UK was suggested in preference to the imposition of duties against colonial 
exports as a way of reducing the competitiveness of Far Eastern products. 92 However, 
observing that any attempt to enforce measures which would impede 'promising 
lines of economic development' would represent a reversion 'to the mentality of 
"plantation" days', the committee did envisage circumstances in which protective 
tariffs might be introduced in the colonies;93 a recommendation which the Treasury 
found hard to accept (85). The report was presented to Cabinet in June 1934, but the 
chancellor was given additional time in which to consider it. 
With consideration of the committee's report postponed, and in the absence of 
clear policy guidelines, the CO was left to deal with questions about industrialisation 
as and when they arose. Enquiries were fielded both from companies trading in the 
colonies, and from colonial governments (88). In some cases colonial governments 
were found to have already fostered limited industrialisation through their tariff 
programmes, exciting the attention of British exporters. The persistence with which 
one company, the Anglo-Dutch manufacturing concern, Unilever, objected to the 
erection of tariff barriers in some colonies, provoked exasperated responses from 
officials and brought to mind the 'stranglehold' which Unilever's subsidiary, the 
United Africa Company, was gaining over West African trade.94 Unilever was not 
convinced that colonial officials were taking sufficient account of the interests of 
British manufacturing, but other moves were nevertheless being made to boost the 
fortunes of British exporters in colonial markets. In 1934 textile quotas on imports 
from Japan and other foreign countries were imposed in those colonies not 
precluded by international agreements from so doing. They proved a mixed success. 
In colonies such as Cyprus, Jamaica and Ceylon, where the Japanese had gained a 
preponderance of the market, the introduction of quotas had a dramatic effect on the 
performance of British exports, but in colonies where the Japanese presence had not 
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been so significant the results were less convincing.95 
The balance of economic advantage which existed between the United Kingdom 
and the colonial empire formed the subject of a memorandum produced in 1937 by 
Gerard Clauson, assistant secretary and first head of the Economic Department, for 
the second inter-departmental committee on the industrial development of the 
colonial empire (89). This committee was appointed following CO enquiries at the 
Treasury about the 1934 report. Chamberlain argued that in view of the committee's 
failure to distinguish between the different conditions prevailing in the colonial 
empire, and as some time had elapsed since the presentation of this report, further 
investigation should be undertaken.96 The second committee, which reported in 
1938, drew heavily on the work of the first, although, presumably in accordance with 
the objections raised by the chancellor, it took greater care to distinguish between 
those areas with some industrialisation and places where it had yet to gain a footing. 
In the case of the first, the committee concluded that it would be inadvisable to 
discourage industrial development, and rejected the possibility of imposing punitive 
duties against colonial manufactures; instead it recommended, as the 1934 report 
had done, the extension of greater control over colonial factory and workshop 
conditions. While the committee therefore stopped short of recommending the 
active discouragement of colonial industrial development, it nevertheless saw few 
grounds for encouraging the development of secondary industries unless the 
prospective gain to the dependency concerned could be clearly demonstrated (90). As 
their minutes on the report illustrate (91), Treasury officials were unhappy with 
aspects of the draft report. Subsequent attempts to revise the draft to prepare a 
satisfactory paper for circulation to colonial governments proved unsuccessful. 
In spite of the attention given to the place of industrialisation in colonial 
development, it was the question of the purpose and value of the development fund 
which, above all, occupied officials in the later 1930s. The Colonial Development Act 
had proved to be disappointing on several counts. As the numbers seeking work in 
Britain had soared in the early 1930s it became clear that the Act had not brought 
(and could not bring) the looked-for relief of domestic unemployment. Not all 
officials believed that the administrators of the fund needed to abide slavishly by the 
requirement that projects should promote UK trade and industry and indeed 
enquiries showed that the terms of the Act had been interpreted loosely (86, 87). 
Nevertheless, the Committee on National Expenditure complained in 1931 that 'the 
element of benefit to the trader and industry' of Britain was 'somewhat remote'. It 
recommended that the fund be limited to £750,000 per annum 'and that the schemes 
to be aided therefrom should be those that will give the greatest and speediest benefit 
to this country in the near future'. 97 In the event the grant was reduced to £700,000 
per annum.98 
Not only did CDAC established in 1929 lack powers of initiation, but the sums 
provided by the Colonial Development Act were insufficient to be of real assistance to 
British colonies, particularly in the difficult economic circumstances of the 1930s. As 
the secretary of state informed the Cabinet in 1934, there were also growing 
restrictions on the entry of colonial exports into some foreign markets.99 Moreover, 
whereas high prices for commodities on world markets had ushered in periods of 
relative prosperity in the colonies before and immediately after the First World War, 
declining commodity prices in the 1930s highlighted the weaknesses of economies 
dependent on the sale of a limited range of export crops. As agricultural opportuni-
lxvi INTRODUCTION 
ties contracted, the numbers seeking work in colonial towns grew. With colonial 
peoples confronting deteriorating terms of trade, shrinking incomes and escalating 
unemployment, the weaknesses of colonial economies were made abundantly 
apparent as a series of protests erupted across the empire. In 1930--1931 and 
1937-1938 West African cocoa farmers withheld supplies of cocoa in protest at a 
market-sharing agreement among leading European merchant and cocoa-
manufacturing firms; in 1935 serious unrest and strike action on the Northern 
Rhodesian copperbelt led to police action resulting in some fatalities. But nowhere 
did the scale of local disaffection receive such widespread publicity and provoke such 
a response as in the sugar-producing islands of the West Indies between 1935 and 
1938. 
The West Indies' ailing sugar industry had been subject to inquiry on several 
occasions. In the light of recommendations made by the West India Royal 
Commission, 1896--1897, and the West Indian Sugar Commission (the Olivier-
Semple Commission), 1929, attempts were made to diversify agricultural production 
and to aid sugar producers, first by the concession of an imperial preference and then 
by negotiation of an International Sugar Agreement (which came into effect in 
1937). But as the West India Royal Commission, appointed in 1938 to investigate the 
islands' social and economic conditions, demonstrated in its subsequent report, the 
situation in the West Indies remained difficult. The problems were aggravated by 
rapid population growth and by the fact that the volume of exports of any given 
commodity was rarely sufficiently large enough to enable the small islands to 
exercise an appreciable influence on the market. In these circumstances assistance 
from the Colonial Development Fund was of only limited impact. In the view of the 
commissioners: 'The demands made on the Fund from other parts of the Colonial 
Empire, and its limitations both in amount and scope, have prevented the use of it to 
relieve in any large measure the financial needs of West Indian governments'. 100 
Among other problems, the commissioners cited inadequate social services, 'unsatis-
factory' health conditions and the 'deplorable' housing of many local people.101 The 
islands would, the commissioners concluded, be reliant upon imperial assistance to 
ease their plight: 
... it is our view that the financing of development by the provision of capital on a 
much larger scale than has previously been employed may often be both desirable and 
judicious. While the financial position of most of the Governments clearly precludes 
them from participating in this work of development, that position should not be 
allowed to stand in the way of progress along sound lines. There is scope for both private 
enterprise and broadly conceived measures entailing Imperial assistance.102 
The crushing nature of the problems in the West Indies had led those in the CO most 
familiar with conditions in the area to regard the appointment of a Royal 
Commission as futile, for 'large-scale improvements in the West Indies could not be 
effected without very heavy further expenditure from United Kingdom funds, which 
present financial conditions would not be likely to permit' (142). It was left to 
officials outside the CO's West Indian Department to make the case for the 
appointment of a commission (92). Convinced of the value of a full inquiry, Malcolm 
MacDonald, the secretary of state, placed the issue before Cabinet in June 1938,103 
having previously obtained the prime minister's and chancellor's agreement. As 
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MacDonald explained to his colleagues, the decision to appoint a commission 
effectively committed the government to greater expenditure on the West Indies 
than hitherto: 'The Royal Commission was likely to report that the present position 
was rather discreditable, and its recommendations were almost certain to involve 
more expenditure'. 104 
As colonial problems forced their way into the arena of public debate other sources 
were already highlighting the failures of British development policy. In 1936, 
Professor W M Macmillan complained in a Warning from the West Indies that 
'intelligently liberal expenditure in earlier days would by now have set the necessary 
works of development in train', 105 and expressed the hope that he could 'rouse at 
once a livelier sense of our responsibility to the old West Indies and an aspiration to 
do better in the New Africa'.106 Two years later Lord Hailey's African Survey 
attempted an objective account of conditions in Britain's African colonies. Both 
Hailey's Survey and Macmillan's Warning documented social as well as economic 
conditions prevailing in the colonies. At the end of the Survey Hailey concluded that 
more specialist knowledge of Africa in the social as well as the physical sciences was 
required, and he proposed the establishment of a fund to finance this kind of 
research.107 
These concerns were echoed by some involved in colonial administration. From 
Nigeria, the governor, Sir Bernard Bourdillon reported that Britain had failed in its 
'duty to promote the economic welfare of the people' and that the lack of funds had 
'sadly retarded progress', with the British government still clinging to the doctrine of 
colonial self-sufficiency. Adding his voice to the others drawing attention to the 
necessity of greater imperial assistance for the improveme,nt of social services in the 
colonies, he argued 'that both educational and medical facilities are seriously 
inadequate to the needs of the people' (95). At the CO and amongst African governors 
there was widespread agreement with many of Bourdillon's criticisms. 
Discussions concerning the revision of the Colonial Development Act were already 
in progress by the time the Office received Bourdillon's despatch early in 1939. The 
appointment of the West India Royal Commission served as a starting point for the 
overhaul of colonial development policy generally. In MacDonald's view, 'there were 
a large number of Colonies, both in the West Indies and elsewhere, in regard to 
which, if any substantial progress was to be made, Treasury expenditure on a much 
larger scale than in the past would be necessary'. The West Indian disturbances had 
served a warning on British colonialism, and in the international context of the late 
1930s the 'eyes of the world' were watching Britain. Further expenditure was 
essential if Britain's 'reputation as a Colonial power was not to suffer irretrievable 
damage'. 108 In MacDonald the CO had a minister committed to colonial reform and, 
with the creation of the new Economic Department within the Office, the machinery 
for the formulation of empire-wide economic policies was also gradually being put in 
place. As head of the Economic Department, Clauson was one of the most persistent 
advocates of a greater metropolitan role in development planning. 109 
MacDonald had begun moves to revise the Colonial Development Act shortly after 
he assumed office in May 1938. A departmental committee was quickly appointed 
under Lord Dufferin, the parliamentary under-secretary of state, to frame proposals 
for new legislation. It met shortly after, and a summary of its recommendations was 
submitted to MacDonald by mid-September 1938.uo But in the event the preparation 
of the bill proved to be a protracted affair, delayed in the first instance by the 
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international crisis of autumn 1938. Although the proposals drawn up by Dufferin's 
committee for a new colonial development bill were discussed in December 1938 
(94), they were put on hold again through the summer of 1939 whilst MacDonald 
dealt with other matters, and the CO awaited the conclusions of the West India Royal 
Commission. 
The flurry of activity which had accompanied MacDonald's succession to office 
bore some fruit by the summer of 1939. CO discussions had been distinguished by 
concern with the promotion of colonial welfarem and, as already noted above in the 
discussion of metropolitan re-organisation, in March 1939 a Social Services 
Department was established. Indeed in December 1938 MacDonald had declared this 
question 'even more urgent' than revision of the Colonial Development Act. It was 
agreed that the new department should assume responsibility for areas of policy 
currently dealt with by the CO's General Division. The merits of establishing social 
service departments, or alternatively the appointment of social services officers in 
the colonies to co-ordinate development schemes in tandem with the new depart-
ment in the CO, were also considered.112 CO discussions of future social and 
economic policy converged over the question of money. Agreement was reached that 
development funds should be made available for expenditure on medical and 
educational schemes and for recurrent expenditure on economic development, as 
well for the establishment of a colonial research fund of the kind proposed by Hailey. 
However, effecting long-term improvements in social conditions in the colonies was 
also held to be dependent upon raising the general economic standard of their 
agricultural communities. Some concern was expressed that there 'was a much 
greater danger of waste of money on social service schemes than on schemes of 
economic development'. 113 
By late July 1939 it had been decided at a CO departmental meeting to recommend 
new colonial development legislation (96). The proposals envisaged abandoning the 
requirement that schemes promote commerce with or industry in the United 
Kingdom, an alteration in the membership and to the powers of CDAC and an 
expansion of the Colonial Development Fund. The meeting also discussed Bourdil-
lon's despatch and a memorandum drawn up by the CO labour adviser, Major G SU 
Orde Browne, proposing the appointment of a development commissioner to oversee 
the expenditure of any funds provided for the West Indies. 114 A number of differences 
between officials over appropriate methods and objectives of future policy remained. 
As the Office continued to debate the best means of ensuring adequate co-ordination 
of development activities in the colonies, there was still little consensus over the 
degree of autonomy to be accorded colonial governments. While Clauson called for 
greater British direction of colonial social and welfare policies, Dawe spurned the 
imposition of 'totalitarian efficiency from the centre at the expense of local liberties 
and individualism'.115 Within a few weeks, however, the onset of the Second World 
War forced the CO to undertake more direct regulation of colonial economic life. 
Although British colonial development policy was about to enter a new phase, it 
remains questionable whether the accretion of proposals during the second MacDo-
nald period at the CO or the demands of wartime mobilisation were more significant 
in the determination of subsequent policy. 
At first it seemed as if the outbreak of war would throw everything back into the 
melting pot. CDAC meetings were temporarily suspended and moves made to halt all 
expenditure on development projects, save those which contributed to the war effort. 
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MacDonald, however, was unwilling to allow the preparations of the preceding 
months to be an early casualty of the war. Colonial governments were informed that 
existing social services and development activities should be 'disturbed as little as 
possible', 116 and the CO held a discussion on colonial development in September. 
The following month MacDonald wrote to the chancellor, Sir John Simon, request-
ing an expansion of the development fund to £5 million per annum (£5 million less 
than he had originally planned) and £500,000 for the financing of colonial research. 
His appeal emphasised the political importance of development policy (100). 
Negotiations between the two departments faltered initially over the welfare element 
of the proposals (101). The West India Royal Commission reported in late 1939, but 
in view of the critical nature of its findings, it was decided to postpone publication of 
its report until after the war. A summary of its recommendations was published 
instead (145, 146). Nevertheless the commission's findings highlighted the potential 
for disorder springing from poor economic conditions, thereby affirming the 
importance of maintaining the CO's development and welfare initiative: 'Those 
disturbances can only be regarded as a symptom of which the principal causes are 
low earnings and irregular employment'Y7 Moreover, the war provided compelling 
reasons for demonstrating Britain's commitment to improving the welfare of 
colonial peoples. As MacDonald later put it when introducing the Colonial Develop-
ment and Welfare Bill to the House of Commons in May 1940, 'when the enemy is 
worsted and the war is finished, Britain will still exercise vast responsibilities for the 
government of colonial peoples' .118 Thus he invited the world to mark the passage of 
the Colonial and Welfare Bill as 'a sign of our faith in ultimate victory'.119 A 
Statement of Policy on Colonial Development and Welfare was published on the same 
day as the recommendations of the commission. The government also promised to 
act on the commission's proposal that a special organisation be established in the 
West Indies, under a comptroller and independent of the West Indian governments, 
to administer funds for expenditure in the islands. 120 The CO's agricultural adviser, 
Sir Frank Stockdale, was subsequently appointed first comptroller for the Caribbean. 
All colonial governments were urged to prepare long-term programmes of 
development, 121 but were warned that the £5 million per annum and £500,000 
provided were 'maximum figures': 'it is not expected that, in either case, this scale of 
expenditure will be attained at once; indeed it is improbable that conditions will 
permit of its being reached at any time during the war'. 122 Indeed MacDonald had 
already offered to limit total Treasury liabilities under the proposed legislation, 
together with 'normal' grants-in-aid, to £5 million for the duration of the war. 
The war made new demands of officials and administrations. A rush of activity and 
correspondence with colonial governments ensued as officials scrambled to put 
emergency controls into place. In August 1939 the CO had advised the governments 
of British dependencies of the measures to be introduced in the event of war to 
regulate colonial trade and foreign exchange expenditure. In September, powers 
assumed by the British government under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act were 
extended to the colonies, enabling colonial governments to enact a series of controls 
(98, 99). These were intended to prevent colonial exports falling into enemy hands 
and to increase the export of important foodstuffs and raw materials to Britain and 
the United Nations; to licence imports to take account of the organisation of shipping 
and British manufacturing on a wartime basis; and to prevent the development of 
black markets and rapid inflation. It was not, however, until the fall of France and 
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Italy's entry into the war in June-July 1940 that the full range of controls were drawn 
upon. At this stage increased difficulties in meeting the colonies' supply needs and 
the greater shortage of shipping required greater austerity in the colonies than 
hitherto. 
The crisis in the summer of 1940 placed the development initiative in jeopardy. In 
what became known in the CO as the 'blitzkrieg' telegram, colonial governments 
were advised in June 1940 that 'it would not be possible to make any substantial 
progress under the new policy', and informed that 'some curtailment of existing 
social and other services' would be necessary (103). Although a subsequent 
distinction was drawn between the colonial empire as a whole and the needs of the 
West Indies, the impending lease of bases to the United States rendering it 
particularly important that Britain be seen to fulfil its duties as a responsible colonial 
power (104), a further twelve months elapsed before the development policy was 
reactivated. In June 1941 Lord Moyne, the secretary of state, issued a circular 
despatch to colonial governments, reassuring them of Britain's continuing commit-
ment to development, but asking none the less for reductions in colonial consump-
tion in line with the sacrifices undertaken in Britain (105). 
Colonial imports were further pared following the fall of Singapore in February 
1942, and, with the loss of Far Eastern supplies of raw materials, the development of 
local sources of essential items was pursued more vigorously than before. 123 India's 
contribution of munitions and supplies to the war effort was particularly great, but 
African resources also assumed far larger importance than hitherto, with the 
increase in demand leading in some cases to the conscription of civilian labour .124 
Cranborne, Moyne's successor, informed African producers in March 1942: 'The 
demand for most African products has now a new urgency and new reality. The 
foodstuffs and minerals of the African Dependencies have become a vast armoury for 
the war effort. There is a new call to the producers in Africa to do their utmost to 
serve the needs of the United Nations.' 125 As suggested above in the discussion of 
political change and constitutional reform, one consequence of this enhanced 
demand for African agricultural products was the consolidation in East Africa of 
white settler communities. 
The restriction of colonial imports and, as a CO memorandum to the War Cabinet 
Africa Committee explained, 'the desire of the Colonies to play an ever larger role in 
the economic side of the war effort', necessitated reconsideration of policy regarding 
colonial industrial development (107). A number of schemes for the development of 
secondary industries were under consideration in the colonies, but delays in 
obtaining London's consent to these proposals prompted fears locally that the British 
government would attempt to stifle any potentially competitive industries. Discus-
sion by the War Cabinet Africa Committee in September 1942 proved somewhat 
inconclusive (108). However, at a meeting held to dispel East African suspicions of 
the UK's determination to obstruct colonial industrial development, the CO was able 
to report to the governor of Kenya that the establishment of secondary industries 
likely to contribute to the war effort was acceptable (109). 
For those British colonies dependent for their prosperity on the export of 
non-essential primary commodities, the war threatened to bite particularly hard. The 
shortage of shipping and loss of markets presaged ruin for producers of non-essential 
commodities and financial difficulties for their governments, which derived substan-
tial revenues from import and export duties. In many cases the loss of the Far 
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Eastern colonies brought about a reversal of the situation by greatly increasing 
demand for colonial exports, but until then the difficulties facing colonial producers 
were particularly acute. Emergency measures were taken from 1941 until the end of 
the war for the relief of the Jamaican banana and the Palestinian citrus fruits 
industries and similar measures were adopted over shorter periods in the cases of 
British Guianan and Fijian sugar, Cameroon bananas and East African sisal.126 
However, the most notable instance of government intervention to support a 
colonial export industry came in late 1939 when the decision was taken to purchase 
all British West African cocoa at a fixed price for sale to the Ministry of Food, using 
European and African companies as buying agents .127 In 1940 these arrangements 
were formalised: control was transferred from the Ministry of Food to the CO and the 
West African Cocoa Control Board was created. The WACCB was reconstituted as the 
West African Produce Control Board in 1942, assuming responsibility for other West 
African agricultural exports. 
The organisation of colonial economies on a wartime basis necessitated an 
expansion of administration both in the colonies and London, and led to the 
strengthening of regional structures, including the appointment of a resident 
Cabinet minister in West Africa. New instances of government-business liaison 
occurred as the British government drew on the reserves of expertise and personnel 
present in expatriate firms, appointing some British businessmen to key positions in 
organisations created to meet the extraordinary needs of war. In 1939 John Cadbury 
was appointed first cocoa controller. This close co-operation between British 
businessmen and officials was nowhere more apparent than in the introduction of 
the West African cocoa control (97). 128 It led to criticism from some quarters of an 
unhealthy identification of colonial policy with British private interests;129 as in 
other areas of UK commercial and financial activity in different parts of the empire, 
the extent to which this was indicative of long-term influence over the policies of the 
British government remains contentious. However, government proposals for the 
retention of the West African marketing boards, put forward in a 1944 white 
paper, 130 did not address expatriate interests in the way that the creation of the cocoa 
scheme had done. In the long-term the introduction of state marketing represented a 
revolution in the organisation of the West African export trade, with private 
enterprise deprived of the opportunity to sell export crops for profit on world 
markets. Nevertheless, the apparent elevation of expatriate interests over African 
which resulted from official reliance on expatriate business associations for the 
implementation of wartime controls and marketing arrangements in Nigeria and the 
Gold Coast contributed to post-war hostility towards British companies and was to 
prove a potent ingredient in the Gold Coast disturbances of early 1948.131 
One of the most significant consequences of the introduction of wartime controls 
was the tightening of the financial bonds between Britain and members of the 
sterling bloc. The operation of exchange control brought about a consolidation of the 
looser ties which had existed since 1931, when the colonies, the dominions (with the 
exception of Canada) and a number of other countries chose to peg their currencies 
to sterling following Britain's departure from the gold standard. A rapid accumula-
tion of colonial sterling balances held-in London occurred during the war as a result 
of payment by sterling credit for colonial exports and British military expenditure in 
the colonies. Access to the balances was restricted throughout the war, but the 
problem of the sterling liabilities exercised the CO, Treasury and Bank of England.132 
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In May 1943 Sydney Caine, CO financial adviser from 1942, sought the advice of Lord 
Keynes, adviser to the Treasury, over whether or not the colonies should be 
permitted to use a proportion of the currency reserves, which constituted one part of 
the balances, to finance local development (111). Although the CO, Treasury and 
Bank of England were by 1945 largely agreed upon the need for colonies to be given 
access to their accumulated sterling balances for development purposes, concern 
about the possibility of the balances being liquidated against imports from either the 
United Kingdom or from the dollar area prevented a firm decision being reached 
until the early 1950s.133 
Over and above the question of sterling balances loomed the still larger issue of 
wartime financial relations between Britain and the United States. The Lend Lease 
Act of March 1941 and the Mutual Trade Agreement concluded in February of the 
following year emphasised Britain's financial dependence on Washington. American 
assistance was given, not in the form of loans but of government credits. The 
Roosevelt administration sought recompense in kind and throughout the war 
continually pressed for the elimination of the British protected economic system of 
the sterling area and imperial preference. Both were identified in America as barriers 
to the growth of world trade and the development of a new multilateral economic 
order (106) . Placing the problem of Anglo-American financial relations within the 
wider context of Britain's anticipated post-war financial position, Keynes observed in 
1944 that 'we have fallen into a rut in our financial relations with the United States, 
and we must jolt themselves and ourselves out of it' (118). 
Simultaneously, the CO was attempting to jolt itself out of the rut into which its 
development policy had fallen. 'Colonial reconstruction' had by now become part of 
the everyday vocabulary of CO officials. The origins can be traced to 1940-1941, 
when a new office was established in the CO to consider post-war planning and a 
committee was appointed under Hailey to examine a series of issues likely to arise 
after the war. By 1942 some senior officials were considering the problems inherent 
in the formulation and practice of colonial economic policy generally. Clauson 
attempted to commit tQ paper 'certain unstated principles' which he observed had 
been inherent in the CO's policy since the establishment of the Economic 
Department in 1934. Finding the task 'extraordinarily difficult', he nevertheless 
contrived to prduce a forty-two page memorandum which was considered by various 
experts. 134 Caine pointed out the controversial nature of many of the issues raised by 
Clauson, especially those relating to colonial industrialisation, but concluded: 'While 
it may be impossible to-day to lay down the lines on which economic thinking will 
proceed after the war, it is possibly not too early to be trying to provide Colonial 
Governments with the brains to do that thinking with' .135 Clauson agreed, arguing: 
'The fact that, although we have been at this game for years, we still have such 
difficulty in getting our ideas clear even on first principles, indicates that economic 
principles are not of a kind which Colonial Governors . .. can lightly take in hand 
amongst a whole lot of other heterogeneous problems .'136 
CO preparation gathered momentum from the summer of 1943 with the shift in 
allied fortunes . In August of that year Caine turned his attention to future 
development policy. There was, he observed, 'a general uneasiness about the slow 
tempo of action under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act', and he expressed 
his own personal doubts as to whether 'things will be very much better after the war 
without radical changes in the present procedure'. The importance of development 
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planning had been acknowledged in the discussions which had led to the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act, 1940, and in subsequent communications to colonial 
governments. However, Caine argued that much more needed to be done to ensure 
the production of comprehensive development schemes. 'We have to face to-day', he 
stated, 'a new concept of the place the State must take in planning'. Arguing that it 
was 'wrong to expect this work to be done by that maid-of-all-work the "Colonial 
Government"', Caine urged the adoption of various measures to improve the 
machinery at metropolitan level for planning economic development. And, anticipat-
ing the post-war establishment of the Colonial Development Corporation, Caine also 
suggested the creation of a semi-commercial organisation capable of much greater 
initiative than existing bodies: 'the device of a company clothed in commercial form 
but in fact working as an agent of Government' (114) . These issues, which in Caine's 
view were of fundamental importance to the achievement of true colonial independ-
ence, were discussed as a matter of some urgency at a departmental meeting (115) 
and a revised version of the memorandum eventually formed the basis of a paper on 
the subject of economic planing circulated to colonial governments.137 A few months 
later, in October 1943, a new high profile advisory body, the Colonial Economic 
Advisory Committee, was established to consider issues relating to economic 
reconstruction and development. The secretary of state agreed that CEAC should 
produce a comprehensive survey of colonial economic issues, to which end a series of 
specialist sub-committees were appointed to examine particular areas. A memoran-
dum outlining the problems likely to arise in the colonies upon the cessation of 
hostilities was drawn up by the CO for CEAC ( 117). The war had had severe effects on 
the colonial empire with dependencies experiencing high inflation and economic 
dislocation. The CO memorandum foresaw further problems, not only in the Far 
Eastern and Western Pacific occupied territories, but elsewhere in the colonial 
empire where a sharp contraction in demand for colonial resources and labour was 
anticipated. 
With an enhanced appetite in the CO for development, an unprecedented range of 
issues were discussed by officials and experts appointed to specialist committees. The 
consideration given to colonial housing and urban planning in the later stages of the 
war provides one example of this qualitative change in the CO's approach to 
development and welfare (166) . Other questions to be addressed included that of 
attracting adequate capital investment to the colonial empire, which in turn was 
related to the difficult issue of the desirable balance between public and private 
enterprise in the colonies. This was an issue to which Caine referred in his 
memorandum, but which had been discussed earlier at greater length in a paper 
prepared by the economist and first secretary of CEAC, W A Lewis, for Hailey's 
committee. There were, in some regions, restrictions already in force which 
proscribed the activities of private enterprise. In West Africa, Malaya and in parts of 
East Africa land could not be alienated to Europeans or other immigrants for the 
establishment of plantations, and in Malaya and Tanganyika there were prohibitions 
on European mineral prospecting. Traditionally, however, mining industry and 
agriculture had been regarded as the 'proper sphere of private enterprise'. But as 
Lewis, observed: ' ... traditions are ephemeral things. In England this particular 
tradition has steadily lost its force as municipal enterprise has gained ground, and as 
one government after another (Conservative even more than Labour governments) 
has substituted the public corporation for private enterprise' (110). Many, Lewis 
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commented, now urged an enhanced role for the colonial state in agricultural and 
mining industries. He advocated adjustments to taxation and royalty arrangements 
to increase the return to the state from colonial mining industries. The Labour 
Party's colonial research organisation, the Fabian Colonial Bureau, was also 
considering the question of public and private enterprises as well as that of 
the alteration of taxation regimes to ensure a fair return to colonial administrations 
from local resources. When Labour published its pamphlet, The Colonies, in 1943, 
these two issues were identified within the CO as ones over which Labour's views 
diverged from those of the department. Official concern at the activities of some 
British companies operating overseas had grown in the 1930s, fuelled, for instance, 
by the West African cocoa hold-ups which had demonstrated the extent of African 
resistance to the policies of some British firms. Even so Caine acknowledged that 
'we are still tending to look a good deal more to private enterprise'. The question of 
taxation of colonial enterprises overseas was also considered more complex than 
Labour had allowed, and Caine thought it unlikely that 'the United Kingdom 
Exchequer would ever surrender the right to take its share of taxation of the 
products of such capital investment and application of the skill and knowledge 
of persons resident in this country'. Nevertheless after detailed official scrutiny of 
the paper's contents, Caine was moved to comment 'it is remarkable how extensive 
is the area of agreement' between Labour proposals and the direction of thinking 
within the CO (113). 
Caine's memorandum of August 1943 placed the issues of welfare provision and 
development planning firmly back on the CO agenda. Only a proportion of the funds 
made available for colonial development in 1940 had been spent by the middle years 
of the war. Despite this officials were increasingly convinced that the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act offered an inadequate basis for post-war development 
policy. The scale of proposed development projects suggested that more was 
required, and under the terms of the existing Act funds which remained unallocated 
at the end of one year could not be carried over to the next. Moreover, the extension 
of development funding beyond the initial ten-year period provided for by the 1940 
legislation was essential if colonial administrations were to be free to embark upon 
long-term development planning of the kind advocated by Caine and stressed also by 
Stockdale in a long communication received by the CO in January 1944 (116). 
Colonial Office and Treasury negotiations commenced in 1944, culminating in 
correspondence between the secretary of state, Oliver Stanley, and the chancellor, 
Sir John Anderson. Although the trusteeship debates which had taken place during 
the war highlighted the political imperative of demonstrating Britain's fitness as a 
colonial power, the Treasury baulked at agreeing to the vastly increased funds 
(amounting to £150 million) requested by the C0.138 Unable to meet CO expecta-
tions, the Treasury agreed that the War Cabinet should consider the matter (120). As 
a result it was decided that a total of £120 million (slightly more than the Treasury 
had been willing to find), of which £1 million per annum was to be provided to 
finance research, should be made available. In contrast to the terms of the 1940 Act it 
was agreed that any money not spent in any one year could be carried forward to the 
next. 
The problems of successful development ran deeper, however, than either the 
inadequacies of financial assistance or the failure on the part of colonial administra-
tions to prepare long-term plans. The West Indies had received more of the funds 
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made available in 1940 than any other region and an organisation for facilitating 
West Indian development had been established. Yet Stockdale's experience in the 
Caribbean had been mixed. Writing to the CO in 1944 about the difficulties he had 
encountered as comptroller, Stockdale called for clarification of the position of his 
organization vis-a-vis the West Indian colonial governments and for 'clear state-
ments of policy on political, economic and welfare issues' (116). The CO responded 
by holding several meetings with Stockdale in July and August 1944; it subsequently 
broached some of Stockdale's concerns in communications to the West Indian 
governments. 139 By the autumn of 1944 CEAC had decided that it 'might be a mere 
waste of time' to proceed with its examination of economic development without 
information about the direction of British colonial policy more generally. Questions 
on aspects of colonial political, economic and social development were duly 
forwarded by the committee to Stanley. 140 The CO's commitment to economic 
development and planning was also brought into question by Lewis when he resigned 
from the secretaryship of CEAC. Lewis claimed that of all the CEAC specialist 
sub-committees only one had progressed with its task of compiling material for the 
comprehensive economic survey of colonial economic problems which the secretary 
of state had invited the committee to produce. This failure was, he believed, due in 
no small part to the continued 'passive resistance' of CO permanent officials who 
were alleged to have opposed the project from the outset. Caine, author of the August 
1943 memorandum, came in for particular criticism. Lewis claimed that Caine had 
attacked the 'underlying theory that administrative action is necessary for, or can 
make a substantial difference to economic development' (121). 
The official response to CEAC's questions, information regarding its future and the 
CO's plans for a new colonial development and welfare act were unveiled by Stanley 
at a meeting with the committee in December 1944. Committee members were also 
informed that Stockdale, newly-appointed CO adviser on development planning, was 
to be the new chairman of CEAC. However, the minutes of the December committee 
meeting provide further illustration of the issues yet to be resolved (123). Treasury 
reluctance to finance colonial development and to relinquish control of funds to the 
CO had served-at least in the view of the CO-as a constraint on policy throughout 
much of the period, and at the meeting concern was expressed by some that the £120 
million negotiated for the next ten years was parsimonious in view of the huge task of 
colonial development which lay ahead. Whilst Stanley expressed the belief that other 
sources of funding would be forthcoming, the role to be allotted to private enterprise 
remained ill-defined. Moreover, while it was agreed that colonial development was 
fundamental to the realisation of true colonial independence, there remained widely 
differing views as to how this economic progress should be achieved. The discussion 
amongst CEAC members revealed, for instance, that there was little agreement over 
the degree of importance to be attached to industrialisation in the advancement of 
colonial economies. The official discussions which had occurred had done no more 
than secure agreement for the creation of import-substituting industrialisation for 
the duration of the war. 
The problems facing colonial administrations in their task of reconstruction were 
to be compounded by Britain's post-war financial difficulties (118) and the probabil-
ity that wartime controls would be retained for some time after the return to peace 
(119). Nevertheless it could justifiably be claimed that a transformation had occurred 
in colonial economic policy over the preceding twenty years, driven by fear of 
lxxvi INTRODUCTION 
colonial instability, domestic and international pressures and by the exigencies of 
wartime mobilisation. Had these pressures not been present to the same degree, it is 
tempting to conclude that this period would still have seen a transformation in 
approaches to colonial economic policy, as wider debates about the motor of 
economic progress and about the role of the state as an agent of economic change 
intruded upon colonial policy-making. The appointment of outside specialists to 
advisory bodies and the changing administrative context of policy-formulation was 
both a manifestation of these developments and a dynamic behind reform. 
Social policies and colonial research 
Reference has already been made in the first section of this introduction to the 
organisation of the CO and its ability to manage the diverse and complex problems 
which emerged throughout the colonial empire during the inter-war years. The 
attempt to evolve a coherent policy on social issues provides perhaps the most 
graphic illustration of the problems discussed in Jeffries's 1942 memorandum (4). 
The problems were not confined to the difficulties posed by the geographical 
orientation of the CO, nor later to those posed by the intrusion of the advisory 
committees, subject advisers and subject departments into territory traditionally 
seen as the domain of the geographical departments. Over and above questions of the 
most appropriate administrative structures to be established within the CO there 
loomed not only the sheer scale of the social issues and problems to be addressed but 
also, as an ever-present constraint on the officials who endeavoured to suggest 
means by which they might be overcome, the absence of adequate financial 
resources. 
As parliamentary under-secretary of state, Ormsby-Gore reflected on the adminis-
trative issues involved in a minute written in December 1926: 
The Colonial Office seems to me to be equipped to deal with countries where education 
is left entirely to the missionaries, where there are no railway or transport problems, 
where agriculture and scientific activities were either non-existent or only in embryo, 
and where each Dependency or at the best group of Dependencies could be considered 
in isolation as a complete and final entity. 
Nowadays we are faced with an entirely new set of problems in the Colonial Empire, 
and I take education as a typical example. Every year we are increasing the number of 
Government-provided and Government-maintained schools, catering for many races in 
many different stages of development. In most cases Government Education Depart-
ments have been endeavouring to work out their own salvation or damnation on good 
old-fashioned nineteenth century English lines. Are the West Indian and the Far 
Eastern Departments as at present constituted equipped to deal with the improvement 
of the standard of education in Jamaica and Malaya respectively? I doubt it. 141 
In the early years of the period covered by the documents in this volume an 
additional difficulty in relation to education was the apparent indifference of some 
senior officials. In 1931, over the issue of appointing an educational commission to 
visit the West Indies, Lord Passfield, the secretary of state, complained that after 
nearly two years in office he could hardly remember receiving a single paper on 
education. Wilson, the permanent secretary, admitted responsibility by confessing 
that he was 'not as cognizant, as I ought to be, of what was going on in the 
"educational world" ' (128) . This admission of ignorance was also perhaps an 
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indication that education was not as yet a priority issue at the highest official level. 
The timing of Ormsby-Gore's observations about the ability of the CO to deal with 
educational issues was particularly significant. A year earlier the Advisory Committee 
on Native Education in Tropical Africa of which he was chairman submitted a 
memorandum which, when published as a white paper, constituted the first 
definitive statement of British educational policy in Africa. The establishment of the 
committee in 1923 was largely the result of missionary pressure and the climate of 
opinion generated by the post-war debate about the concept of trusteeship. It 
members included Lugard, with experience of educational development in Hong 
Kong and Nigeria; Sir James Currie, formerly director of education in the Sudan and 
the first head of Cordon College, Khartoum; J H Oldham, secretary to the 
International Missionary Council representing protestant missionary societies; and 
Hanns Vischer, formerly director of education in Northern Nigeria who became the 
committee's first secretary. The committee's 1925 white paper was heavily in-
fluenced by the earlier Phelps-Stokes reports on education in Africa which empha-
sised that education should be adapted to local needs and conditions. The key passage 
in the memorandum declared: 
Education should be adapted to the mentality, aptitudes, occupations and traditions of 
the various peoples, conserving as far as possible all sound and healthy elements in the 
fabric of their social life; adapting them where necessary to changed circumstances and 
progressive ideas, as an agent of natural growth and education.142 
Implicit in this statement was a rejection of an educational regime in British Africa 
organised on western lines and intended to propagate western skills and values. An 
English literary education was suitable only for the minority who would progress to 
occupy positions in government and private enterprise in an administrative capacity. 
Technical education would also be required to furnish the needs of fledgling industry 
and government public works departments but for the vast majority of Africans it 
would suffice to provide craft and agricultural training in elementary or vernacular 
schools adapted to village life. To the extent therefore that it was to be used primarily 
to preserve African society, in the process stimulating notions of citizenship and 
public service and encouraging qualities of loyalty and character training, education 
was the ideological embodiment of the theory of indirect rule. 
The British adaptive approach to education in Africa contrasted with the 
assimilative practices of the French, especially in West Africa. After a visit to West 
Africa in 1926, Vischer reported that the French governor-general was determined 
'to make French the language of common intercourse amongst natives in all his 
colonies'. Vischer anticipated political dangers for the French but he was also 
convinced that French policy was likely to cause 'envy and possibly dissatisfaction 
amongst certain classes of Africans in our own dependencies on the West Coast'. 
From his position as head of the Nigerian Department, Flood commented that the 
French aim of 'creating a new race of black Frenchmen' would 'hasten the decline & 
fall of western civilization' (125). Eight years later, when the advisory committee 
(now with a remit for the whole of the colonial empire) was about to publish another 
memorandum on the education of African communities, Flood took exception to a 
statement in the report that progress in Africa depended upon 'a steady increase of 
highly trained African leaders in all walks of life'. By insisting on leadership and 
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training, Flood argued that 'we are liable to make the old mistake of trying to run 
before we are even able to walk'. He preferred to see education as a 'slow growing 
plant' which would not produce the highly trained leader for another three or four 
generations. Assistant under-secretary of state Sir Cecil Bottomley shared Flood's 
reservations. Rather than buttress indirect rule, Bottomley feared that too rapid 
progress in the field of education would tend to undermine it. The elders and chiefs 
would be pushed into the background as 'ignorant fossils'. 'No doubt many of them 
are', observed Bottomley, 'but as a class they represent the most stable element in 
our framework' (133). 
Clearly, therefore, at the beginning of the 1930s, a number of permanent officials 
in the CO were out of sympathy with the views of the educational advisers. However, 
as the decade progressed, a new outlook began to emerge in Whitehall. The issue of 
higher education in Africa provides an illustration of changing attitudes and 
priorities within the CO .143 
The 1925 white paper had made only a cautious reference to higher education, . 
asserting that 'the first task of education is to raise the standard alike of character 
and efficiency of the bulk of the people', and concluding that the needs of higher 
education could not be met until resources became available. Thereafter East Africa 
provided the starting point for the debate over higher education. At a conference held 
in Zanzibar in June 1932 the directors of education of the East African dependencies 
approved a proposal that Makerere College in Uganda, which had been established in 
1921 as a technical centre for training artisans, should begin a course leading to 
matriculation by means of the University of London's school examination. In the 
light of this recommendation the advisory committee on education in London set up 
a sub-committee under the chairmanship of Sir James Currie to examine the whole 
question of higher education in British tropical Africa. The subsequent Currie Report 
of 1933 was a pioneering document which sketched in outline the principles which 
were to govern higher education policy in Africa over the next ten years. It can thus 
be seen as the antecedent of a series of later reports on the same subject, each of 
which achieved greater publicity and recognition than the original report by Currie. 
Emphasising that there was a grave danger of the Africans' zeal for higher education 
being overlooked, the report called for an immediate and publicly announced 
programme of 'developing selected institutions in Africa up to a real university 
standard'. It condemned as damaging to British prestige and detrimental to 
administrative efficiency that an increasing number of Africans should be seeking 
higher education in foreign countries. British universities, the report argued, both in 
the conferral of degrees and the provision of adequate teaching staffs, had a crucial 
role to play in the development of higher education in Africa (132). In submitting the 
report to the advisory committee on education, Currie maintained that members of 
his sub-committee were unanimous in their view that unless preliminary steps were 
taken to establish one or two of the proposed African institutions there was a danger 
of 'serious political trouble in Africa'. Sir Robert Hamilton, formerly parliamentary 
under-secretary of state at the CO and a member of the advisory committee, agreed 
and described the report as 'the most important matter that had ever been before the 
Committee as far as African education was concerned' .144 
Although never published, the Currie Report was circulated to the African 
governors for comment. Several were dilatory in replying and negative when they did 
respond. Many did not agree that the demand for higher education was vehement. 
INTRODUCTION lxxix 
They urged the provision of secondary education as a greater priority and emphasised 
the financial constraints (134). A concern common to all was to avoid the experience 
of India. As late as 1939 the government of the Gold Coast reported: ' ... the 
institution of an ambitious series of degree courses would merely lead to the creation 
of a class of "university graduates" who would clamour for lucrative posts in the 
Government service and would become disenchanted and disaffected if this material 
reward for their labours were not, in each and every case, automatically 
forthcoming.' 145 The West African governors, assembled in conference at Lagos in 
August 1939, endorsed this conclusion. The establishment of a West African 
university, they decided, was an ideal at which they should aim but one that could 
not be rushed (144). 
A different atmosphere existed in Uganda. The governor, Sir Philip Mitchell, was a 
keen advocate of higher education and in 1935 he welcomed a review of the functions 
of Makerere College which was then in its fourteenth year. At the end of 1936 
Ormsby-Gore, the secretary of state, appointed a commission on higher education in 
East Africa chaired by Lord De La Warr, the parliamentary under-secretary. In the 
introduction to its report, which was published in September 1937, the De La Warr 
Commission made some challenging observations about the nature of the education-
al debate in Africa (139).146 Although elementary and secondary education in East 
Africa were far less advanced than they were in West Africa, the commission proposed 
to build on what it described as 'the present very flimsy foundations' by recommend-
ing the establishment at Makerere of a university college 'in the near future' and of a 
University 'at no very distant date'. The CO endorsed the commission's recommenda-
tions and approached the Treasury with some carefully rehearsed arguments as to 
why Britain should contribute financially towards an endowment fund for the 
college. The CO's letter emphasised that under the principle of trusteeship the 
government was under a 'definite obligation' to contribute towards the education of 
Africans. The provision of financial assistance was also said to be invaluable from 'a 
propaganda point of view' in that it would provide 'a striking answer to the charge of 
neglect, a charge made not only by Native races themselves but by Foreign observers' 
(140). Initially the Treasury was unmoved. The 'definite' obligation to which the CO 
referred seemed to Treasury officials to be 'alarmingly indefinite, and one that might 
lead to almost unlimited commitments'. Within the CO the head of the East Africa 
Department responded with some barbed comments about Treasury parsimony 
before the matter was resolved to the CO's satisfaction (141). 
The report of the De La Warr Commission was the last major educational initiative 
before the CO coupled its development strategy with one on welfare in a manner 
which has been described above in the discussion of economic policy. Under the 
impetus of the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act the debates over 
education, both at the higher and lower levels, moved forward in tandem. The 
initiative in relation to higher education, not only in Africa but throughout the 
colonial empire, came from an unofficial quarter in the shape of H J Channon, 
professor of biochemistry at Liverpool University and now one of the driving forces 
on the educational advisory committee. With only limited experience of colonial 
education gleaned from visits to Malaya, Hong Kong and Ceylon, Channon submitted 
a memorandum on the development of higher education in January 1941 which 
analysed current deficiencies and then recommended a plan of action to deal with 
them. The main weakness, according to Channon, was that hitherto the function of a 
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university in the colonies had been too narrowly conceived as a mass vocational 
training centre. This misconception about the proper role of a university explained 
why government and commercial circles were hesitant in their support for the 
creation of universities. There was, according to Channon, 'a genuine fear of the 
political and economic consequences of the production of a highly educated class 
among the native populations, and in this connection the example of India is usually 
and understandably quoted'. Channon therefore called for a new conception of 
higher education in the colonies, based on the recognition that purpose of a 
university should not be the production of large numbers of men and women with 
little more than highly specialised technical training; it should instead be 'the 
production of smaller numbers who, while they must be adequately prepared for 
their future professional livelihoods, must go further and be prepared for wider 
service'. To achieve these objectives, Channon's memorandum recommended the 
setting up of an imperial university system in which British universities would be · 
called upon to play a crucial role (148). 
Channon's memorandum was approved by the advisory committee on education 
which in turn appointed a sub-committee on higher education to prepare a more 
detailed report. In May 1943 the sub-committee recommended that the issues be 
investigated by a commission of inquiry.147 Oliver Stanley, the secretary of state and 
a keen supporter of higher education, acted immediately by broaching the idea of a 
commission in a circular letter to the vice chancellors of the British universities 
(159). The latter responded enthusiastically, thus paving the way for the appoint-
ment not of one but of two commissions of inquiry which produced three reports in 
1945. In addition to a separate commission chaired by Waiter Elliott on higher 
education in West Africa, the main commission on higher education in the colonies 
chaired by Lord Justice Asquith set up a committee under Sir James Irvine to report 
on the West Indies. 148 The Elliott Commission captured the spirit in which the 
inquiries were conducted when it reported: 
Somewhere in Africa within a century, within half a century-and what is that in the 
life of a people?-a new African state wiJI be born. It wiJI be strong. Its voice wiJI be 
listened for, wherever there are Africans or African descended communities, and that is 
to say both in the Old World and in the new. It wiJI have a vital need for counsellors, its 
own counsellors. Now is the time, and the time is already late, to train them for their 
work.149 
Unanimous in their view of the objective, members of the Elliott Commission were 
divided over the question of how best to achieve it. The majority favoured the 
establishment of three university colleges-at Ibadan in Nigeria, Fourah Bay in 
Sierra Leone and Achimota in the Gold Coast-but an influential minority believed 
that West Africa could not sustain more than a single university of high quality and 
therefore recommended a unitary British West African University at Ibadan. The CO 
supported the minority view but had to back down in the face of protests from the 
Gold Coast and Sierra Leone.150 No such controversy surrounded the findings of the 
Asquith Commission. It recommended the creation in London of an Inter-University 
Council for higher education and a separate University Advisory Grants Committee 
to administer the funds allocated to higher education under the 1945 Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act which were to be used to finance projects approved by 
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the council. 151 Both recommendations were accepted and the council met for the 
first time in March 1946, charged specifically with the two tasks of co-operating with 
existing colonial universities and fostering the development of colonial colleges in 
their advance to university status. 
The development of education generally throughout the empire, at both elementary 
and secondary levels, presented itself to CO officials as a more daunting prospect. In 
1943 the higher education sub-committee of the advisory committee on education 
illustrated the scale of the problem by comparing the school populations in Malaya 
and Africa. In Malaya, regarded as the most developed of all colonial territories, 
about 250,000 or five per cent of a total population of approximately five million 
received education either in government vernacular schools (Chinese, Indian or 
Malay) or in English schools. About 40,000 attended the English schools and 10,000 
reached the secondary stage. Of these some 2,500 or 0.05 per cent of the total 
population ended their schooling by taking the Cambridge school certificate 
examination and it was from this pool that entrants were drawn for the King Edward 
VII Medical College and Raffles College, both located in Singapore. The position in 
the African territories was more complex owing to the variety of languages, the 
greater number of dependencies spread over a much larger area and the unreliability 
of the available statistics. However, the advisory committee estimated that through-
out British tropical Africa as a whole, about one million or 2.5 per cent of a total 
population of forty million were receiving some form of education. Of these about 
10,000 attended secondary schools where the medium of instruction was in English 
and the aim was to reach the Cambridge school certificate or its equivalent 
examination. The number achieving this standard was small, about 1,100 in 1938 
although the numbers were said to be increasing. The 10,000 who attended 
secondary schools were unevenly distributed. In contrast to the 6,100 in Nigeria and 
the 1,340 in Uganda there were none in Nyasaland or Northern Rhodesia. Upon the 
basis of these figures, the committee drew a further comparison with Britain where 
the number of children aged between five and sixteen in attendance at schools was 
twenty per cent of the population. The committee concluded: 'Accepting this 
percentage as representing the number of children who should be receiving 
education in the Colonies, the figures of 5 and 2.5 per cent in Malaya and Africa, 
respectively, present a striking contrast. 1152 
Faced by a problem on this scale and aware that it would be 'an impossible task, 
owing to the length of time required and financial commitments involved, to 
organise a system of education for all based on the present layout', CO officials 
examined a proposal that primary education should be provided for all children 
between the ages of seven and eleven or twelve. Only those who showed the necessary 
aptitude would continue in education beyond that point. It was argued that by 
establishing this 'central core' in education it might be possible to achieve general 
literacy in a much shorter time and at a more reasonable cost. However, a suggestion 
that the advisory committee on education should appoint a sub-committee to 
examine and report on the central core proposal was rejected. A general statement 
which would be applicable to all territories might result 'in nothing more than a 
collection of cliches and platitudes' (163). 
The Caribbean provides a vivid illustration of the difficulties posed by financial 
constraints. In that part of its report dealing with eclucation, the West India Royal 
Commission recommended the elimination of the pupil-teacher system in British 
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Caribbean schools and the provision of adequate training for all teachers. In August 
1943 Stockdale, the comptroller, advised the CO that if the recommendations were 
implemented in full, the salary costs of qualified teachers would rise to somewhere in 
the region of £2 million per annum as against actual expenditure in 1941 of 
£641,000. In fact the sum involved approximated to the total annual expenditure 
proposed by the Moyne Commission for every aspect of development and welfare in 
the West Indies and, as expressed as a sum per head of the population of the West 
Indies, it represented a higher figure than was then available for all purposes per 
head of population of all colonies. Stockdale argued that although the West Indian 
governments might provide up to £1 million per annum for teachers' salaries, it was 
unlikely that they would be able to improve on this for many years to come. The full 
implementation of the Moyne proposals would thus require a subvention from 
imperial funds of at least £1 million per annum. Stockdale proposed, and the CO 
agreed, that the solution lay, not only in the continuation of the pupil-teacher 
system but in its extension. Significantly, in advising against a subvention from 
Britain, the comptroller argued that any such contribution would probably become 
permanent and that it 'would tend to jeopardise the growth of self-responsibility in 
the West Indian Colonies' (162). The Caribbean was the principal beneficiary of 
grants made under the 1940 Act but where previously the CO had argued that Britain 
was under an obligation to fund educational development in the West Indies, officials 
now seemed more concerned with the alleged incompatibility of any progress 
towards self-government with financial dependence on the British exchequer. 
Distinct from the provision of formal education was the concept of 'mass 
education'. In 1944 a sub-committee of the advisory committee on education 
produced a report on mass education in African society. The report defined what it 
described as the 'curriculum' of mass education as those activities which promoted 
the progress of 'the common people'. It covered 'not only improvement in health and 
agriculture and rural economics, but the building up of strong units of local 
government, sound family and social life, and those recreational and leisure-time 
activities without which no people can survive' .153 The aim was to use the 
instruments of government to stimulate popular initiative. CO officials acknow-
ledged the significance of the report. Its conception was described as being of 'the 
same order in another field as the Beveridge Report on Social Services in this 
country'.154 Jeffries provided a summary of the report's political implications and 
Dawe referred to it as the advisory committee's 'magna opera'. Others in the office 
were less impressed. The report was said to be 'diffuse in wording and in places 
obscure' (157). None the less, mass education-or community development as it was 
later more appropriately termed-rapidly became the central focus of a welfare ethos 
in the CO. A start had been made in January 1943 with the establishment of a 
Colonial Social Welfare Advisory Committee. The committee was charged with the 
task of advising the secretary of state with regard to problems affecting the social 
welfare of urban and rural communities in the colonies and the training of social 
welfare officers. The subjects for investigation included penal and probation services, 
the relief of destitution, rural welfare associations and co-operative societies.155 
Foundations had been laid for the more extensive range of measures which were 
adopted by the CO to promote community development during the period of the 
Labour government after the war .156 
After a hesitant start, colonial research emerged as an equally significant issue 
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during the war. For the purpose of allocating and then co-ordinating the expenditure 
of the separate sum of £500,000 a year to be made available under the 1940 
legislation, the Statement of Policy on Colonial Development and Welfare issued in 
February 1940 recommended the establishment of a Colonial Research Advisory 
Committee. Two years elapsed before the CO acted to implement this recommenda-
tion. The delay over the first year was explained by the virtual closing down of the 
development and welfare initiative in the wake of the 'blitzkrieg' telegram of June 
1940 (103). None the less, and before the policy was formally reactivated through 
Moyne's circular despatch of June 1941 (105), universities and other institutions in 
the UK had taken the 1940 policy statement at its word and had begun to submit 
applications for grants in support of various aspects of colonial research. The 
University of London was one of the first to act. A joint application submitted on 
behalf of the university by the directors of the London School of Economics, the 
School of Oriental and African Studies and the Institute of Education surveyed the 
existing provision for colonial studies in London and concluded, not only that it 
lacked co-ordination but also that there was no 'distinctive university organisation' 
available. The directors therefore urged the creation of a Board of Colonial Studies 
within the university. Their proposal was combined with an application for a grant, 
of between £13,700 and £14,7000, to cover research and teaching in such areas as 
linguistics, African studies, colonial government and law, demography, economic 
and social investigations and educational research in the colonial field. 157 
In the months following Moyne's circular despatch, the CO was rather more 
preoccupied with the applications for development grants submitted by colonial 
governments. It was not until March 1942, when J J Paskin, the head of the Social 
Services Department, suggested that now was the time to appoint a Colonial 
Research Advisory Committee, that the CO began to consider the question of 
research as a separate issue in its own right. 158 By this time those universities and 
other bodies which had submitted applications were said to be impatient and restive 
at the delay in dealing with their proposals. A number of senior officials were 
sceptical about Paskin's proposal. In the immediate aftermath of the collapse in the 
Far East, their concerns were voiced by Dawe who minuted that 'harsh realities' had 
to be faced and that as research was essentially 'long-term', nothing practical would 
be achieved by establishing a committee in present conditions. 'At this moment of 
our history', Dawe argued, such a committee 'would appear to our people overseas as 
a piece of ironical and disturbing escapism' .159 
Yet despite this lack of enthusiasm, Cranborne approved the appointment of a 
'nucleus committee'. Under the chairmanship of Hailey, who was already acting in 
the same capacity in relation to the Committee on Post-War Problems which dealt 
with reconstruction issues, a Colonial Research Advisory Committee was set up in 
June 1942. At the outset it consisted almost entirely of advisers from the natural 
sciences. Social scientists were then added, in belated recognition, as one official put 
it, that there was 'virtually no research on Social Studies going on in the Colonial 
Empire at present at all'. 160 The social scientists formed a separate social research 
group on the committee and they divided themselves into teams of experts, each 
under a convener. By October 1943 the individual groups had produced six 
preliminary reports which collectively revealed a fundamental flaw in the CO's 
planning procedures. Basic data in the social and economic fields was lacking and the 
necessary machinery for securing such information did not exist. Priority research 
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needs were identified by the social research group to overcome these deficiencies 
(164). Support for these initial findings came from other quarters. A year earlier, in 
his capacity as chief political officer to the military command in East Africa, Sir 
Philip Mitchell commented that the war had revealed 'how great is our lack of an 
organised and dependable source of general information about Africans' .161 
Writing in the African Survey, Hailey commented that of the many problems 
facing Africa none had attracted more discussion, and indeed more controversy, than 
that of the type of education which should be given to Africans. 162 But education was 
by no means the only area of social concern. Over the inter-war years labour issues 
emerged in a manner which revealed once again the inadequacies of CO mechanisms 
for dealing with social issues. Until the establishment of a separate Social Services 
Department in 1939, they also imposed additional strains upon a heavily over-
burdened General Department. 163 Moreover, the labour question was arguably the 
most significant area of social policy in relation to which the CO found itself having 
to respond to outside pressures and influences. Pressure from the labour movement 
in Britain itself was intermittent but membership of the International Labour 
Organisation, which had been established in 1919 as part of the machinery of the 
League of Nations, imposed upon Britain definite obligations to apply to its colonial 
dependencies minimum standards affecting the employment of labour. Throughout 
the 1920s it could hardly be said that the CO relished the task of implementing these 
new obligations of trusteeship. CO minutes on labour questions during these years 
are peppered with comments resenting outside interference. 164 The official response 
on labour questions was cautious and at times negative. As the case of forced labour 
illustrates, officials were always anxious to avoid commitments which might 
undermine the basis of indirect rule.165 Equally, although the CO was not unaware 
that significant economic changes were taking place throughout the empire with the 
growth of wage-earning classes (124), the Office maintained that many of the 
ILO-sponsored labour conventions were appropriate for application only in advanced 
industrial countries. It was also argued that it would be impossible to devise a policy 
on labour issues which could be applied uniformly throughout the divergent 
territories of the empire. The influence of the traditional theory of colonial 
administration was readily apparent. The CO was prepared to act if abuses came to 
light but it was reluctant to depart from the time-honoured view that individual 
governments should have the freedom to regulate local conditions of employment 
according to local circumstances. 
The first attempt to devise a coherent series of guidelines on labour issues was 
made during the second Labour government. Drummond Shiels was a significant 
influence and two of his initiatives are documented in this collection-the elimina-
tion of penal sanctions in labour contracts and the recognition of trades unions (126, 
127; also 131, 137). But while urging legislative action on specific labour issues 
Shiels wanted to go much further. Referring in May 1931 to the 'chaos' of the 
existing position on colonial labour legislation, Shiels called for a statement of 
minimum standards which would serve as a yardstick by which to measure the 
policies of individual governments. He described the issue as one of 'fundamental 
importance' which would require the appointment of additional staff within the CO. 
Passfield and his senior officials were reluctant to approach the Treasury for funds to 
support extra staff; instead it was suggested that Shiels might chair an office 
committee and invite co-operation from the Home Office (over factory legislation) 
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and the Ministry of Labour (129). Shiels's suggestion that the general secretary of the 
TUC might also be asked to participate was resisted by officials. 166 Accordingly a 
Colonial Labour Committee was set up in April 1931 but the impetus was lost after 
August of the same year when the national government was formed and Shiels left 
the eo (130). 
The impact of the depression and subsequent labour unrest in various parts of the 
colonial empire in the 1930s persuaded the CO that more concerted action was 
required. During the first of a series of outbreaks on the copperbelt of Northern 
Rhodesia in May 1935, six African mineworkers were killed and a further twenty-two 
wounded by police fire. A commission of inquiry attributed the disturbances to the 
timing and manner in which new rates of tax had been introduced. However, the 
commission also highlighted a more fundamental change which was taking place in 
relation to which the CO had as yet given barely any consideration. Commenting on 
the breakdown of tribal authority on the copperbelt the commission concluded that a 
choice had to be made between the reassertion of tribal authority, together with the 
frequent repatriation of miners to their villages; or, alternatively, 'the acceptance of 
definite detribalisation and industrialisation of the mining population under Euro-
pean urban control'. 167 
In an effort to regulate labour conditions throughout the empire, the CO issued a 
number of circular despatches in the mid-1930s. The first, issued in MacDonald's 
name in November 1935, emphasised the importance of adequate means of 
inspection and supervision of employment conditions in all colonies. 168 Responses to 
the despatch indicated that many colonial governments were under the impression 
that supervision of labour was necessary only in territories where manufacturing or 
mining interests had been established. A second despatch was issued in August 1937 
when Ormsby-Gore was secretary of state. Circulated against a background of 
continuing unrest on the copperbelt and the first outbreaks in the Caribbean, it 
emphasised that supervision was equally important in purely agricultural colonies. 
This second despatch covered a wider field of labour issues than MacDonald's but its 
central thrust was to urge the desirability of full-time labour officers in all territories 
where there was a substantial wage-earning community (138). A third despatch, 
issued when MacDonald was back at the CO in September 1938, was circulated as a 
direct response to the findings of a local commission of inquiry which investigated 
the disturbances which had taken place in Trinidad in the summer of 1937. The 
commission concluded that the unrest had been caused, or at any rate exacerbated, 
by the lack of contact between employers and employees arising from the absence of 
machinery for collective bargaining. 169 The example of Trinidad served as a warning 
of what might happen elsewhere if colonial governments did not act to establish 
labour departments and to ensure that they were adequately staffed. MacDonald's 
1938 despatch was therefore more insistent on the question of labour departments 
than its predecessors. It also revealed that one colonial government (Tanganyika) 
had proposed to appoint labour inspectors from outside government service by 
recruiting retired civil servants, soldiers, policemen and doctors. The justification 
was that in career terms, administrative officers seconded for duty as labour 
inspectors might feel that they were 'entering a blind alley'. MacDonald corrected 
this impression in no uncertain terms, emphasising that colonial labour depart-
ments were 'actually or potentially among the most important departments of 
government', that they called for a 'high degree of skill, tact and wisdom' and that an 
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administrative officer's performance in this role would be taken into account when 
promotion was in question. 170 
The cajolery of colonial governments over the issue of labour supervision was 
accompanied by a reappraisal of the methods by which the CO itself handled labour 
questions. In September 1936, from outside the Office and in the wake of the first 
disturbances on the copperbelt, Shiels urged the appointment of a labour adviser. 
Continuing to emphasise the diversity of local conditions, several officials from the 
geographical departments questioned whether such an appointment was either 
necessary or desirable. Lord De La Warr challenged these arguments by insisting that 
certain aspects of labour relations were common to all colonies, irrespective of 
variations in local conditions (136). However, CO reluctance 'to fight the inevitable 
battle with the Treasury' over the appointment of a labour adviser delayed further 
action and it was not until February 1938, by which time the full extent of the crisis 
in the Caribbean had been revealed, that agreement was reached on the appointment 
of Orde Browne as labour adviser.171 
Raising issues of concern to the empire as a whole, the unrest in the Caribbean 
emerges as the single most important occurrence which confronted officials during 
the inter-war years. When it appeared in 1936, Macmillan's Warning from the West 
Indies prompted several comments in the CO, including observations by the 
agricultural and medical advisers (135). Macmillan's analysis of the serious problems 
of public health and malnutrition were not disputed but exception was taken to his 
analysis of the detrimental effects of the plantation system on agricultural produc-
tion. Two courses of action were suggested in response to the book. First, that an 
examination should be made of CDF grants to the West Indies to establish which had 
succeeded and which had failed and why. Upon this basis it might then be possible to 
set up the equivalent of a five-year plan for CDF grants to the West Indies. Secondly, 
that money should be made available from the fund, over a period of three or four 
years, to examine the economic relationship between different systems of peasant 
farming. The first suggestion was rejected on the grounds that it would be 
premature. The CDF had only been in existence for seven years and more time would 
be needed to establish the success or otherwise of projects which were being 
funded. 172 The second suggestion, put forward by Stockdale, the agricultural adviser, 
was the preferred option but it was overtaken by the outbreak of extensive 
disturbances in the Caribbean between 1937 and 1938. 
In a lengthy memorandum drawn up in May 1938 the West Indian Department of 
the CO attempted an analysis of the problems of the West Indies in the context of the 
findings of the local commissions of inquiry which had been appointed to investigate 
the disturbances and the expressions of concern which had been expressed in 
parliament in Britain. An air of fatalism pervaded the memorandum. Riots were said 
to be 'no new thing in the West Indies'. The local populations were 'very patient 
under conditions of hardship' but 'highly inflammable when they feel a sense of 
injustice' (142). Reference has already been made to the manner in which the 
memorandum's recommendation against the appointment of a more general 
commission of inquiry was overturned by higher authority (92, 93). Nearly two years 
later, when the Moyne Commission had completed its labours, CO officials, the local 
governments in the Caribbean and members of the commission itself, were all in 
favour of immediate publication. However, in view of the conditions described in the 
report, MacDonald was said to be 'uneasy' about publication and officials were left to 
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ponder if the need to economise on paper might be accepted as a plausible reason for 
non-publication (145). The issue went to Cabinet, together with two extracts from 
the report on housing and social needs. These extracts convinced the prime minister 
that publication would inflict serious damage on the war effort. The report would be 
seized upon and exploited by the German Ministry of Propaganda (146). Hence the 
decision to defer full publication until the end of the war and to publish only a 
summary of the report's recommendations. 
Of the many issues which emerged from the findings of the various inquiries into 
the disturbances in the Caribbean, one of the more significant was the development 
of trades unions in the colonies. This was a subject in which the Trades Union 
Congress was now taking an active interest. The TUC established a Colonial Advisory 
Committee at the end of 1937 and in May 1938 it issued model trades unions rules 
for the guidance of colonial organisations. 173 In 1939 Waiter Citrine, the general 
secretary, visited the West Indies as a member of the Royal Commission. Upon his 
return the TUC approved an independent initiative to set up a scholarship scheme to 
enable two young West Indian students to receive training in the organisation of 
trades unions at Ruskin College. After the nature of the scheme had been explained 
by a union official to the CO, the Social Services Department drafted a circular 
despatch to the Caribbean governments, the last paragraph of which read: 'I am sure 
that you will share my view that the assistance which the Congress contemplates 
affording is to be welcomed.' Assistant under-secretary of state Sir John Shuckburgh 
commented on the draft: 
I am not so sure that the last paragraph does not rather overdo the note of cordiality. I 
am old-fashioned enough still to feel that the spread of trade unionism to the Colonies is 
an unavoidable embarrassment rather than a positive blessing. However, I know that 
our official policy is one of sympathy and co-operation and if it is thought fit to assume 
that Colonial Governors share our feeling, so let it be.174 
When circulated to the Caribbean governments in January 1940, the last paragraph 
of the despatch was amended, the phrase 'should not be disregarded' being 
substituted for the words 'warmly welcomed'. 
However, notwithstanding this ambivalence on the question of trades unions, at 
· the beginning of the war the CO itself was only too willing to engage the support of 
the TUC in guiding unions in the colonies along what were described as 'sober and 
constitutional lines'. From their experience of union activity in the West Indies 
especially, the CO concluded that the aim of policy should be 'the gradual 
elimination of the extremely undesirable element in the form of disgruntled or 
self-seeking lawyers, journalists and political opportunists' who were running the 
unions and their replacement by 'good material' drawn from workers in the trades 
which the unions represented. A particular concern was to prevent the smaller craft 
unions being swallowed up by the larger unions of a general character, of which 
Alexander Bustamante's Industrial Trade Union in Jamaica was a leading example. At 
a meeting with Citrine in June 1940, George Hall, a Labour MP and parliamentary 
under-secretary of state at the CO, therefore suggested that experienced trades 
unionists from Britain should visit selected colonies where they would act as labour 
advisers. The TUC could not immediately spare any suitable officials but by 1942 six 
such appointments had been made in. Trinidad, the Gold Coast, Palestine, British 
Guiana, Sierra Leone and Nigeria (153). 175 
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Support for trade union activity in the colonies also came from an unexpected 
quarter. During the committee stage of the Colonial Development and Welfare Bill 
Labour MP's pressed for the inclusion of an additional provision that there should be 
no embargo on the establishment of trades unions. Speaking for the government, 
Hall accepted the amendment in principle if a suitable form of words could be found. 
A section of the 1940 Act indicated that to be eligible for grants under the scheme, 
colonies would be expected to provide 'reasonable facilities for the establishment and 
activities of trade unions'. A despatch circulated over Moyne's signature in July 1941 
explained the nature of the legislation on trades unions which would be required in 
colonies in order to conform to the requirements of the 1940 Act (150). The Kenyan 
government objected strongly and the governor, Sir Henry Moore, pleaded for 
exemption on the grounds that unofficials in Kenya would regard these requirements 
as 'blackmail'. Ultimately, however, Kenya was obliged to fall into line. 
Colonial manpower, for both military and civilian purposes, was mobilised on a 
vast scale during the Second World War. Well over half a million soldiers were 
recruited in Africa. Of the combatant troops, the 81st West African Division and the 
11th East African Division distinguished themselves in the Burma campaigns 
between 1943 and 1945.176 A smaller number of African troops also served over the 
same period in Italy. However, the vast majority were recruited specifically as 
non-combatants, constructing airfields, harbours, railways and roads in support of 
the main theatres of operations in the Middle East and North Africa (156). 
Conscription for military labour was an established practice in wartime. In British 
colonies it was also an accepted practice to compel labour to work during 
emergencies. But the war witnessed a significant new departure in policy with the 
endorsement of large-scale conscription for civil production, often for private 
enterprise. Forced labour was used only to any great extent, for agricultural 
purposes, in Kenya, Tanganyika, Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
and in Nigeria for tin production. That the system was restricted to a handful of 
colonies could not conceal the brutal conditions under which civilian conscripts 
were frequently forced to exist. The most notorious example was the conscription 
over two years between 1942 and 1944 of over 100,000 peasants from the provinces of 
Northern Nigeria for mining in the opencast tin mines on the Jos Plateau. The loss of 
Malaya and the Dutch East Indies had left Nigeria as Britain's main source of tin 
supplies and the intention was to raise tin output to a target of20,000 tons a year. As 
with so many of the wartime production drives in the colonies, the operation was 
planned with only limited administrative personnel who then found themselves 
under enormous pressure and strain to meet the official targets. Conditions in the 
mines were appalling. In the absence of adequate medical services, suitable housing 
and food supplies, the death rate from disease reached ten per cent in 1943. 
Desertions were commonplace and the production targets were never met. Indignant 
voices raised in the House of Commons called for an end to forced labour in the tin 
mines. 177 CO officials shared this disquiet and Orde Browne included a detailed 
account of conditions in the tin mines in a report written after his tour of West Africa 
between November 1943 and March 1944 (165). Officials were equally concerned, as 
one example from Northern Rhodesia illustrates, that forced labour was being used 
to provide increased profits to white farmers (151). 
CO concerns about the conditions under which forced labour operated during the 
war merged with similar anxieties over the question of nutritional standards in the 
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colonies. Inquiries first instituted by the League of Nations had prompted a circular 
despatch on nutrition in 1936. In response to the replies from local governments, the 
prime minister appointed a committee of the Economic Advisory Council to survey 
the existing state of knowledge in regard to nutrition. Chaired by Lord De La Warr, 
the committee presented its report in June 1939. The report revealed a situation 
which left much to be desired. 178 It highlighted in particular dietary deficiencies and 
infant mortality which in the case of the Gambia had reached as high as 369 per 
thousand births. The report concluded that lack of detailed knowledge inhibited 
remedial action but with the outbreak of war wider plans for investigation and 
research were postponed (158). As parliamentary under-secretary of state at the CO 
in 1942, Harold Macmillan expressed further concern that the war might aggravate 
the problem. With the conscription of large numbers of Africans for production 
purposes, Macmillan questioned whether enough men had been left behind to 
produce adequate quantities of food for local consumption (152) . 
On the question of medical policy more generally, the chapter in Hailey's African 
Survey which dealt with health polices prompted a discussion in 1939 within the 
Colonial Advisory Medical Committee as to whether priority should be given to 
clinical care in hospitals or to preventive medicine as part of a wider campaign 
designed to tackle the problems of public health (143) . The committee concluded 
that hospital work should take priority but in 1942, when it submitted a major 
statement on medical policy in the colonial empire, the emphasis had changed. 
Prevention was now said to be better than cure and the primary aim of medical 
services was defined as the raising of the general standard of public health. In their 
response to the committee's report, officials were rather more concerned with the 
question of cost. It was to be regretted that the medical advisory committee, in 
common with all such advisory committees, seldom paid any attention to the 
financial implications of their recommendations (160) . 
The demobilisation of colonial military forces and the reabsorption of conscript 
labour into civilian life emerged as pressing concerns as the war in Europe neared its 
conclusion. Orde Browne prefaced his 1944 report on labour in the individual West 
African territories with some general observations on the re-employment of 
discharged soldiers and post-war housing needs. He described the latter as 'one of 
urgency' in most parts of West Africa. Accommodation provided both by government 
departments and by private employers still left much to be desired. Government 
housing was particularly open to criticism; in some instances employees were living 
'in really shocking accommodation ... overcrowded and out of repair'. Many of the 
houses concerned had long been condemned. In answer to the official explanation 
that the inhabitants had asked to be allowed to continue living in them because of 
the general shortage of housing, Orde Browne responded that this could 'scarcely 
absolve the department concerned from the charge of owning slum property'. As 
revealed above in the discussion of economic policy, the inadequacies of colonial 
housing conditions had attracted comment from a variety of quarters in the late 
1930s. By the closing stages of the war the issue had been identified in the CO as one 
requiring urgent consideration and a Housing Research Group, set up in the 
summer of 1944, submitted its preliminary findings in March 1945 (166) . 
On the question of the demobil isation of labour, Orde Browne commented that the 
West African governments had little experience to work from; hence, of necessity, 
plans had to be based on 'guesswork'. Unknown factors included material questions 
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such as the maintenance or extension of existing industries, and the creation of new 
ones; there were also the 'psychological problems' of the extent to which the African 
would wish to return to his former home life, or would demand wider opportunities 
and a higher standard of living. 
The labour adviser divided what he described as 'the human material concerned' 
into three classes. First, the largest class, consisting of those wishing to return to 
their homes and resume tribal life. Secondly, a 'comparatively small class', 
consisting of those for whom skilled or semi-skilled jobs appropriate to their ability 
would be waiting in post-offices, railways, ports and hospitals, as well as in privately 
owned mines, plantations, factories and transport firms etc. Finally, a class who 
desired skilled occupation, but for whom no openings as yet existed, who formed 'the 
largest part of the problem'. Here the solution was said to depend almost entirely on 
post-war development. Of 'dominating importance' would be the extent to which 
mineral development would be continued or extended; until the future-world need 
for the gold, diamond, tin, bauxite and other resources of West Africa could be 
foreseen, it was impossible to tell whether the various mines would form 'centres of 
well-paid employment, or stagnant groups of workers requiring absorption else-
where'. Agriculture was expected to provide 'a good living for large numbers as it did 
in the past', but here the appearance of serious disease was again said to make the 
future doubtful. 
As regards alternative sources of employment, Orde Browne introduced a further 
three classes. First, government-sponsored scheme of development. These included 
building new townships or reconstructing older ones, laying out airfields and 
improving roads and bridges, and harnessing water power. Secondly schemes to deal 
with the natural features of the country and its disadvantages-swamp reclamation, 
reafforestation and measures against erosion. Finally, the expansion of local 
industries, agriculture and fisheries. Farming and market gardening were expected 
to profit from the facilities offered by air transport and from the placing of hitherto 
'exotic luxuries' on the European market. 
Orde Browne envisaged roles for both government and private enterprise in these 
various activities. He also anticipated that those concerned with infrastructure would 
necessitate co-operation 'on an intercolonial, if not international scale'. The West 
African governments had all appointed committees to consider these possibilities and 
the staff of the resident minister was concerned with the wider, regional aspects of 
them. On the logistical problem, Orde Browne considered as fortunate the fact that 
West African troops were serving in the Far East where hostilities appeared likely to 
continue longer than in Europe; also, transport problems would delay the return of 
the majority of the men for a considerable period, even after the conclusion of 
hostilities. The time factor would enable the requirements of post-war reconstruc-
tion to become better defined and it would also enable the requisite staff to be 
recruited to undertake the work of dealing with the men as they were demobilised.179 
To the extent that it was recognised that the war would act as a catalyst for 
far-reaching economic and social changes, a number of governors acted without 
prompting from Whitehall to impress the imminence of these changes upon their 
local administrative staffs. Sir Charles Dundas, the governor of Uganda, circulated a 
personal minute in June 1942 and Sir Alan Burns acted similarly in the Gold Coast in 
August of the same year.180 Dundas's minute emphasised that good government was 
no substitute for self-government and that in the post -war world it would be 
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increasingly difficult to determine policy 'according as it seems best to us'. 
Forwarding his minute to the CO, Dundas explained that it had been circulated in an 
attempt to overcome what he described as 'a rather too narrow and unimaginative 
attitude in certain local quarters' (154). He sent a further explanatory letter in 
August 1942 in which he argued that even the 'most excellent and best meaning 
colonial officers' became 'rather cramped in their outlook as a result of long years of 
service and life in conditions that outwardly appear to be entirely sound because no 
voice is raised in condemnation therefore '. The governor was equally aware that it 
would not be easy to make the transition from a position of wartime regulation to 
one of post-war liberalisation: 
Oddly enough conditions of war which we believe will ultimately impose changes, 
rather militate against these, because measures we have to resort to in order to 
maintain the war effort resemble rather a harking back to the practices of more illiberal 
days. It is no doubt difficult to think at one and the same time in terms of an Emergency 
Act and Emancipation and the rights of Mankind.181 
In his minute to his administrative staff, Dundas cited the continued existence of 
penal sanctions in labour legislation as one area of social policy calling for reform. 
On this very issue, however, Uganda serves as an illustration of how much more 
difficult it would be to coax a more liberal spirit within the unofficial European 
community. An ILO convention of 1939 calling for the elimination of penal sanctions 
met with particularly strong resistance in Uganda (155). 
The issue of unofficial European attitudes towards penal sanctions in labour 
contracts leads conveniently to the final area of social policy documented in this 
volume, namely the issue of race relations. That discrimination operated in relation 
to appointments within the Colonial Service was one of the main allegations levelled 
against the CO from the late 1930s by the Fabian Colonial Bureau and by Dr Harold 
Moody, president of The League of Coloured Peoples and veteran watchdog of African 
and Caribbean interests. The minutes reproduced here from papers of the Social 
Services Department for the years 1941 to 1942 illustrate the nature of the official 
response to such charges. Jeffries claimed that within his time at the CO (he joined 
the Office in 1917), there had never been 'any colour prejudice in the Colonial Office 
with regard to appointments in the Colonial Service'. Where, in practice, effect had 
been given to a 'colour bar', this was said to have been based solely on considerations 
of administrative efficiency. Officials acknowledged, and found distasteful, the extent 
to which colour prejudice existed in the colonies and they also admitted that the CO 
had not done more, 'by precept and example', to combat it. 182 However, as in so 
many areas of colonial policy, officials maintained that there was no simple solution 
capable of universal application. They argued that the problem of race manifested 
itself in different ways in different territories. Their analysis of the problem embraced 
two perspectives. There was, on the one hand, a social problem which arose in the 
form of petty prejudices and which could be tackled by propaganda, by teaching in 
European schools, by requiring government officials to set an example and by the 
removal of administrative restrictions such as the reservation or segregation of 
residential areas. But there was also an economic problem which was more deeply 
entrenched and which, as in the case of the reservation of land in the Kenya 
Highlands for European occupation, touched on sensitive matters of high policy. 
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Officials were unable to suggest means whereby either the secretary of state or the 
government of a colony such as Kenya could issue a declaration condemning 'the 
more ordinary manifestations of colour prejudice' without at the same time opening 
themselves to the charge of hypocrisy over the reservation of the Kenya Highlands to 
Europeans. Cranborne, the secretary of state, added a further complication. He 
described the arrival in the United Kingdom of large numbers of black American 
troops as a 'most unfortunate development of the war', the full implications of which, 
though likely to be formidable, could not as yet be gauged. Cranborne argued that 
white American troops in Britain would regard an official declaration opposing any 
form of colour bar as a rebuke and even as an insult. A declaration would therefore 
exacerbate an already difficult situation (149). 
During the war, as well as fending off allegations of discrimination within the 
Colonial Service, the CO attempted to tackle the question of racial prejudice on a 
broader front. Officials concluded that the root of the problem, both at home and 
overseas, lay in popular ignorance which could only be overcome by a concerted 
campaign of education. The attention of publishers in Britain was drawn to remarks 
which appeared in school textbooks and which caused offence in the colonies where 
they were used (147). In like manner countless instances of prejudice in Britain were 
brought to the attention of the CO. Over one of the more celebrated, which involved 
Learie Constantine, the West Indian cricketer, officials raised the question of 
introducing legislation making it an offence for hoteliers to refuse accommodation 
purely on the ground of race (161). The task of educating what the CO described as 
'the Great British Public' was always a delicate issue. One official commented in 
1941: 'As for educating public opinion (including my own prejudices) into a more 
tolerant attitude, I am all for it, but how is it to be done? We must have some kind of 
snobbery to keep us going and the more levelling there is of class distinctions the 
more racial distinctions are likely to acquire snobbery value.' 183 Here perhaps was an 
acknowledgement that in the British empire of the post-war world, racial distinc-
tions were likely to become more rather than less pronounced. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Metropolitan Reorganisation, Public Relations 
and the Colonial Service 
Document numbers 1-6 
1 CO 859/5/13 17 July- 1 Aug 1939 
[Education in the UK about the colonial empire]: minutes by J W 
Gittens, 1 H Vischer, C G Eastwood and G L M Clauson 
[These minutes were prompted by a number of letters which had recently appeared in the 
columns of the press. Under the heading 'Parliament and the colonies: MP's castigated for 
lack of interest', East Africa and Rhodesia printed on 6 July 1939 a letter complaining 
about the low level of attendance during the recent parliamentary debate on the CO 
estimates. The Times on 8 July 1939 printed a letter from E R J Hussey, fo rmerly director 
of education in Uganda and Nigeria, which claimed that school children in the UK were 
less well informed about Africa than their German counterparts. As evidence he cited the 
results of a test set by a teacher in one of the UK's biggest cities. The teacher had set a 
paper containing ten simple questions about East Africa to the top form of twenty 
students in a boys' senior elementary school. Kenya was placed by all but four in 
Australia, Asia and the United States and by all but three in the United States, Europe, 
Australia, New Zealand and China. Kenya was said by most to be only 250 miles from 
London and Tanganyika, whose chief industries were described as making milk and 
growing macaroni, was said to be governed by Germany, Italy, France or the United 
States. Among the minutes generated by The Times correspondence was one by A I 
Mayhew, an educational adviser and joint secretary to the Advisory Committee on 
Educat ion in the Colonies. Mayhew had previously suggested a scheme of scholarships 
and fellowships to enable both students and teachers to gain direct experience of life and 
conditions in the colonies. He identified climatic conditions and the question of colour 
prejudice as possible obstacles to the implementation of his scholarship scheme and 
hence suggested that the CO should explore the question of teacher fellowships (CO 
859/5113, minute by Mayhew, 31 July 1939) . Mayhew's scheme did not address the issue 
of how, if at all, the subject of the empire should be taught in British schools. Eastwood 
and Clauson suggested that the matter should be raised with the president of the Board of 
Education. Others disagreed, arguing that the timing was not right. Many schools in the 
inner cities areas had been evacuated and those in the receiving areas were 'somewhat 
dislocated by the influx of strange pupils' (ibid, minute by A H Poynton, 11 October 
1939). However, a letter was sent to Lord De La Warr, president of the Board of 
Education. In his reply the president admitted that teaching in schools about the empire 
left much to be desired and suggested that the fault lay with one particular discipline: 'To 
be quite frank we are not altogether happy about the teaching of geography in our 
schools. The real trouble is that there is so much dissension between geographers - our 
Senior Chief Inspector tells me that one has only to get half a dozen geographers in one 
room to be sure of a dog fight!' (ibid, no 13, De La Warr to Macdonald, 9 November 
1939).] 
1 District officer, Fiji , on secondment to the CO. 
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Mr. Lambert2 
Please see the enclosures opposite. I mentioned to you that this matter of the 
education of children to be "Empire-minded" amounted almost to a hobby of mine, 
and I understood you to say that an expression of views, for whatever mine may be 
worth, would not be amiss, and accordingly I submit them with diffidence in the full 
knowledge that there are many who are much more qualified to speak on this matter 
than myself, and in the hope that one or two suggestions might be of some use. 
2. It is difficult to know where to start, but I think the cutting on "Parliament and 
the Colonies" is perhaps the best place. I have read this cutting over and over again 
and the more I read it the more I am overwhelmed with a real sense of despair. It 
would be really funny were it not so very serious. To think that at no time during the 
debate referred to there were reported to be more than one hundred M.P.s present to 
discuss the Colonial Office Estimates and the welfare of some sixty million people, 
must do more than anything else to justify the claims of the dictators and the critics 
of the British Empire that we take little or no interest in our heritage. The question 
may be asked why there was such a meagre attendance and the answers are many, 
but I suggest that the three main reasons are:-
(a) Boredom 
(b) Ignorance and lack of understanding 
(c) A feeling that their constituents do not care one way or the other because 
Colonial issues, since they do not appeal to the general public at large, therefore 
do not form a plank in the electoral campaign. 
On the other hand, I venture to suggest that if there was a local question of 
whether a certain M.P.'s conduct outside Parliament was worthy of the great 
traditions of our democratic race, every single M.P. would be present at that debate. 
The reason for this is, I suggest, that it provides a sensation, an opportunity for the 
press to print the view of the various M.P.s, and at the same time express their own 
views in attracting headlines, and an opportunity for the various constituents of each 
of these M.P.s to reflect comfortably how fine it is that our great democratic 
structure will not tolerate anything shady, and how fortunate a chance it is that the 
M.P. who represents them should give his views in no weak terms, etc., etc. 
3. Why then does the average M.P. appear to be so ignorant on Colonial affairs? 
The answer surely is that he has never been educated up to them. 
4. The next question is then not how to educate them up to it, but how to educate 
the rising generation, and I suggest that their education might be divided into three 
categories:-
( a) those up to twelve years of age; 
(b) those between twelve and eighteen; and 
(c) those from eighteen to twenty-one. 
As regards the first of these classes, I suggest that in all schools throughout the 
country there should be compulsorily taught to the children a geographical 
knowledge of the Empire, where all the countries are, what the capitals are, the chief 
towns, rivers, and the population, etc., etc., illustrated by little stories of each 
country which would enable the child to remember them, and not only to 
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remember, but to keep his interest alive by some little incident as apart from merely 
telling them, for example, that Africa and Asia are Continents, that Canada is a 
dominion whose climate is cold in the winter and hot in the summer, and that 
Australia is a large country surrounded by sea. 
With regard to class (b), there should be lessons on the economic side, what the 
countries import and export, so that it appeals to the children who might be made to 
realise the importance of these colonies and countries by an example in their own 
homes, e.g. that of their father who perhaps manufactures things that go to the 
countries about which they are studying at school and which, if we were without 
them, might affect their father's family budget, eg, if other countries were to own 
our colonies the possibility of putting up large tariff walls against our exports and 
thus killing our trade. Further, the children should be told what opportunities there 
are to work there, what money is needed to start an industry, who can help them to 
start, what life out there means etc., etc. 
With regard to class (c) for those who go on to the University a studied and 
intimate knowledge of the Dominions, Protectorates and Colonies should be made if 
the individual has decided finally to go into the Colonial Service. It might not be out 
of place here to mention that I recollect most vividly, and I hope I am a normal 
person, that at a gathering of people in October 1927 who had been accepted for 
service in the various colonies, it was decided to try and understand something of the 
places to which we were to be sent and we accordingly pooled our knowledge. The 
result was catastrophic and does not bear mention. Whereupon we all decided to buy 
an Atlas and books and read up all we could in two terms and this brings me to my 
last point. 
5. From time to time efforts have been made to take groups of children to 
cinemas, to get lecturers to come at spasmodic intervals to teach them about the 
Empire, but I suggest this is rather a similar procedure to the builder who puts a new 
roof on to old walls which, strengthened for the purpose, soon collapse under any 
unusual strain simply because the foundation is not strong enough to bear the 
additional weight imposed. So, equally, it is of little use trying to commence frantic 
attempts to popularise the colonies by giving six months' training and then expect 
candidates to be a success. 
6. I do suggest that a concerted effort should be made throughout Great Britain, 
and that all teachers should be trained to have a daily "Empire" curriculum suitable 
for the children whom they teach so that, when and as they grow up, they are just as 
au fait with the Empire and all that it means, as they are with the mathematical 
table. May I just add that whenever possible I have always gone into various schools 
and in not one have I ever seen the Empire treated as a special subject either 
geographically, economically or in any other manner, while in some schools I have 
been met with a stony silence, and in another with the remark that the teacher did 
not hold with teaching slavery to children, adding that in his opinion it was best for 
them to find out for themselves when they grew up. That is just the whole point, 
because when they grow up they have either forgotten the subject, or it is then too 
late to do anything about it. 
7. Rome was not built in a day, nor can the British Empire be kept together by 
occasional voluntary lectures and attendance at cinemas, and it is surely obvious 
from the enclosed cuttings that knowledge of the Empire is deeply appreciated 
wherever it can be obtained, and it is equally obvious that ignorance amongst our 
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own people in regard to the Empire is not only confined to England, but also obtains 
in other countries. 
J.W.G. 
17.7.39 
I have read this with the greatest interest and I am glad that the subject is bring [sic] 
brought up. I lunched with a member in the House the day following the Colonial 
Debate, and was told by my host, as well as by another member, that they were 
greatly disappointed with the Secretary of State's review, which they said they felt 
had been prepared at the Office with the idea of leaving out all the subjects of vital 
interest and policy which might possibly provoke debate or criticism. I repeat this 
with all due respect, feeling that it might be worth while examining how far the 
Secretary of State's speech was responsible for the evident lack of interest in the 
House. 
As regards the ignorance of children in the Empire, the fault, in my opinion, lies 
entirely with the teachers and with the people who set the great mass of examination 
papers for which school children in the United Kingdom are being prepared. As long 
as the wretched teachers in all our Council and private schools in this country have 
to prepare their children to answer examination papers where every subject under 
the sun is treated except our Colonial Empire, all the many efforts made by the 
various Empire Societies and such institutions as the Imperial Institute will only 
reach a very small percentage of the school children. This I consider the first 
condition for changing the present lamentable state of affairs. There are many other 
ways for interesting school children in our Colonies, one of the most effective I 
brought to the notice of the Education Advisory Committee some years ago, 
suggesting that schools all over Africa might be put into touch with schools in this 
country, for the children to exchange illustrated postcards or letters. This is being 
done by some of the Colonial dependencies and I was particularly struck by the 
effectiveness of this arrangement when I visited native schools in the Italian Colony 
of Lybia, each of them having a school in Italy with which the children kept up a 
lively correspondence, which again was used by the teachers in the Colony, as well as 
the home country, in their history and geography lessons. 
H.V. 
18.7.39 
The newspaper correspondence opposite and the minutes on this side of the file are 
both of considerable interest and they should, I think, prompt us to some reflection 
and action. 
We need not concern ourselves on this file with the question of the lack of interest 
in Parliament in the affairs of the Colonial Empire, for that is receiving plenty of 
attention elsewhere. We can limit the discussion to the question of spreading 
knowledge of the Colonial Empire in this country. 
It may be useful to begin by recording what is being done at present. 
(1) The Imperial Institute has exhibition galleries around which flocks of school 
children trail rather wearily. The best endeavours of the Institute's energetic 
Director can never really make the galleries very thrilling. 
(2) The Institute provides an Empire film library, lantern slides, postcards, etc., 
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which are available for circulation to schools. In addition it provides a cinema 
where Empire films are shown. The film library is very much used and would be 
very much more used if more and better films were available. 
(3) The various trade agencies, like the West India Committee, the Malayan 
Information Agency, the East Africa Office, will supply schools on request with a 
certain amount of information on their respective territories, the information not 
usually being of a kind which is very suitable for use in schools since it is primarily 
prepared with other objects in view. Nevertheless, it is no doubt of considerable 
value. 
(4) A few private companies like Cable and Wireless and Cadbury's have produced 
films or books or lectures about their activities and make these available to 
schools. 
(5) Recently the Colonial Empire Marketing Board has entered the field and has 
just completed its first film, and an attractively illustrated booklet on the Colonial 
Empire will shortly be coming out. Both of these will no doubt be of much value 
for spreading knowledge of the Colonial Empire. The film is of a general educative 
nature. As regards the brochure, I can only speak from memory of a rather casual 
glance at an early draft, but I think the emphasis is naturally rather on the 
economic (and therefore less interesting to a school child?) side. No doubt as time 
goes on the activities of the Board will expand. 
(6) Recently our attention has been called to a newly formed "Empire Article 
Exchange · Society". This has been begun in a small way by people in this country. 
The idea is that school children in this country write descriptions of their daily 
lives and the conditions in which they live, and exchange them with schools in 
other parts of the Empire. Out of this grows an interchange of correspondence 
with individual school children. A full description of this excellent little scheme is 
given on pages 200-202 of the current number of "Oversea Education" of which I 
attach a copy. 3 
Mr. Hussey's letter of the 6th July which started the correspondence in the 
"Times" shows how great ignorance of the Colonial Empire can still be. it is safe to 
say, as in effect Mr. Hussey does indeed say, that every German child knows more 
about Tropical Africa than nine out of ten English school children. It seems to me 
quite obvious that a great deal more should be done than is being done at present, or 
even that will be done when the Colonial Empire Marketing Board gets into its full 
stride, to spread knowledge of the Colonial Empire; and to my mind the people who 
ought to do this are the Board of Education. There should be regular teaching in 
schools in regard to the Colonial Empire. There should be suitable textbooks, films, 
broadcasts, etc., and ordinary teaching should be supplemented by such methods as 
those used by the Empire Article Exchange Society. 
In some of the correspondence it is suggested that the trouble lies with the 
teachers and that they are unwilling to teach their pupils about the Empire because 
they are not interested in it and because they think teaching about it implies 
jingoism and flag-waving. While a proper pride in the Colonial Empire is of course to 
be welcomed, teaching about the Colonial Empire need not and should not imply any 
sort of jingoism. The main thing we want to get across is that there are 60 million 
3 Not printed. 
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people in the Colonies for whose welfare we in England are responsible, that their 
standards of living are at present extremely low and that there is an immense work of 
development, education and betterment to be done in these territories. In getting 
across this lesson there need be no jingoism at all. 
I would suggest that the Secretary of State should write to Lord De La Warr 
drawing attention to this correspondence, saying that the subject is one which has 
been causing us some concern for a long time past, and continue on the lines of this 
minute. The letter might also emphasise that the affairs of the Colonial Empire are 
attracting increasing attention in the House of Commons, that there is likelihood of 
a very much more forward Colonial policy in the future than in the past and that, 
quite apart from the intrinsic importance of the subject, on political grounds the 
Secretary of State considers that it would be useful to be able to say that increased 
attention has been given to the question. 
The letter might end up by suggesting that Lord De La Warr should depute some 
of his officials to discuss matters with representatives of the Office ... . 4 
C.G.E. 
28.7.39 
Mr. Mayhew's two schemes are very interesting, & will require further consideration, 
but they relate only to a handful of people & do not touch the main issue dealt with 
on this file, which is the mass education of the U.K. in the history & geography of the 
Colonial Empire. 
What we really want is that this subject shd. be included in the syllabus of the 
primary schools of this country, to the exclusion perhaps of some history & 
geography of less immediate importance. (My daughter, who is after all receiving the 
best education available without regard to cost, complained last year when she was 
14 that she had got as far as Edward the Confessor at least three times, but beyond 
Queen Elizabeth not once.) 
The only way to achieve this is to take the matter up with the President of the 
4 The outcome of the approach to the Board of Education was a proposal that the Board should produce a 
handbook for teachers on colonial geography. After several reminders from the CO, the Board produced a 
lengthy draft which was deemed unsatisfactory. The Board suggested that a book should be written about 
the empire more generally by an outsider (CO 859/80/11, minute by C Cox, education adviser, CO, 2 Feb 
1942). In the absence of anything more suitable, the CO recommended that teachers in the UK and the 
colonies be referred to The British colonial empire by W E Simnett (London: George Alien & Unwin Ltd, 
1942). Simnett was editor of the Crown Colonist; officials described his book as pedestrian but factually 
informative (CO 875/15/11). In the meantime the CO set up a small office committee consisting of the 
heads of the Social Services and Information Depts, together with the education adviser and the director of 
recruitment to the Colonial Service. Overall responsibility for education in the UK about the empire was 
handed to Noel Sabine, head of the Information Dept, and it was suggested that he might write a new book 
in his spare time. The result was Sabine's The British colonial empire which was published by William 
Collins (London, 1943) as part of a series entitled 'The British Commonwealth in pictures'. Sabine ended 
his account with the observation (p 48): 'To-day more and more frequently it is being said that the British 
people should take more interest in the British Commonwealth. We do not want from the British people or 
from our friends in other countries a blind acceptance of the Government's colonial policy: we still need, 
never more than now, questioning, criticism and debate. But it must be based on a knowledge of the facts 
and it must be inspired with a sense of mission and purpose. We have a great task before us: in many ways 
we are only just at the beginning of it, but we have achieved sufficient to serve as a firm foundation for the 
future and to entitle us to look to the future with confidence and hope.' 
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Board of Education, & the present is a favourable time, when the President is, so to 
speak, an Old Boy of the C.O .... 
G.L.M.C 
1.8.39 
2 CO 852/503/6, no 36 4 Sept 1941 
'Projects for the establishment of closer relations between the home 
government and the colonies': memorandum by Sir A Pim for the CO 
Committee on Post-War Problems [Extract] 
[Pim was a former Indian Civil Service officer who undertook financial and economic 
commissions in Swaziland, Bechuanaland, Basutoland, Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, 
Zanzibar and British Honduras, 1932-1937. The extract from his memo reproduced here 
(the original is nearly 100 typescript pages in length) addresses the issue of the 
representation of the colonies at Westminster.) 
. . . 66. It remains to be considered whether any changes are desirable in 
connection with the present relations between Parliament, the Colonial Office, and 
the Colonies, for the purpose of increasing Parliamentary and general public 
knowledge of, and interest in, colonial questions, and of giving Parliament wider 
opportunities for maintaining continuous touch with the formulation of colonial 
policy and with its execution than are provided by the present system of Parliamen-
tary questions and occasional debates. The two main proposals are those for the 
direct representation of the Colonies in Parliament and for some form of Colonial 
Council, either a Standing Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament, or some 
other organisation fulfilling the same purpose. 
In pre-Dominion days the movement for Imperial Federation included proposals 
for a Federal Parliament in which all the Colonies of that time would have been 
represented. The relations between Great Britain and the Dominions have not 
developed on these lines and it seems very improbable that they will do so in future. 
As regards the non-self-governing dependencies, however, Professor Macmillan1 has 
recently advocated the adoption of a policy of quasi-federation by giving some at least 
of the Colonies direct representation in the Home Parliament.* Immediate action in 
this direction is, he says, the more desirable, as otherwise peace, necessarily gravely 
affecting colonial interests, will again be made over the head of the Colonies and 
without a word spoken to express their peculiar point of view. He accepts the fact 
that the rise of the Dominions has made a policy of Imperial Federation impossible, 
and that federation with such immature units as the present Colonies is out of the 
question, but holds that there is room in these special circumstances for some loose 
*See "Democratise the Empire," also the "Fortnightly Review," December 1940, the "Times," August 16, 
1939, and the "Crown Colonist, April, 1941. 
1 W M Macmillan, prof of history, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, 
1917-1934; Heath Clark lecturer (joint), University of London, 1938-1939; member of Advisory 
Committee on Education in the Colonies, 1938-1941, and of Colonial Labour Advisory Committee, 
1946--1952; subsequently director of colonial studies, University of St Andrews, 1947-1954, and acting 
professor of history, University College of the West Indies, Jamaica, 1955; publications include Warning 
from the West Indies: a tract for Africa and the empire (1936) and Africa emergent (1938). 
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centralization taking the form of direct representation in Parliament. His arguments 
in support of this proposal may be briefly summarised as follows:-
There is only one real colonial question and that is the backwardness in all 
respects of the colonial peoples. Under the present system Parliamentary attention 
cannot be concentrated on this, and the most that can be said is that any notorious 
wrongs or grievance are reasonably sure to win a hearing. The Colonial Office can do 
little against the inertia of a Cabinet, or of a Parliament preoccupied with affairs 
more closely concerning a clamorous home-staying electorate; still less against an 
unwilling Treasury. The presence at Westminster of even a handful of colonial 
representatives would at once, as nothing else could, give actuality to the discussion 
of colonial matters. In Great Britain the aim would be to guide, instruct, and 
enlighten, the Imperial Government itself, and the Colonial peoples would welcome 
such a move with enthusiasm as an assurance of future partnership. The record of 
the past shows how much the Imperial Power needs to be informed and enlightened 
as to the nature of its responsibilities and the effect of its actions on the dependent 
peoples. The failure of the old movement for Imperial Federation need not deter us 
from an experiment designed to make Parliament itself truly representative of the 
peoples it governs, and there is no such obstacle as was presented in the case of the 
Dominions by the vested interests of well established local Parliaments. 
The details of his proposal are somewhat vague but he suggests making a 
commencement by including in the scheme only the legal colonies, excluding the 
larger and generally more backward protectorates. That would bring in, among 
others, members from the East, and from the West Indies, and a fair sprinkling of the 
more advanced African communities-quite sufficient to revolutionise the attitude 
of the Mother of Parliaments. Those who are unrepresented will then have an 
incentive to share this privilege and he apparently looks forward to the time when 
"even the humblest colonies will share the partnership which has already converted 
part of the Empire into a democratic Commonwealth." It will however be no part of 
the purpose to take over or interfere with the details of local administration. 
Nothing is said with regard to the basis on which the number of representatives is 
to be fixed, ri:Or as to the character of the electorates, and an examination of the list of 
legal colonies shows how anomalous the results would be if representation were 
confined to them. 
67. The only colonial Power which has had actual experience of the working of a 
system of direct colonial representation in the Home Parliament is France .... The 
main arguments for the system have much greater validity in the case of France than 
of Great Britain. The French system of representation is as illogical as that proposed 
by Professor Macmillan, and is equally unrelated to the relative importance of the 
Colonies. On the other hand that there should be a system of representation is in 
accordance with the French attitude to Colonies as "France Outremer", and the 
greater the progress made in assimilating them to the French culture the more 
logical will it become for them to be represented in the Home Parliament. It is 
especially necessary because the bulk of the colonial legislation is represented by the 
decrees issued by the Colonial Minister, and not by local legislation, though also, it is 
true, not by the French Legislature, and because the colonial economic policies are 
determined in France and are coordinated with the French metropolitan policy. 
There is also considerable competition between French home production and that of 
the Colonies, making it advisable to have spokesmen for the colonial interests. 
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Dominion status has no place in the French conception of the future of the Colonies. 
Nevertheless the French have shown no intention of advancing beyond the degree of 
representation which history has presented them with, possibly because the newer 
Colonies are . in general less advanced, a difference marked by the new conception of 
"association" as replacing "assimilation", but possibly also because of the objections 
to increasing the number of colonial representatives to such an extent as might make 
them a factor of importance in decisions on issues of French home policy. How far 
the colonial representatives have played an effective part in representing colonial 
interests does not appear but the Governor of Mauritius (Sir Bede Clifford) says that 
he has been informed by the Governors of some French colonies which send deputies 
to Paris, that these representatives appear unable to do any useful work for the 
Colony that elects them. Frequently they merely act as a focussing point in the 
metropolis for the complaints of chronically discontented elements at home. It 
seems, he says, that the electors seldom elect the type of person likely to carry any 
weight in the French Chamber and as these represnetatives are for the most part 
ignorant of conditions in the Mother Land, and are unacquainted with, and often 
racially different from, its people, their ineffectiveness is not surprising. 
68. This may not be a fair description but in any case the position as regards the 
introduction of such a system in Great Britain is radically different. British Colonies 
are entities of their own in a sense unknown to France, their legislation is almost 
entirely local though under the general control of the Secretary of State, they 
determine their own economic policies, in theory at any rate, and in the more 
advanced colonies to a large extent in practice. The accepted aim for the future is a 
gradual progress towards self-government, presumably culminating in the attain-
ment of Dominion Status by individual colonies or groups of colonies. It is not easy 
to find a logical justification for applying to the Colonial Empire a new federal 
conception of Dominion Status entirely different from that applied to the present 
Dominions and to India. The Dominions themselves might have something to say on 
the subject, even though the composition of the British Parliament is solely a matter 
for determination by the Home Country. 
Unless there is to be a new conception of self-government and of Dominion Status 
the greater the advance made by the Colonies the more anomalous would become 
the position of their representatives in the Home Parliament, and, as in the case of 
Ireland, they would disappear when Colonial Dominions were recognized. The 
imperial link between the Colonies and the Mother Country which is described as 
one of the purposes of the French system of representation is provided by the Crown 
in the case of the British Empire. There are also certainly possibilities of friction 
between the proposed representatives and the local legislatures. 
So long as it is merely a question of what might be called token representation on 
a very small scale, the practical difficulties might not be serious, except as regards 
finding suitable representation for such divergent interests, and it would be at least 
as true of the House of Commons as of the French Chamber that they would be glad 
to give a fair hearing to qualified colonial representatives. If, however, the system 
was to be extended on the lines apparently contemplated by Professor Macmillan very 
complicated problems would be raised. How would the number of representatives be 
determined? It could obviously not be on the basis of populations- the advocates of 
Federal Union find themselves in a quandary on this point- and in the British 
Colonies there is nothing corresponding to the French citizenship which gives a 
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special status in the French Empire. If again the number, though not on a 
population basis, was so substantial as to make the colonial representatives a factor 
of possible importance in determining issues of home policy, we may get another 
illustration of the difficulty of assimilating members representing an electorate with 
different fundamental interests, in a democratic assembly. The history of the Irish 
members and of their effects on British politics does not encourage a repetition of 
such an experiment, though geographical dispersion and diversity of interests should 
diminish the probability of serious friction. The problem of finding more Parliamen-
tary time would not be solved by the introduction of colonial members; it might be 
made even more difficult as the Irish precedent has shown. When again Professor 
Macmillan says that it will be no part of the purpose to interfere with the details of 
local administration he seems to me to be unduly sanguine. Even as things are now 
the attention of Members of Parliament known to be interested in colonial questions 
is largely directed to local details, and the proposed colonial members could hardly 
resist the continual pressure to take up personal cases and small local incidents. As 
the dependencies advanced this tendency would grow stronger, and would increase 
the danger of conflict with the local legislatures, apart from annoying the Govern-
ments. The Mandates Commission was, I believe, flooded with petty complaints from 
Syria. 
For these reasons, both theoretical and practical, it does not seem advisable to 
adopt the principle of quasi federation for the Colonial Empire only. If, in the future, 
Imperial Federation became a practical possibility the representation to be accorded 
to the Colonies would have to be considered, and that of India would be an even more 
difficult problem. Nevertheless the fact remains that there is a great deal of force in 
Professor Macmillan's two main arguments, first that the presence of suitable 
colonial representatives at Westminster would give a much increased sense of reality 
to discussions on colonial matters, and secondly that a step of this kind would be 
warmly welcomed in the more advanced colonies and would have a valuable moral 
effect-at any rate in the first instance though disillusionment might follow. 
Whether feudatories such as those in Malaya would welcome the innovation seems 
doubtful as they consider their special relations to be with the Crown. Occasions may 
also very well arise in connection with post war readjustments when there will be a 
strong temptation to adopt policies-possibly in connection with the relief of home 
unemployment-which will impose an unfair burden on colonies. In such cases the 
Colonial Office might receive valuable help from representatives of the Colonies .... 
3 CO 866/24/1059/6/1941-46, no 7 24Apr-4 May 1942 
[Colonial Office accommodation]: minutes by C J Jeffries and Lord 
Cranborne 
1. The late Sir Hugh Clifford1 once began a despatch with the memorable words: 
"Sir, After five years of fruitless importunity ... ". It is rather in that mood that I put 
1 Clifford began his career in Perak (Malay states) in 1883 and served in Selangor and Pahang before 
moving to the Caribbean in 1903 and Ceylon in 1907. He was governor of the Gold Coast from 1912, of 
Nigeria from 1919, of Ceylon from 1925 and high commissioner for the Straits Settlements and governor 
of the Malay States from 1927 until his retirement in 1929. 
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forward this minute; thought in this case the period, as far as I am concerned, is 
twelve years. I am writing this in the hope that, now that we have a new Secretary of 
State and new Under-Secretaries, a decisive effort may be made to tackle the question 
of Colonial Office accommodation. 
2. The basic fact, of course, is that the Downing Street office was provided in 
1875 to accommodate a Ministerial and administrative staff of about 25 officers 
together with a clerical staff of about the same number. To-day the Ministerial, 
Advisory and Administrative staffs of the Colonial and Dominions Offices are at least 
five times as large as the original number, while the ancillary services have grown 
out of all proportion. 
3. The accommodation problem has been a nightmare to successive Establish-
ment Officers since at least 1920. First, rooms designed only as storage space were 
pressed into service; then the Accounts and Appointments Departments were 
out-housed, to be followed by other sections. A continuous deterioration in the 
situation has led by progressive steps, which I need not detail, to the present 
position, in which all the Personnel Division, the Social Services Department, and all 
the Advisory staff, except the Legal and Business Advisers, are housed at Park Street, 
just over two miles from the main building. A part of the Economic Department is at 
the Crown Agents' Office in Millbank. Yet the pressure continues to mount. Except 
for the Ministers and Under-Secretaries, few indeed of the officers remaining at 
Downing Street are housed in even moderately decent accommodation. The great 
majority of the staff are working in shabby, dirty, ill-lit and ill-ventilated rooms 
under conditions of severe overcrowding. There are constant complaints about 
delays in dealing with work, and everyone knows that certain simple measures of 
reorganisation would enable the work to be despatched with an immense economy of 
time and labour; but these measures are absolutely impracticable under existing 
conditions of accommodation. It is not only a matter of shortage, but of lay-out. The 
conditions of Colonial Office work, with a higher proportion of administrative and 
advisory officers who require single rooms, call for an entirely different type of 
building. 
4. The disadvantages of separating the Office into two parts at a distance of over 
two miles are too obvious to need elaboration. It is perhaps not so fully realised how 
much the Downing Street building itself operates to the detriment of efficiency. 
Those of the staff who are fortunate enough to work in the Park Street building 
would, I think, prefer separation to being condemned to return to the squalor of 
Downing Street. 
5. The following proposition can, I feel confident, be stated without fear of 
contradiction:-
(i) The Downing Street building will never provide a really worthy headquarters 
for the Colonial Empire. Even if the Dominions Office were to move out, the 
accommodation would be nothing like sufficient. Even if a change of policy should 
result in the elimination or reduction of the India and Burma Offices, the Colonial 
Office would have to compete with the Home and Foreign Offices for the 
accommodation thus released, and past experience gives no ground for supposing 
that we should get more than the other departments' leavings: and even then we 
should still be up against the inherent unsuitability of the building for our 
purpose. 
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(ii) So far as the internal working of the Office is concerned, it is far more 
important that the Office should be under one roof (or at least under immediately 
adjacent roofs) than that it should be at any particular address. 
(iii) There is at present no suitable and sufficient accommodation available or 
likely to be available nearer to the main building than Park Street. This has been 
established at innumerable discussions with the Ministry of Works and Buildings. 
6. On the basis of these propositions, there is an overwhelming case for 
reconstituting the Office as an effective working unit away from Downing Street. 
This can be done in two stages:-
(a) During the war, the Ministry of Works and Buildings can requisition a further 
block of flats adjacent to Park Street, and re-house the main body of the Office 
there. 
(b) After the war, a new Colonial Office can be built as part of the post-war 
reconstruction of London. An eminently suitable site is likely to be available on the 
South bank of the Thames, adjacent to the County Hall. 
7. The only arguments that can be brought forward against this plan (a plan 
which would undoubtedly be strongly supported by the Ministry of Works and 
Buildings) are:-
(a) The convenience of Ministers; 
(b) Separation from the Foreign Office, Treasury, etc.; 
(c) Prestige. 
8. It is not for me to comment on (a) except to observe that I cannot suppose that 
any Minister would wish to have his personal convenience placed in the forefront of a 
question which involves the efficiency of his department and the welfare of his staff. 
In any case, although Mayfair is manifestly less accessible to the Houses of 
Parliament and No.10 Downing Street than the present Colonial Office, the distances 
by car are matters of minutes only, and the inconvenience to our Secretary of State 
would be little if any greater than that to which other Ministers outside the Whitehall 
area are subjected-far less, for example, than that which must be experienced by the 
Minister of Information. 
9. As regards (b), the same consideration may be put forward. Other non-
Whitehall departments are equally concerned to be near their colleagues in other 
departments, and the real question is whether the intermittent need of certain 
officers for contact with other departments is more important than the continuous 
need of all sections of the Colonial Office to be in contact with each other and with 
the Secretary of State and Under-Secretaries, so that the whole organisation can 
function as a team. 
10. Finally, as regards prestige, I can only say that whatever we may gain by 
keeping the Downing Street address (and I am not sure that the words "Downing 
Street" invariably conjure up feelings of warmth and affection in the Colonies), we 
lose the moment anyone sets foot in the building. It would need the pen of a Dickens 
to describe the sort of impression of our Colonial administration that must be given 
to anyone who penetrates the building from which that administration receives its 
inspiration and direction. 
11. I venture to urge most strongly that we should make up our minds now that 
we are paying too high a price for clinging to the old address, and that we should take 
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advantage of the war-time requisitioning powers of the Ministry of Works and 
Buildings to make a clean break. 
C.J.J. 
24.4.42 
Mr. Jeffries certainly puts forward a most moving plea for the concentration of the 
whole of the Colonial Office in Park Street, and no Secretary of State could view with 
equanimity a situation which compels a large proportion of his staff to work under 
conditions both of inconvenience and discomfort. I should, therefore, naturally like 
to do what I could to meet him. But while I am reluctant to attach too much 
importance to what may appear to be merely personal considerations, these must, I 
am afraid, not be entirely neglected, either from my own point of view or from that of 
the efficient operation of the Office. It must, I am convinced after careful 
consideration, be taken as certain that neither I nor Mr. Macmillan could ourselves 
move to Park Street. We have not only our departmental, but our political, duties to 
perform. In my own case, it must be remembered that I am at present not only 
Colonial Secretary but also Leader of the House of Lords, and Mr. Macmillan also has 
to spend much of his time in the House of Commons. We have constantly to attend 
Cabinet and other Committees, all of which are centred round Whitehall, and in my 
own case there is the House of Lords itself from which I cannot be too far separated. 
Even now it is hard enough to combine these activities, and at a distance of a mile 
from Westminster it would be almost impossible. I am driven, therefore, to the 
conclusion that whatever happened to the rest of the Office, I should either have to 
remain in my present room, cut off from all my staff, or transfer to the House of 
Lords, which would be equally remote from them. And the same is likely to be true of 
Mr. Macmillan. All consultations with Sir George Gater or the Under-Secretaries 
would either have to be carried out by telephone or minute, or they would have on 
each occasion to do the two mile journey to and fro. I cannot believe that it would be 
satisfactory or even possible to carry on the work of the Office under such conditions. 
It may, of course, be that some modification of the present arrangements could, with 
advantage, be made so as to enable a larger proportion of the staff to be transferred to 
Park Street to the general benefit of the Office. But I am convinced that the nucleus 
at any rate must remain in Whitehall, and that this must include the Permanent 
Under-Secretary and the Under-Secretaries. This alone seems to make Mr. Jeffries' 
proposal impracticable. 
Undoubtedly, the Colonial Office must as soon as possible after the war be 
concentrated in one building in the Westminster area, and I shall be very ready to 
approach Lord Portal2 about this at once in order that our requirements may have 
the first priority of consideration. But I am afraid that, for the time being, there is no 
alternative to continuing the present arrangement, inconvenient though I fully 
recognise this may be.3 
2 Minister of works and planning, 1942-1944. 
c. 
4.5.42 
3 Cranbome added a manuscript note to his minute: 'I should add that I do not attach the slightest 
importance to the Downing St. address, & if we can find an alternative and equally suitable site to a 
Colonial Office building to be erected after the war, I shall be very ready to support it now.' 
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The CO staff left Downing Street and its other buildings and moved into Church House in Great Smith 
Street (on the other side of Parliament Square in close proximity to Westminster Abbey) between June and 
September 1947. Plans for a new CO building, though frequently conjectured, never materialised, cf 
BDEEP series A, vol 3, D Goldsworthy, ed, The Conservative government and the end of empire 
1951-1957, part 11, 212, 214. 
4 C0970/16 Nov 1942 
'A plan for the Colonial Office': memorandum by C 1 Jeffries 
1. The purpose of this note is to deal not so much with the internal affairs of the 
Colonies (though they must come into the picture) as with the problem of providing 
machinery for the formulation and execution of policy in regard to Colonial affairs in 
general. In particular, the object is to examine the functions of the Colonial Office 
and the adequacy of its organisation for carrying out those functions. 
2. As the official link between the Colonial governments on the one hand, and the 
British Parliament and public on the other, the Colonial Office has a double role. It 
has a duty to the Colonies-to see that their interests are properly looked after and 
represented in the counsels of the mother country. And it has a duty to Parliament-
to see that the wishes and policy of Parliament are carried out in the Colonies. 
3. Although the Colonial Office has always had these two duties, it has not in the 
past had very much incentive to take either of them very seriously. Parliament-and 
still less the electorate-cannot be said to have shown any consistent enthusiasm for 
framing and executing a Colonial policy; nor has political opinion in most of the 
Colonies been sufficiently developed or vocal for the Colonies to make articulate 
demands for attention. In consequence, save on the occasion of some public scandal, 
the Colonial Office has proceeded very much on its own lines, with the minimum 
either of encouragement or of interference from either side. 
4. For good or ill, that phase has passed. But its influence remains. The 
traditions, the outlook, and to some extent the organisation of the Colonial Office are 
still attuned to the days-within the recollection of all but the most junior of the 
staff-when the Office was more or less a law unto itself. Before coming to 
consideration of the present day, it may be worth while to look back a quarter of a 
century and review the position as it existed towards the end of the first world war. 
5. At that time, the organisation of the Colonial Office was for all practical 
purposes entirely geographical. The General Department dealt with Office establish-
ment, with a few subjects of no political importance, such as ceremonies, flags and 
that sort of thing, and with pensions and promotions for the Colonial Service. On 
these subjects there were a certain amount of "circular" and "miscellaneous" 
correspondence; but to all intents and purposes the sole channel of communication 
between the Secretary of State and a Colonial government was the geographical 
department. As between the departments themselves there was little or no contact or 
co-ordination. They were as remote from each other as the Colonies with which they 
dealt. Excluding the Dominions Department, there were two Assistant Under-
Secretaries-one for Africa and one for "the rest", but they made little or no attempt 
to co-ordinate the work even of the departments in their respective divisions. The 
General Department kept a "precedent book" to which departments could refer at 
[4] METROPOLITAN REORGANISATION 15 
their discretion for guidance; but it was not a very effective instrument. Instances 
could be given of an entirely opposite policy being pursued at the same time even in 
East and West Africa respectively with regard to the same subject. Of a general 
"Colonial" policy on any subject there was no sign, nor indeed would it have been 
considered appropriate to think in terms of such a policy. At the same time, there 
was a community of tradition. The Office saw to it that affairs in the Colonies were 
conducted in accordance with what may be described as a "public school" code of 
morals. Oppression and exploitation would be jumped upon if they came to light. 
Financial probity was a sine qua non. A genuine attempt was made to use the 
Secretary of State's right of "patronage" so as to fill the higher posts by able, honest 
and conscientious officials. 
6. The functions of the Office were, however, conceived as essentially negative 
rather than positive. In general, the administrative staff had no practical experience 
of Colonial administration, and they did not regard it as their job to intervene in local 
administrative questions unless they were invited to comment, or forced to do so 
because of the disclosure of some abuse. There were, however, elaborate regulations, 
dating back for 50 years and more, prescribing the matters, mainly relating to 
finance and personnel, in which the Governor was required to obtain the approval of 
the Secretary of State for his actions. The labours of the geographical departments 
were largely devoted to studying and criticising the Governor's submissions. So long 
as a Colony had plenty of money, the Office was inclined to concern itself very little 
with its affairs. On the other hand, if a Colony could not balance its budget and had 
recourse to the Treasury for a grant in aid, every penny of expenditure came under 
the most rigid control. The whole aim and object of this control was to make the 
Colony self-supporting as quickly as possible. In short, the "man on the spot" was left 
free to introduce new political or administrative measures of far-reaching import-
ance to the welfare of the people-or, alternatively, to let things slide-without the 
necessity of consultation with the Secretary of State. But he could not engage or 
dismiss an office-boy, or grant £5 to a necessitous widow, without going through the 
Colonial Office mill. 
7. As has already been observed, the main line of demarcation in the Office was 
not, as now, between "geographical" and "subject", but between Africa and "the rest". 
Apart from physical considerations, there were historical reasons for this. The 
opening up of Africa had presented the Office with a whole series of new problems 
demanding a new technique. The West Indian, Eastern and other older Colonies had 
been the concern of the Office for a very long time, and, since the main business of 
the Office had been with what are now the Dominions, had settled down to a regime 
of what may be described as laisser-faire or blunt neglect, according to taste. But 
Africa was a different proposition. 
8. Before 1914, some effort was made to deal comprehensively in the Colonial 
Office with certain aspects of tropical African administration. In 1909 the Tropical 
African Medical and Sanitary Committee was set up, to advise the Secretary of State. 
In 1910 the foundations of the present Appointments Department were laid and 
recruitment for the African services put on a regular and sound basis. (Malaya, 
Ceylon and Hong Kong were, of course, still under the "Eastern Cadet" examination 
system and remained so until 1932). In 1910 also a "Tropical Services Committee" 
was constituted, to work out a scheme for organising the civil services of the 
Dependencies on both sides of Africa on a common plan. The war, however, 
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intervened to prevent any development in the direction of an unified civil service for 
Africa as a whole. 
9. During the years following the war, two opposing tendencies can be seen to 
have been at work. There was on the one hand a clear movement towards 
"self-determination" in the Colonies. It was recognised that each Colony had its own 
particular problems, and would have to develop along its own particular lines. Even 
such uniformity of practice as had been achieved in dealing with tropical Africa broke 
down in face of the obvious political, social, economic and climatic differences of the 
East and West Coasts. 
10. Against this, there was an equally clear tendency to recognise that in many 
respects the problems of the Colonies, while superficially various, were fundamental-
ly similar. It began to be seen that the new central organisations which had been 
started primarily with Africa in view could contribute also to the welfare and progress 
of the older Colonies. The Colonial Office in short began to develop a corporate mind 
and outlook. 
11. Amongst many symptoms of this new trend, the following may be quoted. 
In 1919-20, three Committees sat on the respective problems of the Medical, the 
Agricultural and the Veterinary Services for the Colonies as a whole. 
In 1922 the scope of the Advisory Medical Committee (which had previously dealt 
only with tropical Africa) was extended to cover all the Dependencies. 
In 1925 the Colonial Office was separated from the Dominions Office. At the same 
time, a Colonial Governor (Sir Samuel Wilson) was appointed Permanent Under 
Secretary of State. 
In 1926 a Chief Medical Adviser was appointed. 
In 1927 the first Colonial Office Conference was held; the second (and last up to 
date) was in 1930. 
In 1928 the General Department was enlarged so that an increasing part of the 
Office business should be dealt with on a "subject" basis. 
In 1929 the scope of the Education Advisory Committee was broadened from 
tropical Africa to the whole Colonial Empire. In the same year the Agricultural 
Council was set up and an Agricultural Adviser appointed. In the same year also, the 
first Colonial Development Act was passed. 
In 1930 the Warren Fisher Report on the Colonial Service was presented and 
discussed at the Colonial Office Conference, followed by the establishment of the 
Personnel Division and the acceptance of the policy of unification. 
In 1932 the Colonies were represented as a unit at the Ottawa Conference, and 
since then the central handling of economic subjects has become firmly established. 
In 1939 the Social Services Department was set up, and in 1940 the Statement of 
Policy on Colonial Development and Welfare was issued, followed by the passage of 
the Colonial Development and Welfare Act. 
12. Along with this-largely due to the initiative of Sir Samuel Wilson-there 
has been a steady tendency towards more intimate association between the Colonial 
Office and the Colonial civil services. During the last war, a small number of Colonial 
Service officers were imported into the Office as "beachcombers", and this no doubt 
did much to establish the idea that the Office staff and the Services abroad were not 
natural enemies but colleagues engaged in the same task. This idea-now a 
commonplace of every day- was certainly not prevalent 25 years ago outside the 
African departments, and only to a limited extent in those departments. Until Sir S. 
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Wilson's time it would hardly have been thinkable that-otherwise than as a purely 
exceptional and temporary expedient-a Colonial Service officer should be employed 
in any position of responsibility in the Office. The African departments however 
necessarily had a good deal of contact with their officials owing to the relative 
frequency of leave. The Eastern and West Indian Departments had little or none. In 
recent years the interchange of staff, the activities of the Personnel Division, the 
appointment of Advisers in close touch with their professional colleagues overseas, 
have done much to break down barriers and to establish a more human relation 
between Whitehall and the Colonial Service. 
13. There is however something to be put down on the other side of the account. 
In the old days, such personal contact as there was did at least subsist between the 
geographical departments and their Colonies. Modern developments, while streng-
thening contact between the Colonial Service and the Colonial Office have weakened 
the special position of the geographical department. In the old days, everyone in the 
Colonies looked to the geographical department as the channel of communication, 
and personal relations of friendship and even of int imacy might grow up between 
officers on either side in favourable circumstances. Now officials in general have 
natural contacts with the Personnel Division, while specialists naturally tend to 
cluster round the specialist Advisers. All this is encouraged by the fact that the 
Personnel Division and most of the Advisers have since 1939 been removed to a 
separate building away from the geographical departments. 
14. This brief historical analysis has been necessary in order to attempt an 
appreciation of how the Office stands to-day in relation to its dual obligation-the 
obligation to the Colonies to see that their interests are adequately represented here, 
and the obligation to Parliament to see that its wishes are adequately carried out in 
the Colonies. 
15. It has already been suggested that this dual obligation, while it has always 
existed, has in the past remained in the background as no more than a theoretical or 
philosophical justification of the existence of the Colonial Office and of its works. If 
in many ways the Office has initiated and carried out important constructive 
measures, the incentive has come less from any external pressure than from the 
enthusiasm and enterprise of individuals within the Office-whether Ministers or 
permanent officials. The Office has been fortunate in having had a number of men, 
such as Sir Herbert Read, 1 of energy and vision, who without any stimulus but that 
of their own consciences have pressed forward schemes of lasting value to the 
Colonial Empire. It has also had its fair share of men of ordinary ability who have 
been content to deal faithfully with such matters as have come before them, without 
attempting to influence the natural course of events. 
16. But this natural course of events, accelerated by the great revolutionary 
movements which have taken place throughout the world, and seconded by the 
inevitable consequences of the efforts of the Colonial Office itself to promote the 
1 Assistant private secretary to Joseph Chamberlain, 1896-1897; chairman, Colonial Survey· Commission, 
1905-1924, Colonial Advisory Medical and Sanitary Commission, 1909-1924, Bureau of Hygiene and 
Tropical Diseases, 1908-1924; served on commissions or attended conferences on African liquor (1895), 
Anglo-German frontier in East Africa (1906), sleeping sickness (1907-1908), African arms traffic 
(1907-1908); assistant under-secretary of state, deputy permanent under-secretary of state, 1916-1924; 
gov of Mauritius, 1924-1930. 
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social and economic advancement of the peoples of many of the Colonial territories, 
has brought about an entirely new situation. A very few years ago, it is not too much 
to say that (apart from one or two questions which had caught the public attention) 
it mattered very little, except to the consciences of the Colonial Office staff, whether 
the Office did anything or nothing. Provided that the Colonies produced no grave 
public scandal, and that the British tax~payer was not expected to spend more than a 
minimum on keeping them alive, the Office was doing all that any reasonable person 
could require of it. Sound administration and sound finance were the twin ideals. 
17. The change in the picture has come with bewildering suddenness. Colonial 
affairs have become a major issue in home and international politics; while in the 
Colonies themselves political and social aspirations are exercising an insistent and 
vocal pressure. The official machinery which served well enough in the conditions of 
yesterday has now to cope with strains and stresses for which it was never designed. 
The problem of adapting the organisation to the new conditions is one that must 
urgently be faced. Before any attempt can be made to suggest a solution, the first 
necessity is to analyse the strength and the deficiencies of the present system in 
relation to the needs of to-day. 
18. It has seemed to some members of the Office, and it has certainly appeared to 
outside observers, that the trend of development in Office organisation since 1925 
has been in the direction of substituting a "subject" for a "geographical" organisa-
tion. It has not, however, been the general view in the Office that such an outcome of 
the changes which have taken place would be desirable. It has been generally felt that 
the geographical system should remain the backbone of the Office, and that the 
"subject" departments and specialist staff should be regarded as advisory rather than 
executive, except as regards quite limited and well defined areas of work. It will 
probably be agreed that in present circumstances, when political developments in 
the Colonies are taking new and individual forms, according to the characteristics of 
each territory, the geographical structure is more than ever necessary. Whether the 
existing status and organisation of the geographical departments is satisfactory will 
be a matter for subsequent examination.2 
19. On the other hand, it can hardly be denied that the "subject" departments, 
with the nexus of Advisers and Advisory Committees, are an indispensable feature of 
the Office in modern conditions. In the old days of simple administration it was 
possible for each geographical department to function as a more or less independent 
unit. The Governor of each Colony had his technical advisers and it was for him to 
formulate and execute a policy. The function of the geographical department was to 
criticise, ratify or disallow the Governor's proposals, principally on the basis of 
finance. If the department needed advice on a technical point, it could obtain such 
2 Sir A Dawe in particular viewed the geographical departments as the 'backbone' of the CO organisation. 
He acknowledged that the Economic and Social Service departments performed valuable functions but 
minuted: 'The establishment of these two Departments means that authority is divided, action is confused, 
and administrative officers are discouraged and hampered by the fact that there is no .clear definition of 
their responsibilities. The system detracts from efficient and harmonious relations between this Office and 
Colonial Governments. The unfortunate Governors are scourged with theories and crowned with 
memoranda which too frequently have no relation to the practical problems to which their activities 
should be directed. In fact, it seems to me that for the ephemeral purposes of political window-dressing we 
are neglecting the serious and underlying issues of Colonial administration' (CO 866/16/1015, minute by 
Dawe, 10 May 1940). 
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advice ad hoc, and in the light of that advice apply its common sense and experience 
to Uie question at issue. 
20. It has been shown above that it was first in relation to the opening up of the 
new and undeveloped African territories that the Office first found itself in the 
position of having to take initiative and formulate a policy of general application; in 
the course of time it became clear that the machinery which had been built up with 
Africa primarily in view could also make a contribution of essential value to the older 
Colonies. Meanwhile, the Colonies share in the general development, throughout the 
world, of the idea that the business of the State is to concern itself with economic 
and social problems which in the past were not conceived as properly activities of 
government. Some central direction of these new activities became inevitable in 
practice, since neither the Colonial governments, still less the geographical depart-
ments of the Office, possessed the necessary technical equipment or could be 
provided individually with it except at the cost of disproportionate expense and 
duplication and waste of the limited resources available. 
21. Assuming, then, that the essential structure is sound, it may yet be suggested 
that there are grave deficiencies. It will be convenient to discuss these under the 
following heads:-
(1) Domestic relations between the Office and the Colonies; 
(2) External relations between the Office and (a) Parliament; (b) the public; 
(c) foreign opinion. 
(3) The staffing and organisation of the Office in the light of the above. 
22. The traditional relation of the Office to the Colonies is simple: all com-
munications pass between the Governor on the one hand and the Secretary of State 
on the other. Within the Office, until recent years, the geographical department was 
the sole channel of such communications, apart from a severely limited class of 
communications clearly identified as "circular" or "miscellaneous" despatches, and 
the replies thereto. All the information which might exist with regard to the affairs of 
any Colony was concentrated in the hands of the geographical department, and 
either the Secretary of State or the Governor, desiring advice or information on any 
particular matter, had only to apply to the department for it. 
23. By force of circumstances, this simple system has very largely broken down. 
Despite the growing volume and complexity of the Office work, the geographical 
departments are no stronger in personnel-indeed they are less strongly staffed-
than they were 20 years ago. The whole weight of the expansion of the Office has 
been on the "subject" side. It is manifestly impossible for the head of a geographical 
department to retain the same intimate knowledge of the affairs of his Colonies as 
had his predecessor in the same office. Again, much of the information and 
experience formerly concentrated in the geographical department is now necessarily 
distributed amongst the "subject" departments and the Advisers. Correspondence, 
both official and semi-official, passes between the Colonial Governors and their 
officers and these sections of the Office; and even though this correspondence is 
"seen" in the geographical department, it does not become part and parcel of the 
department's background in the same way as corre~pondence which the department 
handles, and for which it accepts the responsibility itself. 
24. From the Colonial government's point of view, there is some evidence to 
show that this dispersal of activity in the Office is hot entirely welcome. It was some 
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satisfaction to a Governor to know with whom he was dealing. He could arrive at an 
understanding with his "opposite number" or perhaps lay plans to circumv~nt him! 
Anyhow, there was a personal relationship. But now his relations with the Office are 
necessarily of a more impersonal nature. He has no single "opposite number". He 
suspects that many of the instructions which he receives-have been drawn up by 
experts who do not appreciate his particular difficulties. In short, he wants to deal 
with the Secretary of State, or his representative, as one administrator to another, 
and not with a Committee, however expert and well-meaning. 
25. More generally, there is a need for some more practical recognition of the 
change which has taken place in the relative positions of the Colonial Office and 
the Colonial governments. The Office is no longer, or should no longer be, a machine 
for registering the Secretary of State's approval or disapproval of proposals submit-
ted by the Governor. Much of the official correspondence is still devoted to financial 
and administrative questions of minor importance with which the Governor, 
especially in the larger Colonies, should be empowered to deal on his own responsi-
bility. A large proportion of this correspondence, with the effete Colonial Regula-
tions by which it is governed, can and should be scrapped. (There has been no really 
substantial change in the Colonial Regulations, as defining the relations of the 
Governor and the Secretary of State, since 1867). Correspondence between the 
Secretary of State and the Governors should be put on to a new basis; the topics dis-
cussed should not be details, but questions of importance regarding which the 
Governor may really want advice and guidance, and the Secretary of State may really 
have it to give. The correspondence should be conducted in a spirit of mutual frank-
ness and helpful co-operation, and it should be a definite aim on each side to elicit 
and to impart information which each may require for the proper discharge of his 
responsibilities. 
26. Turning now to external relations, it must be recognised that upon the Office 
lies the duty of representing its case, and the case of the Colonies, before the bar of 
public opinion both at home and abroad. This implies, first, that the Office must have 
a firm grip of its task, must know what it is about and what is going on; secondly, 
that it must be in a position to demonstrate convincingly that the Colonial Empire is 
a "good show", that its problems are being tackled with energy and vision, that it is 
the welfare of the people and not the balancing of the budget that is the objective of 
its policy, and that the Office and the Colonial administrations are working as a team. 
It is necessary, first to make this true in fact and then to convince the world that it is 
true. 
27. To a considerable extent it is, of course, already true in fact, but it can 
scarcely be denied that the present arrangements fall far short of the ideal. The 
difficulties, especially in war-time, are immense; but so are the opportunities and so 
is the urgency of the problem. Tied up by regulations of a past generation, the Office 
still devotes a disproportionate amount of energy to struggling with knotty points 
about somebody's pension or the dismissal of an engine-driver, while broad political, 
social and economic issues raise their heads on every side. There is plenty of good 
will, plenty of good advice, any amount of efficiency. But there is a need for 
disentangling the Office from the inessentials and concentrating its efforts on the 
essentials. Unless it can do so, it will never properly tackle the Colonial problem, still 
less convince anyone else that it is doing so. 
28. If this diagnosis of the situation be approximately correct, it is time to 
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consider the practical implications in relation to the organisation and staffing of the 
Office. The objects of any reorganisation should be:-
(1) The senior administrative officers should have their energies set free to 
concentrate on the more important issues without having their time and attention 
occupied by detail; 
(2) Not only should they have ample time for discussion with their Office 
colleagues and with officers on leave from the Colonies, for planning and for study, 
but they should have opportunities for constant contact with the Colonies by 
travel. It is not so much visits by special emissaries of the Secretary of State that 
are required as frequent visits by those who are actually dealing with the daily 
work; 
(3) The geographical, subject and advisory branches of the Office should work 
together as a team; 
(4) The machinery for collecting and making available information with regard to 
Colonial affairs should be greatly strengthened. 
29. To achieve these objects, two things are required: first, a drastic elimination 
of activities and correspondence which in modern conditions are superfluous; and, 
secondly, a considerable increase in the superior administrative staff. 
30. Details of the possible means of cutting out unessentials need not be gone 
into here; they would best be examined by a small Committee including persons with 
experience of the Colonial end of the correspondence. The objects should be to get 
right away from the conception of the Office as a machine for criticising, approving 
or disapproving the proposals of Governors, and to establish a mutual relation 
between the Secretary of State and the Colonial Governments as partners in a 
common enterprise. There is however one major reform which, if it could be 
accomplished, would have an immense effect. This would be the removal from the 
Secretary of State and the Colonial Office of responsibility for the affairs of Palestine. 
The troubles of this unhappy country have for the past 20 years occupied a very large 
proportion of the time and attention of successive Secretaries and Under-Secretaries 
of State. Yet the problems of Palestine are not in any real sense "Colonial", and every 
hour spent on them is diverting the Office from its proper work. 
31. As regards expansion and re-arrangement of staff, there are clearly many 
possible permutations and combinations, and no definitive plan can be put forward 
here. Any suggestions made can only be regarded as a tentative basis for considera-
tion. 
32. It is somewhat presumptuous to suggest how the Permanent Under-Secretary 
should do his work, but it can hardly be disputed that the burden laid upon him by 
the present system is more than one man can reasonably be asked to bear, if he is to 
give his full attention to the broad issues of policy. The weakness of the system is that 
there is no one below him who is in a position to take a synoptic view of any question 
of more than minor importance. It is accordingly suggested that he should have two 
Deputy Under-Secretaries who would really function as such; that is to say they 
would relieve him of work and act on his behalf in their respective spheres. Those 
spheres would be elastic, so that work could be adjusted to changes of circumstances; 
but broadly speaking one Deputy (who would be a Colonial Governor) might deal 
with the Office relation to the Colonies, and the other (a member of the permanent 
staff) with the Office organisation and the relation of the Office to Parliament, to 
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other Government departments, and to the public. The three would in any event 
work in close and constant co-operation, and it might be expected that for a 
considerable part of the time one or another of the three would be travelling abroad. 
33. It is further suggested that the Permanent, Deputy and Assistant Under-
Secretaries (with the principal Advisers acting as a consultative panel) should form a 
permanent Council for administration and planning, and that the Office should 
acquire the technique of dealing with important questions (geographical as well as 
general) by discussion in council instead of on paper. By this means, the accumu-
lated knowledge and experience of the Office would be brought to bear on all 
important problems, a common sense of responsibility would be engendered, and the 
various sections of the Office would be brought to appreciate each other's point of 
view. Colonial Governors on leave might with advantage be made temporary 
members of the Council during their stay in this country. 
34. Before considering the position of Assistant Under-Secretaries, it will be 
convenient to examine the departmental organisation. From what has gone before, it 
will be clear that the Assistant Secretary in charge of a geographical department 
should be regarded as holding a key position in the Office. It is he who is in practice 
the main link between the Office and the Colony. He should know all about the 
affairs of the Colony and be able to represent its interests here. At the same time he 
should be fully seized of the general policy of the Office and of the views of the 
Secretary of State with regard to all questions which may arise in his Colony. He 
should as far as possible establish personal contact with the Governor and leading 
officials and unofficials in the Colony. To this end he should not only be freely 
accessible to them when they are here, but should pay frequent visits to the Colony 
itself. 
35. If the Assistant Secretaries are to perform these functions aright, their 
number must be increased, so that they have to cover less ground than at present. 
The traditional "lay-out" of a geographical department consists of 1 Assistant 
Secretary, 2 or 3 Principals, 2 Assistant Principals. This should be replaced by a 
"lay-out" of 1 Assistant Secretary, 1 Principal (as his assistant and deputy), 1 
Assistant Principal or Clerical Officer, 1 Secretary Shorthand-Typist. The number of 
geographical Assistant Secretaries required to cover the ground adequately can be 
put at not less than 10, * as against 6 at present. It is suggested that these Assistant 
Secretaries be no longer termed Heads of Departments, but "Regional Officers". It is 
further suggested that they should not all be members of the permanent Office staff, 
but should include a proportion of officers of the Colonial Service; and that it would 
be an advantage rather than a disadvantage for such officers to deal with the Colonies 
in which they have served. 
36. The case of the "subject" departments is rather different. Their work is partly 
of a direct executive character (personal, economic, defence, welfare, public relations 
etc.) and partly in the nature of research and the obtaining and transmitting of 
specialist advice. In some instances these two functions exist side by side in the same 
department (e.g. Social Services) . It is suggested that, as the term "geographical" 
might be altered to "regional", so the term "subject" might be altered to "functional". 
37. No special consideration seems to arise at present with regard to the Colonial 
Service, Appointments, Defence, General and Economic (Supply and Production) 
*eg Africa 4, West Indies 2, Eastern 2, Mediterranean 1, Middle East 1. 
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Departments. Their functions are clearly defined and well understood, and their 
general lay-out corresponds to their functions. The departments which call for 
examination are the Public Relations and Social Services Departments. Both are 
comparatively new and to some extent experimental. The functions which they 
perform are of essential and increasing importance, and it is doubtful whether their 
present organisation is satisfactorily adapted to the requirements of the work. 
38. So far from being a minor appendage of the Office, the Public Relations 
Department should in present circumstances be regarded as one of its most 
important branches. Since, for good or ill, Colonial affairs have emerged from their 
traditional obscurity into the limelight, it is essential, as already pointed out, that 
full and accurate information on the subject should be made available with a view to 
the creation of an educated public opinion both at home and abroad. What is 
required is not only an organisation to deal with publicity and propaganda, but one 
that will at the same time undertake the collection, recording and indexing of 
information with regard to all aspects of Colonial affairs and making the results 
available to the Office and, through the proper channels, to Parliament, the press and 
the public. 
39. It is accordingly suggested that the present Public Relations Department 
should be replaced by an Information Department comprising two officers of 
Assistant Secretary level with the necessary specialist assistants. One of these officers 
would be responsible for external relations (broadly the field covered by the present 
Public Relations Officer); and the other would be in charge of an intelligence section 
which, in association with the Library, would be responsible for carrying out surveys 
as required of subjects upon which any branch of the Office may require information, 
for procuring and supplying material for replies to the more complicated kind of 
Parliamentary Questions, enquiries from the public, requests from Colonial Govern-
ments for factual information and so forth; also for making suitable material 
available for Ministerial speeches, published reports and the like. 
40. The establishment of such an organisation would to some extent relieve the 
Social Services Department of its present duties, and it is now appropriate to review 
the position of that Department, with which is bound up the position of several of the 
Advisers. It is generally considered, in the light of experience, that the Social 
Services Department as at present constituted does not fit happily into the 
framework of the Office; and the suggestion now made is that the Department •as 
such should disappear, and be replaced by a series of liaison officers to act as a link 
between the Advisers and the Regional Officers and other departments of the Office. 
The need for such officers does not appear to exist so far as the Legal and Business 
Advisers are concerned, while the Financial Adviser is already provided with suitable 
staff; for the rest, three officers of Principal rank should at present suffice, divided as 
follows:-
Medical and Educational 1 
Agricultural, Veterinary, Forest (together with town planning etc. if an Adviser be 
appointed) 1 
Labour (together with Social Welfare if an Adviser be appointed) 1 
These officers should be Secretaries of the respective Advisory Committees; and for 
administrative purposes should be regarded as detached officers of the General 
Department. 
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41. The special sections dealing with the welfare of Colonial people in the United 
Kingdom and with Far Eastern casualties have not been dealt with, as they are 
outside the normal organisation of the Office and their lay-out must be considered ad 
hoc in relation to the circumstances of the time. 
42. One more officer at the Assistant Secretary level is required to deal with 
questions of general planning, post-war reconstruction and the administration of the 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act. This officer should act as Secretary of (a) the 
standing Council recommended in paragraph 33 above; (b) the Colonial Develop-
ment aDd Welfare Advisory Committee; (c) the Colonial Research Committee; (d) the 
Post-war Problems Committee. He would require a Principal as his assistant and 
deputy. 
43. Surveying the conclusions thus far reached, we find that the scheme 
propounded, and the Assistant Secretaries required to give effect to it may be set 
forth as follows:-
I. Regional Organisation. 
Regional Officers 
Il. Functional Departments. 
Establishment 
Colonial Service 
Appointments 
Defence 
Economic 
General 
Information 
Development, Welfare and Planning 
10 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
Total 19 
44. As regards Advisers, it has been indicated that two more are almost certainly 
required-one on Social Welfare, and one on Town and Country Planning, Housing 
and kindred subjects. All the Advisers should be of the highest professional standing. 
The "£2000 a year" man, rather than the "£1500 a year" man should be aimed at. 
Youth and energy should be regarded as desirable qualifications. Adequate technical 
assistance should be provided, so that the Advisers may be free to concentrate on the 
larger issues, and so that they or their deputies may travel frequently. 
45. Turning now to Assistant Under-Secretaries, it is suggested that, taking into 
account the proposed strengthening of the Deputy Under-Secretary and Assistant 
Secretary grades, five Assistant Under-Secretaries should suffice to cover adequately 
the field-a ratio of one to every four Assistant Secretaries. A sixth post should, 
however, be provided as a margin to allow of one officer of this grade normally being 
on tour in the Colonies. One or two of the six posts should normally be filled by a 
Colonial Service officer of the status of senior Colonial Secretary or junior Governor 
(but see paragraph 51 below). In spite of difficulties arising out of the nature of the 
home civil service organisation, an endeavour should be made to grade the Assistant 
Under-Secretaries higher than a Principal Assistant Secretary. The latter officers in 
other departments, such as the Treasury, do not normally have Assistant Secretaries 
working to them-certainly not as many as three or four. The Assistant Under-
Secretaries here have to deal on equal terms with Colonial Governors and, when 
travelling in the Colonies, to act as representatives of the Secretary of State. To do 
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their work properly they should be in a position to offer hospitality to Governors and 
senior officials and unofficials from the Colonies. They have to keep up the prestige 
of the Office and of the Colonies, which involves a certain amount of personal 
expense which the normal civil servant is not required to undertake, nor has he the 
means to do so. 
46. As regards the division of work, it is suggested that no Assistant Under-
Secretary should be entirely concerned either with "regional" or with "functional" 
activities, but that each should be in charge of some work of both classes. In this way, 
the danger of cleavage between the "regional" and the "functional" sides of the Office 
would be reduced to a minimum, and mutual understanding and the team spirit 
would be fostered. 
47. The result of these recommendations, which are summarised diagrammati-
cally in the Appendix, would be to increase the permanent cadre as follows:-
2 Deputy Under-Secretaries instead of 1. 
6 Assistant Under Secretaries instead of 4. 
2 Additional Principal Advisers. 
19 Assistant Secretaries instead of 13. 
The number of Principals and Assistant Principals required must necessarily 
fluctuate according to developments in the Office work. It is however improbable 
that any substantial increase in these grades would be required; a reduction might 
even be possible. It is in the higher grades that the Office has been starved and "run 
on the cheap". The increases suggested are modest in relation to the great changes 
that have taken place in the whole scale of operations in the Colonial field. 
48. It is superfluous to point out that one essential feature of any efficient 
reconstruction of the Office would be the housing of the whole organisation under a 
single roof. 
49. While the principal purpose of this paper has been to examine the Colonial 
Office requirements, and it would be out of place to deal in any detail with the 
Colonial end, it would be inappropriate to ignore altogether the complementary 
arrangements in the Colonies. In the Colonies no less than in the Colonial Office, it 
is urgently necessary to take account of the new perspective in which Colonial 
administration has to be viewed. It has already been suggested that the Governors 
and their officials should be released from the archaic restrictions on their powers of 
action without the approval of the Secretary of State. Any such relaxing of the bonds 
will make it more necessary than ever to have the right kind of Governor. At the risk 
of being considered retrograde, I venture to suggest that the selection of Governors 
should be made from a wider field than the Colonial Service. Against the advantages 
which Colonial Service training undoubtedly gives to a Governor, there are certain 
clear disadvantages. The qualities demanded of a Governor are not necessarily those 
displayed by the best civil servant. Especially in modern conditions a Governor 
should be a man of the world, with broad experience, a keen political sense, and 
imaginative vision. He must know when to sacrifice short-term efficiency to the 
encouragement of Colonial people in managing their own affairs. He must be a 
persuasive speaker and a good host. There is room for much younger men as 
Governors, and it is far easier for a comparatively young man to be appointed to such 
a post if he has made his mark in some other walk of life than if he is a member of the 
Service. A junior member of the Service, even if he has the necessary qualities, is at a 
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disadvantage if he is put over the heads of his senior colleagues in the same Service. 
Moreover, if he proves to be less successful as a Governor than had been 
anticipated- "capax imperii nisi imperasset"-the problem of his disposal creates 
great difficulties. If, on the other hand he proves an outstanding success, he tends to 
be moved on to a "better" post before he has had time to give full value to the Colony 
to which he is first appointed as Governor. 
50. One difficulty, of course-to put the matter bluntly- is that of protecting the 
Colonies against the notion of Governorships as a haven for superannuated Generals 
or inconvenient politicians. It must however be assumed that those responsible for 
advising His Majesty with regard to the appointment of Governors will set their faces 
against all claims but those of merit; and on that assumption it would seem that 
great advantages would accrue from the selection of a proportion of Governors from 
outside the Service. In this connection the possibility of appointing as Governors 
persons (of non-European as well as European race) who have attained an eminent 
position in the Colonies themselves should not be overlooked. 
51. This proposal would however necessitate certain alternations in existing 
arrangements. One weakness of the present system is that the Governor is the 
practising head of the Administration. If he is an amateur, and is not content to 
supply general guidance and inspiration, while leaving executive administration to 
the professionals, chaos is apt to result. A further defect is that the Governor, as 
President of the Legislative Council, is not in a position, as he should be, to stand 
above current local political controversy. It is suggested, therefore, that, at any rate 
in the larger Colonies, the executive head of the Administration should be a 
Lieutenant-Governor, who would be a civil servant de carriere. The posts of 
Lieutenant-Governor should replace, but carry a higher status than, the existing 
Chief or Colonial Secretaryships. The Lieutenant-Governor would rank next in 
precedence to the Governor and would act for him in his absence. He would replace 
the Governor as President of the Legislative Council, except on ceremonial 
occasions. The relation of the Governor to the Lieutenant-Governor would, in fact, 
be rather like that of a Minister to his Permanent Secretary. 
52. In the smaller places it will still in general be convenient to fill the 
Governorships from the Colonial Service; but it should be an established rule that 
such a Governor could move on to a Lieutenant -Governorship in a large Colony 
without loss of "face". Such an arrangement would retain reasonable prospects of 
promotion for officers of the Colonial Service (who would not, of course, be debarred 
also from consideration for the more important Governorships), while at the same 
time obviating many of the disadvantages of the present system. 
53. As a corollary to this proposal, it is suggested that business correspondence 
(of which a substantial amount must remain, whatever action may be taken to 
eliminate unnecessary references) between the Colonial Office and Colonial Govern-
ments should be conducted through the Under-Secretary of State and the Colonial 
Secretariat; the exchange of despatches between the Secretary of State and the 
Governor being reserved for questions of policy. 
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5 CO 877/22/16 27 Feb 1943 
'An inquiry into the system of training the Colonial Service with 
suggestions for its reform to meet post-war conditions': memorandum 
by Sir R Furse1 [Extract] 
1. The case for reform 
1. When the balloons come down for good, the curtain will go up on a colonial 
stage set for a new act. At first, as after 1918, the lighting may be dim and the voices 
of some of the actors muffled. It may be some little while before we can see at all 
clearly the lines on which the play is going to develop. When the lights are turned 
full on, we may well find that what we are watching is not so much a new act but, as 
it were, a new play in some great trilogy. We may at least be sure that there will be 
some new actors and new scenery; that the plot will contain novel elements; and that 
the action will be more complicated than ever before, and will make greater demands 
upon the cast. The pioneer era of colonial development has passed. Gone too are the 
times when the most obvious task of the administrator oversea was to redress wrongs 
and to relieve suffering; when a Cordon or a Kirk and his audience at home, could 
normally feel as certain of the rightness of his cause as were the martyrs or the 
knights errant. Things are already much more complicated. The issues are less clear. 
A new note of hesitation and questioning has crept in, at least among the audience. 
Men ask if we are really in the colonies to serve or to exploit? Ought we even to be 
there at all? New problems are arising, demanding of the Colonial Service careful 
study in preparation for new roles-that of economic planner to mention no other; 
and a new actor, the educated native, is moving towards the front of the stage. 
2. And what of the audience? Hitherto the gallery-the outer, colonial, ring of 
the theatre-has been vocal, often critical, sometimes abusive. The trouble with the 
stalls has been that they were empty or apathetic. Distinguished foreigners seldom 
criticised from the boxes. All this is changing. The change was coming anyhow; 
Singapore has precipitated it. The gallery can be relied on for the catcalls and 
oranges (it will be peacetime) . But in future the actors from the Colonial Service 
(and the Colonial Office) will have to play more difficult parts under a cross fire of 
criticisms from all corners of the theatre: from home, the Dominions and foreign 
countries, as well as the colonies. And until the actors, and the best of the dramatic 
critics, have convinced the public that the play is a good play, and not merely an 
excuse for putting money in the pockets of the promoters, and that the acting is 
competent and sincere, much of the criticism will be misguided or ill informed: 
defeatist, if not actively hostile . 
3. Nor is it only a question of criticism. He would be a bold man who would sit 
down now to draw the map of the British Empire Empire as it may appear in 1950. 
Possibilities which would have seemed fantastic five years ago cannot be excluded. 
The internationalisation of all colonies has been mooted: a British Colonial Service 
containing international elements is far from impossible. We might find ourselves 
acting in some form of association with America or Canada in the West Indies, or 
1 Director of recruitment to the Colonial Service, 1937-1948. 
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with the Dutch in Malaysia. American money- with conditions attached- might 
conceivably be applied on a great scale to the welfare and development of Africa. And 
so on. But, whatever the outcome, it will at least be of great importance to prevent 
too wide a divergence between the trend of colonial policy and that of public opinion 
at home, if not also in the Dominions and in certain foreign countries. The danger of 
such a rift, in one field at least, is already obvious. An interesting article in a recent 
number of "The Economist" commented on the fact that, concurrently with the 
growth of "pro-native" opinion at home, there is a tendency towards greater 
subservience to "settler" opinion in the Rhodesias and Kenya.* This rift was apparent 
seven years ago, at any rate, to the traveller in those parts. The searchings of heart at 
home, since Singapore fell, have not lessened its dangers. 
4. And so, if the proposals in the second part of this memorandum seem too bold 
or too novel, my answer is that the Service is entering on a new era which will make 
unprecedented demands upon it, and that if it fails to meet those demands it runs the 
risk of being exposed to such a volume and degree of criticism as may involve serious 
dangers not only to itself but to its charge. It deserves to be adequately equipped. 
New conditions and new demands call for novelties in the training provided. We 
must plan boldly, where necessary, and not be afraid of the additional expense which 
will inevitably be involved. 
5. Nor should we-1 submit- be too much swayed by certain criticisms and 
objections which we are quite likely to receive from colonial governments. Both the 
novelty and the difficulty of the post-war situation will largely depend on factors 
which lie outside the Colonial sphere and of which the Secretary of State is in a 
better position to judge than they are. Some modification, too, will be required in the 
basis on which the Colonial Service is organised and staffed. One of the main reasons 
why so little progress has so far been made in providing facilities for training officers 
once they have passed into the service of a colony is that the Service has not been 
organised or staffed so as to provide for the absence of its officers on "study" as 
distinct from "normal" leave. Once an officer has got out to his territory there have, 
only too often, been a dozen good reasons why he could not be spared for the time 
involved in the necessary course of study. This obstacle must be overcome or any 
scheme for the systematic training of service officers will collapse. 
The development of the existing system of training 
6. Before considering the new proposals it is important to realise how much 
progress has already been made. Until the end of the last war there was no organised 
system either of recruitment or training. Speaking generally, recruitment was 
hand-to-mouth and confined to taking the best of such material as happened to have 
presented itself when vacancies occurred. Until 1924 there was no preliminary 
training apart from the courses in Tropical Medicine for medical officers and a rather 
sketchy three months' course for Administrative officers recruited for Tropical 
Africa. It was the impact of the new demands, which pressed upon the Service after 
the end of the last war, that led to a far reaching re-organisation of the whole system 
of recruitment and training as well as to a partial remodelling of the structure of the 
Services. History seems to be repeating itself. 
7. As regards training, between the years 1924 and 1938 preliminary training 
• "Test in Africa", Economist, 22 Aug 1942. 
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courses were established for most branches of the Colonial Service. For the 
Administrative Service there was the one year course at Oxford and Cambridge and 
other courses, some of a few months others lasting two years or even more, were 
arranged for agriculturists, foresters, veterinarians, education officers, surveyors, 
police officers and so on. 
8. There were indeed gaps in the picture; and the details of certain courses, 
though frequently revised, were still far from perfect. But to a large extent the field of 
preliminary training had been covered. Before 1924 most men entered the Colonial 
Service without any special preparation and none-save in exceptional cases-had 
studied for more than three months. Of the men who went out in 1939, over 80 of 
those selected on the recommendation of the Colonial Service Appointments Board 
had been given special training-in the majority of cases lasting a year or 
more-before taking up their appointments. Lord Trenchard in his speech last May 
said that training for the British Colonial Service lagged behind that given by 
Holland, France and Belgium.2 There is a lot of truth in this criticism, but the 
Colonial Service can claim to be ahead of the Sudan and Indian, as well as of the 
Home Civil Service in this respect. 
Its defects 
9. But the system still has obvious defects:-
(1) Save in the Medical Service of certain colonies, and to some extent in the 
Forest Service, there is no general organised provision to enable an officer-
except in individual cases-to obtain advanced or refresher training or to 
undertake special study. Normally his training ends when his service begins. 
(2) Because-once an officer has taken up his appointment-we cannot count on 
being able to lay hands on him again, certain instruction, which could more 
profitably be taken after he has had a measure of colonial experience, is necessarily 
included in his preliminary course. 
(3) In the non-scientific services, at any rate, rich stores of valuable knowledge 
and experience are at present allowed to run away in the sands. Where the officer 
possessing it has a gift for writing, the fruits of his experience are preserved in 
books like the "Dual Mandate". But where he has not, how much dies with him! If 
the best of such experience could be sifted out and permanently preserved in 
available form, it would greatly help to the building up of a body of knowledge and 
doctrine in a field which is so far only partially explored, and over which the broad 
lines of policy are still-and partly for this very reason-but imperfectly defined. 
Without such knowledge and doctrine in an available form the British case, which 
it is becoming so important to make, lacks that conclusive evidence which it needs 
in these days when an ignorant England and a post-isolationist America are 
beginning to ask searching questions and, if they do not get satisfactory answers 
promptly, to formulate misguided opinions of their own. 
(4) Again in the case of the non-scientific services, there is too little connection 
2 A reference to the debate in the House of Lords on 6 May 1942 in response to a motion by Lord 
Trenchard asking if the government was considering, 'in view of the changed conditions', any 
reorganisation of the methods of staffing and administering the colonial empire (H of L Debs, vol122, cols 
885-943). See also Trenchard's memo, 'Re-organisation of the Colonial Services', enclosed with his letter 
to Cranborne, 13 May 1942 (CO 967/20). 
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between training and research. In certain fields research is conspicuously lacking. 
In some of the newer subjects research, which would be an essential preliminary 
to effective teaching, has not yet begun. 
(5) Members of the Colonial Office have no opportunity of getting any of the 
theoretical instruction given to the men with whom they must co-operate. 
(6) Training is largely confined to the acquisition of what may be called 
professional knowledge applicable to the individual's own branch of the Service. 
The different branches are never trained in common, and there is no general 
system of teaching each something about the problems and methods of the others. 
Yet it is of the first importance that they should co-operate with intelligence and 
sympathy. 
The only exception is to be found in the lectures to Administrative probationers 
on the work and needs of, for example, the Agricultural and Forest Services. The 
effect which these have had in promoting a better understanding between the 
Administration and the Services concerned argues-if we may accept the evidence 
of men like Sir Frank Stockdale, Dr. Tempanl and Professor Engledow4-that the 
wider application of such a system of 'liaison training' would have valuable results. 
Objectives to be aimed at 
10. We are now in a position to define our main objectives. How should the scope 
and method of training be designed so as to achieve them? 
Training in the first place should be adapted both to the probable exigencies of the 
post-war era and to the structure proposed for the post-war service. 
11. It will be a clear advantage if effective contact can be maintained between 
serving officers and opinion at home-and not only that they may be aware of it but 
also may have a salutary influence upon it, by spreading at home a truer appreciation 
of colonial conditions and problems. The contacts which the average officer makes 
on a normal leave are insufficient. He should be deliberately brought into touch with 
some of the people who both reflect, and may influence, instructed opinion in this 
country-teachers, for example, and writers of books. He should also, as shown 
above, at least take stock of opinion in foreign countries and in the Dominions. With 
this in view, and also because there are practical lessons to be learned, our 
Administrative Officers, at any rate, should make some study of colonial administra-
tion as practised by foreign powers and in territories mandated to the Dominions. 
There should also be study of such subjects as economics, labour, nutrition, and 
social welfare, subjects of which there has not so far been a sufficiently widespread 
knowledge in the Colonial Administrative Service, but which are now taking an 
increasingly important place both in the colonial picture and in the political 
consciousness at home. 
12. The Service of the future as envisaged in the Memorandum approved by the 
Cabinet is to be a far more flexible instrument.5 Accordingly it seems desirable that 
3 Assistant agricultural adviser to S of S colonies, 193&:-1940; adviser, 1940-1946; vice-chairman, Colonial 
Advisory Council on Agriculture, 1940-1943. 
4 Draper's professor of agriculture, Cambridge; member of Colonial Advisory Council on Agriculture. 
5 Stanley's memo for the War Cabinet in Jan 1943 emphasised the serious shortage of personnel in the 
Colonial Service. In Africa twenty-five per cent of administrative officers had been released for service with 
the armed forces and the minister resident in West Africa (Lord Swinton) had reported that the 
administrative machine was stretched almost to breaking point. Stanley sought a ruling that immediate 
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the training of the future Administrative Officer should be of wider application than 
the territory in which he is to start his service; at least to the extent that the training 
given with reference to that colony should be set against the wider background of the 
colonial empire as a whole and should include some appreciation of Dominion and 
foreign Colonial Administrations, and of the whole structure and historical outline of 
the British Commonwealth of which the Colonial Empire and its history is an 
integral part. 
13. But we should go further. I submit that we need more of a Colonial Service, 
less of a series of services, Administrative, Agricultural, Educational, and the 
like-which tend to work too often in watertight compartments without an adequate 
knowledge of each other's difficulties, problems, policy or raison d'etre, even if they 
do not at times suspect or despise each other. The effect is a waste of energy, if not 
actual and unnecessary friction. I cannot resist quoting here an illustration from a 
letter written to me by one of the best of our younger Administrative Officers, a man 
of some ten years' service:-
" ... Today there is generally an inferiority complex amongst non-Administrative 
people about the Administrative Service. There is also colossal ignorance among 
the Administrative side about the value of the work of the other branches with the 
result that the local Vet. is sometimes regarded as as big a nuisance as the local 
street corner tub-thumper. The Vet. tends to regard the Administrator as a 
high-hatted individual who, upon request, will commit sufficient minor atrocities 
to provide him with the carriers he wants, and who will regard any contact the Vet. 
may have with the local Chief with intense suspicion. The Administrator, on the 
other hand, regards the Vet. as a 'poor white' who, by insisting on sticking needles 
into the local cattle, may at any moment cause a riot in his district. 
A corollary of the above is the need for showing the officer early in his service 
why a Colonial Secretariat (and a Colonial Office) exists, what difficulties it has to 
face and how these difficulties are multiplied by the District Officer who 'only 
wishes to be allowed to get on with his real job' ... " 
For myself, I would add that it also seems desirable to explain the place of the 
white unofficial-missionary, settler, or trader-in the colonial picture. 
14. Human nature being what it is, it is extremely difficult to break down the 
barriers between different departments and professions. One of the best solvents is to 
give each some insight into the problems and policy of the others. If such instruction 
can be given early in an officer's career, so much the better. If some of it can be 
undergone in common, better still. For it is difficult to over-value the discussions 
which then take place "out of school" or the friendships which spring from 
association in a common course of study. 
15. Such an effort to fuse the Service into a spiritual whole is in keeping with 
modern tendencies in the reform of its material structure. It attempts to overcome 
departmental parochialism, as unification tries to mitigate the effects of geographical 
isolation. It is, indeed, only commonsense. No one can travel in Africa with his eyes 
steps be taken to restore members of the Colonial Service to civil duty. The War Cabinet approved the 
colonial secretary's proposals, subject to a reservation made on behalf of the Admiralty which wanted 
discretion to retain officers who had joined and wished to remain in the navy (CAB 66/33, WP(43)25, 14 
Jan 1943, and CAB 65/33, WM 16(43)4, 25 Jan 1943). 
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open without continually being aware of problems which can only be effectively 
solved if several departments-and the Administrative is nearly always one of 
them-co-operate in the intelligent spirit of a good cricket side. And there are sound 
precedents elsewhere. The fighting services are apt to be ahead of the Civil Services 
in certain aspects of organisation and equipment just because they are periodically 
exposed to the searching test of war. Modern war experience has led first, after the 
Boer War, to the subordination of regimental esprit de corps to that of the arm of the 
Service; then of the arm to the army as a whole. Now we are watching a tendency 
towards the co-ordination of Navy, Army and Air Force into a Wehrmacht on the 
German pattern. War experience, it may be noted in passing, has also led to a 
progressive extension of the facilities for advanced study by officers with practical 
experience-witness the Staff College, the Greenwich War Course and the Imperial 
Defence College. 
16. As with the Service, so with the man. We ought not, I believe, to confine 
ourselves to imparting professional knowledge. We should do more to train the 
whole man: to fit him mentally, morally and physically for what-in the case at any 
rate of the Administrative Officer-is one of the most many-sided and exacting 
careers in the world. Physical toughening and the inculcation of discipline are 
awkward items to fit into the curriculum of a civilian training course. We shall be 
much helped in respect of them, if, as seems possible, compulsory military service is 
maintained after the war. But we can do more than we do now to teach our recruits 
how to live in the tropics so as to withstand not only the effects of a hostile climate 
on their physical health, but also the stresses and strains which the nature and 
conditions of their work apply, in such a climate, to their mental and temperamental 
make-up. 
17. In regard to morale, we should aim at giving the individual officer a just sense 
of the importance and value of the work on which he is engaged, confidence in the 
general rightness of British Colonial aims and policy, an informed but not 
exaggerated awareness of past failures and of the gaps which require to be filled. One 
of our great dangers at the moment is loss of confidence in ourselves as a colonial 
power. We should do well to fortify our young officers against this danger and against 
iii-informed and defeatist criticism, to which most of them will have been exposed 
before selection, and may be exposed again later. Of course I do not mean that we 
should provide them with rose-tinted spectacles through which to look at the 
Empire; the confidence we have to instil is the confidence bred of knowing that you 
know the truth. 
We should arm them, too, against the shocks to their idealism which their early 
service may bring. To quote my Administrative friend again:-
" ... I have only a few words to say on the preliminary ... course ... I feel very 
strongly the principle should be to instil into the budding Administrator the true 
gospel of what the British Empire stands for ... A man who goes abroad at the age 
of twenty-two meets many shocks under which his high ideas of service, and his 
respect for what the British are doing in the world, are apt to suffer~ In the case of 
the weaker brethren it is vitally important that these shocks should be countered 
by a reprise of his early lessons." 
18. Training should have two objects: to lay the foundations on which every 
officer can develop his full effectiveness over the whole period of his service, and to 
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make him efficient as soon as it is possible. Both aims are most likely to be secured if, 
as a preliminary, he is taught what to look out for during his first years of service, 
and the significance of some of the things he will see but might not otherwise 
appreciate. And if-after a period of practical experience-he is given further 
instruction in the significance of what he has seen. Also if his conceit is suitably 
chastened by criticisms and discussion. For, it has been said, and probably with 
truth, that the average Administrator never thinks he knows so much about 
administration as at the end of his first three years of service. For these reasons and 
because parts of the professional training itself can be more profitably studied after 
experience abroad, the training of all officers should consist of two periods of 
theoretical study divided by what for convenience I will call an apprentice tour or 
tours; and all three stages should form a single progressive and inter-related whole. 
19. Later in their career selected officers should be given special leave for 
advanced study. 
20. It will be an advantage if training is so organised that some part of it can be 
taken by itself, by people-Labour and Welfare Officers for instance-who need not 
take the whole. The fact that they too will be studying for a time alongside the others 
will also make for better mutual understanding throughout the Service. 
It is possible too that this section of the training can be made of use to 
unofficials-such as missionaries or employees of commercial firms-and to wives. 
If so, and if they could be induced to take it, there would be a clear gain. The danger 
of the uninstructed white in a colonial society is too obvious to need emphasising. 
21. Before I end this section might I suggest that possibly one weakness in 
British Colonial Administration has been that we have too closely followed the 
Roman model. Have we too much concerned ourselves with material things: 
communications, trade, physical well-being, material prosperity? And, where we 
have gone outside the material sphere, have we, perhaps concentrated too exclusively 
on the Pax Britannica and the rule of law: on the development of political institutions 
and the expansion of political rights? We are sometimes surprised, and a little pained, 
that the immense benefits we have conferred on the, so called, backward races have 
not been received with more whole-hearted enthusiasm and have not more 
completely satisfied their aspirations. Is part of the explanation to be found here? Is 
there not room for a little more of the Greek spirit? In Africa and the Pacific, as well 
as in Asia, we are dealing with people to whom spiritual and aesthetic values are often 
more important than they have come to be for the average modern European. In this 
aspect of Colonial administration I suspect that we have something to learn from the 
French. Might it not be worth while to try to teach our future administrators more 
about the artistic and spiritual background of the people amongst whom they are to 
live? The modern type of recruit is often more receptive of such ideas than many of 
his seniors. 
22. And this brings me naturally-and finally-to two factors which cannot be 
omitted from any survey of the conditions affecting post-war training. The service 
will have to deal with a new type of coloured man and must absorb and acclimatize a 
new type of white officer. Both have already made their appearance. But both will be 
more numerous and of greater significance in the post-war era. 
23. When the Burman regiments were being formed, a British N.C.O., who knew 
no Burmese, was told to take over a part [?party] of Burmans and teach them to play 
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the British bugle calls. He disappeared into the jungle with them for six weeks. They 
came back competent buglers. No one has ever discovered how this was done, nor 
could the N.C.O. explain. In the past the task of the colonial administrator has been 
somewhat similar. He has gone into the bush and produced a miracle. But one effect 
of the miracle has been the emergence of the educated native. The Englishman, 
especially that type of Englishman who is mainly representative of the Colonial 
Service, has been, on the whole, brilliantly-even uniquely-successful in his 
dealings with what is called the unspoilt native. So far he has shown himself much 
less successful in dealing with the new native intelligentsia. He has probably been 
less successful than the French, and, perhaps, also, the Dutch; which-by the 
way-is another argument for including a study of foreign colonial administration in 
our scheme of training. 
24. But the educated native is bound to become to a great extent the future 
mouthpiece and leader of his people. He will play this role both inside and outside 
the Colonial Service of the future; and the new policy of partnership cannot work 
without him. By some means our white officers must learn to understand him, as 
they have understood his brothers in the bush villages; to sympathise and work with 
him, and to use him intelligently. Otherwise we are heading for trouble. Cannot 
training help here? 
25. Then there is the new type of white officer. The guiding principle in our 
recruitment policy has been, and must be, to select the type of man whose qualities 
and qualifications seem to fit him best for the work to be done, in the conditions in 
which it must be done. No other criterion is valid. What elements of the population 
are most likely to possess the right attributes must depend, first on the nature of the 
demand, and secondly on the shape of the social structure in the lands from which 
the recruits come (I use the plural advisedly. It may not be generally realised to what 
extent in recent years we have drawn on the Dominions as well as the Mother 
country). Social structure is conditioned by history and tradition; and by the play of 
educational, economic and other social forces. In the home country especially the 
play of these forces has been changing over the last twenty to thirty years. So has the 
nature of the demand from the colonial end. One result has been a noticeable 
tendency to broaden the basis of recruitment in recent years. 
26. Just because we must expect fresh and even startling developments in the 
structure of society at home but cannot yet foresee their exact nature-and because 
we are in the same position as regards developments in the sphere of colonial affairs, 
entailing very likely a demand for fresh qualities and qualifications in our white 
officers, or even, as witness the trade union officials whose recruitment only began in 
1940 for a completely new type of officer-it would be folly to lay down in advance 
too rigid rules for the conduct of post-war recruitment. But we can be reasonably 
certain that the tendency to broaden the basis of recruitment will continue and quite 
possibly at a faster pace. New elements of the population will have to be fused into 
the living body of the Service. And it must be a real fusion or there will be a serious 
loss of cohesion and efficiency. 
27. We do not want to emasculate the special qualities and virtues of these new 
elements which derive from their background and upbringing; from the hardships 
and struggles which they and their forbears have known and the powers of sympathy 
bred by such experience. Indeed, it may be that among them we shall find some of 
those best qualified to understand the mentality and aspirations of the new native 
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intelligentsia. But their instinctive sympathies must not be left untutored. They will 
especially need to be given a balanced judgment, some knowledge of the historical 
background of colonial society, and of the interplay of the forces and legitimate 
interests which compose it. And they must be helped to acclimatise themselves not 
only to their social environment in the Service itself but to a set of general conditions 
which tradition has made less strange to many of their colleagues than they will be to 
them. Whatever its faults, the public school system has given its products a common 
background and certain very valuable standards. Many new officers will lack such a 
background and something must be given them in its place. They must be helped to 
swim in the shoal without losing their identify. 
28. In framing the proposals which follow I have kept constantly in mind the 
objectives outlined in the preceding paragraphs and have also tried to find a remedy 
for the defects in the existing system of training set out in paragraph 9. 
2. Suggestions for reform 
Outline of proposals 
29. In making concrete proposals it will be simplest first to outline a scheme of 
training for the Administrative Service since the whole training of an Administrative 
Officer falls to be considered; and then, using this as a "master plan", to show how 
certain aspects of the training of officers in other Services can be profitably 
interwoven with it-and at what stages. I only attempt here to draw the outline of 
the scheme proposed. 
The general idea is:-
(1) That all Administrative Officers take their training in three stages:-
(a) A preliminary course, corresponding to the existing Colonial Administrative 
Service Course, 
(b) A period of apprenticeship in a colony, or colonies, 
(c) A second course at home following immediately on their period of 
apprenticeship. 
(2) That at a later stage of their career a selected number of the most promising 
officers be given study leave for special advanced study (Advanced course). 
(3) That in the case of other services the pre-war courses should be maintained or 
revised- subject to such amendment as experience may dictate: and to the 
creation of fresh courses on similar lines where this is thought necessary in the 
case of such services as have not as yet been catered for. 
(4) That, in the case of these other services, their early years should likewise be 
treated as an apprenticeship, and for approximately the same period as may be 
decided on for the Administration. 
(5) That all officers of all such Unified Services as may be considered 
appropriate-and I would include not only the Agricultural, Medical, Educational, 
and so on, but also the Legal and the Public Works Department-be brought 
together to take part of the second course for Administrative Officers, with suitable 
modifications in each case. 
(6) That, as in the case of the Administrative-study leave should be given to 
selected officers of all Services at a later stage in their service. 
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Preliminary course 
30. Under this scheme the preliminary course (1 a) would correspond to the 
existing Colonial Administrative Service Course. But owing to the fact that further 
theoretical training after a period of colonial experience is now to be provided, it will 
be possible to improve on the old curriculum. 
31. The new preliminary course should be designed to give the cadet a general 
background to the work he is going to take up; to start him with a proper sense of 
proportion; to show him what to look out for on his apprentice tour and to teach him 
the significance of some of the things he will see during it. In the course of it he 
should be given a just appreciation of the function and achievements of the British 
Empire, and particularly of British Colonial Administration. His morale, and his 
belief in the importance of the profession he has chosen, should be fortified, and he 
should be given a touchstone to apply to criticism. In general he should be helped to 
withstand the mental and physical shocks, which the transfer of a raw youth to 
tropical conditions will entail, and to learn his basic job quickly on arrival in his 
colony. 
32. The subjects taught would include, as at present, a brief outline of Colonial 
History and of Colonial Geography-economic, political, and human; the develop-
ment of Colonial systems of Government, and some appreciation of the functions and 
problems of the main branches of the Service; an introduction to anthropology, with 
special reference to the mentality of primitive peoples (it has been well said that "the 
value of anthropology lies in its insistence on the other man's point of view"); some 
account of the social and economic conditions, racial characteristics, beliefs, culture 
and customs of the particular peoples amongst whom the given cadet will be 
working; the foundations for a proper study of a native language; the guiding 
principles of English Law, and such practical subjects as Tropical Hygiene and the 
Colonial system of accounts. 
Apprentice period 
33. The period of apprenticeship (1 b) would correspond with the present period 
of probation. It would last about two years. The governing consideration during the 
apprentice period would be the training of the cadet: the object being that, in 
conjunction with the two theoretical courses, this period should be designed to make 
him a fully efficient officer as soon as possible. This does not mean that he should not 
be making himself useful. He should, as now, serve as a junior officer. He should not 
be "wet nursed" and he must be given definite tasks. Otherwise he will not get the 
necessary experience or the necessary confidence. But he must not be left to sink or 
swim. That method, though it has its points, is too wasteful. In the past men have 
sunk through no fault of their own, but for lack of teaching and help. Criticism and 
guidance are essential to enable the cadet to gain the fullest value from the work he 
is given to do. And that work must not be too exclusively of an uneducative or 
routine character, but should be mainly chosen with an eye to giving him the most 
useful experience. It should therefore be varied and he should be given experience of 
different types of station and different aspects of administration. 
The choice of the senior officer under whom the cadet works will also be of obvious 
importance. 
It would be valuable if he could take part in work involving co-operation between 
the Administration and scientific or technical departments; also if he could be 
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attached say for a short time to officers of other departments, to watch them dealing 
with specific tasks. Such experience would give him visual insight into the problems 
and methods of the departments with whom he must co-operate, and illustrate the 
theoretical instruction on liaison with them which he gets in his two courses at 
home. 
34. He must use this period to gain colloquial knowledge of a native language; 
but so far as possible he should be relieved of set examinations, which are more 
appropriate to the theoretical courses. He should spend no more time than is 
essential poring over text books in his quarters and as much time as possible reading 
the great book of Africa (or wherever he may be) open before his eyes for the first 
time and when his mind will take sharper impressions than ever again. 
35. Lastly, this period should, if possible, be used for introducing him to the 
educated native before he has had time to acquire prejudices. If, in the future, his 
coloured colleagues are trained in England he could take his theoretical courses 
alongside them. But in so far as, say, our African Civil Servants are mainly trained at 
Achimota and Makerere, we must use the apprentice tour to develop mutual 
understanding between them and their white colleagues. In any case there are 
advantages in association taking place in an African atmosphere. 
36. The sort of thing I have in mind is that a batch of cadets serving their 
apprentice tour in West Africa should spend part of it at Achimota, and similarly at 
Makerere for East Africa. Besides being brought into friendly relation and discussion 
with African students and teachers, and being taught about them-their needs, 
aspirations and future place in colonial society-this period could be used to teach 
the cadets more about what to look for during their tour and its significance; about 
their own behaviour, native customs and manners, and so on; about their own 
health, food, cooking, native servants, and all those practical hints for living which 
make so much difference to mental as well as physical stability and well being in the 
tropics. If time allowed, advantage could also be taken of the fact that both 
institutions are near seats of government to show the cadets something of the 
working of a secretariat and of the headquarters offices of departments; also to give 
them an idea of the interests and functions of missions and commercial firms. In 
Achimota at any rate the existence of The Institute of West African Arts, Industries 
and Social Science will provide an opportunity for appreciating the place of art-and 
of crafts like weaving and pottery-in African life. And it may be assumed that, in the 
future, there may be developments at Makerere which would offer similar opportuni-
ties. 
37. If the general principle is approved, it will be for later consideration exactly 
when in the apprentice period the visit to these institutions should take place. If the 
apprentice period is a single two-year tour, the right time will probably be at the start 
of it. If in accordance with the new proposals for the Service it consists of two short 
tours divided by an annual leave, the start of the second tour, when the cadet will be 
able to see the educated native against the background of raw Africa, of which he will 
by then have acquired some experience, may be preferable. But he should not be 
given enough time to have acquired prejudices from certain of his seniors-or their 
wives. And in no case should his visit come at the end of a tour, when he will be 
impatient to get home and may regard it as a tiresome source of delay. 
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Second course 
38. The objects of the second theoretical course (para.29(l)c) would in general be 
to check, criticise and clarify the experience the cadet had gained; to counteract 
those "bolshevist" tendencies which are said to be most common about the fifth to 
seventh year of service by teaching him where he fits into the general scheme of 
colonial government and how to understand and co-operate with other departments 
and with the secretariat; to deflate his conceit if he thinks he knows too much; and to 
fortify his morale after any shocks which his idealism had received during his 
apprentice tour. 
39. He should learn something about administrative policy in other British 
Colonies, in Dominion Mandates and under Foreign Colonial Administrations; and 
he should be helped to understand the functions and methods of the Colonial Office. 
In particular he must learn to appreciate that in dealing with the affairs of any given 
territory (his own, for instance) the Colonial Office must frequently keep in mind 
factors which are not always immediately apparent to residents in that territory, such 
as the interests and problems of other colonies, the best use of the Colonial Service 
as a whole and in the interests of the whole Colonial Empire, public opinion at home 
and abroad, and-in the future much more than hitherto-considerations of foreign 
policy and of international collaboration in colonial affairs . 
40. In brief the cadet having now had some experience of one territory and of his 
own branch of government must be helped to see the work of an Administrative 
Officer in its proper relation to that of other instruments of government; and against 
the background of the Colonial Empire, of the whole British Commonwealth, and to 
some extent of the whole field of colonial administration throughout the world-and 
of world opinion on its problems. The course should therefore include a reprise on 
broader lines of the preliminary instruction in history and geography, and a further 
study of anthropology under such aspects as will be more readily appreciated by men 
who have had some colonial experience. A certain amount of additional language 
instruction would also probably be of value. 
41. It is at this stage that I would attempt to give junior officers some clues to an 
appreciation of the spiritual and aesthetic background of the people amongst whom 
they are to work, to help them to understand and be understood in the sphere of 
mind and spirit. Such study is closely linked with anthropology but in some aspects 
may go outside its frontiers. 
In this course, too, the newer subjects, such as economics, international trade, 
welfare, labour, nutrition, and so on can best be studied. Clearly we could not teach 
every cadet all of them. Nor would it be necessary. But under a system of optional 
subjects it should be possible gradually to disseminate throughout the Service a 
sufficient knowledge of each of these subjects to serve the needs of the various 
administrations. 
42. The above outline should be enough to indicate the kind of training proposed 
for all Administrative Officers at the outset of, and as a foundation for, their careers. 
It provides, incidentally, three checks on the original selection of every officer. In my 
opinion mistakes in selection should be more drastically corrected than heretofore. I 
suggest that at the end of each of the three stages, any men who have shown 
themselves unsuitable should be weeded out then and there. Too much dead wood is 
the curse of all professions which must offer security of tenure as one of their chief 
attractions. It is cheaper and kinder to prune early with the knife. There will still be 
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plenty left for the axe later; the enervating conditions of the tropics will ensure that. 
43. Confirmation should come at the end of the second course. This will mean 
postponing it until four years or so from the date of original selection, and I do not 
like the repercussion of too long a probation on recruitment. But, in effect, four 
years would be no longer than is the case now with men recruited through 
agricultural scholarships, and that form of recruitment has proved notably success-
ful over a period of seventeen years. 
44. It will, however, be essential for the working of these arrangements that 
throughout the whole training period the officer should be at the disposal of the 
Secretary of State and that there should be no question of his not coming home 
punctually when required for his second theoretical course. To ensure this I suggest 
that until confirmation the officer might be known by some such title as a "Colonial 
Cadet" and that, though he would naturally be under the order of his Governor while 
doing his apprentice tour, he should not be formally handed over, as a fully fledged 
officer, to any particular colonial government until he has been confirmed .... 
6 CO 877/22/7, WP(44)451 26Aug 1944 
'Staffing of the Colonial Service in the post-war period': War Cabinet 
memorandum by Mr Stanley. Annex: Statement on post-war recruit-
ment for the Colonial Service 
[In a minute written in Oct 1943, C J Jeffries had argued that, as a matter of 'some 
urgency', the eo should take action to interest potential candidates in the armed forces in 
the Colonial Service as a post-war career (CO 875/19/22, minute, 22 Oct 1943). Jeffries 
drafted publicity notes which might be used as the basis for an article in The Times which 
included the comment: 'It is difficult to arrive at any estimate of the numbers of 
candidates which will be required to fill up the gap in the various branches of the Service 
left by the war and to provide for new developments. But it can be said with confidence 
that this requirement will be large enough to make it safe to encourage any young men 
and women who look with enthusiasm to a career in the Colonial Service, and who 
possess the necessary qualifications necessary for one of its branches, to give this field of 
public service their earnest consideration' (ibid, no 1).] 
In W.P. (44) 407 the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs circulated a statement 
which he has since made public on the subject of post-war recruitment for the 
Foreign Service. 
The Colonial Service also is in very great need of large reinforcements of new 
recruits and the same considerations apply as in the case of the Foreign Service. After 
consultation with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Labour and National 
Service, I am therefore proposing to issue a Statement on the lines of the draft 
included in the annex to this paper. 
I shall be obliged if any of my colleagues who have any observations to make on 
this proposal will let me know before the end of August. 
Annex to 6 
The war has inevitably imposed a great strain upon the Colonial Service; and the 
present shortage of staff in relation to the heavy responsibilities which the future will 
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place upon the Service makes the problem of post-war recruitment a matter of 
special moment. 
Since the outbreak of war, many hundreds of serving officers have been released 
for duty with the Armed Forces. On the other hand, fresh recruitment has naturally 
been cut to a minimum, and for certain branches has virtually ceased to exist. 
Leave to temperate climates, which is essential if the health and efficiency of 
externally-recruited officers are to be maintained, is in general much overdue. In the 
Colonial Service in the Far East, the majority of these officers are in Japanese 
concentration camps, and many of them will not be fit for further service, while the 
remainder will require long periods of recuperation. 
A large number of officers by the end of the war will be due, or overdue, for 
retirement. Most of the rest will, as soon as practicable, need a substantial amount of 
recuperative leave if their efficiency is to be restored. 
For the above reasons, the existing cadres will, at the end of the war, be much 
below their pre-war strength. But it is already clear that the pre-war strength will be 
a good deal below that required for our future tasks. An expansion in many directions 
will be urgently required in order to give effect to the widely conceived plans for 
social progress and material development with which it is proposed to press forward 
immediately circumstances permit. 
Under the schemes in prospect, it is hoped that the staffing difficulties will be 
relieved in future by the recruitment of Government servants from local communi-
ties in the Colonies on a much wider scale than in the past. But it is clear that there 
will still be a wide field for the employment of externally recruited officers, and fresh 
recruitment of such officers will have to be undertaken as promptly as possible. 
It is accordingly the intention to make arrangements whereby, after the defeat of 
Germany, candidates from the armed forces or from amongst those employed on 
other forms of war work can be considered for appointment to the various branches 
of the Colonial Service, subject of course to the requirements of the military 
situation. Information about these arrangements will be made available to all those 
concerned when the time comes and full details will be given respecting the wide 
variety of openings which will exist in the Colonial Service. 
[7) 
CHAPTER 2 
Defence and International Relations 
Document numbers 7-43 
7 CAB 63/38, M0(26)1, ff3-7 , 18-41 
'Summary on defence policy': memorandum by Sir M Hankey 
Political assumptions for defence preparations 
41 
Jan 1926 
[Extract] 
The political assumptions on which defence preparations should be made have 
always been a matter of some difficulty. At the 187th Meeting of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence, on July 28, 1924, Lord Haldane, who was in the Chair, 
"pointed out that the political assumptions on which the Departments were 
working appeared to differ. The Admiralty were chiefly looking towards a possible 
war in the Far East, as was apparent from the last paragraph of the paper under 
consideration. The Air Ministry were chiefly concerned with the possibility of a 
Continental war. He thought it might be advisable for the Committee at a later 
date to clear up this apparent divergence in policy and to give some indication to 
the different Departments as regards the political assumptions on which they 
should base their preparations for war .... " 
2. On that occasion the Committee reached the following conclusion:-
"That the political assumptions on which the Departments should base their 
preparations for war should be considered at a later meeting of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence, at which, if possible, the Prime Minister himself should 
preside." 
This occurred just before the Parliamentary recess, and no opportunity arose during 
the life of the Labour Government to consider the question. Nor has it yet been 
considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence. 
3. Nevertheless, during the last few years, the Foreign Office have not only 
referred a number of important questions affecting defence policy to the Committee 
of Imperial Defence, such as the Treaties of Mutual Guarantee and Assistance, the 
Geneva Protocol, the Security Pact, Limitation and Reduction of Armaments, 
International Conferences on such matters as International Law, Prisoners of War, 
etc., but they have also given the Committee much guidance on matters of foreign 
policy affecting defence. 
4. Thus, as affecting Home Defence, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has 
informed the Committee of Imperial Defence:-
"that, under present circumstances, war with France was inconceivable .... He 
gave it as his considered opinion that France would at any rate never risk war with 
us until her population equalled that of Germany. She needed a strong friend on 
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one side of her or the other, and we were really her sheet anchor in spite of the 
alliances she had made with other smaller European States" (200th Meeting, June 
22, 1925). 
On the same occasion, namely, a discussion on the diversion of British shipping from 
the Channel and Mediterranean in time of war, the following responsibility was given 
by the Committee to the Foreign Office:-
"To warn the Committee of Imperial Defence if there should be any change in the 
international situation which would render it desirable to adopt a higher standard 
of preparedness in this matter". 
5. As affecting the situation on the Continent, the Foreign Office have kept the 
Committee of Imperial Defence informed as to every step in the development of the 
policy of the Pact of Guarantee and have consulted the Committee at intervals. Up to 
the present time no attempt has been made at the Committee to work out in detail 
the military commitments under the Pact; the moment has hardly come for this, 
although the matter will probably have to be considered after the Treaty has been 
ratified. 
6. As affecting another part of the Continent, the Foreign Office have recently 
forwarded correspondence indicating that the longstanding desire of Spain to 
recover Gibraltar if necessary by means of exchange for some other Possession has by 
no means vanished (203rd Meeting) . 
7. As affecting defence policy in the Middle East and North Africa, the Foreign 
Office have kept the Committee closely informed as to developments of foreign affairs 
in Morocco, Egypt and Turkey (more particularly as affecting Iraq), and they have 
consulted the Committee on a number of points relating to these countries. 
8. As affecting our position in the Far East, the Foreign Office have given very 
definite guidance to the Committee of Imperial Defence, and, as recorded in the 
Minutes of the 200th Meeting, on June 22, 1925, the Cabinet have approved the 
following:-
"The Committee (of Imperial Defence) accept the view of the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs that, in existing circumstances, aggressive action against the 
British Empire on the part of Japan within the next ten years is not a contingency 
seriously to be apprehended. 
The Foreign Office should be responsible for warning the Cabinet and Commit-
tee of Imperial Defence of any changes in the international situation in the Far 
East which would necessitate a fresh review of the question". 
This decision governs a number of questions, (inter alia, our naval construction 
policy and the rate of development of the naval base at Singapore). 
9. The Foreign Office have also kept the Committee of Imperial Defence fully 
informed as to developments in China, and have consulted the Committee on the 
military aspects of the position in that country. 
10. As regards the United States of America it has been tacitly assumed for a great 
many years that war with that country is so improbable that no preparations need be 
made against its occurrence. The assumption is actually based upon a decision taken 
by the Committee of Imperial Defence on July 8, 1904 (48th Meeting) in regard to 
the defence of Bermuda:-
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"An attack from the United States need not be taken into consideration. Only the 
possibility of a raid by cruisers of a European Power need be considered; but such a 
Power could have little motive for attacking Bermuda. One Battalion of Infantry 
can be withdrawn, and the standard of the fixed defences, which appears to have 
been laid down with a view to defence against battleships, should be reviewed." 
The general but unrecorded discussion which led to the above decision is understood 
to have covered the whole ground of a possible war with the United States of 
America, and it is from that meeting that the tacit assumption referred to above 
dates. It would be useful to have the assumption definitely confirmed, if that is 
considered to be the correct course. 
11. For practical purposes it might be said that our war preparations are usually 
tested against the following Powers:-
France because France is not only the strongest Continental Power in a naval, 
military and air sense, but is also the nearest Power to Great Britain, and from a 
geographical point of view is the most dangerous enemy we could have, both from 
the standpoint of our sea communications through the East Atlantic, Channel and 
Mediterranean and of our liability to aerial attack. It must not be forgotten also 
that French as well as Belgian territory was in German occupation for almost the 
whole of the late war. 
Japan because (omitting the United States of America, which, as already 
mentioned we do not take into serious account in war preparations) she is the 
second Naval Power and is so situated that it is easier for her to damage the British 
Empire than vice versa. 
Germany because she is our late enemy, and, though weak at present, may some 
day seek to regain her losses. 
Turkey though only recently, since the question of Mosul reached an acute stage. 
12. At the same time, our political relations with France are so close that in 
several cases (e.g. the Diversion of Shipping in Time of War and Air Raid 
Precautions) it has been decided that preparations involving expenditure (other than 
that incurred in investigation) should not be made "unless in any particular case the 
Committee of Imperial Defence recommends that such expenditure can be justified" 
(199th Meeting, Conclusion iii (1).) 
13. It will be for the Foreign Office to say if there are any other Powers (e.g. 
Russia) or groups of Powers (e.g. Russia and Turkey) against which the Committee of 
Imperial Defence ought to test their schemes. 
14. Before leaving this branch of the subject it is desirable to point out the 
limitation which was placed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on his 
forecast that aggressive action against the British Empire on the part of Japan within 
the next ten years was not a contingency seriously to be apprehended. This limitation 
is contained in the following statement recorded in the Minutes of the 199th Meeting 
of the Committee of Imperial Defence:-
"Mr. Chamberlain observed that the Foreign Office, in giving their advice on this 
question, were undertaking a great responsibility. He had no doubt whatever as to 
the soundness of their advice, but he wished to make it quite clear that it was 
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confined to the question of there being no danger of war in the next ten years, and 
it was not to be understood that the Foreign Office were giving advice that it was 
unnecessary to make any preparations for war during the next ten years. He 
hoped in three years' time to be able to repeat the same advice, but possibly he 
might have to give his opinion that it would be advisable to be ready for war at the 
end of ten years." 
Presumably this limitation would be of general application .... 1 
Military commitments on the continent of Europe 
40. The maintenance under the Treaty of Versailles of a British military force in 
the Rhineland is, of course, in itself a serious commitment. The plans for reinforcing 
that force in case of emergency have not been communicated to the Committee of 
Imperial Defence. In the various Sub-Committees, however, frequent reference has 
been made to the War Office Expeditionary Force Committee, which is no doubt to a 
considerable extent concerned with this particular commitment. 
41. The Man-Power Committee and the Principal Supply Officers Committee, 
which are concerned with the organisation of man-power and munitions for a major 
war, have accomplished a good deal of work which would be of assistance if this 
commitment ever involved us again in serious operations on the Continent. 
42. The conclusion of the Security Pact, in regard to which the Committee of 
Imperial Defence has been consulted at every stage, should alter the situation. After 
that instrument has been ratified, it would seem desirable for the Committee of 
Imperial Defence to consider what action (if any) is required to give effect to its 
military implications. 
Military commitments in the Mediterranean and Near East 
Morocco 
43. The Committee of Imperial Defence have several times had questions relating 
to Morocco under consideration. Thus in January, 1925, anxiety was felt as to the 
situation which might arise owing to the withdrawal of the Spanish Forces in the 
Spanish Zone and as a result the Committee reached the following conclusion:-
To request the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to make every effort to deter 
France from entering the Spanish Zone of Morocco except on the clear under-
standing that should force of circumstanes compel France to undertake a punitive 
expedition across the present frontier, the extent of such an expedition should be 
as limited as conditions permit, both as regards period and area of occupation. 
(C.l.D. 193rd meeting). 
Subsequently the Chiefs of Staff Committee considered the action in the event of 
the invasion of the International zone by Abd-el-Krim2 and recommended that the 
neutrality of the Tangier Zone is of such importance to this country as to warrant the 
despatch of a force consisting of two brigades of infantry with a quota of medium and 
1 Paras 15-21, on coast defence at home and abroad, and paras 22-39, on home defence, omitted. 
2 Rif leader who led a revolt in the Spanish zone of Morocco in 1920 until 1926 when he was finally 
defeated by Franco-Spanish forces. 
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light artillery and that detailed plans for the mobilisation and despatch of such a 
force should be worked out immediately in order that action might be taken at once 
should the necessity arise. (C.l.D. 618-B). 
On July 1st, 1925, the Committee of Imperial Defence recommended that the War 
Office should be authorised to continue to prepare secret plans, including the normal 
enrolment of Section "A" Reserves, for the despatch of such a force . (C.I.D. 201st 
Meeting). This recommendation was approved by the Cabinet on July 3rd, (Cabinet 
33(25)). 
Egypt and the Suez Canal 
44. The basis of our post-war military policy in Egypt is summed up in the 
following conclusions reached by the Committee of Imperial Defence under the 
Chairmanship of Lord Salisbury on October 2, 1923:-
"(i) That from the point of view of Imperial Defence the vital requirement is the 
security of the Suez Canal. It is also of great strategical importance to maintain 
our aerial establishments in Egypt, particularly those at Heliopolis (near Cairo) 
and Aboukir (near Alexandria) , which constitute the air supply centre for the 
whole of the Middle East. The radio-telegraphic station at Abuzabel, near Cairo, is 
also of strategical importance. 
(ii) From the military point of view it is essential to maintain a military force (a) 
within striking distance of Cairo, in order to secure the Suez Canal, to protect the 
sweet water canal, the wireless station at Abuzabel and the aerodrome at 
Heliopolis, and (b) within striking distance of Alexandria in order to provide for 
the security of the Air Force Establishments at Aboukir. 
(iii) The maintenance of troops at Cairo itself and at Alexandria, though 
desirable, is not essential from a military point of view, and would be extremely 
difficult to secure. 
(iv) Having regard to the military considerations on the one hand, and to the 
difficult diplomatic situation on the other, the best course will be, in any 
negotiations that take place with the Egyptian Government, to maintain British 
Military Forces at Abbassia, near Cairo, and at Mustapha Barracks, near 
Alexandria, and in return to relinquish the Barracks actually situated in those 
cities." 
45. The question has frequently been considered since that time, more particu-
larly in connection with Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's conversations with Zaghlul 
Pasha. 3 The last recommendation of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the 
subject was on June 22nd, 1924 in the following terms:-
"To approve the Report of the Chiefs of Staff on the strategical aspect of the 
situation in Egypt (C. l.D. Paper No.572-B), the summary of recommendation of 
which is as follows:-
(1) That in any agreement which is made with the Egyptian Government, 
arrangements should be made whereby His Majesty's Government should have:-
(a) The power to place military patrols on the banks of the Canal and such Naval 
3 Leader of Wafd (or 'Delegation') Party in Egypt; prime minister of Egypt, 1924; died 1927. 
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and Air Forces for patrolling the Canal as and when they think necessary. 
(b) Sufficient forces in Egypt to provide and protect the forces mentioned above. 
(2) That the Military and Air Forces required by (l)(b) above should be substan-
tially the same, except for the temporary reinforcement of one Cavalry Regiment 
and one Infantry Battalion, as the forces now in Egypt, and that they should hold 
Cairo and the immediate surroundings as at present. 
(3) That, if for political reasons it is considered necessary to give up the military 
occupation of Cairo and its immediate vicinity, then the safety of the Canal might 
still be provided for, but it would be a difficult and costly operation entailing in all 
probability the dispatch of an Expeditionary Force and the risk of sabotage to the 
Canal in the interval while the necessary military protection was being arranged." 
(200th Meeting.) 
The Cabinet's approval of these recommendations has been notified to the Commit-
tee of Imperial Defence (202nd Meeting). 
46. As regards the plans for dealing with an emergency in Egypt, shortly after the 
present Government took office there was a serious crisis in Egypt as the result of the 
assassination of Sir Lee Stack, Governor-General of the Sudan and Sirdar of the 
Egyptian Army, and on the evening of November 20th, after a meeting of the 
Cabinet, the Prime Minister sent for the Chiefs of Staff [and] asked for their advice on 
the military situation (C.O.S.-14th Meeting). The Chiefs of Staff were able to report 
that the possibility of a situation similar to that which had arisen had been under 
consideration for some time; that a defence scheme had been prepared and had only 
recently been overhauled and discussed with Lord Allenby;4 that the arrangements 
between the military and air forces had been co-ordinated; and that plans had been 
concerted for naval co-operation in a variety of ways. The arrangements for 
reinforcements in case of emergency were discussed in a separate Report (C.O.S.-12). 
Steps have recently been taken by the Foreign Office, on the recommendation of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence, to secure that the existing proportion of British 
subjects in the Egyptian Ports and Lights Services is maintained (C.I.D. Paper 
No.661-B). 
Military commitments in the Middle East 
Palestine and Arabia 
47. As a result of the war between lbn Saud and King Hussein,5 a threat arose in 
the first half of 1925 to Akaba, and a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence was apointed to consider the question. As a result of their Report (C.I.D. 
Paper No.613-B) the Committee of Imperial Defence, on June 22, 1925 (200th 
Meeting) approved a number of conclusions, most of which were of ephemeral 
interest and resulted in the withdrawal of King Hussein. Among those of more 
permanent interest were-that the Trans-Jordan Administration should be extended 
so as to include Maan and Akaba; that this Administration should be conducted from 
4 High commissioner in Egypt, 1919-1925. 
5 Hussein, who led the Arab revolt against Turkey during the First World War, was King of Hejaz, 
1916-1924. He abdicated in 1924 in the wake of lbn Saud's advances on the cities of Jedda, Medina and 
Mecca. lbn Saud became King of Hejaz from 1926 and King of Saudi Arabia, 1932-1953. 
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Maan, with no official station at Akaba; that the addition of 300 men under a British 
Officer for the Arab Legion and a flight of aeroplanes stationed at Amman with a 
landing ground, fuel supplies and wireless communication at Maan, should be 
provided; that after ex-King Hussein had left Akaba one of His Majesty's Ships should 
visit the place at intervals; that in the improbable event of lbn Saud attacking Akaba 
and a situation developing which the forces in Trans-Jordania could not meet, 
sufficient reinforcements for the emergency, in the first instance, could be made 
available by the Air Officer Commanding, Palestine, and the General Officer 
Commanding, Egypt, provided the situation in those countries permitted; that the 
British Cavalry Regiment should be maintained in Palestine for another year, till it 
had been seen what effect Abd-el-Krim's successes in Morocco would have on the 
Mohammedan world generally, and what attitude would be adopted by the Wahabis; 
that it would be advantageous to have a British Representative with lbn Saud; and 
that the Secretary of State for the Colonies should arrange a conference between 
representatives of His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud to settle all questions in 
dispute, and particularly those connected with boundaries. The Cabinet's approval of 
this Report was subsequently communicated to the Committee of Imperial Defence 
(202nd Meeting of the C.I.D.). Recently, however, in view of the improvement in the 
general situation in Arabia in consequence of the victory of lbn Saud, and in view of 
the financial considerations involved, the Cabinet have decided on the withdrawal of 
the Cavalry regiment (208th Meeting of the C.I.D.), and, as a result of the activities of 
the Cabinet Committee on Expenditure (13th Meeting) it has been decided to omit 
from the Air Ministry Estimates the provision for the maintenance of two flights of 
aeroplanes at Amman. 
Aden 
48. In connection with the question as to whether the Government of India or 
the Colonial Office should be responsible for the control of Aden, the Committee of 
Imperial Defence were, in July, 1923, consulted as to its strategic importance, and 
reported as follows:-
(1) That, as Aden is an essential fuelling station on the Imperial lines of 
communications to the Far East, it was of greater general strategic importance to 
the Empire than to India. It has also a strategic importance with regard to the 
Suez Canal, Somaliland and Arabia, and is the site of an important wireless 
telegraph station. 
(2) That, as far as the strategical considerations as set out in (1) above are 
concerned, it would be advisable for the administrative responsibility for Aden to 
rest with the Imperial Government. (I 75th Meeting.) 
49. The defence of Aden against seaborne attack has been dealt with by the Joint 
Committee of the Oversea and Home Defence Committees, already referred to, and 
certain matters of detail have recently been before the Oversea Defence Committee. 
50. There have been some recent troubles in the hinterland of Aden, but these 
have not been brought before the Committee of Imperial Defence. 
The protection of the South Persian oilfields 
51. The protection of the South Persian oilfields, which have been developed by 
the Persian Oil Company, a British Company in which the Government holds a large 
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number of shares, and which are of great importance to the Admiralty, has long been 
recognised as a matter of considerable difficulty. This is due to the fact that the 
oilfields are on Persian territory, and that the principal danger to which they are 
exposed is from attack or sabotage by Persian tribesmen or as a by-product of some 
civil strife in that region, such as very nearly supervened in the autumn of 1924 as 
the result of a quarrel between the Central Persian Government and the Sheikh of 
Mohammerah. 
52. In February, 1924, a special Sub-Committee was appointed to go into the 
question, and their Report (C.I.D. Paper No. 227-C), which was approved by the 
Committee of Imperial Defence on July 28, 1924 (187th Meeting), included the 
following recommendations:-
(1) That, if any danger appears to be threatening the oilfields, His Majesty's 
Minister at Teheran should make the necessary arrangements with the Persian 
Government to ensure adequate protection for the fields. 
(2) That, to meet the situation which would arise if His Majesty's Minister were 
not able to make the necessary arrangements with the Persian Government to 
ensure the protection of the oilfields, a force of two Brigades of Infantry and two 
Armoured Car Sections and the necessary ancillary troops should be earmarked in 
India for despatch to the Persian oilfields on receipt of a request from the British 
Minister in Persia. 
(3) That the force detailed in (2) should, on arrival in the Persian Gulf, come 
under the control of the Air Officer Commanding in Iraq as long as such 
headquarters remain there, and that headquarters should supply two flights of 
aeroplanes to co-operate. 
(4) That a Staff Officer should be sent from India now to consult with the Air 
Officer Commanding in Iraq, and draw up in advance the necessary plans for the 
employment of the force · in the defence of the oilfields. 
(5) That, when the Air Force headquarters in Iraq are withdrawn, the question of 
the provision of the two flights of aeroplanes mentioned in (3) above, and of the 
control of the force for the protection of the oilfields, should be re-considered. 
(6) That the War Office, if unable to undertake to replace immediately the force 
sent from India, should accept the liability of replacing it as soon as possible. 
When approving this Report, the Committee of Imperial Defence recommended that 
the Government of India should be asked to earmark a force of two Brigades of 
Infantry, two Armoured Car Sections and the necessary ancillary troops in India for 
despatch to the Persian oilfields in the event of such action being necessary, as well 
as to send a Staff Officer, referred to above. They also took note of the responsibility 
of the Air Officer Commanding in Iraq during the next few years as regards the 
protection of the South Persian Oilfields, and of the difficult military, political and 
financial considerations in which this question is involved. 
The defence of Iraq and a possible war with Turkey 
53. In considering our military commitments in the Middle East, the defence of 
Iraq has been left almost to the last, not because it is the least important, for it raises 
the question of what our action should be in the event of war with Turkey, but 
because, like the defence of the South Persian Oilfields, it links up Iraq to India. 
54. The question was explored last autumn by the Committee of Chiefs of Staff, 
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whose Report (C.l.D. Paper No. 632-B) was considered by the Committee of Imperial 
Defence on October 15, 1925 (203rd Meeting), when the following conclusions were 
reached:-
(1) That all our action will have to be conditioned by the precise status of this 
country in this matter vis-a-vis the League of Nations, on which the Committee 
assumes that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will advise the Cabinet. 
(2) That we must avoid being drawn into extensive military operations in Iraq. 
(3) That the greatest caution must be exercised with regard to the despatch of 
reinforcements from India, which should not take place without Cabinet decision. 
(4) That the Air Officer Commanding should be authorised, in the event of a 
violation of the Iraq frontier by the Turks, to take immediate action against them 
on either side of the frontier at the discretion of the Air Officer Commanding; this 
action might, it is considered, as in 1924, result in checking the Turkish advance. 
(5) That Naval Forces should be prepared, if the Cabinet should so decide, to 
occupy and hold the Turkish islands at the entrance to the Dardanelles, to enter 
the Sea of Marmora, and to blockade Constantinople by sea. 
(6) That the Secretary of State for Air should have authority to arrange with the 
other Departments concerned that any of the battalions which, during the coming 
trooping season, would normally be relieved, should be retained in Iraq in addition 
to the relieving battalions, until it is known what the Turkish plans are. (This 
conclusion has since been rescinded by the Cabinet on the advice of the Chief of 
the Air Staff and with the concurrence of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 
taken note of by the Committee of Imperial Defence at the 208th Meeting.) 
55. The general question of our policy in regard to Mosul and Iraq was at that 
time before the Cabinet, who, on the military aspects of the matter, gave their 
approval only to recommendation (2) above (Cabinet 49 (25), Conclusion 5 (c)). The 
Cabinet also decided that the Secretaries of State for the Colonies and Air should 
inform the High Commissioner and the Air Officer Commanding, respectively, that 
in the event of a conspicuous breach of the frontier involving a definite advance 
across the Brussels line by a Turkish organised military force which menaces 
invasion of Iraq, the Air Officer Commanding should be authorised to take 
immediate action against objectives within reasonable reach of his aircraft, and even 
across the frontier if this is a military necessity, but that such action should on no 
account be taken in consequence of a small frontier incident. A telegraphic despatch 
to this effect was sent on October 22, 1925. 
56. At the beginning of December, shortly before the League of Nations was 
expected to announce its decision in regard to Mosul, the Secretary of State for War 
forwarded to the Cabinet a Memorandum in which the Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff expressed misgivings in regard to the situation in view of increases in the 
strength of the Turkish forces within striking distance of the Iraq frontier. The 
question was accordingly referred back to the Committee of Chiefs of Staff, who, 
after consultation with Sir Henry Dobbs, the High Commissioner of Iraq, who had 
just arrived in this country, expressed the view that the increase in the Turkish forces 
was counterbalanced, particularly so far as an early advance was concerned, by a 
number of new factors brought to their attention by the High Commissioner, 
including the early advent of winter conditions, rendering movements difficult; an 
exceptional shortage of forage; a situation unfavourable to the Turks in Kurdistan; 
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and the arrival of British Officers who would hold executive positions in the Iraq 
Army. The Chiefs of Staff, however, adhered to the following general view which they 
had expressed in their previous Report (C.I.D. Paper No.632-B):-
"That the existing forces in Iraq are sufficient to delay any advance by the Turkish 
forces now to the north of Mosul, but, in view of the large numbers of Turks now 
concentrated in that area, they may not be sufficient to hold Mosul" (C.I.D. Paper 
No.632-B, Para.21), 
and that in the event of a resolute attack 
"we may not unlikely be compelled to fall back on Baghdad". 
57. They also drew attention to rumours that the Turks were laying mines and 
otherwise fortifying the Dardanelles, and made certain recommendations in that 
respect. 
58. After considering the above Report of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (C.I.D. 
Paper No.651-B), the Committee of Imperial Defence made the following recom-
mendations (207th Meeting, December 11th, 1925):-
"The Committee of Imperial Defence approved generally the Report of the 
Committee of Chiefs of Staff (C.I.D. Paper No.651-B) and agreed:-
(a) To recommend to the Cabinet that, in the event of an aggression by the 
Turkish forces against Mosul, the Admiralty should be authorised, if at the time 
they think it advisable, to send ships into the Dardanelles and Sea of Marmora 
without waiting for a formal authority from the Council of the League of Nations 
(but, of course, in definite communication with the League through the Foreign 
Office), since any delay would give the Turks time to take counter-measures by 
mining and otherwise. 
(b) That the Foreign Office should take immediate steps to verify the rumours 
that the Turks have already violated the demilitarisation provisions of the Straits 
Convention, and that, if the rumours are confirmed, the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs should be asked to make immediate representations to the League 
of Nations, as provided for in article 18 of the Straits Convention. 
(c) That a Sub-Committee, under the Chairmanship of the Earl of Balfour, should 
be set up to consider the action which the League of Nations could usefully take to 
apply pressure to Turkey in the event of her resisting the Council's decision as to 
the frontier. Further, that the Departments concerned should give immediate 
consideration to this question with a view to a meeting of the Sub-Committee 
early in the following week. 
(d) That the Admiralty should study the possibility of a blockade of the Turkish 
Black Sea ports. 
(e) That in regard to the Command in Iraq, the recommendation contained in the 
earlier Report of the Committee of Chiefs of Staff (C.I.D. Paper No.632-B, 
paragraph 25) should be adhered to, viz.:-
'We think the first reinforcement on arrival should be under the supreme 
command of the Air Officer Commanding, but that, before subsequent rein-
forcements are despatched, the question should be decided as to whether a 
Commander-in-Chief should not be appointed.'. 
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(0 In order that the Committee of Chiefs of Staff may be kept fully apprised of all 
essential factors in regard to the present and prospective military situation in Iraq 
and its possible reactions elsewhere, the Chief of the Air Staff should keep them 
fully informed and should give them the earliest possible information as to any air 
reinforcements he proposes to send to Iraq and as to the sources from which those 
reinforcements would be drawn. 
(g) That, immediately the decision of the League of Nations in regard to Mosul is 
known, a General Staff Officer should be sent to Iraq from India with the following 
terms of reference:-
(i) To discuss arrangements for the comfort of the 1st Dehelon; 
(ii) To enquire generally into the scheme for the operational employment of the 
force from India." 
59. Lord Balfour's Committee, referred to above in Conclusion (c), at once got to 
work. Its Report (which was approved by the Committee of Imperial Defence on 
January 26th, 1926-208th Meeting), was preceded by the following summary, 
which states in a condensed form the policy recommended by the Committee of 
Imperial Defence for dealing with a Turkish aggression, whether immediately or in 
the coming Spring or Summer:-
(i) The immediate task of dealing locally with any Turkish invasion across the 
frontier as decided by the Council of the League of Nations will devolve in the main 
on the Air Force. 
(ii) This Force should strike the invaders and their lines of communication as 
rapidly and as effectively as possible without waiting for international discussion. 
But this is only an emergency measure, and the ultimate handling of the situation 
concerns the League of Nations, and whatever is done should, if possible, be done 
in their name. 
(iii) The words "if possible" are introduced since the machinery of the League 
cannot be expected to work with extreme rapidity, and situations may easily arise 
which require immediate action on the part of the Mandatory Power. Even a few 
days' delay might render some operation difficult and costly, which, had it been 
taken in time, might have been carried through with the greatest ease. 
(iv) The Committee of Imperial Defence and the Cabinet strongly hold that, so far 
as their share of a war between the League and Turkey is concerned, it would be 
most inexpedient that the main theatre of any large scale military operations 
should be in Iraq. 
(v) An operation which the Committee of Imperial Defence have advised it will be 
necessary to take immediately on a Turkish aggression against Mosul and before 
the machinery of the League is in full action, is that of preventing minelaying in 
the Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus; and the 
violation by the Turks of the demilitarised zone in the neighbourhead of these vital 
channels of communication. 
(vi) Under no circumstances should this country, by landing troops or otherwise, 
give occasion for the suspicion that territorial expansion of any sort or kind is 
desired, or would be accepted, by this country. It is especially necessary, therefore, 
to be cautious in our dealings with any island which has a good harbour, or with 
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any operation which may even appear to affect the territorial hopes or fears or 
other nations. 
(vii) The economic sanction, in so far as it is used, should be used by the League 
as a whole. There is always some odium attaching, for example, to blockade, and 
very rarely are awkard questions relating to international law artd neutral interests 
successfully avoided by the blockading Powers. The League as a whole must bear 
the responsibility of the policy pursued, and not leave it on the shoulders of Great 
Britain alone. 
(viii) In accordance with this general policy every naval operation and every 
military operation (if such take place) should be done under the auspices of the 
League, by its direction or with its sanction; and with at least the formal aid and 
assistance of members of the League other than Great Britain. 
The Committee also made a number of detailed recommendations as to the advice 
which the British representative on the Council of the League could give as to action 
by the League itself, including the nomination of Great Britain, France and Italy, 
with perhaps other countries, to act as mandatories in keeping open the Straits; 
arrangements for a general naval blockade of Turkey; aircraft attacks from Syria, 
Leras Island and the Aegean Islands; the denial by France of the Nisbin Railway to the 
Turks, as well as the denial of the north-east salient of Syria for use by the Turks in 
attacking Iraq; economic pressure on a plan to be drawn by the Blockade 
Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D. Paper No.656-B). As 
regards the latter, the Blockade Committee, after careful investigation, has presented 
a Report (C.I.D. Paper No.660-B) which does not hold out very much hope of 
substantial results from economic pressure on Turkey. 
60. The above Reports (except the Report on Blockade, which was not ready) 
came before the Cabinet on December 18th, when the Cabinet decided that it was 
unnecessary at the moment to take any decision in regard to the recommendations 
of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the subject of the military situation in Iraq 
(Cabinet 59 (25), Conclusion 6). It will be seen, therefore, that none of the above 
recommendations has yet been formally adopted by the Cabinet except the single one 
already mentioned, "That we must avoid being drawn into extensive military 
operations in Iraq". 
61. The Foreign Office have endeavoured to check the rumours that Turkey was 
fortifying the Dardanelles, but the information on the subject is not yet considered to 
have been sufficiently confirmed to justify making a representation at Geneva, and, 
at a moment when attempts are being made to come to terms with the Turks on the 
basis of the Geneva decision in our favour, it was not deemed advisable to take an 
action which must inevitably irritate the Turks, except on irrefutable evidence. It is 
understood that, in accordance with Conclusion (g) of the above recommendations 
of the Committee of Imperial Defence, a General Staff Officer has been sent from 
India to Iraq. 
India 
62. The Report of the Sub-Committee on Indian Military Requirements, June 
1922 (C.I.D. Paper No. 125-D) is the principal authority as regards military policy in 
India. Much of the Report deals with administrative matters, but certain of the 
conclusions are worth quoting as affecting strategical and operational questions, 
e.g.:-
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(1) The extent to which the financial resources oflndia are capable of bearing the 
burden of a large military expenditure 
"While the whole of the resources of Britain will in the future, as in the past, be 
available to support the Government of India in maintaining British supremacy in 
India if it is seriously threatened, it is the recognised duty of India to provide for 
her own defence against external and internal dangers in all but the gravest 
emergencies". 
* * * * 
(12) Employment of the army in India overseas6 
"(a) We recognise that the Indian Army cannot be treated as if it were absolutely at 
the disposal of His Majesty's Government for service outside India. 
(b) We consider that the principle should be generally accepted that, except in the 
gravest emergency, the Indian Army should be employed outside the Indian 
Empire only after consultation with the Governor-General-in-Council." 
(13) Provision of oversea garrisons in time of peace 
"We share the view of the Government of India that the Indian Army should not be 
required permanently to provide large oversea garrisons. We recommend that 
units required for such purposes should be maintained in addition to the 
establishment laid down for the Indian Army, and that the whole cost, direct and 
indirect, of recruiting and maintaining such units should be borne by His 
Majesty's Government, or by the dependency or colony requiring their services." 
(14) Forces required for maintenance of internal order 
"In the face of the evidence given by the official witnesses who are responsible for 
the government of India, as well as by certain unofficial witnesses, we do not feel 
justified in recommending any reduction either in the aggregate number of troops 
allotted to internal security or in the proportion of British troops assigned to that 
duty." 
* * * * 
(19) Defence against external aggression 
"(a) In present circumstances, financial and military, it is not possible to base the 
defence of the frontier on any plan of campaign involving an advance in force to or 
towards Kabul. 
(b) Our policy should be as far as possible to avoid committing the Army to 
military operations on a large scale in the mountainous border region and to keep 
our Field Army concentrated and held in readiness either to strike heavily at the 
6 Edwin Montagu, the secretary of state for India, had advised the Cabinet in Dec 1920: 'So far as India is 
concerned, all idea of initiating as a normal peace measure a scheme, whereby she is to become the base 
for vast military operations in the Middle and Far East, must be definitely abandoned; if public opinion in 
India would tolerate it, Indian revenues cannot bear the charge. Even more modest schemes, under which 
India is to be asked to furnish large military garrisons in the Middle East in times of peace, will have to be 
modified. In short, we must definitely get out of our heads the vague idea too often entertained that India 
is an inexhaustible reservoir from which men and money can be drawn towards the support of Imperial 
resources or in pursuance of Imperial strategy' (CAB 6/4, CID 118-D, 24 Dec 1920, memo by Montagu, 
'Indian military expenditure') . Contingency plans were still made to send Indian troops overseas (see para 
66 of Hankey's memo) but the cost was now to be borne almost entirely by the government in London. 
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enemy's formed bodies as occasion offers or to turn and crush internal risings in 
India." 
* * * * 
(21) Co-operation of Air Force 
"We recommend that the use of the Air Force in Indian warfare be further studied 
under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief by an Air Officer of high rank 
selected by the Secretary of State for Air on the advice of the Chief of the Air Staff; 
for we believe that this arm contains the possibility of great developments and 
should eventually render possible considerable economies." 
* * * * 
(25) Reinforcements from England 
"We recommend that the requirements of India for reinforcements from England 
should be reviewed. We suggest that they might perhaps more appropriately be 
calculated in numbers of regiments and battalions rather than in numbers of 
divisions. In view of the unmartial character of many of the races of India, 
battalions composed of ex-service officers and men specially raised for the purpose 
might be equal to all the demands that would be made upon our troops in 
suppressing a rebellion." 
63. As regards Conclusion (21) quoted above, it is understood that some 
correspondence has taken place as to the possibility of further developments of the 
Air arm in India. 
64. As regards Conclusion (25) no Report has reached the Committee of Imperial 
Defence as to any review of the question of reinforcements from England, but it is 
understood that the question has been the subject of prolonged discussion between 
the War Office and India Office, and that arrangements are now in an advanced stage. 
65. As mentioned in paragraph 15, the coast defences of India were included by 
the Joint Committee of the Home and Oversea Defence Committee in their review of 
Ports East of Suez. 
66. Apart from the above, and apart from the possibility of reinforcements for the 
protection of the South Persian Oilfields, Iraq, Hong-Kong, China, etc., which are 
referred to in other parts of this Report, the military questions relating to India 
which have come before the Committee of Imperial Defence have not been of 
first-class importance from a strategical point of view and have related to such 
matters as artillery for Native States, anti-gas training, etc. The conclusions taken in 
regard to them need not be quoted in this Summary. 
Military commitments in the Far East 
67. Naval policy. Our general policy in the Far East is based on the following 
decisions, under the heading of "Naval Policy", taken by the Cabinet on May 6, 1925, 
after a preliminary study of the question by the Committee of Imperial Defence 
(C.I.D. 200th Meeting, Conclusion 6):-
"(a) on the understanding that the present decision did not in any way reverse the 
general policy of the Government to provide a base at Singapore to accommodate 
the main fleet (the programme for which is under consideration by a special 
Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence), and that the decision of 
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the Cabinet on March 2, 1925, in regard to the programme for the next few years 
was also unaffected, to approve the following recommendations of the Committee 
of Imperial Defence:-
(i) The Committee of Imperial Defence recommend that the policy of leaving to 
the Admiralty, subject to the paramount authority of the Cabinet, the 
responsibility for the naval defence of the Empire on the basis of the one-Power 
standard, should not be reversed or modified. Even before the War it was 
recognised that the two-Power standard did not necessarily imply that our fleets 
were able simultaneously to deal with the concentrated fleets of two first-class 
Naval Powers in different quarters of the globe as well as to provide for all other 
naval requirements. This is equally true of the one-Power standard today. The 
requirements of a one-Power standard are satisfied if our fleet, wherever 
situated, is equal to the fleet of any other nation, wherever situated, provided 
that arrangements are made from time to time in different parts of the world, 
according as the international situation requires, to enable the local forces to 
maintain the situation against vital and irreparable damage pending the arrival 
of the main fleet, and to give the main fleet on arrival sufficient mobility. 
(ii) The Committee accept the view of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
that in existing circumstances aggressive action against the British Empire on 
the part of Japan within the next ten years is not a contingency seriously to be 
apprehended. 
The Foreign Office should be responsible for warning the Cabinet and the 
Committee of Imperial Defence of any change in the international situation in 
the Far East which would necessitate a fresh review of the question. 
(iii) Although, in accordance with recent decisions, preliminary arrangements 
to establish docking facilities for our largest ships at Singapore and to develop 
gradually the necessary oil fuel installations on our Eastern routes should 
proceed, there is no necessity, in view of Conclusion (ii), to make preparations 
involving additional expenditure for placing at Singapore, for a decisive battle 
in the Pacific, a British battle fleet with cruisers, flotillas and all ancillary 
vessels superior in strength, or at least equal, to the sea-going Navy of Japan. 
This decision should be reviewed automatically by the Committee of Imperial 
Defence every year, in the light of the international situation. 
Further, in order that all the data required for a decision may be readily 
available in the event of a change in the situation in the Far East, the 
Committee of Imperial Defence and the Singapore Sub-Committee should 
inquire and report as to the preparations which would have to be made if it 
became necessary to reverse the above decision. 
To meet the unlikely contingency of war occurring before the base at Singapore 
is capable of sustaining a British fleet superior to the Japanese navy, the 
Admiralty should consider in advance what facilities can be made available from 
Great Britain or elsewhere to supplement the facilities which already exist in 
the Far East. 
(b) That, in connection with the second Conclusion of the Committee of Imperial 
56 CHAPTER 2 [7) 
Defence, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should be asked to instruct his 
Office to bear in mind that any warning of a change in the international situation 
in the Far East would not be of much value for the purposes of expediting our 
defensive preparations in that region unless issued some years in advance of a 
situation of actual danger." 
The automatic annual review of Conclusion (iii) above might conveniently be 
undertaken in connection with the annual Report of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. 
68. The Admiralty have secret plans for dealing with the various contingencies in 
the Far East, of which the Committee of Imperial Defence have cognizance from 
verbal statements made by the Chief of the Naval Staff. 
69. So far as is known to the Committee of Imperial Defence, the extent of the 
co-operation of the Army and Air Force in these arrangements is limited to the 
defence of Singapore and Hong-Kong, and the various fuelling stations, etc., on the 
route to the Far East. 
70. The feasibility of bringing economic pressure to bear on Japan in case of need 
is being studied by the Blockade Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence. 
71. Singapore. (See also para.17). After various changes in policy resulting from 
changes of Government, the present Cabinet decided on November 26, 1924 (Cabinet 
64 (24) Conclusion 3) to approve in principle that the Naval Base at Singapore should 
be proceeded with. 
72 . The details have been entrusted to a special Singapore Sub-Committee of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence. In their first Report (C.l.D. Paper No.243-C) the 
principal recommendations were that the sites previously recommended for the 
aerodrome, seaplane station and floating dock in the Old Strait should be adhered to, 
and that for the present:-
"The programme of work to be undertaken by the Admiralty in the Old Strait 
should be limited to what is essential to enable the dock to be used after its arrival 
at Singapore, that is to say, such matters as dredging, water-supply, the provision 
of the necessary accommodation, a floating crane, and other indispensable matters 
such as anti-malaria measures, clearing the site, and the borings required in order 
to obtain the necessary data for such future works as may be decided on later." 
An announcement in accordance with this decision was made in the House of Lords 
by the late Marquess Curzon of Kedleston on March 4, 1925. 
73. Since then the Sub-Committee has presented a second Report, recommend-
ing that the Admiralty should be authorised to proceed with the construction of a 
new floating dock for use at Singapore in lieu of the old German floating dock which 
it had originally been intended to utilise there, and also containing detailed 
recommendations regarding local seaward, medium and light, and anti-aircraft 
defences. The question of the heavy defences has been reserved for decision in the 
summer of 1926, pending the settlement of a controversy as to the possible 
substitution of bombing aircraft for the 15-inch guns which had been recommended 
by the Admiralty and War Office for the defence of the base. These recommendations 
have been approved by the Cabinet, whose decision has been taken note of by the 
Committee of Imperial Defence (205th Meeting). 
74. Hong Kong. The defences of Hong Kong have not received much considera-
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tion by the Committee of Imperial Defence, since, by the terms of Article XIX of the 
Washington Treaty for the Limitation of Armaments, the status quo has to be 
maintained at that fortress. Various questions have arisen, however, regarding the 
interpretation of the status quo, more particularly in regard to moveable and 
anti-aircraft armament. It is unnecessary to go into these details here. 
75. The situation in China. The situation arising out of the unrest and 
xenophobia in China has recently been before the Committee of Chiefs of Staff and 
the Committee of Imperial Defence. The Chiefs of Staff in their Report (C.I.D. Paper 
No.617-B) summarised their conclusions and recommendations as follows:-
"(a) The military significance of the present unrest in China lies rather in the 
promise it gives of further and more serious disturbances in the future than in 
any present danger. 
(b) In the event of threats to or attacks on the Legation or other British interests 
in Pekin or Tientsin, no British military force other than the one battalion at 
Tientsin is available. The first reinforcement which could arrive would be one 
brigade from India; this could reach Taku in about five weeks from the date of the 
order to mobilise. During this period of five weeks reliance would have to be 
placed on international action. 
(c) British interests in the Treaty ports are already receiving such protection as is 
possible from the naval forces in the Far East, and no protection can be provided 
other than by the naval forces, whiCh we recommend should be increased. 
(d) British interests inland can receive no protection unless they are on the 
navigable rivers. Missionaries and isolated individuals if threatened should be 
withdrawn to the ports. 
(e) Modern gunboats should be provided for use in the rivers in China. 
(f) An increase in our military forces in the Far East is desirable so that a small 
reserve may be available to meet emergencies such as the present. 
(g) For the reasons given in the Joint Note circulated with this Report, offensive 
action in China on a large scale is not possible for the British Empire acting 
alone, and finality could not be hoped for from any operation within our capacity. 
Offensive action on a large scale can only be international, and even on that basis 
it would probably be unprofitable, except possibly for Japan, who must be the 
predominant partner." 
76. When this Report came before the Committee of Imperial Defence on July 27, 
1925 (202nd Meeting), the following conclusions were reached:-
"(a) That in present circumstances no reinforcement for the troops in Hong Kong 
should take place. 
(b) That, with a view to further consideration of the question in due course, the 
General Staff should inquire:-
(i) What expense would be incurred in making the existing unused huts in 
Hong Kong suitable for occupation by an Indian battalion, and 
(ii) The extra expense involved if the garrison of Hong Kong were to be 
permanently increased by a British battalion in addition to the Indian battalion 
referred to in (a) above. 
(c) That the Secretary of State for the Colonies should consider whether the cost 
of permanent barracks might be met by the local Government or by some 
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arrangement such as was proposed in the Report of the Chiefs of Staff 
Sub-Committee." 
77. Apart from the above, there have been some minor conclusions affecting the 
Far East, such as one relating to the Japanese air base in Formosa, and the Report of 
the Joint Oversea and Home Defence Committee on the defence of Australian ports. 
7 
7 Para 78, on questions at present before the Committee of Imperial Defence, and para 79 (concluding) 
remarks, omitted. 
8 CO 730/151110/6, CP 167(30) 17 May 1930 
'Treaty settlement with Iraq': Cabinet memorandum by Lord Passfield 
[In Sept 1929 Britain promised to recommend Iraq for membership of the League of 
Nations in 1932, by which date the British mandate would be relinquished and Iraq would 
become independent. The pledge was made long before the end of Britain's legal 
obligations as the mandatory power. Following the recommendations of a commission 
which examined the disputed frontier between Iraq and Turkey and recommended that 
the province of Mosul should pass to Iraq, the League of Nations resolved in 1925 that the 
award should not become definite until Britain had concluded a new treaty with Iraq 
ensuring the continuation of the mandate for the next twenty-five years or until such 
time as Iraq had been admitted to the League. Several factors explained Britain's decision 
to advance the timetable for Iraqi independence. These included the uncertain legal 
position of British forces in Iraq and the fact that there would be no Indian troops 
available in the event of internal unrest and a repeat of the 1920 insurrection 
(demonstrations in favour of the Arab position in Palestine had taken place in Iraq in Aug 
and Sept 1929). Above all the decision was made in an attempt to earn the gratitude of the 
ruling class in Iraq and, in the long run, to maintain Britain's political influence and 
strategic position. The future of the British air bases was the most difficult question 
which emerged in the treaty negotiations. By the beginning of 1930 all British and Indian 
ground troops had been withdrawn from Iraq but five squadrons of military aircraft 
remained, stationed at three airbases: Mosul, Hinaida (five miles from Baghdad) and 
Shaiba (ten miles from Basra), plus a seaplane anchorage at Basra. As Passfield explained 
in the memo reproduced here, the UK Air Ministry was not opposed to the end of the 
mandate but determined to retain the airbases, or as many of them as possible after 
independence. Under the 1932 treaty with Iraq, Britain agreed to withdraw all forces from 
Mosul and Hinaida within five years. The airbase at Shaiba and the seaplane anchorage at 
Basra were maintained and Britain was also allowed to construct a new airbase west of the 
Euphrates in the region of Lake Habbaniya which became operative in 1936-1937 
following the withdrawals from Mosul and Hinaida. As well as allowing Britain to move 
military forces across Iraq, the 1932 treaty also obliged Iraq to purchase all of its military 
equipment in the UK; to employ, at its own expense, the services of a British military 
mission; to send its officers exclusively to British military academies; and to use British 
subjects whenever foreign experts were needed. These provisions of the treaty were 
resented by the new Iraqi government. In May 1941 the Iraqi army besieged Habbaniya 
and Britain had to mount a major military operation to protect the base.] 
Treaty negotiations have been proceeding in Baghdad for the last few weeks. 
Considerable progress has been made, and substantial agreement has been reached 
on most of the points to be covered in the new Treaty with Iraq. For all practical 
purposes the differences between the two parties have been narrowed down to one 
question; the vital one of the retention of British forces in Iraq after Iraq enters the 
League of Nations. King Feisal himself has stated that if this question can be 
satisfactorily disposed of, little difficulty need be anticipated in settling the remain-
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ing provisiOns of the Treaty. But upon this question something approaching a 
deadlock has been reached. 
2. My colleagues will remember that the proposals for a draft Treaty which the 
High Commissioner for Iraq was instructed to negotiate with the Iraq Government 
contemplated the retention of British Air Force contingents, with supporting group 
troops, in three localities in Iraq, namely, Mosul, Hinaidi (on the outskirts of 
Baghdad), and in the vicinity of Basra. When this proposal was put forward by Sir 
Franc is Humphrys, 1 it met with the most lively opposition on the part of the Iraq 
Government. They pointed out that it would, in fact, involve more or less permanent 
British military occupation of the country, which was not only wholly incompatible 
with the independent status to which Iraq would attain on entering the League of 
Nations, but was, in their opinion, unnecessary, since they were confident of their 
capacity to deal with the question of internal security (as opposed to external 
aggression) with the forces at their own command, and without seeking the 
assistance of the Royal Air Force. In particular, the Iraq Government showed 
themselves most strongly opposed to the suggestion for the retention of British 
forces at Hinaidi, in the immediate vicinity of the capital of Iraq. My colleagues may 
remember that the Iraq Government's reaction to this proposal was anticipated in 
the memorandum by the Middle East Department, which I circulated to the Cabinet 
on the 3rd September last (C.P. 239 (29)). 
3. At first, the Iraq Government declined to contemplate the retention of any 
British forces upon Iraq soil after Iraq entered the League. They were ready, they 
said, to afford us every facility that we might need in peace and in war for the passage 
of troops across Iraq and for the use of Iraq's aerodromes, but, rather than acquiesce 
in what was tantamount to permanent British military occupation, they would prefer 
to dispense altogether with a defensive alliance with this country, and to content 
themselves with an ordinary treaty of amity. They professed to believe that the 
danger of Iraq becoming involved in a conflict with any of her neighbours was 
remote. Iraq was now on excellent terms with Turkey and Syria, and, in view of the 
recent rapprochement between King Feisal and lbn Saud, there was no longer any 
serious threat to Iraq's desert frontier. They would, of course, prefer a defensive 
alliance, but even if this were concluded, they saw no need for the continued 
retention of British forces in Iraq. The threat of British intervention would, they 
contended, in itself act as a sufficiently powerful deterrent against external 
aggression. If, for their own purposes, His Majesty's Government wished to retain air 
forces in the Middle East, why should they not be stationed either in Trans-Jordan or 
Koweit, where there would be no question of infringing the principle of national 
independence? 
4. At a later stage in the negotiations, however, the Iraq Government made a 
definite advance. Recognising this country's important interests in the Persian Gulf, 
they offered to allow a British air force to be retained in the neighbourhood of Basra 
for the duration of the Treaty (25 years), and suggested that they might be willing to 
grant to His Majesty's Government the permanent lease of the necessary accom-
modation for an aerodrome and encampment in this region. This offer was 
accompanied by an undertaking to extend to His Majesty's Government the free use 
1 UK high commissioner in Iraq, 1929-1932; ambassador, 1932- 1935. 
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of Iraqi aerodromes in peace and in war and every facility for manceuvres, training 
flights, &c. 
5. There is much force in the Iraq Government's contention that it would be 
difficult to reconcile the permanent presence of a British force just outside Baghdad 
with Iraq's status as a fully independent Power. But the Iraq Government's 
confidence in their own capacity to deal unassisted with the potential forces of 
disorder in the country is not shared either by the High Commissioner or by the Air 
Staff. In the view of the High Commissioner, if the British forces were to be 
withdrawn from Central Iraq, the country would lapse into chaos. The same view is 
held by the Air Staff. 
6. The High Commissioner has suggested, as a possible compromise, (1), a 
scheme for the substitution of Iraqi for British Air Forces at Mosul after a term of 
years, and (2), the withdrawal of the British Air Force at present stationed at Hinaidi 
to Habbaniya, some 45 miles from Baghdad. The High Commissioner has been 
informed that his suggestion as regards Mosul is acceptable to His Majesty's 
Government. His proposal for the withdrawal of the Royal Air Force to Habbaniya is 
not, however, acceptable to the Air Staff. In their view, the most probable 
contributory cause of external aggression would be the outbreak of internal disorder 
in Iraq, which would be greatly increased if the British air force were removed to any 
distance from Baghdad. Their presence just outside the capital acts as a powerful 
deterrent to disorder, and would enable His Majesty's Government unobtrusively to 
influence the course of events in the case of imminent trouble. 
7. As to the Iraq Government's proposal for the concentration of all British forces 
at the head of the Persian Gulf, the view of the Air Staff is that the absence of British 
forces from Central Iraq would prevent prompt and effective intervention on Iraq's 
Northern frontier to repel invasion, which, if not checked at the outset, and if 
allowed to develop, could not be dealt with by air action alone, but would probably 
call for the dispatch of a British Expeditionary Force to Iraq, and involve a serious 
military campaign. The exclusion of British forces from Central Iraq would thus, in 
their opinion, appreciably increase the potential extent of British military commit-
ments under the new Treaty. 
8. My own Department take a somewhat different view. They are doubtful 
whether the removal of the Royal Air Force from Central Iraq would in fact lead to 
complete chaos and the collapse of the Iraqi State. They do not suggest that the same 
standard of Government could be maintained throughout Iraq if the Royal Air Force 
were withdrawn to Basra, perhaps not even the same type of Government, i.e., by 
Parliamentary institutions. They anticipate that the withdrawal of the British air 
force from Central Iraq would probably be followed by a period of unrest and sporadic 
disorder throughout Iraq, that Parliamentary Government might possibly be 
demolished and that an admittedly inefficient but workable system of Oriental 
despotism would ultimately take its place. In the process essential British interests 
would not, they consider, suffer irretrievable damage, and the vital interests of 
Imperial defence could be adequately safeguarded from Basra. 
9. Clearly, I think the question whether Iraq can or cannot stand on her own feet 
is, and must remain for some years, a matter of conjecture. The Iraq Government 
may be right and the Air Staff wrong. Obviously we do not want to see the Iraq State, 
which we have established at such cost in effort and money, fall to pieces and the 
country relapse into disorder. On the other hand, we may well be under-rating the 
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capacity of the Iraq Government to run their own show'. 
10. The Air Staff, I understand, are prepared to put the question to the test of 
experience. They have suggested as a possible compromise that the Royal Air Force 
should be retained at Hinaidi for the first five years after the new Treaty enters into 
force, on the understanding that if, at the end of that period the Iraq Government 
should still wish the Royal Air Force to leave the capital, then the forces at present at 
Hinaidi would be withdrawn to Basra so soon as the necessary accommodation had 
been made available. The Air Staff contemplate that within that period of five years 
either the Iraq Government will find themselves unable to carry on without our 
assistance and will then presumably wish the Royal Air Force to remain where they 
are, or they will manage to carry on without British assistance, in which case there 
will be no excuse or reason for the Royal Air Force to remain in Central Iraq, and 
they could be withdrawn with a clear mind to Basra. There is a third possible 
contingency. The Iraq Government might find themselves forced to invoke the 
assistance of the Royal Air Force, and nevertheless, prompted by considerations of 
amour-propre, they might demand the withdrawal of that Force at the end of the five 
years' period. In such circumstances the British Air Force would, of course, have to 
leave, and we should have to face the risk of the country relapsing into disorder. 
11. It is not unreasonable to hope, however, that before that time comes the 
army and the security forces of Iraq would be developed to a higher pitch of efficiency 
than at present. The Iraq Government would have had practical experience of the 
responsibilities of self-government. There would have been ample time for such 
political and administrative adjustments as circumstances might show to be 
necessary. Moreover, the balance of the probability seems to be either that the Royal 
Air Force will remain at Hinaidi indefinitely at the request of the Iraq Government, 
or that when they withdraw they will leave behind them a reasonably well-ordered 
and stable administration. A necessary condition of this proposal is, however, that 
some arrangement should be made with the Iraq Government whereby His Majesty's 
Government are assured of permanent occupation of an air-base in the neighbour-
hood of Basra. This, I understand, is vitally important in the interests of imperial 
defence; but it is also essential in order to enable us to discharge our obligations 
under the proposed alliance with Iraq. As explained above, in the view of the Air Staff, 
our commitments under the alliance would become potentially more onerous in the 
event of a complete withdrawal to Basra, since effective intervention in the initial 
stages of a conflict would be impossible. But even from Basra those obligations could 
be adequately discharged, although possibly at greater cost. 
12. A proposition on the above lines would, I think, ultimately be accepted by the 
Iraq Government, but there remains to be considered the almost equally difficult 
question of finance. We had contemplated that, if the British Forces were withdrawn 
from their present stations in Central and Northern Iraq, the Iraq Government, 
having regard to the Egyptian precedent, would agree to meet the cost of providing 
alternative accommodation elsewhere. The High Commissioner has now informed us 
that, in his opinion, our hopes were ill-founded. In effect, he says that there is no 
prospect whatever of inducing the Iraq Government to accept any such contingent 
liability, and even if the Iraq Government could themselves be brought to agree, they 
would inevitably be disavowed later by the Iraqi Parliament. The Egyptian precedent, 
as the High Commissioner points out, is not strictly relevant. In the case of Egypt, 
the provision of alternative accommodation for our troops is part of the price which 
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the Egyptian Government must pay for the withdrawal of British opposition to the 
admission of Egypt to the League of Nations. This lever can no longer be used in the 
case of Iraq. We have already unconditionally promised to support Iraq's candidature 
for admission to the League in 1932. We cannot now attempt to qualify or condition 
that promise. Moreover, it would be useless to threaten the Iraq Government with 
the withdrawal of our offer of a defensive alliance, since, as has been explained above, 
the Iraq Government apparently set little store by the alliance, and do not accept the 
view that our obligations thereunder demand the permanent presence of British 
Forces in Iraq. Apart, however, from this conflict of opinion, there is the practical 
consideration that the Iraq Government are at present in desperate financial straits. 
Owing to the fall in the world price of grain, Iraqi cultivators cannot market their 
produce. This had a disastrous effect upon the collection of revenue, and the Iraq 
Government are now faced with the practical certainty of a serious Budget deficit. In 
this atmosphere of acute financial stringency, the Iraq Government would naturally 
be the more reluctant to accept any substantial new financial commitment. 
13. I do not suggest that this view should be accepted as inevitable without being 
put to the test, or that His Majesty's Government should assume this contingent 
liability unless and until it has been definitely proved that there is no chance 
whatever of inducing the Iraq Government to accept it. I suggest, however, that, if it 
becomes evident that by no other means can a satisfactory treaty be concluded with 
the Iraq Government, His Majesty's Government should in the last resort themselves 
agree to meet the cost of providing the extra accommodation at Basra, in the event of 
our Forces having to withdraw from Hinaidi at the end of the five years' period. 
14. It is estimated that the cost would be in the neighbourhood of £1,000,000, to 
be spread over some three years; but, against this, there will be certain savings. The 
High Commissioner anticipates that a reorganisation of the system of the ground 
defence for our aerodromes in Iraq, which he has recommended, would lead to an 
annual economy of some £30,000. To this must be added the amount of the present 
subsidy towards the cost of the Iraq army, viz. £60,000, which would not be 
continued under the new arrangements. Both these economies would begin to 
operate as from the entry into force of the new Treaty, and thus a sum of some 
£450,000 would have been saved before the time came to consider the removal of our 
Forces to Basra. The High Commissioner anticipates, also, that the value of the Royal 
Air Force buildings at Mosul and Hinaidi, to be handed over to the Iraq Government, 
would approximate to £200,000, and this the Iraq Government would, of course, 
have to pay. I understand, moreover, that the Air Staff would probably be prepared to 
consider dispensing with one squadron, if the whole of the Royal Air Force in Iraq 
were concentrated at Basra. This would involve an annual saving of approximately 
£130,000. 
It will be realised, therefore, that there are substantial economies to set off against 
this contingent liability, and that even if some seven years hence we are compelled to 
concentrate our Forces at Basra and to meet the cost of providing additional 
accommodation there, it is unlikely on the balance to result in any substantial 
increase of our present financial commitments in Iraq. In any case it is, I submit, a 
relatively small price to pay in return for securing the essential requirements of 
Imperial defence. 
15. It may be asked, why do we want an alliance with Iraq at all? The Iraq 
Government do not seem to set much store by it. It entails the possibility of serious 
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defence commitments, and the professed policy of His Majesty's Government is to 
liquidate, so soon as may be, their commitments in Iraq. Why not abandon the idea 
of an alliance and be satisfied with a simple treaty of friendship? The answer to that 
question is, I think, that an alliance is vitally necessary in order to secure Imperial 
interests. This was held to be the case in Egypt, and the same considerations apply in 
the case of Iraq. There is no other means of securing the unfettered use in all 
circumstances of our strategic air route, of adequately safeguarding our position at 
the head of the Persian Gulf and of obtaining a permanent base for our Middle-
Eastern air reserve. By no other means can we be sure of preventing some other 
Power from establishing itself in Iraq and threatening our vital communications by 
air and sea. In default of a formal alliance, we could not, without contravening the 
accepted principles of neutrality, retain our forces at Basra, or make use of Iraqi 
territory in the event of a war in which this country, but not Iraq, was engaged. Our 
interests in these regions are such that, even if we had no defensive alliance with 
Iraq, we could not afford to stand aside if the territorial integrity of Iraq was seriously 
threatened. That being the case, it is clearly desirable that there should be a formal 
alliance. Its very existence should act as an effective deterrent against irresponsible 
action by other Powers. The knowledge that Iraq could count upon British assistance 
in any conflict should give pause to any State contemplating aggression.2 
16. Moreover, without some such assurance of the continuing stability of the Iraq 
State as would be provided by a formal alliance with this country, it is extremely 
doubtful whether the Council of the League of Nations could be brought to relieve 
this country of her mandatory responsibilities. In 1925, as a condition of awarding 
the Mosul province to Iraq, the Council of the League stipulated that the Mandate 
should continue for a maximum period of 25 years. It is scarcely likely that, after the 
elapse of only seven years, the League Council would be prepared so radically to 
revise their former opinion as to agree to release Iraq from the Mandate without at 
the same time requiring adequate safeguards for her future stability, 
17. There is one other question of only slightly less importance which has arisen 
in the course of the negotiations with Iraq. My colleagues will recollect that the 
treaty proposals which the Cabinet approved contemplated that the Treaty would be 
of indefinite duration, but could be revised at the end of 25 years by agreement 
between the two parties. Thus it would have been possible for His Majesty's 
Government, by withholding their approval, to block any attempt on the part of the 
Iraq Government to secure the termination or revision of the Treaty at a time or in a 
manner considered contrary to British interests. As in the case of Egypt, this 
provision has met with strong opposition in Iraq. The Iraq Government have put 
forward a counter-proposal, the effect of which would be that the Treaty would 
2 In an earlier memo to Cabinet, Passfield had argued that there were 'the most cogent reasons of Defence 
Policy' for the retention of British air forces in Iraq: 'In our Imperial Air Defence Policy-as in the sphere 
of commercial aviation-Iraq occupies a key position similar in practically every respect to that held by 
the Suez Canal in our maritime policy .... Apart from its strategical value, the air route through Iraq is 
the main trunk road over which must pass the commercial air traffic and mails to India, Australia and the 
Far East, and we must be in a position to safeguard that route. Moreover, the presence of a strong British 
air force in Iraq affords an important measure of security to the great industrial enterprises in the South 
Persian oilfields and in the Persian Gulf, and acts as a deterrent to the several possibilities of action hostile 
to the British Empire in Persia and Arabia generally, and as a check to any threat to India from Central 
Asia' (CO 730/15115/5, CP 45(30), 10 Feb 1930). 
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definitely come to an end after 25 years, unless it was extended with the agreement of 
both parties. I fear that there is little prospect of tying the Iraq Government down to 
a Treaty which might continue in perpetuity, and that it will be necessary to go some 
distance to meet them in this matter. I suggest, therefore, that the High Commis-
sioner should be authorised, if necessary, to accept an arrangement, such as that 
contemplated in the recent negotiations with the Egyptian Government, which 
would provide that, at the expiration of a period of 25 years, either of the High 
Contracting Parties could demand that negotiations be opened with a view to its 
revision, and in the case of disagreement the difference should be submitted to the 
Council of the League. 
18. To sum up, I recommend that I be authorised by the Cabinet to instruct the 
High Commissioner to negotiate with the Iraq Government on the following basis:-
(1) His Majesty's Government to be granted by the Iraq Government a permanent 
lease of an air-base, to be selected by His Majesty's Government, at, or in the 
vicinity of Basra; 
(2) The British Air Force to remain at Hinaidi for 5 years after the entry into force 
of the new Treaty, and at the expiration of that period to withdraw to Basra if the 
Iraq Government so desire, the withdrawal to be carried out with all reasonable 
despatch; 
(3) The Iraq Government to assume the contingent liability for meeting the cost 
of constructing the necessary additional accommodation at Basra, unless the High 
Commissioner is satisfied that insistence on this condition would involve a definite 
breakdown of negotiations and the rejection of the Treaty, in which event this 
liability to be accepted by His Majesty's Government. 
(4) The Treaty to provide that at any time after the expiration of a period of 25 
years, the High Contracting Parties will, at the request of either of them, enter 
into negotiations with a view to such revision of its terms by agreement as may be 
appropriate in the existing circumstances, and that, in case of disagreement, the 
difference will be submitted to the Council of the League. 
9 PREM 11152, ff 6--9 5 Apr 1933 
[Singapore naval base]: minute by Sir M Hankey to Mr MacDonald 
urging that the national government take the question of the defence 
of Singapore more seriously. 
[Singapore was one of three sites originally considered for a naval base in the Far East. 
The others were Hong Kong, rejected because its anchorage was too small for a modern 
fleet, and Sydney, rejected on the strategic grounds that its lines of communication 
through Singapore and Colombo could be dissected by Japanese naval forces breaking 
through the Malay barrier. Singapore by contrast was described as the 'gateway to the 
Pacific'. Commanding a strategical position on the shortest possible route between the 
Indian and Pacific oceans, it was said to provide the ideal base from which a fleet could 
protect the trade routes from India to Australia. The decision to build the base was made 
in 1921 and the first funds were voted in 1923. A year later the first Labour government 
cancelled the project, justifying its decision on the grounds that security could best be 
achieved, not through competitive armaments but through a new policy of international 
co-operation based on the League of Nations. Cancellation did not actually halt the 
preparations and the Conservative government renewed the scheme, albeit at a reduced 
level, in 1926. The main construction contract was let in 1928 but throughout the 1920s 
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plans for the defence of the base were dogged by an inter-service dispute between the navy 
and the air force over the relative merits of heavy artillery and torpedo bombers. This 
particular issue was not resolved until1932 when it was decided that heavy guns, assisted 
by the air arm, should be the main deterrent against a naval attack on the base. The 
second Labour government which entered office in 1929 again tried to call a halt but 
found that the project had developed a momentum of its own and that cancellation might 
prove more costly than continuation. Just over £4 million had already been spent on the 
base, of which £2V4 million had been provided by the main empire contributors-the 
Malay states, New Zealand, Hong Kong and the Straits Settlements. However, it was not 
until the Manchurian and Shanghai crises of 1931-1932 that a decision was taken to 
complete the base. After 1934 Singapore had to compete for scarce resources in the 
government's overall rearmament programme. Although the dockyard was formally 
opened in 1938, the base was far from complete and construction work was still 
continuing in 1940-1941 on the eve of the Pacific war.) 
Prime Minister 
Is it not time that the National Government took the question of the defence of 
Singapore more seriously? In the last two years we have had three crises in the Far 
East- the original Manchurian crisis, the Shanghai crisis, the Jehol crisis, 1 to say 
nothing of the earlier crisis when we had to send troops to Shanghai. In any of these 
crises a false step by the League or by ourselves might have precipitated a most 
anxious situation and perhaps a disaster. There is no reason to believe that the 
situation is yet (or is soon likely to be) stabilised, and the Government of Japan 
remains under the influence of an irresponsible military junta. 
If the unexpected did occur, as well it might, and we lost Singapore-the pivot of 
our strategical position in the Far East-there would be a calamity of the first 
magnitude. We might well lose India, and the faith in us of Australia and New 
Zealand would be shattered. The disaster to our trade would be overwhelming. 
In that event the Government would be in an awkward position. It would be said 
that they had been warned every year since the original project had been started; that 
these warnings had been emphasised by the events of 1931- 1933; that floating docks 
and dry docks and huge stores of fuel had been provided and left defenceless in spite 
of repeated warnings from the Government's responsible advisers; that quite a 
moderate annual expenditure from the beginning of the project until today would 
have put the defences on a satisfactory footing; that the question had unfortunately 
(almost for the first time in Imperial defence) been brought into the political arena, 
though even the Governments that in principle approved the Singapore scheme had 
not implemented their policy. 
Up to now the Government could have given the following reasons for not 
proceeding with Singapore:-
(!) Their general desire for a policy of pacification. That reason, however, is very 
much weaker after the way Japan has flouted the League of Nations. It is clear that 
the present regime in Japan respects nothing but force. 
(2) The technical dispute Air versus Guns for coast defence. But that dispute 
would never have arisen if the original scheme had been pursued consistently. 
Moreover this excuse applies no longer, as the dispute was settled a year ago. 
(3) That we could not afford the money. But during the years that we were 
neglecting Singapore we found money for such objects as roads used mainly for 
1 Frontier province of North-East China occupied by the Japanese in 1933 and annexed to the new state of 
Manchukuo. 
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joy-riding, swimming baths, recreation grounds, town halls, and artificially-
anticipated works of various kinds (such as the sewage works in my own Parish). 
These works, it is true, gave employment, but largely of a blind alley kind. The 
Singapore defences would have enabled key men, artisans of the best type, to be 
kept at work in an industry the importance of which to the nation is emphasised by 
the Reports which are coming before the Committee of Imperial Defence in 
connection with Item I of the Agenda Paper. 
Whatever the case in the past it is hard to find a decent excuse to-day for further 
delay. If disaster occurred, it would seem incredible to posterity, especially in the face 
of the warnings of the last two years, that we could have jeopardised the British 
Empire for the sake of a few hundred thousand pounds in a Budget of nearly 
£800,000,000. 
10 CAB 29/148, NCM(35)1 23 Mar 1934 
'Preparations for the 1935 naval conference': memorandum by SirE 
Chatfield1 (with comments by the FO) [Extract] 
Part I.--General strategical requirements for security 
1. It is not considered necessary to set out here the essential principles that have 
been accepted as the basis of our system of Imperial Naval Defence, nor the tasks of 
our naval forces in carrying out the role assigned to them, though it is from these 
premises that the views of the Naval Staff are essentially derived. It will be sufficient, 
for the present purpose, to point out that, in considering the relative standards of 
naval strength to be adopted in a general international agreement, possibly of long 
duration, and one which would form a precedent for any later agreements, the Naval 
Staff is bound to take stock of our general strategical requirements for security. 
2. In accordance, however, with the policy of His Majesty's Government, the 
strength of the United States Fleet is left out of account in computing these 
requirements. 
3. Briefly, then, it is the view of the Naval Staff that for our full security our naval 
defence policy be such as to enable us to provide in the Far East a force of sufficient 
strength to ensure security for the Empire and its essential interests against Japanese 
encroachment or attack, to provide also protection for our merchant ships on all the 
sea routes, and at the same time to have sufficient forces in European waters and the 
Atlantic to give us security against the strongest European naval Power. This policy 
has been described as a "Two-Power Standard." 
4. This is not the position to-day and the Naval Staff would be failing in their duty 
if they left any doubt in the minds of the Government as to the risks we are taking 
with our present policy and present strength, risks which can only be counter-
balanced by a correlated foreign policy. 
5. At the Washington Conference2 we agreed to parity in capital ship strength 
with the United States, which gave us practically a two-Power standard of strength as 
against Japan and the strongest naval Power in Europe. We definitely refused, at that 
1 First sea lord and chief of naval staff, 1933-1938 (Lord Chatfield, 1937). 2 Of 1921-1922. 
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time, to commit ourselves to any agreement as regards the strength of cruiser forces 
and light forces, because we knew that our demands, based on our special 
responsibilities, would not be agreed to. At that time, however, our strength in these 
forces in relation to those of Japan and the strongest European Power was 
satisfactory. The position is now profoundly changed. The superiority of our cruiser 
forces has been gradually lost in the last 12 years, and in the five years previous to the 
London Naval Conference,3 only 9 cruisers were ordered and future construction was 
most uncertain, so that when that Conference met our naval position was serious. In 
order to ensure a steady naval programme of cruisers for the ensuing 6 years, and to 
meet the American demand for parity in all classes of ships, the Admiralty agreed to 
what was strategically unsound in consideration of the ratio secured by Japan. The 
position was accentuated by the failure of France and Italy to associate themselves 
with Part Ill of the London Naval Treaty, with the result that France has been free to 
construct cruisers at her will, whereas we have been artificially limited. At the 
present time France has reached the formidable total of 54 cruisers, built and 
building, though many of them are small. 
6. In the last 12 years our naval security has been seriously jeopardised, so that 
the despatch to the East of a fleet sufficient to meet that of Japan, combined with a 
distribution of cruisers to ensure the security of our sea communications against 
Japanese attack, would leave us with a strength in Europe and Home Waters 
definitely inferior to that of the strongest European naval power. In capital ships 
alone we should have a bare equality, but in other classes of ships the position is 
serious, as we should have a mere handful of cruisers and destroyers left to meet the 
powerful cruiser and submarine forces which could be brought against our Atlantic 
and Mediterranean trade. It is therefore vital that the following question should be 
most carefully considered:-
/f we have to send out to the Far East an adequate fleet, how is our security in 
Home Waters to be obtained, and what is the minimum strength of our naval 
forces in those waters that can be accepted? 
7. It is fully realised that it is our policy to remain on good terms with France, 
but the Naval Staffemphasise that the French naval strength provides, and will 
provide, the measures for the strength of the strongest European naval Power and 
that the present position of France may be assumed by a Power whose interests are 
opposed to ours. There are reasons why a long naval agreement is highly desirable 
and so our foreign policy must envisage, from the point of view of naval security, our 
relationships for a long time ahead. The standards of relative strengths agreed to in 
1935 will bind us and determine our relative strengths in, say, 10 years' time. 
8. If we are to accept definitely that it is an impossible financial task to build up a 
sufficient naval strength to face the strongest European Power when we are already 
engaged with Japan, that is a "Two-Power Standard," we must also accept the fact 
that the Admiralty cannot guarantee the security of our vital sea communications in 
Home Waters against attack by sea. It seems that we must either trust to a naval 
combination with some other Power to give us security at sea against such 
aggression, or we must keep the balance of our forces remaining in Europe 
sufficiently strong to prove an effective deterrent to any interference, namely, a 
3 Of 1930. 
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"One-Power Standard." 
9. The Committee of Imperial Defence in 1925 defined the "One-Power Standard" 
as follows:-
"The requirements of a one-Power standard are satisfied if our fleet, wherever 
situated, is equal to the fleet of any other nation, wherever situated, provided that 
arrangements are made from time to time in different parts of the world, 
according as the international situation requires, to enable the local forces to 
maintain the situation against vital and irreparable damage pending the arrival of 
the main fleet and to give the main fleet on arrival sufficient mobility." 
10. A naval combination with some other Power does not afford a basis for a 
standard of relative naval strength to be established by treaty, nor could His Majesty's 
Government, in the absence of our Main Fleet, confide the entire protection of this 
country and its vital sea communications to a foreign navy. The naval dangers to 
which this country would be exposed are a seaborne raid, or loss of control of the 
home terminal area, which might result in a dangerous stoppage of our trade and 
supplies. If the balance of our forces is strong enough to guard against these dangers 
we should, so far as sea communications are concerned, be able to maintain this 
country for a period necessary to withdraw forces from the Far East and redispose 
them to meet the new situation and the greater danger. It must not be supposed, 
however, that we should be able then to provide. protection for our territories and 
mercantile marine against Japanese attack. If the Government accept the situation 
stated at the beginning of paragraph 8, we cannot simultaneously fight Japan and the 
strongest European naval Power. 
Final assumption 
11. It has been assumed in this paper, therefore, that our minimum strategical 
requirement for security can be stated as follows:-
We should be able to send to the Far East a fleet sufficient to provide "cover" 
against the Japanese fleet; we should have sufficient additional forces behind this 
shield for the protection of our territories and mercantile marine against 
Japanese attack; at the same time we should be able to retain in European waters 
a force sufficient to act as a deterrent and to prevent the strongest European 
naval Power from obtaining control of our vital home terminal areas while we can 
make the necessary redispositions. 
It is on this strategical requirement that these proposals are based. 
Foreign Office Comment on Part I (general strategical requirements for security) 
It may be assumed that, in the years covered by any future naval treaty, it would be 
the policy of His Majesty's Government, with their eye on dangers nearer home, to 
spare no pains to improve relations with Japan and to avoid possible causes of 
friction. Nevertheless, in the absence of any Cabinet ruling that the Admiralty will 
not be called upon to send a fleet to the Far East capable of engaging the Japanese 
fleet, the Naval Staff are clearly justified in basing upon the above premiss their 
proposals for the 1935 Conference .... 
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11 CAB 29/148, NCM(35)3 19Apr 1934 
'The naval conference, 1935': note by Sir W Fisher1 
The subject matter of the Naval Staff memorandum (with comments by the Foreign 
Office), dated the 23rd March, 1934,2 is of direct concern to the Treasury as the 
efficient preparation for war, and, if war comes, its successful conduct are only 
possible if Treasury policy in the sphere of finance and economics is soundly planned. 
It is too generally assumed that imperial defence is a matter solely for compromise 
between the opinion on international affairs of the Foreign Office and the strategical 
and tactical conceptions of the Defence Departments: this assumption is based on a 
twofold illusion, as it appears to me. The first is that the resources for war which we 
can command are in exact proportion to the willingness of our people to subscribe 
paper pounds to the Exchequer, and the second is that that willingness is quite 
independent of the material conditions of life to which our people may have been 
reduced. 
Of the readiness of our people-provided that they are convinced of the reality of a 
danger to themselves-to be taxed up to the hilt I myself have no doubt; but the 
translation of paper pounds into ability to secure the necessary material equipment 
for unlimited war is a wholly different matter. Our internal resources (apart from 
coal) are negligible, and we therefore must be in a position to purchase from overseas 
almost the whole of our requirements, whether this be food-stuffs or munitions of 
war. For this purpose paper pounds are, of course, useless, and thus the willingness 
of the English taxpayer to contribute even up to 100 per cent. of his income is quite 
irrelevant to our capacity to conduct war indefinitely and on an indefinite scale. This 
disposes of illusion number one. Illusion number two, namely, our readiness to be 
taxed up to the hilt when our belts have been narrowed by absence of food-stuffs to 
vanishing point, needs no further disproof than the obvious remark that any man so 
situated will be ready to surrender on any terms. -
The criterion applied by the Naval Staff for the security of our country seems to me 
to be a perfectly good one. It assumes that, even though our main Fleet may be 
disposed for protective purposes in the Far East, there must be available in Home 
Waters force sufficient for the protection of essential needs until the main Fleet can 
be retransferred. 
The recurrent postulate in the Naval Staffs memorandum is that we could only 
"accept" (i.e., allow) this, that and the other position of inferiority on the part of a 
foreign Power or Powers as the basis of our agreement with them. No argument is 
adduced why the foreign Power or Powers should acquiesce in any such inferiority. 
The implication is presumably that we are financially in a position to threaten, in the 
absence on their part of such acquiescence, to outbuild them; but this is not the case. 
The memorandum recognises that the policy of this country has always been to 
disregard the strength of the United States Fleet in computing our naval require-
ments: this is in accordance with the self-evident fact that we could not successfully 
fight a country which (a) is twenty-five times our size; (b) has nearly three times our 
population; (c) has internal material resources which simply cannot be measured; 
and (d) can over-run Canada at any moment she chooses. 
1 Permanent secretary to the Treasury, 1919-1939. 2 See 10. 
70 CHAPTER 2 [11) 
Apart from this fact of her material strength, it is highly improbable that the 
United States would initiate an attack on ourselves except in the event of our 
interference with her sea-borne trade in the form of a blockade by us of an enemy 
Power when she was a neutral. 
But the inference from this decision of policy should surely be that we should 
settle our own conception of our own interests without reference to the United 
States. 
From various passages in the memorandum and the Foreign Office comments 
included in it, it would seem that in this way and that satisfaction ofour own needs is 
regarded as almost unrealisable because it would not suit the supposed naval policy 
of the United States. Now-<lmour-propre apart and the exacting ideal of Rule 
Columbia-the risks to the safety of the United States, whether on land or in the air 
or at sea, from the encroachments of any foreign Power are precisely nil. She can, as 
already mentioned, maintain herself on her own internal resources; and the 
American citizen is not and never will be in the faintest danger of being physically · 
starved. The United States likes size, particularly if she can get it "on the cheap"; 
therefore she insists, or tries to, on an international agreement of limitation which 
provides for her having, for instance, the largest cruisers and rather more of them, 
though not many more, than anybody else. An agreement that includes big cruisers, 
though not too many, is admirably suited to the satisfaction of her vanity and, as the 
price of agreement, she forces us to adopt a similar policy and at the same time saves 
herself from having to satisfy her vanity at the cost of unlimited building. 
In other words, a naval agreement between ourselves and the United States is the 
most complete non sequitur from any and every point of view, for, as already stated, 
"in accordance with the policy of His Majesty's Government the strength of the 
United States Fleet is left out of account in computing its (that is, our own) 
requirements"; and, if regard be had to our own needs in the (to us) live issue of 
security, the last criterion we should apply is what the United States may want to 
force us to do. So much for the United States of America. 
The Naval Staff and the Treasury are in complete agreement on the fundamental 
point of ensuring to the utmost limit possible the safety of our Country and Empire. 
But one of the principal ingredients in successful insurance is a wise disposition of 
our resources. The Naval Staff most pertinently observe that if "a two-Power 
standard" is beyond our capacity "we cannot simultaneously fight Japan and the 
strongest European naval Power." In other words, economy, properly conceived, 
means ability to concentrate our maximum strength on our principal danger. It will 
be common ground to the Admiralty and the Treasury that the British Empire, 
whether in Asia or elsewhere, would become defenceless if England herself were 
knocked out. It will probably be agreed that even at the extreme limit of her 
endeavour Japan by herself could not knock out England or deprive her of the 
essentials in food-stuffs and raw materials. That Japan could scoop not merely such 
outposts as Hong Kong, but the whole of our Chinese investments and trade, is 
hardly open to serious doubt; but given a completed Singapore-and incidentally an 
anti-Japanese America*-Japan's capacity for endangering our trade routes or India 
or Australasia will never assume such proportions as to lay us low. 
• I understand, however, that some agreement has recently been made between the United States and 
Japan, probably relating to Manchukuo and American trading interests, and possibly also to naval matters. 
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While this is no argument for ignoring all reasonable measures to bring home to 
the Japanese that we are not a negligible factor, it is certainly not a reason for basing 
our war preparations on an encounter with Japan. For the risk which really could 
involve us in disaster is much nearer home; and it is highly dangerous to limit our 
estimate of a future German menace merely to the consideration of our present 
relative position vis-a-vis Germany in naval strength. In a recent paper, C.P. 104 
(34), Sir Robert Vansittart gave, in his own picturesque fashion, an appreciation of 
the Prussian outlook and objective.3 He had been preceded by a less spirited stylist. 
The late Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir George (now Lord) Milne, in a paper 
dated the 28th October, 1932, C.P. 362 (32), came to a similar conclusion as to the 
ultimate policy towards which modern Germany was moving. My only comment on 
both papers would be that they might easily leave the impression that it was only 
during relatively recent times that these Teutonic impulses were given birth; as a 
dilettante reader of history I should, for my own part, have said that they came into 
being in the days of the nascent Duchy of Brandenburg. 
Given the consistency of the attitude of these Teutonic tribes, who century after 
century have been inspired by the philosophy of brute force, we should be more than 
usually stupid if we assumed that the sweet reasonableness of the Treaty of Versailles 
had converted them to the tenets of the Sermon on the Mount; and if we want to 
survive we had better think most carefully how so to economise our resources as to 
meet the danger at its maximum point. That, at a distance of 10,000 miles, we can 
down the Japanese is a chimera compared with which A/ice in Wonderland is a 
serious essay; that we should wish to down Japan seems to me to be worse than Don 
Quixote in his most idiotic moods towards a windmill; in fact, we have everything to 
gain and nothing to lose by coming, as I believe we most easily could, to an 
accommodation with Japan, in substance though not in form, similar to our 
agreement of thirty years ago. 
Now the Naval Staff paper in principle does not seem to differ from this 
conclusion, and, from more than one talk that I have had with the Chief of the Naval 
Staff, I believe that he has not the least desire to get us embroiled with Japan and 
recognises that a mutually agreeable understanding between ourselves and Japan 
would be a very definite increase in our security. The Naval Staff memorandum, 
however, as has already been mentioned, emphasises our inability to "accept" for 
ourselves vis-a-vis the Japanese any strength that is not decisively superior to their 
own. Such an attitude seems to me inconsistent with any hope of resuming stable 
and intimate terms with the Japanese; for, apart from our complete inability to 
impose subordination on the Japanese, it can only have the effect of wounding their 
amour-propre and of fastening on them the conviction that we regard them as 
potential foes. Of course, if we could rely without question on securing and 
maintaining the good-will of the Americans-and by "good-will" I mean, not 
high-sounding professions, but the practical assurance that if we got into difficulties 
anywhere we could permanently count on the effective support of the United 
States-! would agree that good relations between ourselves and Japan, although 
still most desirable, would be a less urgent problem. But the very last thing in the 
3 cf 14. 
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world that we can count on is American support;t and, as the policy of His Majesty's 
Government referred to in the Naval Staff's memorandum has been and continues to 
be that our naval dispositions may leave out of account the United States, I think it 
would be conceded that we should be singularly ill-advised to jeopardise the 
possibility of some friendly arrangement with the Japanese by paying any regard to 
the United States. 
The underlying reason for our naval attitude to Japan since the end of the 
European War has been in no sense due to consideration of our own direct interests 
but to a misplaced feeling that we have got to "keep in with" the Americans; in the 
result-though I am aware that the responsibility for any change is sedulously 
foisted on to the Dominion of Canada-we gave up a completely satisfactory treaty 
with Japan for a completely unsatisfactory naval Pact of Washington. The natural 
self-respect of the Japanese was greatly mortified, and although, as the memoran-
dum of the Naval Staff points out, the material effect at the time on ourselves was not 
unsatisfactory, the subsequent march of events, intensified by the London Pact of 
1930, has been to emphasise our practical disadvantages, comprising at the same 
time a relative diminution in actual strength, an unsuitable type of Fleet, and a 
replacement in the sphere of the "intangibles" of a thoroughly reliable good-will 
between Japan and ourselves for a feeling of suspicion on their part. 
The Naval Staff memorandum is thus quite legitimately based on a political 
situation which is itself, however, fundamentally unsound if we have real regard to 
our own security. It is none of the Admiralty's making; though I cannot conceal from 
myself that some of my naval colleagues in 1922 were (not unnaturally) moved by 
sorrow at the possibility of "Rule, Britannia!"-that heartening battle song of 
England- being degraded into "Rule, Columbia!" 
But 1922 was a mere three years or so distant in time from the complete defeat of 
Germany, and it is not by way of criticism of the then mentality that I say that the 
conclusions reached in 1922 are as remote from the realities of 1934 and future years 
as the North from the South Pole. 
If "we cannot simultaneously fight Japan and the strongest European naval 
Power"- and even the most optimistic estimate of our resources makes this 
self-evident-we not merely cannot afford further to alienate Japan, but it is an 
imperative and pressing need for us to effect a genuine and lasting reconciliation 
with her. And this latter we cannot do by futile insistence that we won't permit her to 
have such naval weapons and in such quantities as she may think necessary. 
This, however, does not in the least mean that it is hopeless to imagine that we can 
reach some reasonable accommodation with her. If the post-War years have driven 
t The late Sir John Fortescue, Librarian at Windsor Castle, in the course of the Ford Lectures at Oxford in 
1911, has neatly summed up the position. The whole passage (pages 23-28) is well worth reading; I 
confine myself to quoting here one paragraph:-
"Now we know how the Americans--represented by their Government- have always dealt with us since 
they have been an independent State. They must always prevail , and never give way; they must always 
take and never concede; they enjoy the flouting of an older community as a proof of their superiority; 
and they esteem a good bargain, even if gained by dishonourable means, to mark the highest form of 
ability. The United States cannot engage in any form of competition with us, from athletics to 
diplomacy, without using foul play. They must win, if not by fair skill , then by pre-arranged trickery or 
violence; if not by open negotiations, then by garbled maps and forged documents. There is the fact. It 
may be unpleasant, but it cannot be denied." 
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one impression home to her, it is that the English have no mind or backbone of their 
own, that they are ready to toe the line wherever and whenever the Americans order 
them, that the British Naval Forces may therefore be available at American command 
to support every anti-Japanese policy America may indulge- in short, that we are not 
merely renegades vis-a-vis our pre-War and War allies and friends, the Japanese 
themselves, but are servile adherents of the country that more than once between 
August 1914 and April 1917 showed a readiness to stab us in the back. This 
impression it is vital for us to remove; then, but not till then, can we discuss with the 
Japanese-not necessarily such questions as ratios, but the much wider issue of our 
respective needs, to be measured in the light of reciprocal friendship and the 
complementary nature of our Asiatic interests. 
It is high time that we should analyse the true requirements of our own security; 
the American "yard arm" may well get us into trouble, but will assuredly never come 
to our rescue. 
The Treasury point of view in this matter of England 's security is indistinguishable 
from that of the Admiralty; where it may differ is in the application of the point of 
view. Just as the Admiralty are the advisers of Government in regard to the 
technicalities of naval defence, so the Treasury are responsible to the Government for 
ensuring that the resources of the country-which, as I have already stated, include 
far more than the payment of paper pounds into the Exchequer, but embrace the 
whole problem of the material supplies on which a successful issue depends-are 
wisely developed and used for the attainment of the objective common to both 
Departments . 
The reconciliation of any differences that there may be is, I suggest, to be found in 
the adoption of a national and imperial policy firmly based on the facts of the 
situation. 
We cannot hope to secure agreement between the widely different outlooks of the 
various Naval Powers in any expectation that they would be prepared to subordinate 
their own conceptions of security to our theories of what we would wish them to do. 
It is simpler-and, if security be our object, more effective-for us to clear our own 
minds as to our own necessities and make this the touchstone of our policy. 
The Report of the Defence Requirements Committee-which I should like here to 
emphasise was quite unanimous and was not dictated by any member or members of 
that Committee to the rest of us-makes it clear that, as the result of some months 
of the closest investigation, we have no doubt whatever as to where our ultimate 
danger lies, i.e., from Germany. It is common ground that we cannot successfully 
fight both Japan and Germany at the same time. The first essential, therefore, to our 
own safety is that we must be free to concentrate our strength where it is most 
needed. This implies that any German hopes of finding or getting us embroiled in a 
first-rate war in the Far East must well in advance be doomed to disappointment, and 
that the Germans themselves are left under no illusion in the matter. What, then, is 
the prime condition for attaining this essential object of definitely relieving ourselves 
of any danger of being involved in a war with Japan? I suggest that the first and, 
indeed, cardinal requirement for this end is the disentanglement of ourselves from 
the United States of America. For the Americans no question of any jeopardy to their 
national security can under any conceivable conditions arise. Their armed forces of 
all kinds are therefore in large measure a luxury. For some reason best known to 
themselves they view with a suspicious and, indeed, hostile eye the Japanese. We, on 
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the contrary, from the very earliest days of Japan's westernisation until the end of the 
European War have felt and shown a real sympathy to Japan, and have recognised 
that the interests of the two countries have been in the maintenance of mutual 
goodwill and regard; and until we threw them over in 1922 this attitude has been 
fully reciprocated by Japan towards ourselves. The interest of the Americans in Naval 
Pacts has been threefold: in the first place, such pacts have admirably played the 
American game in their relations vis-a-vis Japan, for by introducing discord between 
the Japanese and ourselves they have tended to diminish the international influence 
and potential force of Japan. Their second reason for liking these naval pacts is that 
the successful antagonisation of the Japanese towards the English weakens us and 
therefore in our turn we have lost both influence and power and are more dependent 
on the (non-existent) goodwill of the United States. The third motive force of the 
United States is vanity, for which reason alone-and for no essential need-they 
desire to have a fleet at least as large as ourselves; and as there is no essential need, a 
limiting agreement giving this result obviates the risk of the American public getting 
tired of paying up the vast sums which an unlimited luxury armada would entail. 
Now we might tell the Americans in effect that, as our long-established policy has 
been to exclude them entirely from the role of a potential foe to England, we 
naturally feel quite unconcerned with the scale of their warlike preparations; 
whatever they may decide in this sphere is entirely a matter for their own 
determination, and we have no intention of trying to compete in any way with them; 
indeed, if they had in mind to treble or quadruple their naval strength, we should 
neither attempt to follow suit nor feel in the least disquieted. Our own position, as we 
should make clear, is wholly different from theirs, for, while we believe that we are in 
no danger of an attack from the United States, we cannot ignore the possibility of 
very serious danger from other quarters. Although our interests, of course, are by no 
means limited to Europe, we are an inevitable part, for geographical reasons, of the 
European system, and if, in the future, a further upheaval were to occur in Europe 
we could not help being involved sooner or later by the mere force of events. Our 
preparations accordingly must be related to our own position, and obviously cannot 
be effective for that purpose if they are to be measured in principle or detail by purely 
arbitrary considerations unconnected with those needs. 
Having in one way or another thus regained our freedom to consider our needs on 
their merits we can then make it our aim to dispose of any Japanese menace; and I, 
for my own part, feel no doubt that the Japanese, once they are convinced that we 
propose to order our own doings instead of having them ordered from Washington, 
will be more than ready to come to a satisfactory and lasting accommodation with 
ourselves. And this will be all the more likely if we, in other aspects of our 
relationship with Japan, show that we wish and intend to eliminate (on the basis, of 
course, of give and take) any serious cause of disagreement. 
The result on our naval strength would be that we could have at a price which we 
could afford a really effective European standard, not one power but two, if the latter 
were considered necessary. While naturally we cannot count the French Fleet as a 
part of our own defensive arrangements, we know that the very last thing in the 
world that the French have in mind is to engage in a war against ourselves. The Naval 
Staff memorandum suggests, I think very fairly, that our interest in the French Fleet 
is that it "provides and will provide the measure for the strength of the strongest 
European naval Power," and that we have to visualise the possibility of some other 
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European Power by no means well disposed as the French are to ourselves trying to 
usurp the French continental lead at sea. Here again an effort in 1935 to force on the 
French a limitation of their ratios just because of the possibility I have just 
mentioned could only result in discord, when our obvious interest, as between the 
French and ourselves, is goodwill; and, apart from the almost certain failure of any 
such effort, it is quite unnecessary if, on the lines of policy which I have sketched out 
above, we are in a position-fully obvious to the Germans-to prepare and mobilise 
naval forces of overwhelming strength to confront the latter for as long ahead as we 
can see. 
To secure our national and imperial safety my advice therefore is (1) that we 
should regain our freedom to make such preparations and dispositions in regard to 
our Fleet as are necessitated by our own needs; (2) that we should effect a thorough 
and lasting accommodation with the Japanese (I am not suggesting a resumption of 
the alliance in its original form) in every sphere of relationship between themselves 
and us; and (3) that we should make it evident so that the Germans can be under no 
illusion-that we intend to have available for immediate concentration our max-
imum force in the event of their engineering any future cataclysm in Europe. 
12 FO 371120110, no 5401, CP 156(36) 8 June 1936 
'Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations': Cabinet memorandum by Mr 
Eden1 
[A legacy of wartime controls on the Egyptian economy and the imposition of a 
cumbersome and alien bureaucracy provoked widespread disturbances in Egypt in 1919. 
The agitation was ended by a declaration in Feb 1922 which bore the name of the then 
high commissioner, Lord Allenby (1919-1925). No treaty was signed; instead the 
declaration set down four subjects which were to remain exclusively under British 
control: the defence of imperial communications, the defence of Egypt against aggres-
sion, the protection of foreign interests, and the administration of the Sudan. Britain 
pledged to refrain from intervention in Egyptian affairs and British officials were 
progressively withdrawn from the administration. The Allenby declaration was based, 
from the British viewpoint, on the notion that Egyptian nationalism and Britain's 
imperial requirements were not necessarily incompatible. In practice, in the years which 
followed, Britain continued to exercise considerable influence in Egyptian politics, the 
high commissioner frequently intervening to resolve clashes between the ruling dynasty 
and the Wafd party which led the government. A British offer, made in 1927, to open 
negotiations for a formal treaty led ultimately to the agreement of Aug 1936. Britain 
withdrew its garrison from Cairo to the canal zone, sponsored Egypt's membership of the 
League of Nations and agreed to refer any dispute over a new treaty at the end of the 
twenty-year term to the Council of the League. A treaty of alliance was signed in 
perpetuity (only the detailed terms were to be renegotiable after twenty years) and Britain 
was permitted to introduce unlimited reinforcements in an emergency. Britain's control 
of Egypt's defence was thus effectively acknowledged. This formal recognition of Egypt's 
independence did little to persuade British policy-makers that the days of behind the 
scenes influence in Egypt's internal affairs were over. Nahas Pasha the prime minister and 
architect of the treaty on the Egyptian side, was forced from office in Dec 1937 after 
clashing with the new king, Farouk. In the months between the treaty and his fall, the FO 
in London wondered what Britain could do by way of 'maintaining the internal policy and 
1 In an earlier memo to Cabinet (FO 371/20096, no 447, CP 6(36), 4 Jan 1936) Eden had emphasised that 
in an age of air power imperial communications required the defence of all Egypt, not just the area of the 
Suez Canal. 
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the administration of Egypt on proper lines'. Sir M Lampson,2 now ambassador, advised 
against official action. Unsolicited advice would be resented by the Wafd who were 
anxious to preserve their newly-won independence. 'It would be a mistake', he wrote, 'to 
exercise influence too openly or officially, but, with tact and firmness, British influence 
should remain the governing factor with all Egyptian Administrations under the new 
conditions of the post-treaty regime' (FO 371/22006, no 2805, Lampson to Halifax, 30 
June 1938, enclosing Egypt annual report, 1937).) 
My colleagues will have read the telegrams from His Majesty's High Commissioner in 
Cairo describing the reception by Nahas Pasha of the proposals which Sir Miles 
Lampson was instructed to put forward in pursuance of Cabinet Conclusion 38 (36) 
of the 20th May. They will have seen that the head of the Egyptian delegation stated 
that he was quite unable to accept these proposals, and, in view of the serious 
position revealed by the deadlock thus reached in Cairo, His Majesty's High 
Commissioner was instructed to proceed to London for purposes of consultation. 
This paper is designed to set out the issues as they stand in present circumstances. 
General 
2. The first general question to be considered is that the world situation has 
changed definitely since the instructions for treaty conversations were given to Sir 
Miles Lampson last February. The present position of Italy in the Eastern Mediterra-
nean as a consequence of her conquest of Abyssinia, the disturbance in Palestine, the 
possibility of unfavourable reactions in the Near East, the increasingly aggressive 
militarism of Japan, and the growing likelihood of untoward developments in Europe 
and elsewhere, make it all the more essential to avoid complications in Egypt. If we 
fail to get a treaty with Egypt, the situation there will deteriorate, and we may before 
long be faced with a situation requiring repressive measures and large further forces 
of occupation in Egypt. This aspect has been more fully treated in C.P. 131 (36) of the 
8th May. 
3. The elements in the case for our decision seem to be simple: (a) with our 
present military resources we obviously cannot afford to have difficulties everywhere; 
(b) dangers to this country and the Commonwealth from various quarters may be 
apprehended from (i) Germany, (ii) Italy, (iii) Japan in the event of (i) or (ii) 
materialising. Either (i) or (ii) may materialise in the near future, though Germany 
is the more formidable military menace. Moreover, Germany's potential threat is not 
to the communications but to the heart of the Empire. 
4. In the light of the above situation it seems essential not to let an opportunity 
slip to clear up in so far as we can our position in the Mediterranean as soon as can be 
contrived, since it is not possible to feel confidence that another move by Germany 
will not take place in the near future. We may not be able to effect this clearance 
quickly with Italy, but should seek to do so now with Egypt. Nahas Pasha appears to 
have made striking progress in goodwill and good sense since 1930; and it is probable 
that this is largely due to the Egyptian apprehension-formerly non-existent-of the 
Italian danger on two borders. On the other hand, we must be under no delusion 
that, were His Majesty's Government to fail to profit by the present favourable 
2 1st Baron Killearn (er 1943); high commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan, 1934-1936; ambassador to 
Egypt and high commissioner for the Sudan, 1936-1946; special commissioner in South-East Asia, 
1946-1948. 
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opportunity to reach some really friendly agreement with Egypt, our difficulties 
would inevitably be increased by a tendency, of which there are already marked signs 
on the part of the Egyptians, to turn their eyes towards Italy. There is no doubt that 
Signor Mussolini's recent success has considerably impressed at our expense the 
timorous and receptive Egyptian public. A situation might thus arise when danger 
(ii) might begin to overtake and co-exist with danger (i), and with such a situation an 
Egypt whom we had antagonised could make our position definitely untenable. 
Present position of the discussions 
5. Sir M. Lampson has reported that the Egyptians have refused to accept two 
major treaty stipulations, providing:-
(1) A recognition of a British right to military occupation of the Suez Canal Zone 
in perpetuity. 
(2) Independent action by Great Britain for the protection of the Suez Canal, i.e., 
enjoyment by Great Britain of the rights allocated under article 9 of the Suez 
Canal Convention of 1888 to Egypt and not merely those allocated to Turkey. 
6. The Egyptian Prime Minister has stated categorically that insistence on either 
of these two points would involve the breakdown of treaty discussions. 
7. Further, there is another outstanding major point, viz. , the continued 
occupation of Alexandria. To this the Egyptians have shown strong opposition except 
on the basis of a clearly defined and not too extensive time limit. 
8. I must now ask my colleagues to consider whether we can agree to such 
modifications of our desiderata on these three points as would render them 
acceptable to the Egyptians. In doing so I must invite especial attention to a new and 
most interesting development-one, indeed, which is, in my opinion, of capital 
importance in view of the rapidly and disadvantageously altering situation in Europe. 
Within the last few days several times orally and also in a formal memorandum 
handed to Sir M. Lampson on the 1st June for communication to His Majesty's 
Government, Nahas Pasha has made an important declaration. Referring to the 
provisions of the 1930 draft treaty relating to the alliance<a) Nahas Pasha has stated 
that Great Britain would, under those provisions, be entitled not only to take the 
"unlimited measures of military co-operation" provided for in the clauses of the 1930 
draft, but also to take these measures "even after the evacuation of Egyptian territory 
by British troops. In other words, whether British troops did or did not remain in the 
country, Britain's co-operation in the defence of the Canal remains intact." Nahas 
Pasha has since informed the Acting High Commissioner on 4th June that he and his 
colleagues meant that our troops could come back literally at any time, with no limit 
(a) The reference is apparently to article 8 of the 1930 draft, which article reads as follows:-
"Should, notwithstanding the provisions of article 7 above, either of the high contracting parties 
become engaged in war, the other high contracting party will, subject always to the provisions of article 
12 below, immediately come to his aid in the capacity of an ally. The aid of His Majesty the King of 
Egypt, in the event of war, or imminent menace of war, will consist in furnishing to His Britannic 
Majesty, on Egyptian territory, in accordance with the Egyptian system of administration and 
legislation, all the facilities and assistance in his power, including the use of his ports, aerodromes and 
means of communication. It will accordingly be for the Egyptian Government to take all the 
administrative and legislative measures necessary to render these facilities and assistance effective." 
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whatever, in case of "apprehended emergency ."<b> His Excellency added that the new 
formula of "apprehended emergency" would hold good equally at any time (i.e., after, 
no less than before, the evacuation of Egyptian territory by our troops, should this 
have taken place). He said that what the Egyptians offered was a perpetual treaty of 
alliance. The time limit, he explained, specified in the 1930 draft referred to revision 
of the need for military occupation, not to the principle of military alliance, which 
was to be of unlimited duration. He asserted that they all wished this principle to be 
adopted as the immutable pivot of Egyptian policy. 
9. It will be seen that Nahas Pasha refers to the continuance of the alliance and of 
the important facilities provided by article 8 (together with the right to send troops 
in case of an apprehended emergency) not merely after the termination, if it has 
occurred, of the occupation, but apparently indefinitely. As a matter of textual 
interpretation of the 1930 draft, Nahas Pasha's statement is, in fact, not accurate, 
since the 1930 draft in article 9 contemplated a revision of the British occupation of 
the Canal Zone, and in article 14 the revision of the whole treaty. The importance, 
however, of his statement is that it may justifiably be taken as expressing a principle 
to which Egypt is ready to agree. It is consequently of extreme importance; and in 
view of its repetition, we are justified in asking him to make a suitable addition to the 
1930 draft with a view to establishing the principle of a perpetual alliance. If we were 
able to secure some such addition, this would remove one of the grave objections to 
our admission of the possibility of our evacuation of the Canal Zone. It would also 
render far less important the inclusion in the treaty of a recognition by Egypt of a 
permanent British right to protect the Suez Canal. Indeed, it may be argued that a 
permanent alliance is such a recognition, since the whole raison d'etre of the alliance 
from our point of view is to provide security for British communications. 
10. It is for consideration whether in the light of the above, and of the disquieting 
limitation of our resources during the crucial years immediately ahead, it is wise to 
risk a breakdown in the discussions when we can apparently secure a treaty giving to 
us, even if some time after twenty years we were to evacuate the Canal Zone, the 
right to bring back our forces in unlimited numbers in the event of an apprehended 
emergency. 
British claim to act independently of Egypt for the protection of the Suez Canal 
11. The object of this requirement is that His Majesty's Government should have 
the right to take action independently of Egypt, particularly to prevent sabotage of 
the Canal and generally to ensure its safe navigation, by recourse, if necessary, to 
British martial law in the Canal Zone. By the same provision it was intended to 
secure a legal sanction for the declaration of British martial law in the Canal Zone 
should this be necessary, though no reference was to be made in terms to martial 
law. 
12. As a matter of fact, His Majesty's Government, so long as they had in the Zone 
the necessary forces, would certainly act independently for the defence of the Canal if 
the military situation required it, whether or not the treaty provided for it expressly. 
Moreover, in practice, so long as the alliance is in operation and working well, there 
(b) This refers to an agreement reached in recent discussions that His Majesty's Government should have 
the right to reinforce their forces in Egypt not only in case of war, or menace of war, but also in case of 
apprehended emergency, that is to say, before a state of acute crisis is reached. 
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is not likely to be a serious difference between His Majesty's Government and the 
Egyptian Government over measures taken for the protection of the Canal and the 
question whether His Majesty's Government have acted independently or not. If, 
however, the Egyptian Government do not challenge steps taken by His Majesty's 
Government, as being unjustified because taken independently, but, on the contrary, 
approve them, it would be difficult for any of the other Suez Canal Powers to 
challenge them on this ground. Consequently, the express provision about indepen-
dent action is only likely to be of any importance upon the hypothesis that 
Anglo-Egyptian relations are bad, when it might be useful as a legal cloak for our 
action for use against a third Power which was disposed to challenge it. In regard to 
an Egypt with whom our relations were bad, legal considerations resulting from such 
a treaty provision would not be of practical importance. Even in such an event some 
legal case could be made out for arguing that His Majesty's Government, even under 
the 1930 formula (which is what the Egyptians now want), had not given up the right 
of independent action, and that the words "with a view to ensuring in co-operation 
with the Egyptian forces the defence of the Canal" did not mean that His Majesty's 
Government could only act in co-operation with the Egyptian forces. For these 
reasons the point, in my opinion, is not one on which we should be justified in 
sacrificing a treaty under which we should obtain a permanent alliance, and I suggest 
that Sir M. Lampson should be instructed that, in resuming the negotiations, he 
need not insist either upon the formula previously put forward, or on dealing with 
this point as a point of fundamental principle. (cl 
Alexandria 
13. Egypt will not agree to a British right to station troops at or near Alexandria 
for an unlimited period of years. But Nahas Pasha has admitted the possibility of our 
troops remaining in Alexandria longer than in Cairo. 
14. Nahas Pasha had already agreed to improvement of road and rail communica-
tions westward from the Canal Zone, amounting practically to the construction of a 
completely new system; and also to our liberty of unlimited reinforcement in the 
Canal Zone in the event of an apprehended emergency. These offers by His 
Excellency render the continued occupation of Alexandria by British troops less 
necessary than hitherto. 
15. In a telegram (No.263) of the 1st April the High Commissioner reported that 
the Commanders-in-chief "feel that even the provision for communications alone 
would be worth more than the retention of one battalion at Alexandria for an 
indefinite period." 
16. It should also be noted that even if the British troops have left Alexandria they 
can under article 8 (see footnote [a]) be sent back there in the event of war or menace 
(c) It must be admitted that the 1930 formula is not satisfactory as a cover for British martial law in the 
Canal Zone (or at any rate unilateral British martial law as opposed to martial law declared jointly with 
Egypt). On the other hand, it is obvious that declaration of British martial law in the Canal Zone not in 
co-operation with the Egyptian Government is a step which would only be contemplated when there was 
an acute difference of opinion between the Egyptian Government and His Majesty's Government. In such 
circumstances His Majesty's Government would no doubt be maintaining that the Egyptian Government 
were not fulfilling the provisions of the treaty, and would base their declaration of martial law upon this 
fact, which they could say entitled the commander of the British forces in Egypt no longer to hold himself 
bound by the limitations of the treaty and entitled to exercise the powers of an occupying force. 
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of war. Moreover, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is Nahas Pasha's 
right-hand man and the most powerful influence in the Wafd, told the Acting High 
Commissioner on the 6th June that the Egyptians were fully prepared to incorporate 
the "apprehended emergency" formula (see footnote [b]) in article 8. This would 
mean giving the right to send British troops to any part of Egypt, including 
Alexandria, in the event of an "apprehended emergency." 
Conclusions 
17. In view of the considerations set out above, I recommend that Sir Miles 
Lampson should be instructed to continue the discussions so far as the military 
clauses are concerned upon the following basis:-
(1) Egyptian agreement should be secured to the insertion in the treaty of 
provisions to secure a permanent alliance on the lines indicated by Nahas Pasha 
and explained in paragraph 8 above. 
(2) His Majesty's Government's requirements in the matter of express stipulations 
for (a) a recognition of a British right to military occupation of the Canal Zone in 
perpetuity, (b) independent action by Great Britain for the protection of the Suez 
Canal, should be abandoned. 
(3) As regards Alexandria, His Majesty's Government should agree to the occupa-
tion of the British forces being limited to a fixed period of years . 
I fully realise that the second and third recommendations above involve a 
considerable departure from the previous Cabinet Conclusions on the matter, but I 
wish to emphasise that (1)-a permanent alliance with the explicit corollary 
described by Nahas and his colleagues-offers an entirely new possibility which has 
never been considered before, and in my opinion introduces a fundamental 
difference into the situation. 
13 CAB 24/265, CP 334(36) 11 Dec 1936 
'The role of the British army': Cabinet memorandum by Mr Chamber-
lain [Extract] 
[Chamberlain's memo was written in response to a memo by Mr Duff Cooper, the 
secretary of state for war, which recommended the creation of a Field Force of seventeen 
divisions to be available as soon as possible after the outbreak of war in Europe (CAB 
24/265, CP 326(36), 3 Dec 1936) 
5. The Navy remains the first line of defence in preserving our sea communica-
tions. For this reason we have always put the maintenance of a strong Fleet before 
the maintenance of a large Army, and we must continue to do so. 
But a Navy, however strong, no longer suffices for the defence of this country. 
Unless we are to be at the mercy of a sudden knock-out blow from a Continental 
Western Power we must have a strong Air Force. Further, such is the power of attack 
from the air that it is only by building up an Air Force capable itself of defeating a 
powerful attacking blow, and therefore affording a strong deterrent against any 
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attack upon us, that we can ever hope to provide a real measure of security for these 
islands. 
6. The position in which we find ourselves today is that after a period in which we 
deliberately allowed deficiencies to accumulate, in the hope of securing a measure of 
international agreement on disarmament, this country is at the beginning of an 
intensive effort to rebuild our defences. In order, however, to secure these islands 
from attack, it is necessary that we should not merely, as in the past, make our Navy 
sufficiently strong to preserve our overseas communications. We must also build up 
a strong Air Force able to strike a potential enemy at least as hard as he can hit us; 
and at the same time to provide the maximum passive defence against air attack. This 
latter includes the re-equipment of that part of the Territorial Army which provides 
Anti-Aircraft defence. 
7. These needs have first claim. Looking at the matter from a practical point of 
view, the essential point is whether our resources (skilled labour, industrial 
organisation, finance and imports) can effectively cope with the whole task, in 
addition to the equipment required for seventeen divisions ready to take an effective 
part in Continental War . . .. 
14. There remains the political aspect of the problem. No doubt the existence of a 
substantial British Army strong enough for immediate and effective intervention in 
Continental disputes, in addition to our naval and air forces, would in some respects 
strengthen our influence on the Continent. But there are definite limits to the 
contribution we can make in such an eventuality; and in making our choice of the 
relative size of the three arms of our Fighting Services, we should not lose sight of 
the fact that the political temper of people in this country is strongly opposed to 
Continental adventures. 
15. Although when the time comes they may, as in 1914, be persuaded that 
intervention by us is inevitable, they will be strongly suspicious of any preparation in 
peacetime with a view to large-scale military operations on the Continent, and they 
will regard such preparations as likely to result in our being entangled in disputes 
which do not concern us . 
16. Opinion will, no doubt, differ as to whether or not this almost instinctive 
aversion from large-scale military preparations corresponds with a sound perception 
of the principles upon which foreign policy should be founded. But at least it is a 
factor which can never be ignored by those responsible for framing our policies . . .. 
14 CAB 63/51, M0(36)10, ff 161-169 21 Dec 1936 
'The world situation and rearmament': memorandum by Sir M Hankey 
[Extract] 
[Hankey commented in this memo on an earlier draft of a memo under the same title by 
Sir R Vansittart (permanent under-secretary of state, FO, 1930-1938). A copy of the final 
version of Vansittart's memo is at FO 371119949, no 8998, 31 Dec 1936.) 
The first thought that Sir Robert Vansittart's Memorandum provokes is support for 
his main contention that we must make even greater efforts to press forward with 
our armaments: the second is the realization of the pass to which our post-war 
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foreign policy has brought us: and the third is to question whether matters can be 
improved in the region of foreign policy. 
11. 
2. The need for pressing on with armaments stands out so clearly as to require no 
comment here. It is true that it would be deplorable to give a serious set-back to the 
present trade recovery: for trade is wealth, and wealth is the real sinews of war, and, 
in the long run our relative wealth is one of the greatest advantages we possess over 
Germany, Italy and Japan. But we cannot afford to give the aggressor Powers an 
advantage which will enable them to deliver a knock-out blow before we can bring 
our superior real strength to bear. Some increase in the present interference with 
trade would seem to be inevitable, but we must not bring ourselves down to the 
deplorable economic position of Germany and Italy. 
Ill 
3. The second thought needs a little explanation. We seem to have lost nearly all 
our old friends among the nations. In the case of Japan, friendship with whom is so 
essential to our position in the Far East, the first blow was struck by the termination 
of the Alliance in 1921-22 at Washington under pressure of the United States of 
America, who, by means of the war debt, superior wealth, and the threat to the 
financial paramountcy of the City of London held trump cards. Before we could 
re-establish cordial relations with Japan came the Manchurian and Shanghai 
episodes. As the main supporter of the League of Nations we came to be regarded in 
Japan as the arch-enemy, and we could not recover our position by recognising the 
new State of Manchukao (as we should have done, and did do in the case of Corea, in 
pre-war days), as this was inconsistent with our obligations under the Covenant and 
our good relations with China. The economic dispute over Japanese imports into our 
overseas territories did not help matters. At present the re-establishment of cordial 
relations appears remote. 
4. The unexpected breach with Italy, to whom we were linked by memories of 
Garibaldi and our assistance in the critical days of Caporretto1 is even more 
deplorable, for Italy lies straddled across our main line of communications between 
the menacing theatres of war in Western Europe and the Far East. There is no 
country in the world with whom it is more dangerous to fall out. Again our adoption 
of the League as the basis of our policy, was the main course of our misfortunes. In 
pre-war days we should no more have interfered with Italy in Abyssinia than we did in 
the equally reprehensible occupation of Tripoli in 1911. As a matter of course we and 
other nations would have sold arms to either belligerent that could pay for them. It is 
not unlikely that money and volunteers would have been forthcoming from all over 
Europe for Abyssinia as it was for the Greek War of Independence, for Bolivar, or for 
Garibaldi, and Italy might have had to pay a much higher price for victory. But once 
the conquest was completed we should have had no difficulty in recognising it. 
Owing to our policy of support to the League at all costs we have once more been 
regarded-in this case by Italy-as the arch-enemy. And once more it has from the 
1 A village at an important road junction in the upper Isonzo valley, transferred from Italy to Yugoslavia 
after the Second World War. Scene in Oct 1917 of a major Italian defeat during the First World War, 
costing 320,000 men and 3,000 guns. 
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first been an obviously losing cause in which we have come to be regarded as the 
leader. Although the prospects of re-establishing some kind of working relationship 
with Italy seem better than in the case of Japan, it must be long before it has any 
basis of cordiality and reliability. 
5. In the case of Germany it was, of course, even harder to establish cordial 
relations, owing to the bitter feeling left by the war and the course of events in 
Germany itself. For years we worked successfully if slowly in the face of French 
opposition and intrigue to whittle away the harsher aspects of the Treaty of 
Versailles, and this was recognised by Germany who showed a strong disposition to 
seek our friendship. But, for reasons which would take too long to dissect here and in 
which French policy plays a leading part, we have never been able to respond 
cordially to these overtures. One reason, however, which deserves mention is our 
strong adherence to the ideals of the League of Nations, disarmament and the 
so-called collective security, all of which are repugnant to realist "have not" nations 
like Germany, Italy and Japan. 
6. Thus our League policy and our habit of "taking the lead" at Geneva when we 
have nothing but moral force behind us has been one of the principal causes of our 
disastrous quarrels with two great nations with either of which it is a calamity to fall 
out, and a factor militating against the re-establishment of cordial relations with a 
third. We are left with an emasculated League, which was mutilated at birth by the 
withdrawal of the United States of America (as I foresaw in 1919 when I refused to be 
the first Secretary-General), which has lost three more of the Great Powers (for Italy 
seems practically lost), which in its 16 years of existence has not a single success in a 
first-class issue to its credit, and which through its repeated failures in such issues 
has lost prestige and the confidence of the world. Our own credit and popularity have 
suffered severely from the failure of our protege. Added to this, the League, or its 
main support in this country, the League of Nations Union, has produced a state of 
material and moral disarmament, a pacifist and defeatist spirit, and a sense of false 
security, which even the dangerous situation in which we stand today has not 
succeeded wholly in dispelling. 
7. Of our old friends among the nations we are left only with France- for the 
United States, though more friendly than formerly, cannot be counted on at all: in 
fact, by our disarmament policy, and the discouraging attitude we have adopted at 
Geneva and elsewhere towards private manufacture and export of arms, we have 
probably aided and abetted the disastrous "neutrality" policy of that country. But, to 
return to France, that once stalwart ally is stalwart no longer. She suffers to some 
extent from the same pacifist and defeatist disease from which we are only beginning 
to recover. Her armaments are in an unsatisfactory state. Her economic and financial 
position is bad. And, worst of all, she is inoculated with the virus of Communism, 
which is at present rotting the body politic, delaying much needed re-armament, and 
causing acute internal dissension. 
IV. 
8. The third thought, then, as to whether we can improve our foreign policy, 
becomes one of supreme importance. Sir Robert Vansittart opens hardly a hope of 
averting a war. The utmost for which he indicates we may hope is to gain much 
needed time, but even this aspiration is, according to his prognosis, very difficult to 
achieve. 
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9. Personally I take a less pessimistic view. I should be inclined to rate higher 
than he the deterrents operating against a decision on the part of Germany's rulers to 
make war. The food position must be very uncomfortable to a nation that lost the war 
largely from economic collapse. The very fact of the adoption of a Four Year Plan of 
dubious efficacy shows how seriously they view the position. If their food position is 
bad, their credit position is worse. If they embark on war they would find great 
difficulty in financing the purchase abroad of essential raw materials, or of food, even 
if they could get them. In these circumstances the failure of a single harvest would be 
a first class disaster. The arbiters of German policy would also have to bear in mind 
the exposed position to air bombardment of the Ruhr, Rhineland and Saar, where are 
concentrated more than 80% of their coal and steel output, most of their coke 
production, 60% of their engineering, 54% of their chemical industry, 58% of their 
industrial workers and over 17 millions out of a total population of less than 66 
millions,-many of them concentrated in populous cities easily located. They could 
not disregard the air menace from Eastern Europe-especially if Soviet Russia was in 
the war-to the Silesian industrial regions and Berlin itself. They can only make war 
if they are assured of a rapid victory. But on this they must entertain grave doubts in 
the next year or two. Their military preparations are not yet complete. The French 
fortifications are too strong to be attacked with any assurance of success, particularly 
in the next few years when the Germans are not likely to have medium or heavy 
tanks-for, like ourselves, they have not yet succeeded in producing a satisfactory 
model. For some years the German Navy will not be a really formidable weapon. They 
must therefore stake everything on a rapid and complete success in the air. But their 
air force is rather young to launch into a major war and they are equipping it with 
new machines, which must take a year or two. And to bank on the air force is a 
gamble since no country has yet achieved complete success (even in favourable 
circumstances such as Shanghai in 1931-2 or in Abyssinia last year) by use of the air 
arm alone. 
10. The German rulers, therefore, would have to gamble on a doubtful rapid 
victory, the alternative being a long war in which the sea-powers, even though at 
appalling cost, would probably win, in which case-or perhaps in any case-
Germany would become a prey to that communism which she affects to fear so 
much. 
11. There are some reckless people among Germany's leaders, but Hitler is no 
fool, and the General Staff are no fools, and the German people, if their reputed 
attitude towards the Spanish adventure is correct, are perhaps less keen on fighting 
for fighting's sake than they are sometimes represented. 
12. If we can tide over the next few years all kinds of things may happen. The 
unrest in Germany may well increase; the Four Years' plan may fail: the economic 
position may deteriorate still further: the regime even may be upset: they may easily 
encounter the same difficulties with their new armaments (aircraft and tanks) as we 
are finding ourselves: France may recover: our own armaments situation should be 
better, provided we increase our efforts: and some of the more hopeful developments 
in air defence research may reduce the menace of air attack to this country. 
13. On the whole, therefore, while looking to the next few years with grave 
apprehension, and while sharing Sir Robert Vansittart's views as to the need for 
expediting our armaments as a deterrent to war, I am less pessimistic than he as to 
the risks of an early war. Incidentally, also, I take a less serious view than he of the 
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German and Italian adventures in Spain. General Franco is still a long way off 
victory, even if he captures Madrid, and, even if he wins, he may easily quarrel with 
his erst-while supporters. Gratitude is not a strong tie in politics. 
V. 
14. Sir Robert Vansittart's constructive suggestions for our policy do not take us 
very far. A speeding up of armament production, so far as feasible without bringing 
economic and financial disaster in its train, is certainly necessary in order to add to 
the deterrents for war. His second proposal is to throw a colony or two to the 
Germans to keep them quiet, and so to gain all-important time, but only as 
compensation for an agreement which they are unlikely to enter into with or without 
the bribe, and much less, as he shows, to keep. Hippomenes had to throw three 
golden balls in order to win the race from Atalanta.2 How many colonies should we 
have to throw away in order to win the armaments race from Germany? And what 
would be the final result when the war came in the form of trouble in Africa, and on 
the trade routes from surface ships, submarines and aircraft based on German 
territory? Would the offer not be interpreted as another proof of our weakness? 
VI. 
15. One point that stands out from the foregoing remarks is that we ought to be 
more cautious in our League of Nations policy. We should for the next few years 
cease to "take the lead" at Geneva when we have no force behind us. We ought to 
place our own interests before the idealism of the Covenant. We can, at present, put 
no faith in the League, or in its coercive machinery for protection. Once the United 
States left the League it was clear that on major issues, where the interests of Great 
Powers were involved, it must fail. With four of the Great Powers out it is hamstrung 
for larger issues. That does not mean "scrapping" the League. It performs invaluable 
services in a secondary sphere, and may still be useful now as in the past to keep 
smaller Powers in order and so to stifle some of the causes of war. 
16. Similarly we should cease to put confidence in "collective security" unless 
accompanied by binding military Treaties. 
17. Disarmament should disappear from our political vocabulary, and limitation 
of armaments should be pursued cautiously and objectively as in the case of the 
Naval Treaties. The attempts to control private arms manufacture should be 
abandoned, as they are disastrous to the Sea-Powers and deprive them of one of the 
great advantages they possess over the Land-Powers of being able to draw supplies of 
war material from abroad. 
18. We should make a determined effort to bring home to President Roosevelt the 
advantage which the Dictator Powers, who are devoting all their energies to 
preparation for war at their selected moment, derive from the American "neutrality" 
policy. Carefully selected emissaries should be sent for this purpose, even if their 
mission has to be camouflaged. 
19. These developments all stand out clearly. Whether any large change in our 
policy is possible or desirable is more doubtful. Assuming the probable failure of the 
2 Greek mythology. Atalanta, the virgin huntress, would marry no one who could not outrun her. With the 
help of Aphrodite, Hippomenes (or Hippomedon) secured three apples of the Hesperides which he threw 
down during the race so that he gained on Atalanta as she stopped to pick them up. 
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proposed Five-Power Pact, there are several possible courses:-
(i) To orient our policy towards the Dictator Powers. 
(ii) To work for a policy of encirclement of Germany. 
(iii) A defensive alliance with France. 
[15) 
(iv) To remain "on the hedge", as friendly as possible with all, but avoiding all 
temptations to "take the lead" and keep everyone guessing .... 
15 CAB 32/128, E(PD)(37)3 21 May 1937 
'Imperial conference, 1937': minutes of the third meeting of principal 
delegates; statements by the dominion leaders on the international 
situation [Extract] 
[At the second meeting of the 1937 Imperial conference, Eden delivered a statement 
surveying, from the UK viewpoint, the current situation in Europe and the Far East. At 
the third meeting, from which extracts are reproduced here, the dominion leaders 
responded. They spoke in the following order: Mr W L Mackenzie King (prime minister of 
Canada), Mr R G Casey (Treasurer, Australia), Mr M J Savage (prime minister of New 
Zealand) and General Hertzog (prime minister of South Africa). The remarks on behalf of 
India by Lord Zetland (secretary of state for India) are not included.] 
Mr. Mackenzie King said the Foreign Secretary's further analysis of the situation in 
Europe and the Far East has been marked by the balanced judgment and the 
combination of idealistic principles and frank facing of realities which we have come 
to expect from Mr. Eden. His two statements have given us all a much clearer and 
fuller knowledge of the trends of international policy and the springs of national 
action, particularly in Europe. I wish to express the Canadian Delegation's warm 
appreciation of the pains taken by the Foreign Secretary to place before us so fully 
the position as it presents itself to the Government of the United Kingdom; and also 
of the full documentation provided by the Foreign Office. 
Mr. Eden has disclosed to us frankly both the manacing and the hopeful features in 
the international situation. He has portrayed powerful and ambitious states under 
the control of arbitrary and often incalculable rulers, ruthless at home and 
unscrupulous abroad, carrying on ceaseless intrigue with governments and reckless 
propaganda among peoples. Small states fearful and uncertain, not knowing where 
to find security; armaments mounting to fantastic heights, new depths of fear; the 
hope of control through the League dimmed for the present; altogether, an 
incredible sequel to a war to end war and make the world safe for democracy, an 
incredible perversion of the possibilities that modern science has brought within our 
reach for the enrichment and security of the life of the average man. 
It was made apparent, however, that if there has not been any notable increase in 
friendliness or goodwill in Europe, at least there has been some lessening of tension, 
some more prudent counting of costs and chances, some approach to an equilibrium 
of forces. When Mr. Eden turned to the United States he was happily able to report a 
clear and positive growth of goodwill. 
One factor in the improvement in the European situation has undoubtedly been 
the increasing efforts of the Government of the United Kingdom to lessen tension, to 
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prevent friction bursting into flame, and, when they do burst out, to prevent the 
flames from spreading. Such a review as we have listened to enables us in some 
measure to appreciate the burden and the anxiety that rest upon that Government. 
The effort to localize the Spanish conflict, and to prevent the ambitions of other 
states and the sympathies of rival doctrines converting a civil war in Spain into a civil 
war in Europe, has been followed with persistence and a greater measure of success 
than might have been anticipated. The patience of the Government in the face of 
Italian and German provocation and evasion has been a steadying and restraining 
influence. There also seems little doubt that given the circumstances which had 
arisen, rearmament by the United Kingdom was justified and that it has checked 
some of the aggressive programmes of disturbers of the peace. Whether different 
policies could have prevented the circumstances in question from arising, could have 
preserved democracy in Germany and friendliness in Italy, is a question which, as the 
Foreign Secretary has indicated, it is perhaps not profitable now to pursue. Whether 
a race in armaments can be any more effective in the long run in bringing permanent 
peace than it has been in the past, and what will be the economic effects of the 
eventual ending of the stimulus and diversion of industry which armament orders 
involve, are more practical questions which undoubtedly have been receiving the 
anxious consideration of the Government of the United Kingdom. 
I think the most useful contribution I could make to the discussion at this stage 
would be to give some review of recent Canadian relations with foreign countries, 
and some indication of the trend of Canadian opinion on foreign policy .... 
United States 
... It is, however, the general question of our relations with the United States, and 
the bearing of our geographical position upon our outlook on foreign policy that I 
especially wish to note. As with every other country, our outlook must be largely 
shaped by our geographical position and by the complex of past traditions and 
present relations that arise out of the contacts with neighbours. It is true that in the 
case of Canada this factor is only lately coming to have its full effect. When first 
thrust into the international arena, our attitude was that of a spectator with little 
recognition of direct interest in the outcome, or of the necessity of forming our own 
conclusions upon the situation. We were accustomed to take our views at second 
hand, views frequently based on conditions quite different from our own. Even in our 
participation in League of Nations affairs, there was a tendency to regard Geneva as 
an automatic force that worked mysteriously and ideally. Recently, however, a more 
responsible and direct interest has developed, with some greater approach to the 
realistic appreciation of forces and interests which characterizes more experienced 
and mature countries. 
In this more realistic approach, our own geographical situation and the economic 
and political interests and strategic implications that derive from it play an 
increasing part. 
We are fortunate, as I have elsewhere put it, alike in our neighbours and in our 
lack of neighbours. No country, wherever situated, could consider itself as detached 
from the world under present conditions; certainly not a country whose place as fifth 
in the total of world trade reflects the measure of its economic inter-dependence. But 
it is one thing to be a small country in a continent like Europe, with powerful and 
often aggressive neighbours on every side, and with inherited grievances and 
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aspirations, and quite another to be in a new continent with three thousand miles of 
ocean on the east and five thousand miles on the west, and only polar bears on the 
north. It follows that in special degree our outlook is conditioned by our relations 
with our one great neighbour to the South . ... 
There is an important development in the foreign policy of the United States since 
the last Imperial Conference to which I ought to refer-one which may turn out to 
be of great general significance and which, because of our geographical position, may 
have a special kind of significance for Canada. I mean the so-called Neutrality or 
Peace Act of the United States. 
As members of the Conference are aware, the United States Neutrality Act was first 
enacted in 1935 as a temporary measure; then in the winter of 1936 it was renewed, 
with additions, for a further year; and last month, on the eve of its expiry, its most 
significant features were made a part of the permanent law of that country ... . 
As for what is behind it all a good deal has been said. It seems important to attempt 
to understand the development. It would, I feel, be a great mistake to regard it as 
thoughtless or necessarily short-sighted. It represents a tradition which goes back to 
the earliest settlement of the United States. This tradition was broken by their 
participation in the Great War, but in recent years they have again become intensely 
sceptical of the wisdom of military intervention overseas. As a people they were never 
convinced of the workability of the League of Nations in its "collective security" or 
"sanctions" aspect. There is, however, in high administrative circles in Washington, 
a belief that if the sanctions and status quo articles (16 and 10) were removed from 
the Covenant, it might be possible to bring the people of the United States to agree to 
accept membership in a league in which the emphasis would be placed on inquiry 
and conciliation and the effects of an informed world opinion. 
Failing this possibil ity, the political leaders of the United States have been driven 
to the alternative represented by the neutrality legislation. So far as the Administra-
tion at least, as dintinguished from Congress, is concerned, it is not the only 
alternative policy. Both the President and the Secretary of State are firmly convinced 
of the value and possibility of a policy of economic appeasement as a constructive 
means of lessening political tension. Their reciprocal tariff policy is a step in this 
direction; exchange and gold policies have been given a similar trend; and the 
Administration, as is well known, is cast about for possible methods of wider world 
co-operation in the economic sphere. 
Internal problems of Canada 
There is another aspect of our geographical position which is of serious and 
increasing concern to us . Canada itself is half a continent, and covers an area larger 
than Europe. It has only eleven million people. Of these, over ninety per cent. are 
congregated in a narrow strip less than 200 miles wide adjoining the United States 
border, though mining development in the north is steadily giving us breadth as well 
as length. In this long and narrow strip, nearly 4,000 miles long by a few hundred 
miles wide, we have not only marked diversity of racial origins but marked diversity 
of economic interests, so concentrated as to establish four or five areas fairly 
homogeneous and united in themselves, but each differing from the other areas in 
preoccupation and outlook. In Europe, I may observe, the task of reconciling the 
divergent interests of a continent is a foreign affairs question, in which other 
countries are expected to take an interest. In Canada a similar, though of course a 
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simpler continental task, is an internal affairs question, which we have to solve 
ourselves. 
At the best of times it is not easy to work a federal system-and any other is 
inconceivable-in conditions of such diversity. As I have already briefly indicated in 
the Plenary Conference, the strains and stresses of economic depression and 
unemployment are to-day making the task doubly difficult. In several provinces 
depression has developed or transplanted new social gospels and afforded an 
opportunity for leaders more given to rash promises than most politicians. 
Unfortunately some of their chickens come to roost on federal doorsteps. Even at 
Canada's distance, the rival ideologies of which the Foreign Secretary has spoken, 
have some influence, at least to the extent of importing new suspicions and new 
bitterness into labour disputes, and providing a new arsenal of epithets for 
hard-pressed provincial politicians. Friction results from the uncertainty as to the 
responsibility for the relief measures and social legislation required to cope with new 
conditions. There has been a marked tendency on the part of authorities to stretch 
old powers and assert new ones, to demand federal aid and reject federal control. 
Members of the Conference may have noted in this week's press despatches a report 
of a speech by the premier of one of the larger provinces in his legislature, 
emphatically declining to accept federal accounting for the large special grants 
which the federal treasury has been making to aid the provinces in meeting the 
burden of unemployment and relief; the speech ended with the declaration that if 
Ottawa wanted war it would have war. I need hardly add that Ottawa does not want 
war, internal or external, and that we were unaware that to grant millions of 
subsidies was tantamount to a declaration of war. 
I am not asking members of governments, each of which has its own full quotas of 
troubles, to give consideration to ours. It is our task to find a solution, and I have no 
doubt that given peace and a reasonable measure of economic prosperity, we shall be 
able to do so. But there is one aspect of this task of maintaining national unity that is 
of importance beyond our borders, and that is the imperative necessity of avoiding, if 
at all possible, the further strain that would be involved by present controversy as to 
participation in overseas wars or commitments so to participate. 
League of Nations 
As to participation in League sanctions operations, there is not a sufficient 
difference of opinion to create any special difficulty. Such differences as exist are not 
sectional or racial. Canadian opinion has from the beginning been overwhelmingly 
in support of the League's objectives, and great hopes were based on its efforts. There 
was, however, always a difference of opinion as to the means to be adopted for 
attaining those objectives. The predominant view from the beginning was that the 
path of conciliation and co-operation, not the path of sanctions and defence of the 
status quo, should be followed. In Sir Robert Borden's1 protest against Article 10 
before the Covenant was signed, in the early efforts of Canadian delegates to have 
that article removed or revised, in the position taken on the Protocol of Geneva and 
in various official pronouncements later, this view was adopted by every Canadian 
administration since the war; it is no new development. In the Abyssinian dispute 
public opinion supported giving the method of sanctions a fair trial in what appeared 
1 Prime minister of Canada, 1911-1920. 
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the most favourable conditions possible for the experiment. Disillusionment fol-
lowed. There are still elements which favour a policy of collective sanctions, but they 
are in a minority; in some cases their support is based upon a desire to turn the 
League into an anti-fascist alliance. There is no question that public and parliamen-
tary opinion at present is emphatically against any interpretation of League policy 
which would involve automatic sanctions. 
As I stated at Geneva last September:-
"There is general concurrence (in Canada) in the view which has been expressed by 
leaders of all political parties since the beginning of the League, that automatic 
commitment to the application of force is not a practical policy. Successive 
Canadian Governments have opposed the view that the League's central purpose 
should be to guarantee the territorial status quo and to rely upon force for the 
maintenance of peace .... What I have said does not mean that in no circum-
stances would the Canadian people be prepared to share in action against a11 
aggressor; there have been no absolute commitments either for or against 
participation in war or other forms of force. It does mean that any decision on the 
part of Canada to participate in war will have to be taken by the parliament or 
people of Canada in the light of all existing circumstances, circumstances of the 
day as they exist in Canada, as well as in the areas involved." 
From that view no dissent was expressed in the session of parliament recently 
ended. 
We do not deny the attractiveness of the conception of a world united to prevent by 
force a breach of the peace, and so united as to make any risk of challenge or actual 
resort to war impossible. But as we have declared both in our own Parliament and at 
Geneva, we do not consider that such a conception bears any relation to the 
actualities of to-day. The lack of universality, the failure of members of the League 
even to attempt to enforce the coercion provisions when the conflict was far from 
Europe's shores, the failure to carry out the pledges of disarmament, or to attempt to 
apply Article 19, make it impossible to regard Article 10 or Article 16 as having any 
real validity. We have taken the view that this situation should be frankly recognized. 
In connection with the proposals for the reform of the Covenant, which have been 
objectively reviewed for us, we came to the conclusion reached by the Foreign 
Secretary that in the existing diversity of opinion no substantial formal amendment 
of the Covenant is possible at present. But, in last September's Assembly, we pointed 
out:-
"The powers and duties of the League develop by usage and experience as well as by 
explicit amendment. What its members will and will not do can be read more 
clearly from what they have done and not done than from the text of the Covenant. 
What is now called for is to register in the light of actual facts the position which 
has developed during sixteen years of League history by the interpretations given 
and the action taken or not taken as occasion for decision arose." 
It remains to be seen whether it will prove possible to secure an interpretative 
resolution. 
In any case we have registered our own interpretation in that sense. 
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British Commonwealth 
It is when we pass from the question of League to Empire war relations that we 
touch a really vital issue and face the possibility of definite cleavage. It is an issue on 
which there has been wide and serious discussion, particularly since the intensifica-
tion of European unrest and the fading of the hope that the League might solve the 
problem of Commonwealth war-time relations. There are many forces which would 
make for Canadian participation in a conflict in which Britain's interests were 
seriously at stake. There would be the strong pull of kinship, the pride in common 
traditions, the desire to save democratic institutions, the admiration for the stability, 
the fairness, the independence that characterize English public life, the feeling that a 
world in which Britain was weakened would be a more chaotic and more dangerous 
world to Jive in. The influence of trade interests, of campaigns by a part of the press, 
the legal anomalies of abstention, the appeal of war to adventurous spirits, would 
make in the same direction. 
On the other hand, opposition to participation in war, any war, is growing. It is not 
believed that Canada itself is in any serious danger. It is felt that the burdens left by 
our participation in the last war are largely responsible for present financial 
difficulties. There is wide impatience, doubtless often based upon inadequate 
information, with the inability of Continental Europe to settle its own disputes. The 
isolationist swing in the United States, its renunciation of war profits and neutral 
rights in order to keep out of war, have made a strong impression on Canadian 
opinion. In some sections of the country opinion is practically unanimous against 
any participation in either a League or a Commonwealth war. There is outspoken 
rejection of the theory that whenever and wherever conflict arises in Europe, Canada 
can be expected to send armed forces overseas to help solve the quarrels of 
continental countries about which Canadians know little, and which, they feel, know 
and care less about Canada's difficulties, and particularly so if a powerful country like 
the United States assumes no similar obligations. No policy in Canada is more 
generally accepted than that commitments of any kind, involving possible participa-
tion in war, must have prior and specific approval by parliament. The statement I 
made last year, that "the Canadian parliament reserves to itself the right to declare, 
in the light of the circumstances existing at the time, to what extent, if at all, Canada 
will participate in conflicts in which other members of the Commonwealth may be 
engaged," was not questioned by any party in parliament. 
Certain it is that any attempt to reach a decision, or take steps involving a 
decision, in advance, would precipitate a controversy that might destroy national 
unity without serving any Commonwealth interest, and that the decision given on an 
abstract issue in advance might be quite different from the decision taken in a 
concrete situation if war arose. This explains why the increased defence preparations, 
which the Canadian government decided to recommend at the recent session of 
parliament, and which my colleague, the Minister of National Defence, will review at 
a later session, were definitely stated to be for the defence of Canada, why even so 
they met with wide opposition, and why no party in the House proposed preparations 
for operations overseas. 
I shall not attempt to forecast what the decision would be in the event of other 
parts of the Commonwealth actually being at war. Much would depend upon the 
circumstances of the hour, both abroad and at home-upon the measure of 
conviction as to the unavoidability of the struggle and the seriousness of the outlook, 
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and upon the measure of unity that had been attained in Canada. That is not the least 
of the reasons why we consider peace so vital for the preservation of the unity of the 
Commonwealth as much as the unity of Canada. 
In reply to Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Lyons2 intimated that Mr. Casey would speak on 
behalf of the Australian Delegation this afternoon. 
Foreign policy 
Mr. Casey felt sure that all the Principal Delegates must feel under a great debt of 
gratitude to Mr. Eden for his very clear description of the European situation and for 
his masterly compression of so vast and complicated a subject. The Dominion 
Delegates must also feel considerable diffidence in commenting upon Mr. Eden's 
statements, more particularly as none of the Dominions had entered into specific 
commitments vis-a-vis foreign policy in Europe. At the same time all must be 
impressed by the great gravity of the situation, and any comments that he had to 
make would be for the purpose of elucidating points of doubt rather than of 
formulating definite criticisms. 
The supreme aim of Great Britain, and it might be hoped the supreme aim of the 
whole Commonwealth, was to preserve peace in Europe. The main factors . in the 
preservation of European peace related to Germany and Italy and to the potential 
dangers which the Berlin-Rome axis had created. So long as Germany and Italy 
continued closely to co-operate as at present, so long would this nightmare, namely 
the fear that such co-operation involved a definite anti-British trend, continue. 
It was, of course, realised that the domination by Germany of Austria was 
specifically prohibited by the Treaty of Versailles, and that at Stresa, Great Britain 
had announced that the continued independence and autonomy of Austria was a 
matter of importance to her. Mr. Eden had mentioned that Hitler's minimum 
objective appeared to be the re-inclusion in the German Reich of all the German-
speaking elements in Europe. This involved qua Austria the "Anschluss." It 
concerned the 3,000,000 Germans in Czechoslovakia and the Germans in Danzig, 
Memel and other localities. 
As regards Austria, a conceivable solution might be that Great Britain should cease 
to offer any further opposition to the realisation of the "Anschluss" provided always 
that Germany could attain this objective peaceably and without the shedding of 
blood. One great advantage would be that Italy and Germany would be at once 
divided. Germany at the Brenner would be very little to Italy's liking, and instead of 
sharing a common axis, each of them would be at the other's throat. 
It must, of course, be realised that the absorption by Germany of Austria would 
lead to a claim by Germany for a port on the Adriatic which, no doubt, would be 
Trieste. Would the transfer to Germany of Trieste create a very grave danger to the 
United Kingdom and the rest of the Commonwealth? Doubtless Germany might be 
expected to become more arrogant and difficult, but she would have to count on the 
opposition of Yugoslavia and the other Eastern and Baltic States. 
There were great difficulties in the way of any solution, but this proposal might 
possibly be the lesser of two evils, and it was very much to be feared that unless 
Germany was given some let-out of this kind that she might, within the next two 
years, take the law into her own hands ... . 
2 Prime minister of Australia. 
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It seemed clear that if Czechoslovakia was menaced by Germany, Great Britain 
would not be prepared to go to war in defence of the independence of Czechoslovakia. 
If this was the true position, would it not be very much fairer to the smaller 
countries, and particularly to those in Central and Eastern Europe that the position 
should be explained to them without possibility of misunderstanding? 
He hoped that at a later stage Mr. Eden would be able to comment on his 
suggestion that Germany should in future be allowed a freer hand in Europe, 
particularly in regard to the "Anschluss" with Austria. 
Foreign policy 
Mr. Savage said that the New Zealand Delegation very greatly appreciated the 
statements which had been made by Mr. Eden on 19th May and on the morning of 
that day. He proposed to read to the Principal Delegates a statement setting out the 
view of the New Zealand Government, and if this statement might appear somewhat 
critical he hoped that it would be clearly understood that his criticisms were directed 
not to the objective, in regard to which the New Zealand Government were entirely 
at one with Mr. Eden and the United Kingdom Government, but rather in regard to 
the ways and means of reaching that objective. Mr. Savage then read the following 
statement-
May I say how much I appreciate the admirable review and the open statements 
made by the Foreign Secretary on Wednesday and again to-day, and following his 
invitation I desire to supplement the brief discussion at that time by setting out the 
views of the present Government of New Zealand. 
If my remarks should appear critical, I submit that my objective is identical with 
that of the Foreign Secretary and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. 
We desire to achieve peace, but we believe that the procedure followed during the 
past few years with the best of objectives-the avoidance of war-may, if continued, 
lead us to the position we are so anxious to avoid. 
If the avoidance of immediate war entails continued acquiescence in the operation 
of aggressive countries, then ultimately it will mean the destruction of the work of 
the years and a return to reliance on our own power or to the old secret 
diplomacy-with its alliances to achieve a balance of power. We all know the 
suspicions that this policy breeds. 
These suspicions inevitably mean conflict and my Government do not believe that 
conflict is inevitable. We know that the road to peace is difficult, but think that the 
difficult road cannot much longer be avoided. 
This is why I particularly welcome a meeting of the Imperial Conference at this 
time by reason of the opportunity it affords for a discussion and clarification of the 
Commonwealth's policy on foreign affairs and our attitude to the League of Nations. 
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand feel very strongly on these subjects. We 
have been, and, indeed, still are, unable to see eye to eye with His Majesty's 
Government in the United Kingdom in several important respects, and I hope I shall 
be pardoned if, even at this early stage, I outline in general terms the problems and 
the difficulties as we in New Zealand see them. 
In doing this I make no complaints and no criticisms but I should, I feel, be 
neglecting the opportunity that this Conference affords if I did not at once, and with 
complete frankness, expound and emphasize the points upon which we desire 
enlightenment and discussion. We are met here as friends and partners and I hope 
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you will all agree that any want of frankness is a disloyalty to our association. 
Let me anticipate criticism also by saying at once that I clearly recognize that a 
country such as New Zealand can expect to play only a small part in world affairs. I 
realize that the United Kingdom is much more intimately affected and menaced by 
the world situation than New Zealand, and that the United Kingdom, with its 
age-long experience in such matters and with its widespread and expert sources of 
information is in a better position to weigh the circumstances than we, at the other 
end of the world, can ever hope to be. It is for this reason of course that previous 
Imperial Conferences have laid it down that, while the Members of the British 
Commonwealth are equal in status, the United Kingdom must play a greater part 
than the other in the actual administration of a Commonwealth foreign policy. And 
that leads me to my first point, which is that if the Commonwealth is to have a 
foreign policy, as distinct from a United Kingdom policy, some means must be 
afforded-some better means than at present exist-of evolving and adhering to 
such a policy. 
I submit that we must have a Commonwealth foreign policy, not only because we 
must all recognize the desirability of agreement amongst ourselves, but also because 
by the very facts as they exist we are all, in a greater or less degree, inevitably 
involved in the troubles of each. 
And even at this stage I wish to make one point as clearly and as positively as I can, 
namely, that the principles we may adopt as a Commonwealth foreign policy must be 
founded on a moral basis that it universally acceptable. I suggest that even the 
admitted necessity of self defence is not now enough-we must have a wider and 
more inspiring appeal. Only one such policy, I submit, is available to us-one that all 
right-thinking people can support with their hearts and their consciences-and that 
is the collective peace system of the League of Nations. 
I warmly appreciate the really valuable information that is so generously supplied 
to us and the other Members of the British Commonwealth, by His Majesty's 
Government in the United Kingdom; I welcome this information and would be glad 
to see its supply extended to the utmost degree possible. But information is one 
thing; consultation is a totally different thing. 
The days have passed when the autonomous Members of the British Common-
wealth can fairly be expected, either in fact or in principle, to accept, without 
question, any line of policy laid down by the United Kingdom, particularly when the 
principles of that policy are exceedingly difficult to discover. 
We hope and believe that notwithstanding our different points of view, based, as 
frequently they are, on different interests, it will be found possible to evolve a 
Commonwealth policy, and in any case it is surely to the advantage of all of us to 
endeavour, by frequent consultation and exchanges of views, to remove divergencies, 
or if they cannot be removed, to recognize the fact that divergencies do exist and that 
a Commonwealth policy is not always obtainable. 
I do not at this stage propose to make any comment on the very difficult problem as 
to how closer consultation, if generally agreed upon, should actually take place, and 
I am prepared, for the purposes of this discussion of recent foreign policy, to assume 
that it was a Commonwealth policy and that we are all, according to our respective 
points of view, equally entitled to the congratulations or liable to the criticism that 
the policy deserves. From that point of view, then, will you allow me to examine in 
quite general terms the larger movements of our policy during the last few years. 
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These will, I think, be found perplexing enough to give rise to a serious searching 
of soul and to doubts as to whether any policy can be discerned, other than one of 
expediency-of improvisation on the principle of peace at any price. Such a policy 
may be wise or unwise. It may have been absolutely necessary in the circumstances, 
but what I do suggest is that at this Conference we should clearly enunciate the 
principles that we are to follow and as far as possible evolve measures to ensure not 
only that we do follow them but that each portion of the Commonwealth should bear 
its proper share of the responsibility of formulating them and of ensuring that they 
are followed. 
The League of Nations 
Looking back, then, over the period since the last Imperial Conference we start 
with the policy announced so frequently that first and foremost and above all, the 
Commonwealth supports the collective peace system established by the League of 
Nations and bases its policy on the Covenant. But even before the period with which I 
propose to deal, this policy had been considerably discounted. The "watering-down" 
interpretation of the provisions of the Covenant, the rapid growth of extra-League 
negotiations and arrangements (of which Locarno is a conspicuous example and the 
proposed new Locarno another), the timid and inconsistent efforts made by the 
League itself-in many cases quite irreconcilable with its basic principles-have in 
turn led to doubts, probably justifiable doubts, as to the efficacy of the League, and 
have given real ground for questioning whether we believed that this primary 
principle of supporting the League would prove in the long run to be an effective one. 
If the League is progressively weakened it will become a menace rather than a 
protection, or will disappear altogether. Indeed, even to-day the League has been so 
weakened, partly by our own action, that it can scarcely stand much longer as the 
centre of our foreign policy unless we take serious steps to restore its authority. But 
in spite of extra-League and other inconsistent acts, the Commonwealth has 
continued to affirm its adherence to the principles of the Covenant and its intention 
to support those principles and to base its national policy upon those principles alone 
and in their entirety. 
The Manchurian incident 
May I cite some actions which support my statement. The first great occasion on 
which these principles were tested was provided by the Manchurian incident, and 
there are I should think, few amongst us here who will now contend that any serious 
effort was made in that case by the League of Nations to implement the Covenant, or 
that the League's impotence in this instance has not had a most serious detrimental 
effect upon the influence of the League itself, upon international morality and upon 
the international situation since that date. 
It was, I agree, an exceedingly difficult case, but our own share in the 
consideration of that situation was, to say the least, hesitant and ambiguous, and the 
British Commonwealth is certainly open to the criticism, in this instance, that it paid 
perhaps primary attention to its own individual interests, its own individual risks, 
and its own individual convenience. Indeed, I am by no means sure that there is not 
weight in the criticism that we paid more regard to the interests of our late Ally than 
to the interests of the world. It is, I know, easy to be wise after the event, but I should 
be grateful for enlightenment as to the attitude adopted by His Majesty's Government 
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in the United Kingdom in respect of the advances made in this connection by the 
United States of America. 
I think scarcely any person round this table will at this stage defend the one step 
that we did take, namely, the embargo on armaments which, it will be remembered, 
was applied impartially to both parties. 
In parenthesis I may remark that this principle of impartial embargoes seems to 
have achieved some popularity, at any rate to the extent that it has been applied on 
several occasions later (including the revolt against the legitimate Government of 
Spain), but I think on each of those occasions it had the effect in fact of assisting the 
wrongdoer and penalizing the victim. I do most seriously suggest that where an 
embargo may have a partial and unjust effect, that fact should be considered with the 
utmost seriousness, and by the whole British Commonwealth, before the embargo is 
imposed. Further, it is our view that when an embargo, once imposed, is not 
honestly observed by all parties the whole question should at once be reconsidered. 
The Manchurian difficulty is, so far as the League is concerned, still unliquidated 
and remains an unpleasant inheritance for consideration when an attempt is made to 
liquidate the later Abyssinian incident. Clearly it will be inconsistent to recognize 
Italy's illegitimate conquest of Abyssinia without at the same time recognizing the 
conquest of Manchuria by Japan. 
It is worth noting in passing that in the Manchurian and Abyssinian incidents the 
League has succeeded in obtaining the worst of both worlds. It has alienated two 
Great Powers without achieving its objectives and it can scarcely be suggested that a 
recognition of their conquests is likely to be accepted by these two Powers as an 
inducement to resume collaboration with the League if and when these conquests 
are recognized. 
In the Chaco dispute, where two small Powers were concerned, the League's 
efforts might have been expected to be simpler and more successful but, no doubt as 
a result of the League's crushing defeat in the case of Manchuria, nothing effective 
was accomplished. Again we saw a recourse to the so-called impartial embargo until 
ultimately lifted in respect of one party to the dispute. 
Abyssinia 
I cannot help feeling reluctant to touch upon the next great occasion for the 
application to the facts as they existed of the Commonwealth 's announced policy of 
supporting the Covenant. I refer, of course, to Abyssinia. Here, as I see it, we had the 
Members of the League faced with the clearest possible issue of Covenant or no 
Covenant, and, indeed, with a further issue that if the Covenant were not applied in 
these glaring circumstances it could scarcely be hoped that the Covenant ever would 
be applied. Led by Great Britain the League rose to the occasion and for the first time 
actually endeavoured to apply in practice the principles which it had accepted sixteen 
years before and generally speaking had consistently maintained in theory ever since. 
I do not minimize the difficulties of the situation or the perplexities of the 
individual nations that took part in that great effort to establish the Covenant as a 
living thing, but it is necessary to recognize at once that the Covenant as a whole was 
not applied and that even the economic sanctions that were generally agreed upon 
were of such a partial and incomplete character that they proved to be ineffective. 
And I come now to the central point of my remarks, the whole of the British 
Commonwealth, the whole of the membership of the League of Nations, and, in 
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sympathy at any rate, I think it is safe to say practically the whole of the world, had 
enthusiastically supported the magnificent lead given at Geneva on behalf of this 
country by Sir Samuel Hoare. The amazing reversal of this policy, without 
consultation with the Dominions, without one word of warning to the Dominions, 
the complete abandonment of the principles which the nations of the world, and, 
indeed, the peoples of the world, were accepting with an enthusiasm and fervour 
unknown in the past, dealt, we feel, a heavy blow to the League of Nations and to the 
principles of collective security. If an international crime can be committed with 
impunity, and on more than one occasion, if the aggressor is actually to be rewarded 
for his breach of the Covenant, then the whole principle upon which the League is 
founded must fall to the ground. 
In the judgment of the New Zealand Government, the results of the deplorable 
plan to buy off the aggressor at half price were, are and will be disastrous from the 
point of view of the world in general and the collective peace system in particular. 
No attempt was made to ascertain whether this plan, which was not only published 
but was strongly urged upon the victim, was acceptable to the Governments or the 
peoples of the Dominions or to the Members of the League and in fact it transpired 
that it was far from acceptable even to the people of this country. There can be no 
suggestion that this plan was anything but a drastic departure from the announced 
Commonwealth policy of supporting the League of Nations and the collective peace 
system of the Covenant-a departure on which the Dominions were not consulted 
and the evil effects of which they were powerless to prevent. Indeed, I feel it my 
bounden duty to say with all solemnity that we simply cannot risk another case of 
this nature. No one can confidently assert that another such alteration of policy 
without consultation might not split the British Commonwealth from end to end. 
Germany 
Turning now from the relations between the Commonwealth and the League to 
other aspects of our foreign policy, which to us seem to be confusing and 
contradictory, perhaps I may be allowed to refer to the history of German Treaty 
infraction and British reactions. 
In February, 1935, as a result of Franco-British conversations, an agreement was 
arrived at by these two Powers to endeavour to obtain German collaboration in a new 
peace plan as the price of an agreed limited rearmament of Germany. It was left to 
Great Britain to initiate conversations with Germany to this end, which were to 
commence on the 8th March. Four days prior to this date, however, a White Paper 
covering the British Defence proposals was issued. The publication of the Paper was 
followed by the postponement of the conversations owing to Herr Hitler's "cold." On 
9th March Germany announced the institution of an official German air force-a 
breach of the Treaty. On 16th March Germany announced conscription-a breach of 
the Treaty. On 25th-26th March, during the postponed German-British conversa-
tions Germany advanced a claim for naval forces equivalent to 35 per cent. of the 
British Naval forces and was told by the British Foreign Secretary that this claim 
could not be accepted. 
On 14th April Britain, France and Italy, meeting at Stresa, stated that they "found 
themselves in complete agreement in opposing, by all practicable means, any 
unilateral repudiation" of Treaties. 
At Geneva on 17th April the Council of the League, including the United Kingdom, 
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resolved that "It is an essential principle of the Law of Nations that no Power can 
liberate itself from the engagements of a Treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof 
unless with the consent of the other contracting Powers", and recognized that such a 
breach must lead to action by the League. 
Despite these resolutions the United Kingdom on 18th June entered into a 
bilateral undertaking with Germany recognizing the German naval forces and 
agreeing that these should amount to 35 per cent. of British naval forces-an 
infraction of the Peace Treaty. This act appears to be completely inconsistent with 
the resolutions of Stresa and Geneva and with the spirit of the February negotiations. 
I am not at the moment suggesting that from the point of view of purely British, 
and, indeed, British Commonwealth, interests this arrangement may not have 
appeared desirable, but I have no doubt that from the point of view of respect for the 
sanctity of international engagements it has had, and will continue to have, a highly 
detrimental effect. 
A year after German rearmament there occurred the re-militarization of the 
Rhineland, a contingency against which specific provisions were contained not only 
in the Treaty of Versailles but in the Locarno Pact. I do not enter upon an 
examination of the question whether in the circumstances it was possible or 
desirable to prevent the step that Germany took but I do suggest that it was an event 
that Great Britain had undertaken to prevent. 
In short, my contention is that the British Commonwealth cannot divest itself of 
its share of the responsibility for the deterioration in the sanctity of international 
engagements which is such a disturbing and ominous feature of the present day. 
With the breach of the Locarno engagements we find Britain and France entering 
into reciprocal arrangements to protect themselves against aggression while at the 
same time endeavouring, with little success up to the present and without the 
co-operation of the Dominions, to create another Locarno Pact, no doubt in the hope 
(which does not seem to be based on any logical principle) that the next Locarno is 
less likely to be ignored than that of 1925 or than numerous other solemn 
international engagements of recent times. I must emphasise my disbelief in the 
theory that a breach of one engagement is adequately disposed of by making another 
engagement. 
I feel that I have said sufficient to illustrate the view of the New Zealand 
Government that the Commonwealth 's policy during the period under review has 
been one of improvisation and indecision and that it cannot by any stretch of the 
imagination be accepted as a sufficient application of the principles of League 
support accepted as the Commonwealth foreign policy. 
I realise the complexity and difficulty of these questions and we in New Zealand are 
prepared to go a long way in supporting the principal partner of the Commonwealth 
in any foreign policy, the general lines of which we have understood and approved 
beforehand and which is based on principle and not only on expediency. But I 
consider it essential that an agreed Commonwealth foreign policy should be adopted; 
that effective means of consultation must be evolved to ensure that this is observed 
or to provide for agreed alterations. 
While I have felt it necessary in frankness and honesty to question the wisdom of 
our foreign policy in certain respects, I wish to make it clear that I doubt in no way 
the wholehearted desire for peace of His Majesty's Government in the United 
Kingdom, nor do I minimise the difficulty of the series of problems that they have 
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had to face. It is not their objective that I question but the methods adopted to bring 
it about, which seem to me to imperil collective security. 
Final observations 
New Zealand's views on collective security and the League of Nations are, I think, 
well known, and with a few final observations I have fulfilled my purpose in 
addressing you. One is that the evils from which the world is at the present time 
suffering are, in our opinion, due almost entirely to a faulty peace; that the nations 
which are now most threatening in their attitude have had undoubted and legitimate 
grievances, and that a proper atmosphere for the international co-operation that we 
all so heartily desire can, we think, never be achieved until an attempt has been made 
to consider and to rectify, in so far as they can be rectified, the injustices of the past. 
My second observation is this, that in the present circumstances, where the 
democracies, devoted to peace, appear to be retreating step by step before the 
advancing dictatorships, the New Zealand Government can in no case be a party to 
any Commonwealth policy which, in the struggle that we fear may come between 
fascism and democracy, would tend to align the Commonwealth with the former. 
Thirdly, I would say that the road to a sound foreign policy and universal peace can 
never be built except upon foundations which will do economic justice to the peoples 
of the nations of the earth-beginning in our own case with the people of the British 
Commonwealth. 
For generations past the statesmen of the various nations have ignored the fact 
that war was almost entirely the result of economic causes, the chief of which was 
the inability of the people to purchase to the same extent as they had produced, an 
omission which inevitably brought them into conflict with other nations over foreign 
markets and which, from every point of view, was disastrous to the people involved. 
We are therefore of opinion that this Conference should give a lead in the 
preparation of the way to peace by examining methods that would bring about an 
expansion of trade within the Commonwealth and with other nations, and by issuing 
through the League of Nations invitations to all nations willing to take part in a 
world conference the objective of which would be to agree upon means of raising and 
making more secure the standards of living of all the people. 
To sum up, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand desire to press most 
earnestly the adoption of an immediate and two-fold policy, firstly, that the 
Commonwealth (through the League of Nations) take the initiative in inviting a 
world-wide consideration of international affairs, both political and economic, and, 
secondly, that at the same time the Commonwealth take the initiative in inviting as 
many Powers as possible to join them in realistic support of the Covenant of the 
League, presenting a firm and resolute front under Article 16 against any form of 
aggression, but pledging equal attention to peaceful change under Article 19. 
We believe that other important members of the League, including France and the 
U.S.S.R., might be expected to join the Commonwealth in such proposals, and that 
with this nucleus a sufficiently general response might well be achieved to present a 
really effective deterrent to any breach of the Covenant and also to attract further 
Members to a League of Nations which would then actually mean something. 
General Hertzog said that he was very glad to hear Mr. Eden's statement that the 
United Kingdom had entered into no new commitments, and in particular that she 
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remained free and unfettered in regard to Eastern Europe, Austria, Danzig and 
Memel. Apart from other considerations this would enable him to speak with greater 
freedom. 
Germany and Italy 
All would agree with Mr. Eden's view that the European situation was a very 
serious one and that it would be no exaggeration to say that Europe might be 
gradually drifting into war. Mr. Eden was by no means alone in taking this view, as 
was clear from the documents (Paper No. E. (37) 21) which had recently been 
circulated to the Principal Delegates. General Hertzog said that before he had left 
South Africa he had derived the impression from the newspapers and other sources 
that a war feeling was setting in in Europe, and possibly that war propaganda had 
started. If the question was asked what countries were responsible for this 
lamentable state of affairs, the answer was Germany and Italy. It must be recognised 
that the decision of Great Britain to rearm on the lines and to the extent which had 
been announced was due to the conviction that Germany and Italy constituted a 
menace to the peace of the world, and that Great Britain's rearmament was 
undertaken to a very large extent, if not wholly, as a deterrent to them in the first 
place. Why should Germany and Italy be looked upon as a menace to the peace of the 
world? It could not be because of some inherent depravity in the national character 
of the inhabitants of those countries. Might it possibly be because of some defect or 
vice in the forms of government which they had adopted? He did not agree with those 
who maintained this. But even if this were so, it must be remembered that the forms 
of government in Germany and Italy were not those which the inhabitants of those 
countries had evolved naturally, but were forms of government which had been 
forced upon those countries by circumstances over which neither they nor their 
inhabitants had any real control. In all fairness it must be admitted that the 
responsibility for the present dictatorial governments in Germany and Italy was to be 
found in the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. If a real and lasting peace was to be 
re-established in Europe, it would be necessary to wipe out the wrongs and injustices 
which that Treaty had inflicted upon Germany, and to rebuild afresh on the basis of 
justice and whole-hearted goodwill and co-operation. It was clear to him that in this 
sad tragedy which the world was witnessing to-day, it was Germany and the German 
people who had been forced to suffer more than any other, under the Treaty of 
Versailles, great material injustice, and what was even more exasperating to a proud 
and powerful people many grievous humiliations and indignities. To-day they were 
looked upon as the real menace to peace. He maintained that the peace of Europe 
could only be firmly re-established and secured if Great Britain was prepared to 
approach Germany in the same cordial and tolerant spirit as she had shown in her 
dealings with France ever since 1919. The impression which had been created both 
in Germany and outside was that since the War, Great Britain had treated Germany 
with coldness and indifference and that her action in this respect was in marked 
contrast to the cordiality and friendliness of her relations with France. 
If Great Britain would pursue the same policy of friendly co-operation with 
Germany as with France, he was positive that the wrongs done to Germany by the 
Treaty of Versailles could and would be redressed to the ultimate satisfaction of all in 
Europe, and thus peace be secured. If, however, these wrongs were left unredressed 
the consequence must inevitably be war. Great Britain should cease to give indirect 
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support to the Franco-Soviet Pact. She had no right to assist in coercing Austria 
from exercising the right of self-determination with respect to Germany; nor may 
she allow her prestige and influence to be used in Czechoslovakia, Danzig or Memel, 
as a screen behind which injustice could be perpetrated towards Germans, or people 
of German origin, without thereby causing bitterness and enmity, eventually leading 
to war. These wrongs must be redressed and stopped. In these matters not directly 
concerning Great Britain, the parties directly concerned may claim that they have a 
prior right to be heard; and if peace is the object desired, they have the right to 
demand that any interference by parties not directly concerned, shall carry with it 
the clear mark of the peacefulness of their intentions. 
There was, however, another wrong which should be righted, if European peace 
and co-operation with Germany is sincerely desired. Two years ago he (General 
Hertzog) had said, and he repeated to-day, that there should be a partial restitution 
to Germany of her colonies. The great Powers which had been given mandates for 
Germany's colonies had, as far as President Wilson at any rate was concerned, 
obtained those mandates under what can hardly be called anything else but false 
pretences. This was a matter which deeply affected Germany's honour and we must 
and should see that the slur cast upon her be removed. 
Keeping in view the deference constantly paid by Great Britain to the views of 
France since the last war, and the sympathetic manner in which France's wishes 
have been entertained and dealt with; and contrasting therewith the cold indifference 
with which German proposals and approaches have, as a rule, been received, 
Germany cannot very well to-day be blamed if she should feel incredulous of 
impartial goodwill on the part of Great Britain and can see no peaceful intentions in 
Britain's interference or association with interference in Austrian affairs, or in the 
Franco-Soviet Pact. 
As regards British Policy with respect to Western Europe as outlined by the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Leamington, he considered it sound and 
reasonable, it would receive South Africa's approval as it had in the past. But for 
Great Britain to extend that policy to the East or to Central Europe; or to associate 
herself with interference in matters pertaining to Eastern or Central Europe, in such 
a manner as to justify the impression with those more directly concerned in such 
matters that her action is due to hostility, or to a want of good and friendly feeling, 
would be to stultify peace and court war. 
If Great Britain were to interfere or to associate herself with interferences in 
matters concerning Eastern or Central Europe, and war were to arise in these 
quarters involving her, she could not escape the accusation of having assisted in 
bringing it about. Such conduct would, sooner or later, result in hostile alliances, by 
the party resenting it no less than by the party responsible for it. In essence we would 
here again have the beginnings of all the old methods of the Balance of Power, and 
the restoration of that Balance with all its evil consequences of international rivalry, 
bitterness and war. 
He felt compelled to speak as he had done, because as far as South Africa was 
concerned, it felt that there was no necessity for a European war and it insisted, and 
would continue to insist, upon peace being maintained. If war were to arise because 
of England's persistence to associate herself with France in an Eastern or Central 
European Policy calculated to threaten Germany's existence; or because of unwil-
lingness to redress wrongs arising from the Treaty of Versailles, South Africa could 
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not be expected to have any share or part in such war. He took this opportunity freely 
to give expression to the feelings and views of South Africa on this matter, surpassing 
all others in importance, because he could not but feel that this was the critical 
moment for doing so, if any good were to be achieved by advice. 
He sincerely hoped and trusted that it would be taken in the spirit in which it was 
meant: namely, of faithful endeavour to help in leading the British Commonwealth 
along the path of peace and well-being-its proclaimed mission in the world. 
He wished to add that on the subject of the partial restitution of Colonies, if the 
peace of Europe could be secured by returning to Germany some of her former 
Colonies, South Africa would be prepared to contribute her share to such a 
settlement. Two years ago he had pointed out that in estimating the possibility of 
Germany's return to the fold of European comity and co-operation, we must not 
overlook the reasons which had compelled Germany to act in the manner she had 
done. Germany's actions were regarded as crimes which proved that she was unfitted 
to be included among civilised Nations. No doubt Germany had in various respects 
violated her engagements, but it was only just to her to remember that in acting as 
she had done she had been forced to desperation by an unjust peace followed by 
violations in the observance thereof by her victors. 
He himself was in Paris when the Treaty of Versailles was in preparation and he 
well remembered how the harsh terms of that Treaty had been forced upon Germany 
in a manner which involved the maximum of humiliation for her. Since then, it had 
been generally admitted that the undertakings in the Treaty had not been observed 
by France, and this was specially true in regard to disarmament. Germany was for 
fifteen years kept down in durance without being given any reasonable hope or 
expectation of ever again being treated as a Great Power. Such treatment could not, 
and should not, be endured by any high-spirited Nation, and he was quite sure that if 
Great Britain had been placed in the same position as Germany, she would have 
asserted herself earlier and even more vigorously and violently than Germany had 
done. On a small scale he had experienced the same kind of feelings . He, personally, 
knew what it had meant to be on the losing side. In such circumstances desperate 
men would stop at nothing to secure relief. The German people had been reduced to 
the depths of despair by the Treaty of Versailles and by the callous treatment to which 
they had been thereafter subjected. Rendered desperate, they were ready to face any 
consequences and had rearmed and in various other ways violated their Treaty 
obligations and were quite prepared to accept any punishment rather than continue 
in servitude. 
He realised that in the last few years Germany had achieved almost everything that 
she desired in the internal sphere. In Germany, the spirit of the people was now a 
very different one to what it had been. What the Germans now wanted was to be 
treated as an equal in the European comity. He was positive that if approached from 
that point of view we should find Germany amenable and that she would show again 
her good pre-war qualities. 
He could not understand why Germany, France, and Great Britain should not 
co-operate cordially together in the same way that France and Great Britain had done 
since the war. If a real friendly spirit was shown to Germany by Great Britain, and if 
France could be persuaded by Great Britain to abandon her anti-German mentality, 
he was confident that these three Great Nations could fully safeguard the peace of 
Europe. 
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He had a very great dread and horror of the old system of Alliances and the Balance 
of Power and similar methods of maintaining peace. If we returned to that road we 
should find ourselves in a vicious circle. History showed that this was entirely true 
and it was because of this that it had been decided to break completely with the old 
methods and to have recourse to the League of Nations. If the events of the last two 
or three years were reviewed, it would seem that there was a very grave danger that 
we might be returning to the old discredited machinery which had over and over 
again failed to keep the peace .. . . 
16 CAB 32/128, E(PD) (37)5 & 6 24-25 May 1937 
'Imperial conference, 1937': minutes of the fifth and sixth meetings of 
principal delegates; statements by the dominion leaders on defence 
[Extract] 
[The statements from which extracts are reproduced here were made in response to a 
review of imperial defence by Sir T Inskip (UK minister for the co-ordination of defence) 
which emphasised the need for rearmament. The dominion representatives spoke in the 
following order: Mr I A Mackenzie (minister of national defence, Canada), Sir A Parkhill 
(minister of defence, Australia), Mr M J Savage (prime minister of New Zealand) and Mr 
N C Havenga (finance minister, South Africa). Lord Zetland (secretary of state for India) 
spoke on behalf of the government of India.) 
Present defence policy of Canada 
... The Canadian Delegates to the Imperial Conference had the advantage of very 
recent expressions of opinion by the Canadian Parliament on the questions of 
neutrality, foreign policy and defence. 
It might be useful if he [Mr Mackenzie] were to analyse the various schools of 
thought in Canada. These were as follows:-
(1) Imperialists who regarded Canada as an integral part of the British Common-
wealth of Nations, bound to support every other member of the Commonwealth 
with military action and bound to accept the foreign policy of the United Kingdom 
Government whether that policy were arrived at independently or through 
consultation. Their slogan was "When Britain is at war Canada is at war and is 
bound to throw her full weight into the conflict." 
(2) Isolationist or Nationalist or North American group, who held that Canada's 
geographical position and economic interest required that she should dissociate 
herself from responsibility for troubles in other parts of the world, especially Great 
Britain's European complications and her Imperial commitments in Africa, the 
Far East, etc. In wars arising from such situations Canada would not participate. 
(3) A third group consisted of League Collectivists who would have Canada 
participate in international organisations for Peace. Some of these would go so far 
as to have Canada participate in military sanctions; others would not, if the 
hostilities were remote from Canada. 
(4) American or North American collectivists who would have Canada join the Pan 
American Union as a League of Nations for the Western Hemisphere and unite 
with all other American nations in taking only so much interest in European and 
Asiatic affairs as might be consistent with purely American interests. 
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(5) The Moderate or Middle Group which believed in no automatic commitments 
either for military action or for neutrality. These would join with Great Britain or 
the League in war for a principle or for the safety of the liberty of the world if 
convinced that liberty were really threatened. But they refused to imperil 
Canadian security and Canadian unity by accepting in advance the propositions:-
( a) that wheri Britain was at war Canada must automatically go to her support 
with all her resources, or 
(b) that when the League orders sanctions Canada was bound to take action. 
This, by far the largest group, acted on the formula that "Parliament will 
decide." 
The Prime Minister of Canada speaking in the Dominions Debate of 25th January, 
1937, on the subject of a resolution advocating automatic neutrality held the 
following language:-
"Over and over again we have laid down the principle that as far as participation in 
war is concerned it will be for the Parliament of Canada to decide. Having that 
attitude with respect to participation I think we take the same attitude with 
respect to neutrality." 
And again:-
"We have need for unity in our own country. Nothing can do this country more 
injury than internal disruptions and differences. We have need for unity as 
between all parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations. I for one believe that 
the British Commonwealth to-day is exercising a greater influence for peace than 
any other force in the world. What Britain has done to appease antagonisms in the 
last few years is something that the rest of the world hardly begins to appreciate." 
He hoped that he would be pardoned if he were to quote one or two brief extracts 
from his own remarks in the Canadian Parliament when the defence estimates were 
under discussion:-
"(1) . .. I cannot repeat too often that the defence of our shores and the 
preservation of our neutrality are the cardinal principles of the defence policy of 
the Dominion of Canada. · 
(2) I desire to suggest that the safe policy is to preserve the unity of the Canadian 
people, to avoid on the one hand extremes of inaction or, on the other, extremes 
of excessive action, and to preserve a prudent, moderate, and safe course-in 
other words a rational policy of domestic defence for the Dominion of Canada. 
(3) The obligations of Canada are, therefore-
(i) The maintenance of internal security in the Dominion. 
(ii) The maintenance of strict neutrality, law and order within our territorial 
waters in time of peace. 
(iii) The protection of our coasts and focal areas of our trade routes in case of 
conflict." 
It was possible that some people would criticise them as pursuing a purely national 
policy. It might be said that they were evading their Empire responsibilities. There 
were many people who disliked the phrase "Imperial Defence"-possibly because of 
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the suggestion of domination in the word "Imperial". If the defensive resources of 
any part of the Commonwealth were thought by other parts not to be commensurate 
with their responsibilities he himself could see no objection to criticism being voiced 
provided that such criticism were directed to national and not Imperial defence. 
Such a system might be costly. General Staffs would prefer centralisation, but 
centralisation was impossible. Centralisation inevitably meant disunity. A system of 
separate national defence policies might be unwieldy and costly, but the alternative 
would be more costly still. The best contributions that Canadians could make either 
to Canada or to the Commonwealth was to keep Canada united. That wa.s the 
objective of their present policy. 
As in the homeland a combination of geography and economic policy had 
introduced a problem of military necessity and had decreed the need of adequate 
naval and air forces, so a similar combination in the case of Canada had produced a 
dominant, economic, and social problem with negligible military ramifications. The 
steps taken by Canada to cope with these problems were prompted by precisely the 
same motives that compelled Great Britain to maintain strong defence forces-the 
attainment of national security. 
The first duty of each part of the Commonwealth was its own defence; their second 
was, while reserving to their Parliaments their individual rights of decision and 
action, to seek to co-ordinate their various defence policies in such a way as to assist 
one another should the occasion arise, and to forward the cause of peace. He would 
therefore leave with them the following conclusions-
!. Canadian public opinion supported the present defence policy of the 
Government of Canada. 
2. Canadian public opinion would not, under present conditions, support any 
larger appropriations than those voted this year by Parliament. 
3. Canadian public opinion was definitely opposed to extraneous commitments 
but was prepared to support a National defence policy for the protection of their 
coasts and the focal areas of their trade routes. The most important contribution 
they could render at this time, when dark shadows seem to be hovering over the 
world, was, as far as possible, to preserve unity in their councils; to avoid any 
possibility of dissension, and to respect the heartfelt opinions and profound 
convictions of those who might differ from the policies which might, to others, be 
necessary. The nations here represented were ruled by Parliaments. The nations of 
the Commonwealth were happily placed in that their Parliaments still governed; in 
that democracy was still in the saddle and autocracy had not obtained supremacy. 
They were fortunate nations, fortunate in their great institutions of liberty, 
fortunate in the contributions their various peoples had made in building up a 
Commonwealth of Nations-a Commonwealth that stood for Peace. 
They all had the greatest veneration for the contribution that had been made by 
the Empire, especially in recent years, towards the preservation of the peace of the 
world. 
On this Empire Day it was fitting to recall the words of Burke:-
"The ties of Empire are light as air but strong as links of iron." 
Let them strive that at the conclusion of this Conference these links were not 
weakened by placing too much strain on them, but that, as the result of their 
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deliberations here, and a real earnest spirit of co-operation they should be stronger 
than they had ever been before. 
Australian defence policy 
Sir Archdale Parkhill paid a tribute to the comprehensive review which had been 
presented to the Conference by Sir Thomas Inskip. He had studied with great interest 
the documents that had been circulated to the Conference by the United Kingdom 
Delegation, and he hoped that there would be an opportunity at a later stage for 
discussing many of what he might call the "subordinate matters" which were dealt 
with therein. For the moment he would confine himself to the more general aspects 
of the problem. The Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia, in his speech 
at the opening of the Conference, had said that Australia viewed her security as lying 
within three successive safeguards. The widest of these was the Covenant of the 
League and supplementary Treaties. The second and narrower one was that of 
co-operation in Commonwealth Defence. The third and innermost was the Defence 
Forces that Australia should maintain. The guarantees of national security consisted 
of a blending of these three safeguards. The degree to which reliance could or must 
be placed on each having been determined, a basis existed for Commonwealth and 
National Policies relating to the League, Commonwealth co-operation in Defence, 
and National Defence. 
In the Conference discussions on Foreign Affairs they had had to face the fact that 
a collective system had not so far been evolved which could be relied on to afford 
security, and attention was being given to the policy they should pursue to make it a 
sufficiently effective guarantee of peace. 
It fell under Defence to consider the other two safeguards he had mentioned-
their individual defence efforts and their relation to each other. 
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom had outlined the reasons why, 
in the present world situation, they considered an increase in their armaments to be 
necessary for security and the maintenance of peace. Wide support for this 
conclusion was to be found in the defence measures being taken by the various 
Dominions and other peace-loving nations to improve their defences. Speaking on 
behalf of Australia, he would say that the Defence Programme of the United Kingdom 
Government had been received with deep and widespread satisfaction. That the 
Australian people were not oblivious of their own responsibilities for co-operation 
would later be shown by reference to their recent defence efforts and proposals for 
their extension. 
In the opinion of the Australian Delegation, the main defence objective of this 
Conference should be to realise the means by which their common defence might be 
strengthened so that, while ensuring their own security, they simultaneously 
contributed to the general cause of world peace and stability. Regrettable though the 
necessity for increased defence expenditure might be, it would have served its 
purpose if it staved off a world catastrophe until measures for political and economic 
appeasement could be brought to fruition. Then there might be in sight the 
establishment of an enduring peace, leading to the ultimate goal of a convention for 
the limitation and reduction of armaments. 
He would recall the words of the Australian Prime Minister in his speech at the 
opening of the Conference, that the British Commonwealth-a lesser League within 
the League-had its common interests developed to such a degree that it was vital to 
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the welfare of its members to afford each other mutual support. He had also observed 
that the recent experience of the League had indicated the importance of machinery 
being ready to put into operation the provisions of the Covenant without undue 
delay, and had emphasised that the weakening of the collective system had reacted 
more disadvantageously against the small nations of the world than against the great 
and powerful States, for it was necessary for the small Powers to look to a greater 
strength than their own to repel a strong aggressor. 
Proposal relating to co-operation in defence 
The Australian Delegation was circulating a detailed proposal relating to co-
operation in defence, of which the following was a summary of the essential 
points:-
"As the establishment of peace on a permanent footing is declared to be the aim of 
Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, 
And as such Members are pledged to unswerving support of the League of 
Nations, which is regarded as essential machinery for promoting the preservation 
of peace by facilitating and regularising the means of international co-operation, 
It is vital for a common understanding to exist between the Members of the 
British Commonwealth as to the manner in which measures should be concerted 
between them for the maintenance of their common ideals. 
In order, therefore, that Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations may 
be aware of what they are required to provide for their defence, its expansion in 
war, and for the assistance they may be prepared to extend to any other Member or 
Members of the British Commonwealth, it is a matter of mutual arrangement 
between any such members to prepare plans for their common defence. 
The proposal provides that these plans may cover all or any of the naval, 
military, air, munitions, financial and economic aspects of the problem, so that a 
Member of the Commonwealth may agree to co-operate in those directions in 
which he had particular aptitudes or resources. 
The plans would cover the main probabilities of the world situation in regard to 
the defence of the Members concerned. 
It is emphasised that the proposal is entirely optional in nature, relates to the 
preparation of plans only, and provides that such a step will not involve the 
commitment of one member by another in any way whatever, or limit the 
sovereign control of any member's policy." 
He would deal with this proposal in more detail when the Conference had had an 
opportunity of studying it, and it came up for discussion. 
Certain major problems of Australian defence policy 
Sir Archdale Parkhill then referred to certain major problems of Australian Defence 
Policy on which the Australian Delegation sought advice. Though this must mainly 
come from the United Kingdom Government because of its predominant position in 
Empire Defence, there were important aspects relating to other members of the 
Commonwealth. If, therefore, their own firm belief in the defence of each part of the 
Commonwealth being inseparably bound up with each other received any general 
acceptance by the Conference, the details of their individual defence measures and 
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attendant problems were not only of mutual interest, but even of vital importance to 
each other. 
The basis of Australian Defence Policy might be summarised as participation in 
Empire Naval Defence for the defence of seaborne trade, as a deterrent to invasion 
and as a general defence against raids. The aim of Local Defence was to provide a 
deterrent to and defence against invasion and raids, but, owing to their limited 
financial resources, priority of provision was being given to the completion of the 
defence against raids. 
The guiding principles of the Imperial Conferences of 1923 and 1926 had been 
accepted by the Australian Government as the basis of its Policy, and on 30th June 
next a Three Years' Programme would be completed which had been primarily 
applied to Naval Defence and Local Defence against raids. The first year of a new Four 
Years' Programme had also been overlapped with the last year of the earlier 
Programme. The total Defence provision for the last three years had been 
£22,860,000, all of which has been found from Revenue. The vote this year was · 
£9,000,000, the highest in the history of the Commonwealth, and it represented a 
doubling of the pre-Programme rate of expenditure. The details of what had been 
done under these Programmes was [sic] shown in an Appendix to the Paper on 
Co-operation. 
As the aim of Australian Defence Policy was to provide for the continual 
development of an effective policy, the Government desired, before deciding on the 
nature and amount of the remainder of its New Programme, to review the basis of its 
Policy in the light of the discussion of the Conference now in progress. 
The following were questions to which answers were sought:-
(i) Basis of policy.-Whether the present basis of Australian Defence Policy was 
endorsed, and whether the priority of provision for defence and expenditure of the 
vote at present laid down afforded an appropriate guide for a New Programme. 
(ii) New programme.-Whether the details of the proposed alternative New 
Programmes were endorsed. 
(iii) The time factor.-It had been noted that the United Kingdom Government 
was working on plans for the completion by 1939 of its defences against any risk 
from Germany, and that the British position in the Far East vis-a-vis Japan was 
unsatisfactory until 1942, owing to the time required for new naval construction. 
The Australian Government would therefore be glad of advice as to the period of 
time, in the light of the international position, within which it was desirable that 
any particular stage of progress for any Service or Services should be completed. 
Though Australia acknowledged the guiding principles laid down at the Confer-
ences of 1923 and 1926 to have been of great value in the development of its Defence 
Policy, experience had shown that they represented only part of the strategical facts 
of the problem, and their classification into the divisions of Commonwealth Naval 
Defence and Local Defence did not convey to Dominion peoples a full realization of 
all that was involved in their security. 
It had been found that Local Defence was a dangerous expression in any but a 
technical sense, for it had acquired a widespread and erroneous meaning that 
national security could be attained within certain restricted territorial limits. For 
example, the defence of British interests in the Eastern Hemisphere depended upon 
adequate naval strength and a secure line of communications extending from Britain 
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to a strongly defended fleet base at Singapore. All parts of the Commonwealth with 
interests in that region were therefore vitally concerned in the defence of that line, 
which, encircling half the globe, transcended any limited conception of a Member's 
security being purely local. History also showed that in war the fate and future of 
overseas territories had always been decided by the outcome of the war in the main 
theatre. 
The Australian Delegation would therefore like to see the re-definition of the 
Principles of Defence previously laid down, so as to remedy the weakness pointed 
out. It felt that the development of the conception of co-operation which it had put 
forward should, with appropriate political guidance, lead public opinion throughout 
the Commonwealth to a realization of this wider idea of national security based on the 
full strategical facts of what was involved in the defence of their national interests. 
As he had already mentioned, the defence of British possessions and interests in 
the Eastern Hemisphere hinged on British naval strength and a secure line of 
communications, through the Suez Canal or round the Cape of Good Hope. A 
completed and adequately defended Singapore Base was also essential if the British 
battle fleet was to act as a shield to these interests. British seapower was not only the 
first line of defence against overseas aggression against the parts of the British 
Commonwealth, but also the means of protection of their seaborne trade throughout 
the world. 
The Royal Australian Navy was maintained as their contribution to the naval 
strength of the Commonwealth, and the Australian Government's naval capital 
programme of £7,500,000 in the five years ended 1928-29 was its part in the scheme 
of naval security that hinges on Singapore. It was vitally interested in the completion 
of the base and its relation to Australian security. 
The re-armament of the Australian Coast Defences which was being carried out at 
a cost of over £3,000,000 was also a contribution to the scheme of adequately 
defended bases on the trade routes. It would provide secure bases in Australian 
waters for the operations of Empire Naval Forces and furnish harbours for local and 
overseas shipping. 
Australia was also building up a local defence that would provide a deterrent to 
aggression, or, should an invader reach our shores, would enable a strong resistance 
to be offered until support was forthcoming. The Army organisation provided for 
seven Divisions, and the Air Force, with Civil Aviation resources as an adjunct, was 
being organised for co-operation and for the exercise of the independent role it might 
be called upon to assume. 
The Australian Government had noted, however, that until 1942 we were in an 
unfavourable strategical position in the Far East, and it was greatly concerned as to 
the best manner in which its limited resources should be applied so as to contribute 
both to Empire Defence and the security of Australia during that period. It would, 
therefore, be glad to be furnished with the following information:-
(i) Strategical appreciation of defence against invasion.-A strategical apprecia-
tion of the danger to Australia of invasion and the defence against same, in the 
light of the naval situation and the security of the Singapore Naval Base and line of 
Communication thereto:-
(a) For the period up to 1942; 
(b) After 1942. 
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It was desired to know whether, in certain circumstances (the reasonable 
probability of which might be indicated), it would be possible for Japan to 
undertake major military operations with an object and on a scale amounting to 
invasion against Australia. The probable form and scale of such attack might be 
stated. It was also desired to know the probable period of warning that might be 
available for completing preparations for defence after the first obvious indication 
of a threat of war. 
(ii) The best means of contributing to empire and local defence during the critical 
period to 1942.- In view of the critical period up to 1942, would the best 
contribution to Empire and Local Defence that could be made by Australia from 
any additional funds that might become available, be by:-
(a) An increase in the strength of the Royal Australian Naval Squadron? or 
(b) A blending of Empire Naval Defence and Local Defence on the lines of 
present policy? or 
(c) Predominantly providing for Local Defence? 
The Dominions of Australia and New Zealand and India had a more direct concern 
in a conflict with Japan because of their geographical position, but all the Dominions 
were interested in the security of their seaborne trade, which would be open to 
Japanese attack, while it would be apparent if Japan were in a position to carry out a 
major military operation against any of these members, the British Commonwealth 
would have lost either its military strength or its cohesion of common interest to an 
extent which made any part of it an easy prey to any aggressive Power . . .. 
New Zealand defence policy 
Mr. Savage began by thanking Sir Thomas Inskip for the very clear exposition of the 
United Kingdom Defence policy which he had given to the Conference on the 
previous day. He said that His Majesty's Government in New Zealand had been 
greatly concerned with the very serious state of international affairs at the present 
time and the risks to which, in consequence, the British Commonwealth of Nations 
was exposed. Although the New Zealand Government believed that ultimate safety 
could be assured only through collective security provided by an efficient League of 
Nations, there was no disguising the fact, having regard to recent events, that until 
the League of Nations had brought into being a policy in which the nations were 
co-operating in actual collective security, it was the duty of every Government to 
provide for the security of its people. 
It was perfectly clear to the New Zealand Government that the people of the 
Commonwealth must stand or fall together in the event of an attack upon any one 
member. Unless all co-operated and worked out in peace plans for mutual assistance 
it would never be possible to develop the strength that might well prove to be 
,necessary to safeguard the interests of the Commonwealth. The prime importance of 
Great Britain to the rest of the Commonwealth was recognized as a predominant 
feature of Imperial Defence and the security of the Homeland was therefore a 
paramount consideration. It was agreed that the defeat of Great Britain would create 
the greatest possible danger to the various Dominions and consequently it was the 
duty of all to do their utmost to ensure that that catastrophe did not occur. 
He observed that in a world of rapidly changing international situations and 
complications, which could not fail to affect the widely scattered Commonwealth, it 
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might appear at any one time that some members of the Commonwealth were in far 
greater danger than others. This might well be the case, though it seemed to him 
that the defeat of the Commonwealth would adversely affect economically, if not 
territorially, each and every one of the members of the Commonwealth to a profound 
degree. No parochial spirit should therefore, in his opinion, enter into the 
deliberations of the Conference. 
In an association of nations such as the British Commonwealth the problems of 
defence were by no means simple. In the case of New Zealand the Government were 
concerned to provide the most efficient form of defence. The Dominions were too 
small to be able to rely upon their own forces for complete protection and had 
therefore perforce to rely upon the co-operation of the other members of the 
Commonwealth . What members were prepared to receive, however, they must also 
be prepared to give. New Zealand would welcome and indeed asked for a co-ordinated 
system of defence for the Commonwealth. 
Although each self-governing Dominion had itself to undertake the responsibility 
of deciding what expenditure it should devote to defence, guidance was desirable as 
to the form that forces should take so as to fit into the common scheme. The New 
Zealand Government, after a study of the subject, were in some doubt as to the naval 
assistance which could be expected from a fleet at Singapore in the event of a 
European war in which Japan was also engaged against us. There was more to be 
done than simply to spend money-money had to be spent intelligently. The principal 
difficulty which confronted the Government of New Zealand was to determine in 
what proportions the three Defence Services should be developed within the financial 
capacity of the country. The United Kingdom had provided an officer to act as Air 
Adviser for New Zealand who had given them valuable assistance. Nevertheless, they 
were still not quite clear as to the proportions between the three Defence Services 
in which defence expenditure would best be allotted. He felt that some body, repre-
sentative of the whole Commonwealth and aided by the best available expert advice, 
should work out what the Commonwealth really required in the way of armed forces, 
and where these forces should be situated. The next step would be the tentative allo-
cation, for the consideration of the various Governments, of the cost of those forces. 
Even though it might not be found possible to come to complete agreement on the 
proposals which would be put forward under this method, all members of the 
Commonwealth would at least know that was really required and would be able to 
proceed with their own respective Defence programmes with some common object 
clearly in view. Any proposals on these lines would receive the most sympathetic 
consideration of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand. 
Mr. Savage repeated his statement made at the meeting on Foreign Affairs that his 
Government considered there should be a Commonwealth Foreign Policy. At the 
present time a Commonwealth Foreign Policy must mean also a Commonwealth 
Defence Policy. He did not propose to go into details as to the best defence procedure 
to be followed, but the New Zealand Government in its study of the reports already 
supplied and when further information was available from the discussions at the 
Conference, would assure the other members of the Commonwealth that all 
necessary steps for the co-operation of New Zealand in the defence of the 
Commonwealth would be taken. 
He would not weary the Conference with details of the New Zealand Forces, but 
would circulate them for the information of delegations later on. He would like an 
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assurance, in regard to the Singapore base, that in the strategical plans of the United 
Kingdom the defence of the Dominions in the Pacific was considered equally 
important with the defence of the United Kingdom and that our defensive strategy . 
looked upon the Commonwealth as an indivisible whole. There was a feeling in New 
Zealand that if the United Kingdom were hard pressed the Dominions in the Pacific 
would get little assistance from her. His own view was most emphatically that all 
must sink or swim together .... 
South Africa defence policy 
Mr. Havenga said that as far as the Union was concerned, all matters of principle on 
questions. of defence had been discussed and settled between the United Kingdom 
Government and the Union Government when Mr. Pirow had been in London in the 
previous year.1 Briefly stated, the South African defence policy was based on the 
principle which had been repeatedly asserted at previous Conferences, viz., the 
primary responsibility of Dominions for their own local defence. Superimposed, 
however, on the basic principle there existed in South Africa a strong and 
fundamental national consciousness of the responsibilities of the Union in the 
maintenance of the supremacy of its white civilization. It inevitably followed that any 
threat to the white populations of South Africa was a matter of vital concern to the 
Union. 
He did not think the Conference would wish to have details of the extent of the 
1 South Mrican defence policy and defence co-operation with the UK were delicate and involved affairs 
which required a careful balancing act on both sides. Hertzog and 0 Pirow, the South Mrican defence 
minister (1933-1939), realised that South Africa was dependent upon Britain for its own security but they 
could not afford to be too open about defence co-operation for fear of incurring the wrath of the extreme 
nationalist right. Britain pressed for a greater South African defence effort but the UK was also wary of 
conceding any defence role for South Africa in colonial security further north on the continent. Such 
military co-operation as existed between the two countries was often shrouded in secrecy. For instance, at 
the beginning of 1936, when Pirow declared himself ready to collaborate over Naval Control Services, an 
agreement was reached whereby regular naval officers 'working in mufti' started the various services 
required and operated from the offices of one of South Africa's big insurances offices. Both sides made 
concessions when Pirow visited the UK in the summer of 1936. In return for South African agreement that 
arrangements would be made to divert British shipping to the Cape in a future emergency, Britain finally 
conceded that South Africa might participate in wider African defence planning. The Pirow visit was not 
without its sour moments. The defence minister pointedly refused to attend most of the engagements 
which his hosts had arranged to emphasise the scale of Britain's rearmament and he was angered when it 
emerged that the UK could not fulfil South Africa's aviation requirements because British firms were 
stretched to the limit in meeting domestic priorities. For references, see DO 35/186B/ll and DO 35/187/4. 
On the eve of the Imperial Conference, Sir W Clark, the UK high commissioner in South Africa, 
submitted to the DO an assessment of Hertzog and South Africa's defence policy. Hertzog's was said by 
Clark to regard the 1926 definition of dominion status as 'the charter of his country's sovereign 
independence'. Hence his dislike of the word 'dominion' and his growing tendency to substitute the word 
'states' in place of 'members' when referring to the Commonwealth. Clark argued that Hertzog's views 
were incompatible with 'the exiguity of the Union's present effort in the matter of defence'. Properly 
defended bases in South Africa would be important in another war but nothing had been done. Admiral Sir 
F Tottenham, c-in-c of the Africa station, had been 'talking gloomily on the subject' and had sent to the 
Admiralty a memorandum on Union defences in relation to naval requirements which revealed 'the 
inadequacy of the coast defences and the complete lack of any provision for air co-operation '. These were 
matters which related to the British naval base at Simonstown (DO 35/186/13). Hertzog could 'hardly 
object' to their being raised with him personally in London but Clark anticipated that the prime minister 
would be 'most reluctant' to join any in any conference discussion on defence (CAB 64/29, Clark to 
MacDonald, 19 Apr 1937). 
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Union's existing and projected defence forces; such exchange of information could be 
left to the Military and Air Chiefs of Staff. It would be sufficient for him to say that 
their plans included what they, in the light of the valuable and unstinted advice of 
the War Office, Air Ministry and Admiralty, considered to be necessary for the 
adequate protection of their important and vulnerable harbours and extensive coast 
line. The world symptoms which the conference had discussed in the last few days 
and which had so materially affected the defence preparations of other parts of the 
Commonwealth, had also had their reaction on South Africa. South African 
expenditure on defence had been greatly increased, in fact, it had been nearly trebled 
since 1932-33; in relation to their resources, it represented a very substantial sum. 
An important feature of South African defence preparations was the matter which 
had been stressed in several of the defence papers circulated to the Conference and 
referred to by Sir Thomas Inskip in his statement the previous day, viz. the 
preparation in peace-time of the industrial resources of the Union to meet possible 
military requirements in time of war. Although the position in South Africa in this 
respect was still largely experimental, nevertheless encouraging progress had been 
made during the last two years and the experts were confident that with the technical 
co-operation and assistance of armament industries in Britain, the Union would be 
able in a few years time to relieve considerably the strain on Great Britain's sources 
of munition supply-at any rate, so far as South Africa's requirements were 
concerned. 
His Government felt that the existing arrangements facilitating free exchange of 
technical military information; the strengthening of South Africa's local resources 
for the production of munitions of war; and the putting in order of South Africa's 
own house-these were the soundest contribution which the Union could make 
towards the common safety and security of the British Commonwealth. 
Answering Mr. Chamberlain who enquired what kinds of munitions were now 
being produced in South Africa, Mr. Havenga said they were mainly small-arm 
munitions and bombs-no guns were being produced. The Government was 
entering into contracts with Imperial Chemical Industries in this connection .... 
Indian defence policy 
Lord Zetland said that in considering the position of India in relation to Imperial 
defence, two sets of circumstances had to be envisaged. First, when India was herself 
the victim of an attack; and, second, when India was not herself attacked but might 
be assisting in Imperial defence elsewhere in the Empire. 
He would deal first with the case when India herself might be the victim of attack. 
The traditional enemy of India was Russia and all through the last half of the 19th 
Century, those who were responsible for the defence of India were constantly 
preoccupied with the danger of Russian ambitions in central Asia. These unsatisfac-
tory relations with Russia continued until the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. 
Thereafter relations progressively improved until 1914 when the Russians and 
ourselves fought as allies in a common cause. 
The Revolution in Russia changed the situation once more, and Russia reverted to 
her traditional attitude of hostility towards us. This attitude was later modified by the 
course of events in Germany and Japan. The relations between Russia and the United 
Kingdom had improved pari passu with the deterioration of her relations with 
Germany and Japan. 
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Nevertheless, the lessons of history were that so far as India was concerned, Russia 
had always to be regarded as a potential aggressor. It was a threat which could not be 
disregarded in framing long term defence plans. If India were ever attacked by Russia 
the brunt of the attack would fall on the troops in India. The forces there were well 
able to stand the shock except in one particular. Of recent years great progress had 
been made in the development of long range aircraft and, in this particular respect, 
Russia was well advanced. 
The Royal Air Force in India, however, was not equal to the task of meeting a 
large-scale attack of this nature nor was it likely to become so for a considerable 
time. Aircraft were very expensive, and India was a poor country. Already 41 per cent. 
of her central revenues were spent on defence2 and it was therefore quite 
impracticable at present to build up a big airforce in India on a European scale. In 
these circumstances India would have to rely on outside aid in an emergency, and it 
was obvious that any Dominion which maintained bomber squadrons or air defence 
units could in such circumstances render invaluable aid to India. 
He would turn now to the case where India was not herself being attacked and 
could supply military aid for other parts of the Empire. Provided the internal security 
position in India was satisfactory, and that there was no trouble on the North West 
Frontier, it was anticipated that India could send military reinforcements to the 
extent, roughly, of one division, as she had frequently done in the past. He recalled 
that during the recent Abyssinian crisis India had sent a legation guard to Addis 
Ababa, a battalion to Aden, and artillery and anti-aircraft units to Aden and Port 
Sudan. Troops had been held in readiness for despatch to Egypt and Somaliland. 
2 Finance was a major consideration in India's contribution towards imperial defence. Under the new 
constitution established by the Government of India Act of 1935, between 1937 and the outbreak of war in 
1939 Congress ministries held office in six of the eleven British Indian provinces. They were opposed to 
increases in military expenditure and yet the Indian army stood badly in need of reform and 
modernisation. Sir James Grigg, finance minister in New Delhi (later secretary of state for war) explained 
his government's dilemma in a letter to Sir Horace Wilson, permanent secretary to the Treasury, in Jan 
1938. Pointing out that the value to Britain of the Indian army was of the order of £5 million a year (of 
which Britain had never contributed more than £1 1/2 and that only for the last three or four years), Grigg 
informed Wilson: ' . . . if I raid the Sinking Fund not to give the Provinces more revenue but to provide 
more money for less troops there will be a storm, I feel sure. For not only will they [the provincial 
governments] not get their money quickly but they will see that the chances of their getting it at all will be 
gravely endangered. In my view the storm will be such that the Congress ministries would seize the excuse 
for walking out and throw the blame for their failure to deliver the goods on H.M.G's insistence on our 
giving more and more pay to the brutal and licentious white soldiery' . Ensuring the continued success of 
the new constitution was only part of the problem. As Grigg continued: 'Now that the strategic centre of 
the Empire has moved eastward India is going to be a source of weakness unless you are prepared to help it 
maintain a higher standard of defence than ever before. We are at the limit of our resources but even so we 
cannot do all that it is necessary. And so what is required is that India's lot in the scheme of Empire 
Defence should be re-determined and re-determined not on the basis of saddling India with everything 
that can by any stretch of the imagination be called an Indian liability but on the basis of the U.K. bearing 
everything that can reasonably be accounted imperial ' (PREM 1/339, ff 132-143, Grigg to Wilson, 16 Jan 
1938). 
In 1939 a committee chaired by Lord Chatfield (minister for co-ordination of defence, 1939-1940) 
suggested that Britain should pay for over £34 million of India's military costs. The division of Indian 
defence expenditure was settled by an agreement between London and Delhi in 1940 under which India 
was to pay only the cost of specifically Indian defence. In 1940--1941, Britain contributed £40 million and 
India £49 million to Indian defence. By 1941-1942, Britain's contribution was £150 million and India's 
£71 million. By 1942-1943, Britain's contribution to Indian defence had risen to an estimated £270 
million. By the end of the war Britain owned India £1000 million, a sum which soon rose to £1500 million. 
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Plans had been worked out under which India would be prepared to send 
reinforcements to Singepore, the importance of which to the Dominions had been 
referred to by Mr. Savage; to the Iranian oilfields, to Hong Kong, to Egypt and to 
Burma. With regard to the value and efficiency of these forces, they had one great 
advantage in that they were always maintained on a war footing. They could 
therefore be despatched as soon as the ships to carry them could be provided, and 
this speed might be of the greatest value in a crisis. As for their equipment, it was 
well known that there were great changes taking place in the armament and 
equipment of land forces everywhere. He could not claim that the Indian forces had 
the very latest mechanised equipment. Such equipment was very much more 
expensive and, as in the case of the Air Force, finance was the difficulty. That, 
however, was a matter solely for discussion between the United Kingdom and India. 
Proceeding, Lord Zetland referred to a point which he had made during the 
previous discussions on foreign affairs. It must be realised that the fact that the 
United Kingdom Government controlled the foreign policy of India, and to a large 
extent the forces in India, was not sufficient to ensure the whole-hearted co-
operation of India in a crisis. There was a great difference between India and the 
Dominions. At the previous Meeting the representative of Canada had given cogent 
reasons why Canada wanted to have a free hand and to have no prior commitments to 
the United Kingdom or any other part of the Commonwealth. He (Lord Zetland) 
believed that the people of Canada would never stand by and watch unmoved the 
defeat of the United Kingdom in war. There were compelling ties between the United 
Kingdom and the Dominions, ties of blood, of literature, of language, of common 
institutions and of common allegiance to the Crown. For India, however, these ties 
were to a great extent lacking. There was only India's loyalty to the Crown and the 
growing ties of literature and common institutions. It was clear that there were some 
in India who would see in England's difficulty India's opportunity. He had recently 
had an interesting confirmation of this. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the leader of the 
secessionist movement in India, had received information from Berlin, where he had 
many contacts, that Europe would be at war within two years. He was therefore 
biding his time until Great Britain should be involved. His Majesty's Government was 
not greatly concerned by this very precise information from Berlin-their own 
sources of information, they thought, were more accurate. Nevertheless, it was true 
to say that, if an emergency arose, the Pandit would be a potent force for mischief. In 
these circumstances it was conceivable that the whole of India's military forces 
would be occupied in maintaining the internal security of the country, and in that 
case it would be impossible to despatch aid to other parts of the Empire. 
The attitude of the Indian people towards the British Commonwealth was a matter 
of the greatest importance. He appealed to all who were in any way concerned with 
such matters to have regard to the great sensitiveness of the Indian people to the 
treatment of Indians by other Members of the Commonwealth. The United Kingdom 
Government was continually faced with difficulties in this matter. He instanced the 
repercussions on Moslem opinion of our handling of the problem in Palestine. 
If was, of course, hoped that the full co-operation of India in an emergency would 
be secured, but it would be foolish to shut one's eyes to the facts in India . . . . 
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17 CAB 32/128, E(PD)(37)7 26 May 1937 
'Imperial conference, 1937': minutes of the seventh meeting of 
principal delegates; statements on the naval situation [Extract) 
Imperial defence: dependence on sea power 
Sir Samuel Hoare 1 expressed his regret at having been unable to attend the two 
previous Meetings at which defence matters were discussed. He then proceeded to 
make the following statement. 
"1. The Minister fo; Co-ordination has dealt in his opening speech with the more 
general aspects of the problems of Imperial defence and the Chiefs of Staff have 
circulated a full and detailed appreciation of our position to the members of the 
Conference. 
2. I need not, therefore, return to the ground that they have covered. Rather is it 
my task, as First Lord of the Admiralty, to concentrate upon the naval questions at 
issue. 
3. To obtain a clear perspective it is necessary to say once again that the British 
Commonwealth of Nations is a world-wide Empire which was founded by sea power 
and is, to this day, dependent on sea power for its existence. 
4. I cannot put this aspect of Imperial defence more clearly than by quoting the 
words of Sir Archdale Parkhill, Minister of Defence in Australia, if he will forgive my 
quoting him in his presence. The speech was made on the Australian Defence 
Estimates, 1936-37. He said, 'The backbone of the defence of the British Common-
wealth is still essentially naval, and will remain so as long as oceans link the shores of 
its members.' 
5. Just so long as we are in a position to control the sea communications of the 
world, so long is every member of the British Commonwealth of Nations assured of 
safety and security against invasion. 
6. If we ceased to be in a position to control sea communications in any part of 
the world, then those parts of the British Empire where our control is successfully 
resisted become open to invasion, and our Imperial highways would be cut. 
7. I state this basic fact at the beginning of my speech. I do so on purpose, for, 
during the past months, doubts have been expressed, and have been expressed 
publicly, as to our ability, in the face of our European commitments, to despatch a 
fleet to the Far East if Japan determined to force matters to a trial of strength with 
us. 
8. Let me assume for one moment that these doubts are well-formed, and that 
Japan, determined on aggression, is free to exercise her sea power in the Far East 
unopposed by the British Fleet. Let me assume that, in these circumstances, Japan 
decides to invade Australia and launches an expedition covered by the full strength of 
her naval forces and her naval air forces. 
9. I am convinced that, if this act of aggression took place, no measures of local 
defence, no Army and no Air Force which the Commonwealth of Australia could 
conceivably maintain could save her from invasion and defeat at the hands of the 
Japanese. The Dominion of New Zealand would be exposed to exactly the same 
1 First lord of the Admiralty, 1936-1937. 
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danger, and every word I have said about Australia is equally applicable to New 
Zealand. 
10. With Australia and New Zealand dominated by the Japanese and the Indian 
Ocean under the control of Japanese sea power, where would be the security of the 
Union of South Africa and of the Indian Empire? Or let me suppose that Japan casts 
her eyes eastward across the Pacific, what is to deter her from action against the 
Dominion of Canada? 
11. Finally, what of the United Kingdom interests in the Far East, the British 
Colonial possessions, our immense trade in the Pacific and Indian Oceans? All these 
would lie at the mercy of the Japanese. 
12. I have said enough to make it clear that we believe that the very existence of 
the British Commonwealth of Nations as now constituted rests on our ability to send 
our fleet to the Far East, should the need arise. 
13. Moreover, by our action in building, developing and equipping the Naval Base 
at Singapore, we have advertised to the world generally and to Japan in particular our 
intention to maintain Imperial interests in the Pacific. This great project undertaken 
at a time when our financial resources were restricted by the years of the depression 
is now happily approaching the date of completion. 
14. It may, therefore, be said that our intentions are obvious. I must now turn to 
the question of our ability to put our intentions into practice. 
This involves the consideration of our naval strength and the ultimate factor in 
naval strength, it should be remembered, is the capital ship. 
15. We can appreciate the situation as it exists at the present time, and, since a 
capital ship takes some three to four years to build in this and all other countries, we 
can forecast the situation up to a period some four years ahead. 
16. At the present moment we are satisfied that our naval strength would allow 
us to despatch an adequate fleet to the Far East whilst retaining sufficient strength in 
Home Waters to cover our European commitments. 
17. Looking ahead we appreciate that there will be a period, from the Spring of 
1938 to the Summer of 1939, when we could only retain forces in Home Waters 
barely adequate to meet the naval forces of Germany and must rely on being assisted 
by the French Navy. We could still send to the Far East a Fleet, but it would be, from 
a purely material point of view, slightly inferior to the full Japanese naval strength. 
By the adoption of a defensive policy and, relying on the superior fighting qualities of 
the British race, this Fleet should achieve its object of assuring the Dominions from 
serious aggression. 
18. But let us look further ahead and contemplate the time when the battleships 
now building in other European countries have been completed. A study of 
comparative numbers at once shows that after 1940, or thereabouts, from the 
standpoint of Capital ships alone, the despatch of a fleet to the Far East would be a 
most hazardous undertaking unless our battleship strength is increased above the 
number of 15 ships. The problem of maintaining the standard necessary in the years 
beyond 1940 is one therefore that will call for effort and expenditure of unpre-
cedented magnitude. 
19. These forecasts are based on our own new construction programmes and on 
the present known intentions of Germany. Thanks to the Anglo-German Naval 
Agreement of 1935, whereby Germany voluntarily restricted herself to a limit of 35 
per cent. of British naval strength, we can face the future, as far as the German Navy 
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is concerned, with equanimity. Japanese intentions are, on the other hand, still 
shrouded in oriental mystery. 
Naval construction programmes 
20. In our 1936 and 1937 programmes we have 5 capital ships, 4 aircraft carriers, 
7 large cruisers and 7 fleet cruisers under construction. Our 1937 Naval Estimates 
reached the enormous figure of £105,000,000. This colossal burden has been 
imposed on us by the needs of the situation as it exists to-day. 
21. For the future the one thing that can be prophesied with some assurance is 
that Japan will undertake the construction of new capital ships. This will demand 
further capital ship construction by the British Commonwealth of Nations. When all 
the other burdens on the taxpayer of the United Kingdom, involved in our 
rearmament programme, are taken into account it is impossible to foretell whether 
we, in the United Kingdom, will be able to face, almost single-handed, the immense 
financial strain that will be involved. Let me put to you this question in a single 
sentence. Shall we in the United Kingdom in peace time be able to support on the top 
of our huge expenditure upon the social services and the other branches of defence a 
permanent charge of more than 100 millions a year for the new required Fleet. 
22. I must emphasise again that a large proportion of this expenditure is required 
to meet our Imperial obligations in the Far East and that the safety and security of all 
the Dominions is dependent on our ability to meet these obligations. In these 
circumstances I feel sure that the Dominions will appreciate the dangers with which 
the whole of the British Commonwealth of Nations is now faced. 
Dominion contribution to imperial naval defence 
23. I turn now to the question of the best form which Dominion contribution to 
Imperial Naval Defence can take. And here I would draw your attention to the Naval 
Appendix to the Chiefs of Staff Review. This paper has been prepared in the Admiralty 
for the information of the Delegates attending the Conference. 
24. The Appendix starts by quoting the advice formerly given and agreed to in 
previous Imperial Conferences. This advice culminated in the recommendation that 
Dominion Naval building programmes should comprise the construction of cruisers 
and sloops, the latter now being known as "Escort Vessels." 
25. With the lapse of the treaties of quantitative limitation the opportunity has 
been taken to review this advice in the light of the situation as it exists to-day and in 
Part II of the Appendix will be found the Admiralty's recommendations for Dominion 
naval construction to-day. It will be seen that the Admiralty now recommends to the 
Dominions that they should consider carefully whether they are in a position to build 
and maintain capital ships. 
26. Before making such a recommendation the Admiralty have fully weighed its 
financial implications. It has been found that, taking every calculable factor into 
consideration, the total over-all cost of a capital ship only slightly exceeds the cost of 
2 modern large cruisers. The value of one capital ship, as a contribution to Imperial 
Defence, greatly exceeds the value of two cruisers. 
27. The construction of cruisers is also recommended. It can safely be said that 
we can never have too many cruisers. Finally, the review concludes with a 
recommendation that destoyers should be built. The latter recommendation is a 
departure from Admiralty advice during the Treaty period. The factors justifying this 
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change of policy are fully discussed in the Appendix. Briefly, the Admiralty consider 
that whilst destroyers are primarily fleet units and, as such, should be employed 
whenever possible in flotillas working with a Main Fleet, yet their value, both in the 
training they afford and in their benefit to morale, outweighs other considerations 
and justifies their construction. 
28. I hope I have made it abundantly clear that in my opinion it is upon our 
Imperial sea power in both hemispheres that the security of the British Common-
wealth of Nations primarily depends. I am fully aware that there is a school of 
thought in the world to-day which believes that the advent of air power has rendered 
Navies obsolete. The truth is, of course, that air power and sea power are 
complementary parts of a single defence problem. But so long as we are dependent 
on sea-borne trade and our sea communications, I am convinced that we are as 
dependent on sea power today as we have always been in the past. ... " 
Questions asked by the New Zealand delegation 
Mr. Savage said the New Zealand Delegation had certain questions to ask, and he 
would prefer to read these to the Conference. He then proceeded to read the 
following statement. 
"1. The New Zealand Government would welcome an expression of opinion as to 
the most effective proportionment of moneys available in New Zealand amongst the 
three fighting services for purposes of local and Commonwealth defence. 
2. Assuming always that Singapore is a vital necessity to our security in the Far 
East and, further, that the security of Australia and New Zealand rests upon the safe 
arrival of the British Fleet at Singapore and assuming, too, that it is the policy of His 
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to build a fleet of sufficient strength to 
take the offensive against Germany in Home waters and to send a sufficient force to 
Singapore to contain the Japanese Fleet, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand 
are not clear why it is not possible to maintain in peace time a force in the Far East 
sufficient to contain the Japanese Fleet. 
3. Assuming that for various reasons it is not possible to maintain a force 
sufficient to contain the Japanese in the Far East in peace time, can His Majesty's 
Government in New Zealand obtain the positive statement that a British Fleet of 
sufficient strength will move out to the Far East in the event of Japan taking 
offensive action against us, even if we are also embroiled in Europe. 
4. What Naval Forces are available to resist aggressive action and how may it be 
expected they will be disposed in one, two, three, etc., years. 
5. As previously affirmed New Zealand being willing to play its part in any 
co-ordinated scheme of Commonwealth defence, His Majesty's Government in New 
Zealand would be glad to know what is the maximum scale of attack to which New 
Zealand is likely to be exposed in the event of a war in the Far East at the same time 
as the Commonwealth is involved in Europe, and would appreciate a revision of 
C.I.D. Paper No. 358-C. 
6. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are doubtful of the capabilities of 
surface men-of-war operating in the face of air attack, and inclined to the view that 
local defence of their territory is better achieved by the air rather than by surface 
ships and would be glad of up-to-date views on this problem. 
Note.-It is understood that a Committee of Imperial Defence Paper has been 
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issued on the subject of air versus surface ships and perhaps the New Zealand 
Delegation might have a copy of this Paper. 
7. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand would be glad to know what part is 
to be played by the New Zealand cruisers in the new war plan on the outbreak of 
hostilities in the Far East. 
8. It is requested that discussions between Great Britain, Australia and New 
Zealand should be instituted with the object of making a thorough survey of the 
strategic value of the islands in the Pacific, including cable and wireless communica-
tions. 
9. Development of the principle of Imperial co-operation in Defence: would it be 
advisable and feasible for New Zealand to have a representative on the Defence Policy 
and Requirements Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence or on some 
similar body. This would i ncidentally provide a direct and secret channel of 
communication between the Committee of Imperial Defence and the Defence 
Council of New Zealand, the Secretary of which is also the Secretary of the 
Organisation of National Security (analogous to the Committee of Imperial Defence 
in London) . 
10. Finally, whilst the New Zealand Government would like written answers to 
these points they would welcome a further meeting with the Chiefs of Staff 
Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence at which these and any other 
outstanding points could be discussed." 
Mr. Baldwin said that some of the points raised by Mr. Savage would no doubt be 
found to have been covered in the review by the Chiefs of Staff.2 Others, however, 
would need very close consideration and all would certainly be most carefully 
examined, before discussion, at a later stage. It was very difficult to know what was in 
the minds of the Japanese. For his own part he had always felt that Japan would not 
run amok unless there were war in Europe. As long, therefore, as the peace could be 
kept in Europe all would probably be well. Nevertheless, we could not exclude 
altogether the possibility of Japan running amok and, in that case, it was hard to 
know on which Dominion her attack might fall. History was repeating itself in the 
wish of Sir Samuel Hoare for more cruisers. In his room at Chequers there was a 
letter from Nelson, written on the eve of the battle of the Nile, in which he said that 
"frigates" would be written on his heart. . . . 
2 See the introduction to this volume, pp xxxvi . 
18 CAB 24/273, CP 281(37) 19 Nov 1937 
'Palestine': Cabinet memorandum by Mr Eden on the arguments 
against partition 
[Arab-Jewish clashes in Palestine between May and Oct 1936 led to British intervention 
during which thirty-four soldiers were killed. Continuing disturbances thereafter con-
verted Palestine into a major military commitment with eighteen battalions of the British 
army deployed in peace-keeping operations. The Baldwin government responded to the 
1936 disturbances by appointing a Royal Commission headed by Lord Peel to consider the 
working of the mandate. Charged specifically with the task of investigating the causes of 
the disturbances and recommending measures which, within the terms of the mandate, 
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might remove the legitimate grievances of the contending parties, the commission 
exceeded its area of competence by recommending in its report of July 1937 that Palestine 
should be divided into Arab and Jewish states, with Britain supervising a corridor inland 
from Haifa and including Jerusalem, Nazareth and Bethlehem. The principle of partition 
was rejected by most Arabs and Zionists, although Chaim Weizmann (president of the 
World Zionist Organisation and of the Jewish Agency in Palestine) was prepared to accept 
it. After a stormy reception in parliament (the House of Lords rejected Peel's recom-
mendations), the Cabinet considered the implications of partition. Ormsby-Gore, secret-
ary of state for the colonies, proposed that this should be examined by a new commission 
with extensive powers to delineate frontiers. In the memo reproduced here, Eden 
outlined FO objections to partition. His views were shared by other ministers, notably 
Lord Zetland at the India Office who was concerned with possible adverse reactions 
amongst India's Muslims.) 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies bases his paper (C.P. 269) on the view that we 
are precluded by our original acceptance of the principle of partition from 
considering any alternative solution (paragraph 11). He recommends therefore that, 
even if the co-operation of Arabs or Jews is not forthcoming, the policy of His 
Majesty's Government should be "to proceed nevertheless with the partition of the 
country" (Appendix I, paragraph 5) . The functions of the new Commission would be 
strictly confined to working out a scheme of partition, and it would "not be within its 
province to consider evidence or representations not relevant to that proposal" 
(Appendix I, paragraph 6). I feel bound to point out that, if this policy is adopted, the 
consequences may be most serious from the international point of view, which most 
affects my responsibility. 
2. Mr. Ormsby Gore proposes that Arab opposition to our policy should be dealt 
with by treating the problem from a purely Palestinian angle, and making it clear 
that we propose to "deal with the Arabs of Palestine and Transjordan alone" 
(paragraph 10). The suggestion is that we should try to bring over "moderate Arab 
opinion in Palestine" by firm military measures against terrorism, while Arab 
opposition in general is regarded as probably "tending to wane." It seems to be 
assumed that Ibn Saud can be relied upon to maintain his "correct" attitude 
(paragraph 7). I fear that these assumptions regarding the attitude of the Arabs, at 
least in the neighbouring countries, are likely to prove unfounded and misleading. 
3. It may be convenient first to consider how far this proposed policy coincides 
with the actual recommendations of the Royal Commission, and what are now likely 
to be its implications and its consequences, if it is in fact adopted. 
4. The Royal Commission, it will be remembered, put forward its partition 
recommendations after the conclusion of its main report and outside its main terms 
of reference. In a document of over 400 pages, only 16 are devoted to this admittedly 
tentative suggestion for a constructive solution of the problem. The success of the 
scheme was recognised to be dependent on a number of assumptions, the most 
important of which was that it would be arrived at by general agreement, which, with 
the treaties which would be negotiated as a result of it, would make it possible to 
overcome the obvious difficulties of security, defence, exchange of populations, 
immigration, &c., inherent in the scheme. But events since the Report was 
published have admittedly modified the situation. We have not only had time for 
close reflection on the wider aspects of the problem and been able to estimate the 
various international reactions to it, but we are now faced with solid and growing 
opposition from the majority of the native inhabitants of Palestine, and, what is 
much more serious, from the whole Arab world. 
122 CHAPTER 2 [18) 
5. It seems clear that partition can now only be imposed by force, and that many 
of the measures consequent on it, which, in the Royal Commission's conception, 
would have been taken by consent, will now prove impracticable. In these changed 
circumstances, it is essential to consider to what our policy will ultimately lead. 
6. What then are likely to be the consequences, and what our prospects of 
success, if we continue our present policy, and to contrive to set up a Jewish State by 
force? Is the creation of that State, in present conditions, likely to furnish any real 
solution? 
7. Our main object in setting up this State will be to give to the non-Palestinian 
Jews of Central Europe better opportunities for immigration, and to the 400,000 
Jews of Palestine complete security and independence. Let us take immigration first. 
Even if the whole area recommended by the Royal Commission be allocated to this 
State, it now seems clear that the opportunities it will offer for further immigration 
will be severely restricted. This area is at most 4,600 square kilometres, and already 
contains some 645,000 inhabitants, or about 140 inhabitants to the square 
kilometre. As the Jews themselves have pointed out, this density of population 
corresponds to that of modern industrial Germany, and is nearly twice that of 
France. It is proposed that the quarter of a million Arabs at present in this area 
should be removed. As they are likely to be extremely unwilling to go, as there is very 
little alternative land of equal value on which they could be settled, and as nothing 
like a comparable number of Jews exists in the proposed Arab State against whom 
they could be exchanged, this operation, which will have to be carried out by force, is 
likely to be one of great difficulty. But, even if it succeeds and the absorptive capacity 
of the Jewish State is thereby increased, it seems in the highest degree unlikely that 
the area will be able to support at the very most more than another half-million 
people. Allowing for the natural increase of the existing Jewish population, it is 
difficult to see how the new Jewish State could possibly absorb any considerable 
number of new immigrants. 
8. Mr. Ormsby Gore told the Permanent Mandates Commission that, "if the Arabs 
and the rest of the country are granted independent freedom, it will be easier to 
induce the Arabs to allow the Jews to enter their areas." The Jews themselves make 
no secret of their intention to expand, and the Polish Ambassador recently said that 
Dr. Weizmann had given as one of his main reasons for urging the acceptance of 
partition the fact that it would still be possible for the Jews to spread into the Arab 
State. But even without these statements, it is surely obvious from the nature of the 
case that, unless immigration is to be practically stopped-and perhaps even if it 
is-the Jews must expand beyond their new borders. Their skill and enterprise will 
lead them to establish at first economic, and later political, influence in the 
neighbouring territories. The flow of immigrants from the vast reservoir of European 
Jewry seeking outlet or escape will drive even those Jews who wish to remain in their 
little coastal State to seek to establish themselves beyond its frontiers. Indeed, when 
the Jewish State is created, the pressure of immigration is likely steadily to increase, 
since (as the French have pointed out to us) anti-Jewish campaigns in Poland, 
Germany and other countries will be intensified once the Jews can be represented as 
having "their own country" to go to. The outward urge from the small nucleus of the 
Jewish State is therefore likely to be well-nigh irresistible. 
9. What will be the Arab attitude towards this inevitable attempt at expansion? 
The Arabs are not a mere handful of aborigines, who can be disregarded by the "white 
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coloniser." They have a latent force and vitality, which is stirring into new activity. If 
any stimulus were required to their rapidly growing nationalism, it is hard to 
imagine any more effective method than the creation of a small dynamic State of 
hated foreign immigrants on the seaboard of the Arab countries with a perpetual 
urge to extend its influence inland. There are many Arab leaders who fully and clearly 
realise all the implications of the creation of the Jewish State, and who view with 
growing consternation the prospect of either becoming a minority in what they 
regard as a province of Arabia, or of becoming widely subject to steadily growing 
Jewish influence. From the Arab point of view Palestine is an Arab country, the best 
area of which is being treacherously handed over to an alien and particularly 
dangerous invader by a Power whom the Arabs thought to be their friend. Their 
reaction is becoming increasingly bitter. I give at Annex I1 one of the many reports 
which has reached me on this subject, and which throws a useful sidelight on Arab 
opinion in Palestine. It may be noted in this connexion that General Dill, who was 
then Commander-in-chief in Palestine, expressed, last June, the opinion that it was 
only when we began putting the recommendations of the Royal Commission into 
practical effect (as we shall be doing when we begin actually establishing the Jewish 
State and embark on the eviction of its 230,000 native Arab inhabitants), that the full 
strength of Arab opposition would show itself (see extract at Annex II). But even since 
Mr. Ormsby Gore expressed to the Permanent Mandates Commission the view 
quoted in paragraph 8, the situation has so greatly deteriorated that it would surely 
be hopeless, on the present basis, to look for any reconciliation between the native 
Arabs and the immigrant Jews, such as to enable any Jews to establish themselves in 
Arab territory without provoking a conflict. 
10. Historical parallels are dangerous, but a close and sinister parallel to the 
present situation may be found in our well-intentioned efforts to re-establish the 
Ionian Greeks on the Western edge of Asia Minor. We did the Greeks no service by 
sending them back to their classical homelands, but the contrary consolidated 
Turkish nationalism in a way which led us into moments of acute national peril. 
11. With this background of fundamental hostility between the native Arabs and 
the immigrant Jews, what is our position going to be when the Jewish State has been 
set up? As I have said, one of our objects in creating the Jewish State would be to give 
the Jews security. Are we to arm them to defend themselves, and leave them to their 
own resources? It is proposed that the defence of the new State should be provided 
for by a treaty of alliance. Treaties will in any case be necessary, if only for the 
protection of our own imperial strategic interests-the pipe line, inter-imperial 
communications, &c. But treaties will both decrease our authority and perpetuate 
our responsibilities. Moreover, there is no question to our wholly escaping from our 
Palestine commitment, since under the Royal Commission's proposals we are to be 
entrusted- and rightly-with the protection in perpetuity of the Holy Places of 
Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth, and possibly elsewhere. Again, with so much 
inflammable material about, it is admitted that we shall have to retain a right to 
protect minorities in the new States. Are we to use British troops to prevent all the 
conflicts which seem to lie so close beneath the surface of an enforced partition? And, 
if so, can we see any limit to the extent to which these troops are likely to be 
1 Annexes not printed. 
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involved? The so-called independent sovereignty of the new Jewish state, and the 
increased bitterness of the Arabs towards the Jews and towards us, must create new 
elements of danger. 
12. Mr. Ormsby Gore's paper states that Arab opposition should not be taken too 
seriously, and that we can safely ignore Arab opinion outside Palestine if we show 
determination. I consider, in view of recent developments, that this hope is 
unhappily ill-founded, and that it would be most unwise to regard Arab opposition in 
this light. I have already alluded in paragraph 9 to Arab opposition in Palestine. Arab 
opposition in the neighbouring countries is even more serious. It is a dangerous 
misconception to imagine that we can deal with the Palestine problem in isolation. 
The Middle East is an organic whole. The frontiers between the Arab States as shown 
on the maps are largely artificial post-war creations, resting on no true national, 
geographical or ethnographical basis. Palestine's neighbour States are not "foreign" 
to Palestine in the European sense, and opinion or events in one produce quick 
reactions in another. There is a growing number of Arab nationalist leaders in Syria, 
Egypt and Iraq, and the example and prestige of Saudi Arabia, the guardian State of 
the Holy Places of Islam, may yet prove a formidable force. 
Egypt 
13. I will take these neighbouring countries one by one, and begin with the case 
of Egypt. Hitherto the attitude of the Egyptian Government towards the Palestine 
question has been, on the whole, remarkably correct, but speeches at Geneva by the 
Egyptian Representative on the League of Nations and a recent statement in the 
Egyptian Parliament by Nahas Pasha clearly indicate that the question is one of 
interest to the Egyptian public and that the Government is under the necessity of 
showing that they are not indifferent to Arab opinion. If this sympathy is not at the 
moment very active, it is, at any rate, latent and ready to take active form if an 
occasion arises. Such an occasion would be Arab resistance to our forceful 
imposition of a policy hateful to the Arabs. There is, indeed, a real and ever-present 
danger that the nationalism and religious sentiment of the Egyptians, always readily 
inflammable, may be roused to new excitement by sympathy with their Arab 
co-religionists, of whose civilisation they regard themselves to some extent as the 
leaders. Such popular excitement would be extremely difficult for any Egyptian 
Government to resist. Egyptian politicians, and perhaps particularly members of the 
Wafd, aspire to a position of leadership in the Arab world, both for themselves and for 
their country. The present Wafd Government is in a state of decline. No successor 
Government, however, is likely to be in a strong position either. There would be 
great temptation, therefore, either for the present Government or an eventual 
successor to secure popularity by espousing the Arab cause. 
14. These factors and the general delicacy of the internal situation in Egypt 
provide a promising field for Italian propaganda which would not be slow to fan the 
flames of pro-Arab resentment. It is not a situation which His Majesty's Government 
can contemplate with equanimity, when even in the best circumstances in Palestine 
we might require to be free to draw on our other available forces in the Middle East, 
and when we might find ourselves faced with a situation in Egypt which demanded 
the retention of all our forces in that country. In saying this, I have taken no account 
of the tension with Italy and the presence of large Italian land and air forces on the 
western frontier of Egypt, facts which measurably increase the necessity of retaining 
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our forces intact in Egypt and avoiding a situation in which they might have to be 
used partially for internal security. 
15. The main importance to us of our position in Egypt derives from the 
necessity to protect our imperial communications through the Suez Canal, a matter 
on which, incidentally, the Dominions are particularly sensitive. This necessity was 
the chief reason for the decision to conclude a treaty with Egypt and to accept the 
terms to which the Egyptians were willing to agree. It seems to me highly important 
now to avoid substituting for the Egyptian question (which we may hope to have 
settled for some years) another question in Palestine and the surrounding countries, 
not less-and with its external repercussions possibly even more-troublesome. It 
can hardly be desirable in a large measure to throw away the strategical and political 
advantages gained from the Egyptian settlement. 
16. Moreover, Egypt, already nervous for its security on the west, does not relish 
the idea of a vigorous and expansive non-Moslem State being created as a near 
neighbour on the east. To create a sovereign Jewish State in the Middle East can 
hardly fail-as I have suggested in paragraph 8 above-to encourage anti-Jewish 
measures in Central Europe. The Germans will not be slow to appreciate that, by 
making the most of such an opportunity, they will be able both to get rid of more 
Jews and at the same time to foster our difficulties in the Middle East. With Egypt 
involved in the controversy, Herr Hitler is brought indirectly into Egyptian affairs. It 
will be bad enough to produce a situation in which Egypt is thrown (even if 
reluctantly) on to the side of the Arab countries united in antagonism to us. It will be 
far worse if, the Arab countries having been forced into the arms of one of our 
European rivals, Egypt should be brought into the same hostile camp. I attach, as 
Annex Ill, a telegram which has just reached me from His Majesty's Ambassador in 
Egypt strongly confirming the above views. 
Iraq 
17. Very similar considerations apply in the case of Iraq. The present Iraqi 
Government have behaved correctly, though the speech of the Iraqi Foreign Minister 
in the Assembly of the League last September was a strong and able plea on the Arab 
side, which created a considerable impression; while it was his brother who presided 
at the recent Arab nationalist congress at Bludan in the Lebanon. It must be 
remembered, however, that our position in Iraq is by no means too secure, and that 
Governments in that country have of late not been noted for their stability. Arab and 
Moslem feeling runs high, particularly on the Middle Euphrates and among the 
desert tribes. Were public opinion and religious fanaticism to be inflamed by some 
event or incident in Palestine, such as a serious encounter with an Arab band of Iraqi 
origin, or some serious clash with British forces in the process of the establishment 
of the Jewish State and the eventual eviction of its Arab inhabitants, the danger 
cannot be excluded of a wide movement against us. It must be remembered that Iraq 
is now a very important source of our oil supplies, and that it would be of little avail 
to have safeguarded the seaward end of the pipe-line at Haifa if the oil-fields 
themselves were to be seriously threatened. There is also the position of the Royal Air 
Force in Iraq to be considered, and the vital importance of the Iraqi aerodromes to 
our military and civil air communications with India and the East. A telegram from 
His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad forms Annex IV. 
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Saudi Arabia 
18. Meanwhile there are strong indications that King Ibn Saud may before long 
be driven to reconsider his whole attitude towards us, and possibly even to throw in 
his lot with Italy if we cannot give him some satisfaction over Palestine. I annex 
(Annex V) a paper containing King Ibn Saud's latest communications to us on this 
subject, from which His Majesty's deep anxiety and distress at our own present policy 
will be apparent. I also attach (Annex VI) a copy of a letter of the 8th November from 
the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office, giving the views of our Minister at Jedda on 
King Ibn Saud's probable future attitude. These documents reveal a most disquieting 
situation. I would only add that the effect of our Palestine policy on King Ibn Saud 
has already made itself felt in the stiffening of his attitude towards us over the 
question of his South-Eastern frontiers, and in his revival of his claim to Akaba and 
Ma'an and his presentation of a new claim for a territorial corridor to Syria-claims 
which have recently formed the subject of a report by the Chiefs of Staff 
Sub-Committee (see paper C.O.S. 627 of the 15th November) . 
The Yemen 
19. Hardly less serious is the attitude of the King of the Yemen. It was recently 
decided by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee that it was a matter of the utmost 
importance from the imperial point of view that Italy should not be allowed to 
establish herself in the Yemen. The King of the Yemen was until recently no less 
anxious than we to prevent this. We know, however, that the reaction in the Yemen 
to our Palestine policy has been most unfortunate. The Yemeni protests against it 
have now been followed by the conclusion of a new ltalo-Yemeni Treaty, and the 
establishment of increasingly cordial relations between the Yemen and Italy. 
Following on this, the King of the Yemen has recently revived the question of the 
Aden Protectorate frontier, and it is a curious coincidence that the Italians at the 
same moment should be challenging our actions in the Northern areas of the 
Protectorate and in the Southern Red Sea. 
20. I suggest, then, that it is not only useless, but most dangerous to deal with 
the Palestine question in isolation. All our evidence goes to show that it is now 
dominating every other question throughout the Middle East, and that our whole 
future relations with the Middle Eastern States depend almost exclusively on our 
handling of it. Our European adversaries have not been slow to seize on this fact. It is 
difficult to estimate the dangers of a European conflagration, but they are sufficiently 
real for our potential enemies to neglect no field in which they can cause us 
embarrassment. 
League of Nations 
21. There is another aspect of this question which is no less important-that of 
probable reactions at Geneva. As my colleagues are aware, before partition can 
become effective, our policy will need the unanimous approval of the Council of the 
League. If forcible partition were proposed and pressed, I foresee the gravest 
difficulty in obtaining the necessary unanimity in the Council, and I think it very 
probable that we should fail in our attempt to secure it. There is, it is true, at the 
moment no Arab State on the Council, but the Middle Eastern States are represented 
by Persia and no doubt rely on her support. Further, this is a matter on which we 
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could look for no active support from the Council, not even from the French 
representative, since France has her own Moslem difficulties. 
22. From the point of view of the Assembly, the public demonstrations of our 
friends and allies against us, which created such a painful impression last September, 
may be converted into more active opposition. I should view with dismay the 
possibility of Egypt, Iraq, Persia and possibly Turkey also working against us at 
Geneva. It could surely prove more serious than the possible opposition, which 
would be confined to this issue, of the States with large Jewish populations, such as 
Poland and Roumania. Such limited opposition would be unlikely to affect the 
general policy of Poland and Roumania, or their relative positions in the balance of 
power. But the alienation of the Moslem countries might well be total and 
permanent. 
23. These arguments seem to me to constitute a very strong case against any 
decision to commit ourselves afresh to carrying out a policy of partition in Palestine 
forcibly and in opposition to the wishes of the inhabitants. The Secretary of State for 
the Colonies has expressed the view that we are too far committed to the policy of 
partition to retreat. I am not convinced that this is precisely the point at issue. The 
declarations of His Majesty's Government have all been subject to important 
provisos-the approval of the Council of the League and of Parliament in this 
country, and above all, our ability to secure at least a measure of consent on the part 
of the parties concerned. It has now become clear that this consent will not be 
forthcoming, and to impose a policy of partition on an unwilling population is surely 
a very different proposition from that which the Royal Commission contemplated, 
and to which His Majesty's Government originally gave their support. I therefore feel 
strongly that the possibility of an alternative solution should not be excluded, and 
that the new Commission's terms of reference should be so enlarged as to allow it to 
consider, and if necessary recommend, alternative proposals. 
Possible alternatives 
24. Is it in fact possible to devise a practicable and preferable alternative solution? 
I have tried to show that the Palestine problem cannot be dealt with without regard 
to the general situation in the Middle East, but this does not mean that a local 
solution of it is not possible. It is essential in considering this question of alternatives 
to clear our minds as to the real cause of the trouble, and the more closely this 
question is considered, the clearer it seems that, serious as the "Palestine problem" 
in its accepted sense may be, there is, in fact, no serious problem in Palestine itself. 
In spite of its diversity of races and faiths, there is nothing insoluble in the task of 
evolving a safe and prosperous future for Palestine and its present inhabitants, 
including the 400,000 Jews already in the country, provided the Arabs can cease to 
regard these Jews-as they do at present-merely as the vanguard of an invading 
army. The Palestine problem, as we have known it hitherto, is created by one single 
and quite extraneous circumstance- the fact that we have hitherto been required 
annually to bring into Palestine a steady flow of foreign immigrants from outside 
that territory, who are, in fact, and setting aside for a moment Old Testament 
associations, as alien to present-day Palestine as the Greeks to Asia Minor and the 
Moors to Spain. 
25. A similar problem would surely have arisen in any part of the world if a 
similar process were applied to it. If a Power conquers a territory already occupied by 
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a population possessing a certain level of civilisation and a growing sense of 
nationalism, and then introduces a new population into that territory in such a way 
as must eventually reduce the original population to a minority in what it regards as 
its own country, the original population can hardly fail to rebel-at least when it 
realises that the danger point is reached and that it must either lose a part of its 
territory or accept a position of inferiority. The whole crux of the Palestine problem 
is the fear of the Arabs that they will become a minority in a country which they have 
for thousands of years regarded as their own. I have often been assured that the 
majority of the Arabs would far rather have continued under the rule of a Turkish 
minority than be "liberated" in order to fall under the numerical predominance of 
the Jews. 
26. It has been suggested to me that there is only one way in which we can now 
make our peace with the Arabs, both in Palestine and in the surrounding Arab States, 
and avoid the dangers I have indicated above, that is, by giving the Arabs some 
assurance that the Jews will neither become a majority in Palestine, nor be given any 
Palestinian territory in full sovereignty, with the danger of its serving as a 
jumping-off point for further expansion. These are very serious conditions, and the 
question whether we can, in fact, reassure the Arabs on these two points is one which 
will need very careful consideration. But if we could agree to them, we should, I 
think, go a long way towards recovering the confidence and friendship of the Middle 
Eastern States, and greatly strengthen our moral and political position in that vital 
area. 
27. Can we do this compatibly with our obligations under the Balfour Declaration 
and the Mandate towards the non-Palestinian Jews? What is the precise nature of 
those obligations? I attach, as an annex to this paper (Annex VII), a memorandum 
intended to show that it was never the true intention of the Balfour Declaration, or of 
the Mandate, to create a predominantly Jewish State in Palestine, although that 
meaning has subsequently been attached to these documents as a result of later 
European events. In this Annex replies are also given to two other arguments 
frequently advanced by supporters of the Zionist cause, which have led to much 
misunderstanding in the past, and have served further to confuse the issue.2 I will 
not repeat these arguments in the body of this paper, but I think the annexed paper 
makes a strong case to show that we should be violating no pledge and doing no 
injury to the Jews, in now seeking a primarily Palestinian solution of the Palestine 
problem. 
2 These two arguments were, first, that having liberated the Arabs from alien rule, Britain had a moral 
right to dispose of at least part of Arab territory in whatever way it saw fit and, secondly, that the area in 
Palestine designated for Jewish immigration was very small when compared with the full extent of the 
Arab territories. Eden countered the first argument by drawing a comparison with Central Europe: ' ... 
this argument would apply equally to Czechoslovakia and to Poland; yet no one would seriously argue 
that, because these countries were liberated as a result of the great war, England and France thereby 
acquired a right to dispose of portions of Poland and Bohemia to an alien race against the wishes of the 
inhabitants'. He countered the second argument with the observation that the question of size would 
'hardly afford any consolation to the quarter of a million Arabs who will have to leave the proposed Jewish 
state' and he also pointed out that by far the greater part of the area covered by the Arab territories 
consisted of almost uninhabitable desert: 'If only those parts of the Arab countries which can be cultivated 
and developed and can support a stable population are taken into account, it will be found that the area 
which we propose to constitute into a new Jewish State for the benefit of the non-Palestinian Jews is a very 
much larger proportion of the total habitable area than it seems.' 
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28. I am naturally not in a position to put forward a detailed alternative solution 
to the present proposal for enforced partition. I would only urge that, in view of the 
very grave difficulties and dangers to which I have drawn attention, all other 
possibilities should be carefully explored. One which has been suggested to me, and 
which might enable us to re-establish peace with the Arab and Moslem world, while 
at the same time enabling us in no lesser degree to fulfil our obligations to the Jews 
than would be the case by an enforced partition of the country, is that of the 
establishment of a fixed numerical proportion between the two races. It would be for 
the new Commission to consider the arguments for and against this. It is true that 
such a solution would involve an indefinite continuance of the British Mandate over 
the whole country. But I doubt whether this would, in fact, involve us in any greater 
responsibilities or commitments than we should incur by retaining responsibility-
as at present proposed-in certain isolated and indefensible portions of the country, 
and incurring new and difficult responsibilities, by treaty or otherwise, for the 
protection of the proposed new States. I am assured that such a solution would be 
welcomed by King Ibn Saud, who would probably agree, if it were adopted, to 
abandon his old claims to Akaba and Ma'an, and his new claim to a corridor to Syria. 
The main outlines of a solution of this type have been submitted to me, and I think 
deserve very careful consideration. I am not, however, putting them forward to my 
colleagues at this stage, as I feel that the new Commission should be given complete 
freedom to put forward whatever proposals it thinks best suited to meet the new 
situation which has developed since the Royal Commission issued its Report. No 
doubt solutions are possible, such as some kind of provisional cantonisation-which, 
it will be remembered, was suggested by the Permanent Mandates Commission. But 
for the moment my main concern is to show the grave dangers which would follow if 
His Majesty's Government were to commit themselves forthwith to a policy of 
enforced partition, likely not only to involve them in continuing military commit-
ments of a far-reaching character in Palestine itself, but also to bring on them the 
permanent hostility of all the Arab and Moslem Powers in the Middle East. 
19 CAB 24/273, CP 289(37) 1 Dec 1937 
'Palestine': Cabinet memorandum by Mr Ormsby-Gore on the 
arguments in favour of partition 
[Ormsby-Gore was a strong advocate of partition but when Cabinet considered his memo 
reproduced here, together with that by Eden (see 18), only Malcolm MacDonald, the 
dominions secretary, supported his opposite number at the Colonial Office. Ministers 
resolved that the chairman of the proposed new commission, Sir John Woodhead, should 
be given authority to decide against partition if an equitable and practical scheme could 
not be devised (CAB 23/90, CM 46(37)5, 8 Dec 1937). On the grounds primarily of 
economics and geography, this effectively was the substance of Woodhead's subsequent 
report (Palestine Partition Report, Cmd 5854, 1938). The commission arrived in 
Palestine in Apr 1938, just after theAnschluss, and reported in Nov 1938, shortly after the 
Munich settlement over Czechoslovakia. At a time of heightened tension in Europe, 
Middle Eastern security became the government's priority where Palestine policy was 
concerned. In a political sense, this meant securing Britain's position in the Arab world in 
the event of war. After an abortive conference in London at the beginning of 1939, the 
government issued a white paper in May which envisaged Palestine becoming indepen-
dent as a unitary state in ten year's time. Jewish immigration would be restricted to 
75,000 over a five-year period and thereafter dependent on Arab agreement.] 
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When the question of policy in Palestine was last under discussion in the Cabinet 
(Cabinet 42 (37)), it was agreed that the matter should be postponed and that the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should circulate a memorandum; but it was also 
understood that there was no question of going again over the ground covered by the 
Royal Commission, but rather of considering whether the situation had been altered 
by factors which had arisen since the Commission's Report was made public. 
2. I feel bound to observe that the memorandum (C.P. 281 (37)) which has been 
circulated by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs seems to me to ignore certain 
fundamental realities of the Palestine problem and of our position in relation to that 
problem, and to adopt a standpoint which must involve the reopening not only of the 
Report of the Royal Commission, but of the policy embodied in the Command paper 
of last July,* if not of the policy, now twenty years old, which was embodied in the 
Balfour Declaration. 
3. I have dealt in an appendix (Appendix 1)1 with certain statements and 
assumption which appear to me to be erroneous, and I will confine this memoran-
dum to the main issue. 
4. I need hardly remind my colleagues that the unanimous report of the Royal 
Commission, to whose ability and impartiality public testimony has been paid in 
Parliament and elsewhere, diagnosed the root of the trouble in Palestine as a conflict 
of the national aspirations of Arabs and Jews, which were irreconcilable under the 
existing Mandate. They pointed out that these national aspirations were justified by 
the terms of various pledges of His Majesty's Government and of the Mandate itself, 
and had been stimulated by political developments outside Palestine. 
The Commission also pointed out, as preceding Commissions had done, that Arab 
hatred and fear of the establishment of the Jewish national home had been 
aggravated by the general uncertainty, due to the ambiguity of certain phrases in the 
Mandate, as to the ultimate intentions of the Mandatory Power. As is well known, the 
lack of a clear definition of the obligations of His Majesty's Government, particularly 
with reference to the establishment of a national home for the Jews, has deprived 
successive British Governments of any sound moral foundation on which a firm and 
consistent policy or administration could be based, with consequent damage to our 
prestige not only in the eyes of the Arabs and Jews of Palestine, but throughout the 
world. 
5. The Royal Commission, who occupied, in the eyes of the public, the position of 
arbitrators between the contending parties in Palestine, and between those parties 
and the British Government, after a disinterested examination of all the relevant 
facts as to the nature of our obligations towards Arabs and Jews, reached certain 
important conclusions which may be summarised as follows:-
(1) that, on a just interpretation of our pledges and of the provisions of the 
Mandate, both Arabs and Jews in Palestine were entitled to independence; 
(2) that both races must be regarded as tit for self-government; 
(3) that on the one hand the Arab hatred of the Jewish National Home, and on the 
other the nationalist ideals on which the conception of the Jewish National Home 
• Command 5513. 
1 Appendices not printed. 
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is based, precluded the possibility of satisfying the national aspirations of both 
races under a unitary Government; and 
(4) that the only means by which we could discharge our obligations to the two 
races was by partition, which, in the opinion of the Commission, was the only 
solution which seemed to offer at least a chance of ultimate peace. 
6. In the Statement of Policy (Command 5513) His Majesty's Government 
expressed their general agreement with the arguments and conclusions of the 
Commission, and have now obtained authority from Parliament and from the League 
of Nations to explore the possibilities of a solution by means of partition; and I would 
here remind my colleagues that both in Parliament and before the Permanent 
Mandates Commission this policy encountered serious criticism, mainly from the 
point of view of Jewish, not Arab, interests, and that the "pro-Arab" group of 
Members of the House of Commons, whose opinions were embodied in a letter which 
I circulated to the Cabinet on the 11th August (C.P. 203 (37)), have recently 
reassured me of their support of partition in principle. I may add that Sir John 
Chancellor, the late High Commissioner for Palestine, has recently informed me that 
he is strongly in favour of partition. 
Dr. Weizmann, the Zionist leader, who heartily supports the principle of partition, 
succeeded in obtaining from the Zionist Congress at Zurich last August, provisional 
authority to negotiate with His Majesty's Government on the details of a scheme of 
partition, and it is clear that any proposal short of this would have been heavily 
attacked by Jews all over the world as a repudiation of our obligations to the Jewish 
people. 
Dr. Weizmann has, moreover, committed himself publicly to the principle of 
partition on as recent a date as the 12th October, when he spoke at a meeting of the 
Royal Empire Society. The report of his speech contains the following passages:-
"For himself, he [Dr. Weizmann] would, with certain modifications, heartily 
support the decision on general lines at which the Commission had arrived. It was 
not an ideal solution, but there was no ideal solution to any problem in the world." 
"He felt that this solution, if promptly and properly carried out, offered from the 
Jewish point of view an opportunity to the Jews which they had not had for a very 
long time." 
7. In face of these events I would like the Cabinet to envisage the consequences of 
withdrawal from the policy to which we are committed. We have accepted the 
impartial interpretation of the Royal Commission as to the nature of our obligations 
towards the Jewish people, an interpretation which clearly does not satisfy their full 
demands, but for which their leaders have obtained approval in principle. On what 
grounds could we justify to the Jews the repudiation of a Statement of Policy issued 
only four months ago, and the offer to the Jews, in place of a settlement by partition, 
which follows inevitably from acceptance of the arguments and conclusions of the 
Royal Commission, of a permanent minority position in Palestine? I know of no new 
development which would provide us with a defence against the charges of betrayal 
which would be levelled at us from Jews throughout the world, and I should not envy 
any Secretary of State who might be called upon to defend such a proposal in 
Parliament or before the Permanent Mandates Commission. The effect of such a 
volte-face on our relations with foreign Governments is not for me to assess, but I 
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feel bound to draw attention to the serious possibilities of disturbance of our 
relations with the Government of the United States. 
8. The greater part of Mr. Eden 's memorandum is devoted to showing that the 
policy of partition has met with widespread opposition from the Arab peoples of the 
Middle East, and, if I understand him aright, he maintains that this opposition 
represents the "new development" which justifies reconsideration of our policy; but 
this opposition has surely taken no one by surprise. The fact that the Royal 
Commission in their Report did not discuss the possibility of the enforcement of a 
scheme of partition does not justify the implication (in paragraph 4 ofC.P. 281 (37)), 
that the Commission regarded the success of their scheme as dependent on general 
agreement. The Commission in their Report and His Majesty's Government in the 
Statement of Policy went no further than to express the hope of securing the consent 
of the communities concerned, and it is obvious that in neither of these documents 
would it have been appropriate to refer to the possibility of compulsion in the last 
resort. 
9. It is important to consider the nature of the Arab opposition to our policy. 
Both in Palestine and, I think Mr. Eden will agree, in surrounding Arab countries, 
this opposition has been based not on the merits of the question at issue, but on the 
inveterate Arab objection to the Balfour Declaration. It is clear to me that with such 
objections there can be no compromise. Either we must carry out our pledges to the 
Jewish people as now interpreted by an impartial Royal Commission, or we shall have 
to tell the Jews that, we cannot fulfil our-frequently reiterated pledges for fear of 
jeopardizing our relations wi'th the Arab rulers outside Palestine. This is the issue 
which will have to be faced in the last resort. Previous British Governments have 
been unable to face this issue squarely owing to lack-of clear definition of our 
obligations towards the Jews. Our acceptance in principle of the conclusions of the 
Royal Commission and the acceptance in principle by the Jews of the partition 
solution provide us with the necessary moral foundation for a firm policy, and the 
grave consequences of abandonment, on grounds of expediency, of our obligations to 
the Jews must be weighed in the balance against any "Middle Eastern" interests that 
may be held to justify so formidable a change of policy. 
10. I hope that I do not underestimate the strength of the pan-Arab movement, 
but, with all deference, I venture to doubt whether it is yet possible to argue with any 
plausibility that "the Middle East is an organic whole." I do not propose to comment 
in detail on the paragraphs of Mr. Eden's memorandum dealing with the state of 
opinion in Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen. I cannot say what impression 
these paragraphs may have made upon the minds of my colleagues, but, for my own 
part, I find no conclusive or final evidence in those paragraphs of any widespread or 
permanent feeling in those countries with reference to the Palestine question. 
11. The reference in paragraphs 21 and 22 to possible obstruction at Geneva has 
caused me some surprise. Speaking from my own personal experience during the 
recent Special Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission, I can only testify 
that the attitude of that body, whose opinion carries much weight with the Council 
of the League, was almost exclusively concerned with the fulfilment of the Balfour 
Declaration and that our policy was criticised on the ground, not that partition 
would be unjust to the Arabs, but that it would not give enough to the Jews. Indeed, 
the whole tenour of my cross-examination was that we had been weak in the face of 
Arab aggression. 
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In view of the reference in paragraph 21 to possible lack of sympathy with our 
policy on the part of the French Government, I feel it necessary to observe that, so far 
as I am aware, the only doubts so far expressed by that Government related to the 
proposal mooted in Part 11 of the Report of the Royal Commission for the 
establishment of an Arab Bureau in this country and to the advisability of 
encouraging the pan-Arab movement. On the Palestine-Syria frontier the French 
authorities are co-operating whole-heartedly with the Government of Palestine in 
the control of political undesirables and the suppression of armed bands. 
I also find difficulty in accepting the suggestion that Persian opposition is likely to 
be encountered at Geneva. In my opinion the attitude of Iran is not likely to differ 
from that of Turkey, who is strongly opposed to any encouragement of pan-Arab 
ideals. 
12. In paragraph 28 Mr. Eden states that he is not in a position to put forward a 
detailed alternative solution to the proposal for partition, but elsewhere in that 
paragraph and in paragraphs 24 and 26 he appears to favour the suggestion which 
has been put forward by King Ibn Saud that a fixed numerical proportion should be 
established . between the two races (Ibn Saud demands the maintenance of the 
existing proportion), thus providing the Arabs with an assurance "that the Jews will 
neither become a majority in Palestine nor be given any Palestinian territory in full 
sovereignty." It will be clear from the preceding paragraphs of this memorandum 
that such a proposal, which the Jews have described on past occasions as the 
conversion of their National Home into yet another "ghetto," not only would involve 
repudiation of the Royal Commission's interpretation (accepted in our Statement of 
Policy) of the nature of our obligations to the Jewish people, but could not be 
regarded as in any sense a solution of our problem, which is to secure ultimate peace 
in Palestine. Such terms would never in any circumstances have been accepted by 
the Jews and, in view of our Statement of Policy, would now be regarded as a 
betrayal. On the other hand, as Mr. Eden realizes, his proposal would involve the 
indefinite postponement of the self-government and independence which are the 
primary demands of the Arabs of Palestine and Trans-Jordan. We should be 
committed indefinitely to the course of repression from which we are now trying to 
escape, aggravated by the fact that we should have to meet active opposition not, as 
at present, from the Arabs alone, but from both races. 
13. If the Cabinet accept my view that the only solution compatible with our 
obligations as interpreted by the Royal Commission lies in the partition of Palestine, 
it follows that the functions of the new Commission, the appointment of which has 
been announced at Geneva by Mr. Eden and by me in the House of Commons, should 
be strictLy confined to working out the details of a scheme of partition. To empower 
that Commission, as now suggested by Mr. Eden, to consider the arguments for and 
against a proposal such as that of Ibn Saud, or indeed any alternative solution, would 
stultify our acceptance of the Report of the Royal Commission and subsequent 
announcements of the intentions of the British Government. In short, it seems to me 
that Mr. Eden's proposal amounts to a suggestion that a new Royal Commission 
should be appointed to examine the whole matter de novo. 
14. I understand that Mr. Eden sees particular objection to the announcement of 
an intention on the part of His Majesty's Government to enforce partition in the last 
resort. I hope that I have succeeded in making it clear that, in the light of recent 
events and if the Arab attitude remains unchanged, the only alternative to enforcing 
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some form of partition will be to inform the Jews that we cannot carry out our 
obligations on account of Arab opposition. I feel bound to emphasize the point that 
whether we clarify our intentions by an immediate announcement or not, this issue 
will have to be faced in the long run, if the new Commission succeed in devising an 
equitable and practicable scheme which secures the approval of His Majesty's 
Government, of Parliament and of the League of Nations. 
15. Paragraph 7 of Mr Eden 's memorandum contains certain criticisms of the 
scheme of partition outlined by the Royal Commission. In this connection I need 
only observe that we are not committed to that particular plan or to the 
Commission's proposal for the compulsory transfer of Arabs from the prospective 
Jewish State. I may mention, as regards the latter point, that I took the responsibility 
of informing the Permanent Mandates Commission that this particular recom-
mendation had not been accepted by His Majesty's Government. No useful purpose is 
served at the present stage by criticism of the plan of the Royal Commission or by 
anticipation of difficulties which the new Commission will have to overcome. 
16. As I envisage future procedure, it will be for the new Commission to ascertain 
all the facts relevant to partition and, if possible, to work out a scheme in the light of 
those facts and of such representations as they may receive from the various 
communities in Palestine and Trans-Jordan. They will also have to take full account 
of British requirements from the point of view both of our strategic needs and of our 
mandatory obligations. I think it probable that the Commission may find it necessary 
to increase, at the expense of both Jewish and Arab areas, the area placed under 
mandatory control in the plan of the Royal Commission. I also think that our 
strategic needs, as well as the demographic facts in Palestine, may require that at 
least for a considerable period of years North-Western Galilee, including Haifa and 
the triangle between the Egyptian frontier and the Gulf of Aqaba, must remain under 
British mandatory government. This suggestion should, in my opinion, be examined 
by the Chiefs of Staff. 
17. The work of the new Commission will undoubtedly occupy many months. 
They will be unable to complete their report until they are in possession of the data 
which will be supplied by the hydrographic and other surveys and inquiries which 
have recently been put in hand by the Palestine Government. When their report is 
received, and assuming that the Commission have been able to devise an equitable 
and practicable scheme, a decision must be further delayed pending reference to 
Parliament and to the League of Nations. Assuming the co-operation of both 
communities, a further lengthy period will be required for the establishment of 
provisional Governments, subordinate to the control of the mandatory Power, and 
the negotiation of treaties with reference to the establishment of independent States. 
Thereafter, it may be decided to adopt the suggestion of the Permanent Mandates 
Commission that the embryo States should be administered provisionally under a 
"cantonization" system or under separate temporary mandates for a few years. There 
is, therefore, no question of immediate action to carry out partit ion. 
18. On the other hand, it is clear to me that, while the establishment of 
independent States may be delayed for some years and is in any case obviously 
dependent in each case on the willing co-operation of the peoples concerned, a 
decision on the question of partition must be taken as soon as the verdict of 
Parliament and of the League of Nations has been pronounced upon the specific 
proposals of the new Commission. "Provisional cantonization," after a scheme of 
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partition has been decided upon, will be well worth consideration provided that both 
communities have accepted the offer of self-government leading to independence; 
but its inadequacy in any other circumstances has been, in my opinion, completely 
exposed in Chapter XXI of the Report of the Peel Commission. If one or both of the 
communities refuse to co-operate in a scheme of partition leading in due course to 
the establishment of independent States, I see no alternative, if ultimate peace is to 
be attained, to proceeding with the partition of the country with a view to 
administering separately under British Mandate the area or areas in which it is not 
found possible to establish an independent State or independent States. 
19. In paragraph 2 of his memorandum Mr. Eden criticises my proposal that the 
Partition Commission should be empowered to receive evidence and representations 
from the Arabs of Palestine and Trans-Jordan alone, and implies that I am dealing 
with the question "from a purely Palestinian angle." I cannot accept that implication. 
In my opinion, this particular question is one of procedure and my recommendation 
is based on purely practical considerations. I know of no precedent for inviting 
representatives of foreign Governments to give evidence before a Commission 
appointed to carry out investigations in territory under British administration, and 
if, as I recommend, the functions of the Commission are confined to working out a 
scheme of partition, there could, I suggest, be no justification, practical, or 
otherwise, for associating such foreign representatives with the inquiry. The 
intervention of the Arab Kings in Palestine in 1936 was not invited by His Majesty's 
Government and was only tolerated with the greatest hes itation. As my colleagues 
are aware, the consideration accorded by His Majesty's Government and the 
Government of Palestine to the mediatory activities of those rulers has been the 
subject of grave criticism both in Parliament and at Geneva. 
20. The question for immediate consideration is whether or not it is advisable at 
this stage to clarify our intentions. I am far from wishing to add to the embarrass-
ments of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at this juncture. It is for the 
Cabinet to decide whether the considerations to which he has drawn attention 
outweigh the need which has been impressed upon me in various quarters for a clear 
statement of our intentions. In my earlier memorandum (C.P. 269 (37)), I referred 
generally to the circumstances which have tended to obscure our policy and to the 
grave disadvantages of the present atmosphere of uncertainty both within and 
without Palestine. The Acting High Commissioner, who has been discharging with 
excellent judgment and firmness the difficult responsibility of combating the 
campaign of terrorism which has been the chief weapon of the Arab leaders, has 
repeatedly emphasised the need for a definite statement of policy and for the early 
appointment of the new Commission as an earnest of the intention of His Majesty's 
Government to persist in that policy. I will quote from a recent letter:-
"(a) It is uncertainty which is causing so much tension here and which is 
incidentally having an adverse effect on · industry and trade. 
(b) More delay means more uncertainty and a strengthening of the feeling that 
His Majesty's Government really do not mean to enforce a scheme of partition. 
(c) The East does not understand compromise, but merely accounts it as 
weakness. It would be damaging to His Majesty's Government's prestige having 
accepted the arguments in favour of a scheme of partition and having stated that 
the next step will be the appointment of a Commission to investigate the practical 
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possibilities of such a scheme, if His Majesty's Government were now to recede 
from that position. Such a move would be looked upon, not only in Palestine but 
elsewhere, as a surrender to the gunman and the assassin, and a triumph for the 
forces of disorder." 
The following passage from the latest Police Intelligence Report of Palestine is also 
significant:-
"There can be little doubt that for the present no person of standing is likely to 
assume the leadership of moderate opinion and that the situation in this respect 
will not change until the country generally is convinced that there is no likelihood 
of a reversal of recent Government policy." 
I may add that Sir Charles Tegart,2 who has gone to Palestine for the purpose of 
advising on Police matters and more particularly on measures to combat terrorism, 
speaking from his experience in India, has strongly emphasized the extent to which 
security measures of this nature are handicapped by uncertainty as to policy. 
In the House of Commons, too, I have been pressed with questions relating to our 
intentions with regard to the appointment of the new Commission and its terms of 
reference. 
Jewish leaders, not unreasonably, are pressing me to give some indication that the 
British Government is in earnest with regard to its acceptance of the policy of 
partition. 
21. I remain then of the firm opinion that an early announcement should be 
made a,nd that the terms of such an announcement should be as definite as possible. I 
must, however, defer to the representations of the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs as regards the international complications to be apprehended as a result of 
any accentuation at the present stage of certain implications of our policy, however 
inevitable they may be, and I have appended (Appendix 11) to this memorandum a 
revised draft of the proposed despatch to Palestine, the terms of which will, I hope, 
secure his concurrence. 
2 Indian Police, 1901-1931 (retired); adviser to government of Palestine on police matters, 1937. 
20 CAB 27/623, FP 21(36)2 24 Jan 1938 
'Germany: the next steps towards a general settlement; the colonial 
question': minutes of Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy1 
[With the possible exceptions of Palestine and the response to the disturbances in the 
Caribbean in 1937-1938, such public and parliamentary interest as there was in the UK 
in colonial affairs in the 1930s was largely focused on the issue of the return to Germany 
of colonies which that country had lost at the end of the First World War. First raised by 
the German government in 1935, the issue placed the British government on the 
defensive. To be acceptable to world opinion, any rejection of German claims for the 
1 Present: Mr Chamberlain (prime minister, chair), Sir J Simon (chancellor of the Exchequer), Lord 
Hailsham (lord chancellor), Mr Eden (FO), Mr Ormsby-Gore (CO), Lord Halifax (lord president of the 
Council), SirS Hoare (home secretary), Mr MacDonald (DO), Sir T Inskip (minister for co-ordination of 
defence). Also present: Sir H Wilson (chief industrial adviser to government), Sir A Cadogan (permanent 
under-secretary, FO), Sir M Hankey (Cabinet secretary), Sir R Howarth (assistant secretary). 
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restoration of colonial territory had to be based, not on narrow grounds of self-interest 
but on moral considerations of what was in the best interests of the inhabitants of the 
territories concerned. Chaired by Lord Plymouth, a sub-committee of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence was appointed in Mar 1936 to examine the question of the possible 
transfer of. a colonial mandate or mandates to Germany. The committee's main 
conclusion when it reported in June 1936 was that there was little prospect of satisfying 
Germany in the colonial sphere and that any efforts in that direction would have to be 
combined with a wider settlement of other outstanding differences (CAB 161145, CID 
1236-B; also PREM 1/247). That Germany might be appeased by the return of former 
colonies caused considerable unease in colonial circles. Sir B Bourdillon, the governor of 
Nigeria, was particularly alarmed by rumours that Germany might receive Nigeria 'as a 
sop' for the refusal to return Tanganyika and German South West Africa. He pleaded that 
he was not being 'melodramatic' when he wrote to the secretary of state that to hand over 
'Nigeria proper, or any portion of it, would be an act of treachery which would hammer 
the last nail into the coffin of the African's faith in us' (PREM 1/247, Bourdillon to 
MacDonald, 22 Nov 1936). Sir R Brooke-Popham, gov of Kenya between 1937 and 1939, 
emphasised the defence implications if, in addition to a hostile Italy in the Mediterranean, 
Germany acquired possession of Tanganyika. British sea communications via the Cape to 
the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, India and Singapore would be threatened, and air and road 
communications through British territory from the north through Central Africa to the 
Rhodesias and South Africa would be severed. Brooke-Popham also emphasised the 
'psychological effect' on the economic and social life of Kenya: 'Threatened on north and 
south, isolated with Uganda from the rest of the British Empire, there is certainly a 
probability that Kenya will be regarded in the light of a hostage whose existence is 
constantly threatened. Under these conditions, how can one expect British settlers to 
come out to Kenya? How can one expect anyone to invest money in industrial or other 
undertakings? ... (T)he men who will come to Kenya will not be those who intend to 
make it their home but those who will hope to make, in the minimum of time, enough 
money to settle down in reasonable comfort elsewhere. The country will tend to be 
exploited rather than developed, and the individual who will suffer most will be the 
African native' (ibid, note by Brooke-Popham, 11 Oct 1938). Concerns such as these were 
mirrored in the discussions of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy. Between July 
1936 and Feb 1938, out of a total of forty-five papers circulated for discussion by the 
committee, no less than nineteen dealt with the question of a possible colonial settlement 
with Germany.) 
The Prime Minister reminded the Committee that the question on the Agenda Paper 
for the Meeting was the next steps towards a general settlement with Germany, and 
that the documents mentioned on the Agenda were the account of the Lord 
President's visit to Germany in November last (F.P. (36) 39), the record of the 
conversations during the visit of French Ministers to London last November (F.P. 
(36) 40) and a Note by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs covering a 
Memorandum on the main points requiring an early decision (F.P. (36) 41). This 
latter document was the operative Paper, but before examining it it might be 
advantageous to the Committee if he was to offer a few observations. 
He had been much impressed by the desirability of showing the Germans at the 
earliest possible moment that we were giving serious consideration to the position 
arising out of Lord Halifax's visit. Some time had elapsed since that visit, and as time 
went on the Germans might well become suspicious that we had abandoned our 
original intention of following up Lord Halifax's conversations. This suspicion might 
be confirmed and intensified if we entered into conversations with Italy. While he 
(the Prime Minister) had no special reason for thinking that this was in fact the 
German point of view, he felt that it was quite possible that this might be the case. 
Another reason for urgency was that if an announcement had to be made about the 
opening of the Anglo-Italian conversations, which it would be generally recognised 
would have to lead up to the question of the recognition of Italian sovereignty over 
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Abyssinia, it would be of considerable assistance for the Government if it were known 
that we were directing our efforts to secure a general appeasement by conversations 
not with Italy alone but also with Germany. 
In the Foreign Office Memorandum (F.P. (36) 41) the first point mentioned for 
consideration was what territorial concessions, if any, we are prepared to make to 
Germany, and in the summary on page 3 of the Memorandum the question of the 
Colonial settlement was also given the first place. He (the Prime Minister) entirely 
agreed with the way in which the problem was presented in F.P. (36) 41. The placing 
of the Colonial settlement in the forefront did not of course mean that we were 
prepared to settle the Colonial question independently of the other issues. This had 
never been the Government's policy, which was that the examination of the Colonial 
question could only be undertaken as a part and parcel of a general settlement. At the 
same time it must of course be recognised that the Colonial question was in German 
eyes the only outstanding problem remaining between the two countries, and having 
regard to the importance which Germany attached to it, it was right and proper that 
it should be emphasised in the Foreign Office Memorandum. 
Speaking generally, the attitude taken up by Germany in regard to the Colonial 
question was that they had a moral right for the return of the whole of the Colonies 
which had belonged to Germany before the War and of which Germany was deprived 
by the Treaty of Versailles. This general claim was, however, tempered by Germany's 
recognition of our strategical objections to the return to her of Tanganyika, and she 
accordingly was disposed to claim that she should receive compensation elsewhere in 
respect of Tanganyika, and that if necessary such compensation should be carved out 
of the Colonial possessions of other Powers. At the outset he (the Prime Minister) 
had been surprised at Germany's apparent readiness to acquiesce in the loss of 
Tanganyika. It should, however, be remembered that Dr. Schacht2 had based 
Germany's claim for the return of her Colonies largely on economic grounds and 
particularly on Germany's need for self-sufficiency in regard to oils and fats, and he 
had persuaded himself that by intensive development of certain of her former African 
possessions Germany could obtain her objective in this respect. Now, oils and fats 
were produced not in East Africa but in West Africa, and from Dr. Schacht's point of 
view it would obviously be of much greater advantage to Germany to give up her 
claim to Tanganyika in return for a substantial enlargement of any territories in West 
Africa which she might otherwise get back under a Colonial settlement. However the 
Colonial problem was dealt with, he (the Prime Minister) was convinced that no 
satisfactory general settlement with Germany was possible which excluded some 
Colonial concessions, and moreover that it would be necessary for any Colonial 
settlement to be on a broad and liberal basis. It must be recognised that considerable 
difficulty must be anticipated in getting over the objections of public opinion in this 
country, in France and in other countries which now held former German Colonies 
to the idea that those Colonies, or some of them, should be returned to Germany. It 
was not only in the United Kingdom that objections would be raised on strategical 
grounds to Germany receiving back her former Colonies. Moreover, there would 
inevitably be widespread opposition to proposals involving the handing over from 
one Power to another of native populations as though they were mere chattels. There 
were also very real practical difficulties in the way of transferring territories, many of 
2 President of the Reichsbank and, as finance minister (1933-1937), architect of Germany's four-year plan. 
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which were now in a very different condition to what they had been 20 years ago, 
owing, for example, to the heavy expenditure which in the interval had been incurred 
in their development and to the many and varied vested interests which had grown 
up. 
The prime minister's plan for a colonial settlement 
The notion which had been developing in his mind was the possibility of a solution by 
the adoption of an entirely new method of presenting the problem. His suggestion 
was that the matter should not be treated as a restoration to Germany of territory of 
which she had been deprived, but the opening of an entirely new chapter in the 
history of African colonial development to be introduced and acce_pted by the general 
agreement of the Powers interested in Africa. The new conception would be based on 
the complete equality of the Powers concerned and of their all being subjected to 
certain limitations in regard to the African territories to be administered by them 
under the scheme. Germany would be brought in to the arrangement by becoming 
one of the African Colonial Powers in question and by being given certain territories 
to administer. His idea was that two lines should be drawn across Africa, the 
northern line running roughly to the south of the Sahara, the Anglo-Egyptian 
Sudan, Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland, and the southern line running roughly to 
the south of Portuguese West Africa the Belgian Congo, Tanganyika and Portuguese 
East Africa. There should be general agreement among the Powers concerned that all 
the territories between the two lines should be subjected to the proposed new rules 
and regulations covering the administration of the territories. It was not contem-
plated that there should be any pooling of the administration but that those Powers 
which now held the territory, together with Germany who would be given a territory 
of her own, would each administer their own territories subject to the over-riding 
rules and regulations to be laid down. 
If some such plan could be adopted it would get over many of the difficulties and 
objections which would certainly be raised to an out and out transfer in full 
sovereignty to Germany of particular territory or territories. Germany would be 
invited to accept the arrangement, not as a restoration of territories in her view 
wrongly taken away from her, but as an arrangement voluntarily accepted by all the 
Powers confronted with similar problems in regard to the administration of 
territories in tropical Africa and the protection and betterment of the native 
populations of those territories. 
The conditions to be generally observed would include such matters as (a) the 
preservation of native rights and privileges; (b) freedom throughout the territories of 
communications; (c) so far as practicable, freedom of trade throughout the area; and 
(d) undertakings to refrain from the raising of native armies, the construction of 
submarine bases, or of military aerodromes throughout the area. 
If this scheme could be put forward it would not be necessary, in the first instance, 
to discuss and settle what particular territories should be assigned to Germany, or 
what compensation (if any) should be given to those Powers which assigned territory 
to Germany. It would be necessary, in the first instance, to ascertain whether 
Germany would be prepared in any case to entertain a scheme on these lines. It 
would be observed that the scheme itself avoided the use of the word Mandate. This, 
of course, was in any case necessary having regard to German susceptibilities and 
objection to any arrangements connected in any way with the League of Nations. At 
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the same time it was clear there would have to be some international body to which 
reports on the administration of the various territories would be submitted and 
which could hear any complaints in regard to such administration. This body might 
well consist of representatives of all the Powers interested in the administration of 
the whole area. These Powers, in addition to Germany and ourselves, would be 
France, Belgium, Portugal, and possibly Italy. 
If some arrangement on these lines was acceptable to the Cabinet, the next step 
would be to approach Germany and indicate to her that this seemed to us the easiest 
and best way of solving the problem, having regard to the difficulties of the whole 
position, and invite her to say whether she would be prepared to entertain the 
scheme in principle. So far as he (the Prime Minister) could see there was no reason 
why Germany should reject a scheme on these lines. In essential matters it met the 
German desiderata and gave them what they so strongly insisted upon, namely, 
equality of opportunity and treatment. 
The proposals should have a good reception in Berlin as it would demonstrate that 
we had not been idle, and if this was so we could encourage the Germans by telling 
them that we proposed shortly to submit a complete scheme to them and we hoped 
that they would then be prepared to collaborate in working out the details. 
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs observed that the Prime Minister had 
not expressly mentioned the relation of any colonial settlement to the general 
settlement with Germany. 
The Prime Minister said that he thought that he had made his attitude on this 
point clear at the beginning of his remarks. While this question of a colonial 
settlement might be taken first, there could be no question of coming to some final 
conclusion about it apart from the general settlement of which it would be one of the 
items. 
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that it would be essential to make 
clear to the Germans at the outset beyond any possibility of doubt that while we were 
prepared to place the colonial question in the forefront of the discussions, no 
settlement in regard to that question could be arrived at except as part and parcel of a 
general arrangement covering our own desiderata. 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer favoured the Prime Minister's proposals but 
pointed out that while there were certain Powers, including France, Belgium and 
Portugal, which, like ourselves, were interested in the colonial question, there were 
other Powers which were in no way concerned with that question but which were 
very interested in a comprehensive settlement with Germany. As regards the colonial 
question it was clear that under the Prime Minister's proposals Germany stood to 
gain territory but it was equally clear that other Powers would have to lose territory 
and a glance at the map of West Africa would show how very extensive were the 
possessions of Belgium and Portugal in that part of the world. He enquired whether, 
an an early stage, it was proposed to indicate to Germany the territory to be conceded 
to her. In any case it was clear that this would be one of the first questions which the 
Germans would ask. 
The Prime Minister said that in his view this matter should be treated by us very 
vaguely and at large in the first instance. We should be wise to refuse to give any 
indication at all of what was contemplated, at all events until the Germans had 
agreed to accept the scheme in principle. 
The Home Secretary thought that it was very important that we should settle 
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before hand in our own minds precisely how far we were prepared to go in handing 
over territory either to Germany or by way of compensation to other Powers. 
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs hoped that we should be very careful 
indeed in what was said to Germany and particularly that we should give Germany no 
possible excuse for insinuating that we were trying to effect a colonial settlement 
with her at the expense and to the detriment of other Powers interested in tropical 
Africa. For example Portugal, with which we had for some time been strenuously 
endeavouring to improve our relations, was extremely sensitive in regard to this 
matter and had been very apprehensive that some deal in West Africa at her expense 
was in contemplation. He, Mr. Eden, had recently given very definite assurances on 
this point to the Portuguese Government. He himself would like to emphasize to 
Germany that in any colonial settlement the United Kingdom would be prepared to 
make a contribution and that France would also make her contribution. 
The Home Secretary pointed out that the procedure now proposed was directly 
contrary to what had hitherto been always contemplated, namely, that we would 
never treat the colonial question in isolation and as a separate issue. 
The Prime Minister said that the procedure proposed was not unlike that which 
had been followed in the recent Irish negotiations. It had there been found desirable 
to discuss each subject separately while, at the same time, reserving any final 
decision upon it until the parties were in a position to make a comprehensive general 
agreement. 
The Home Secretary did not think that the negotiations with Mr. de Valera and 
those which it was proposed to have with Herr Hitler were really comparable. He was 
by no means satisfied that the German reactions to the Prime Minister's scheme 
would be as favourable as the Prime Minister hoped and in this event the position 
might have been made worse, rather than better. 
The Prime Minister did not agree and could not see why the position would be 
worsened by the submission in outline of his proposals to Germany for acceptance in 
principle. 
The Home Secretary observed that we had given Germany the impression that we 
were prepared to discuss the colonial question and Germany no doubt thought that 
while it was improbable that she could get back the whole of her former colonies she 
looked to receiving in full sovreignty certain valuable possessions in tropical Africa. 
She might regard with considerable suspicion and dislike a return of territory on the 
kind of terms and conditions contemplated. 
The Lord President of the Council suggested that we should say to Germany that 
we had given much thought to the problem which was an extremely difficult one for 
us having regard to the point of view of public opinion in the United Kingdom and 
throughout the Empire. We have come to the conclusion that the only way in which 
the matter could be satisfactorily dealt with would be to present it in a form which 
would not excite great opposition from our own public opinion. Herr Hitler, who was 
a realist, would fully appreciate our difficulties of this kind. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies enquired whether any ideas had been 
formulated as to our desiderata in a "general settlement". There were no doubt 
certain things, including a colonial settlement, which Germany wanted but it was 
imperative that she should in turn give some indication of what she would be 
prepared to contribute towards such a settlement, for example in regard to air 
disarmament and the position in Central Europe, as to which definite assurances 
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would be necessary. 
The Home Secretary thought that it was objectionable before the opening of any 
formal Conference with Germany to pick out this item of colonies and try to reach a 
provisional settlement in regard to it. This was not what had been done in the Irish 
negotiations where all the questions had been discussed in the Conference itself. 
The Prime Minister observed that His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin was very 
strongly of opinion that we should put the colonial question in the forefront of any 
discussions with Germany. 
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs agreed that this was so. Sir Nevile 
Henderson3 went even further and advised that we should try to obtain a colonial 
settlement with Germany in the hope that Germany would subsequently meet us in 
regard to our own desiderata. 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer thought that this would be a great mistake. The 
procedure should be as the Prime Minister had indicated, no settlement on the 
colonial question apart from a general comprehensive settlement. 
The Prime Minister said that he was anxious to get the Germans interested in a 
general settlement and that he was convinced that the opening of the discussions on 
the colonial question would be the most hopeful way of securing this. 
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs assumed that in any event we should not 
inform Germany that we were prepared to make colonial concessions until the 
Conference had made substantial progress and we knew to what extent our own 
desiderata would be satisfied. 
The Home Secretary thought that, in this matter, the Government were 
substantially ahead of public opinion in the country. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies thought that intelligent public opinion was 
prepared for colonial concessions in West Africa but nowhere else. Of course any 
concessions would be strongly opposed by the die-hards. 
The Prime Minister doubted whether public opinion had formed any very definite 
conclusion accept [sic] that it wanted the preservation of peace. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies warned the Committee that the whole of 
the coloured world, including tropical Africa, the West Indies and parts of Asia, 
would be greatly disturbed and would intensely resent the idea of our handing over 
native populations to another Power. It would, of course, be necessary to defend such 
a proceeding by arguing that in no other way could the peace of the world be 
preserved. He was sure that the longer we waited the higher was the price that we 
should have to pay and the granting to Germany of some concessions now in West 
Africa would heal a running sore and effect a permanent settlement. 
The Home Secretary dissented from this view and was convinced that Germany 
would never be satisfied unless she received back the whole of her former colonial 
possessions. 
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs hoped that there would not be too much 
reference to West Africa. In his view it was most improbable that a settlement with 
Germany could be effected by handing over to her Togoland and the Cameroons. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies pointed out that substantially larger 
concessions could be made to Germany in West Africa than was represented by the 
Cameroons and Togoland. For example, the King of the Belgians, who had given 
3 UK ambassador in Berlin. 
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considerable thought to the matter, had told him that while Belgium could not 
possibly contemplate the return to Germany of Ruanda-Urundi, she might be 
prepared to make some contribution in West Africa. As regards the question of 
finding compensation for France, it might be necessary for us to give to France a 
slice of northern Gold Coast territory. Also we could give up to Germany some 
territory in the Adamawa province of Northern Nigeria. He was, however, convinced 
that it would be out of the question to transfer Sierra Leone and the Gambia, both 
ancient British possessions the inhabitants of which would most violently object to 
any such proposal. 
The Minister for Co-ordination of Defence enquired whether Germany had ever 
formulated a demand for the return of all her former Colonies. 
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that there had been different 
statements by various German authorities. Herr Hitler himself had never formulated 
any such demand, but other Nazi leaders had made various claims. It would be most 
unwise to think that we could get away with this question on the backs of other 
Powers. 
The Lord President of the Council was disposed to agree with the Home Secretary 
and could not see how we could produce in West Africa an equivalent to Tanganyika. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies agreed that it would not be possible to 
contemplate the transfer to Germany of the old British Colonies in West Africa, and 
that an attempt to do so might well result in serious native risings. 
The Home Secretary observed that considerations of this kind seemed to him to 
point to there being very great difficulties in reaching any agreement on the basis of 
the Prime Minister's scheme. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies warned the Committee that it was not 
possible to measure the value of concessions by the mere size of the territories to be 
handed over. Other factors had to be taken into consideration, such, for example, as 
the size of the population, the possibility of development, climatic etc. conditions. 
For example, large areas in French Equatorial Africa consisted of dense tropical 
forest, were very unhealthy, and owing to climatic and other conditions were 
practically uninhabited; whereas areas very much smaller in size in British hands 
were healthy and well-developed and supported large and prosperous populations. 
From the point of view of value these areas were infinitely more valuable than the 
vast expanses of uninhabitable territory in French hands. It must be recognised that 
apart from small parts of Kenya the whole of tropical Africa (including Tanganyika) 
was a black-man's and not a white-man's country. If Germany wanted territory on 
which to settle surplus German population the only suitable African territory would 
be South West Africa. 
The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs pointed out that the Government of 
the Union of South Africa had always taken up a non-possumus attitude in regard to 
the possibility of the return to Germany of South West Africa. Indeed, at one time 
there had been some sort of an agreement reached between the Union Government 
and the German Government under which in effect Germany was to forego her 
claims in return for the German inhabitants being allowed the use of their own 
language, their own schools and churches. It was possible that Herr Hitler would 
now like to go back on this agreement, but it might be taken for granted that the 
Union Government would never consent to give up the territory. They looked 
forward to the time when their mandate over it would cease and it would be 
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incorporated in and become part of the Union of South Africa. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies observed that opinion in South Africa was 
also very strong in regard to any giving up of Tanganyika, being of course concerned 
at the threat to the communications with South Africa if Tanganyika was in 
potentially hostile hands. The position of Kenya would be an appalling one if 
Germany recovered Tanganyika, as Kenya, with a population of 3,000,000 natives 
and some 20,000 whites, would be wedged between Italian Abyssinia and German 
Tanganyika. 
The Prime Minister pointed out that in any case his plan would exclude South 
West Africa, as clearly this was not a territory suitable for the kind of administration 
contemplated in the plan. 
The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs said that he personally favoured the 
plan suggested by the Prime Minister, provided that the Southern line was drawn 
North of South West Africa. He was, however, disposed to agree with the Home 
Secretary that the Germans would not look at the plan, and thought that in that 
event we ought to be prepared to give the whole question further consideration. But 
a settlement on the basis of the Prime Minister's proposals would be very much 
easier for us and probably.also for the French than any other scheme. It was not quite 
true to say that the Government of the Union of South Africa had taken a very 
decided view about Tanganyika, though Mr. Pirow4 had stated that he himself was 
opposed to the return of Tanganyika to Germany. When the question was considered 
at the Imperial Conference of 1937, General Hertzog had expressed the following 
views:-
"As to the other former German Colonies, the Union Government did not wish to 
interfere in the business of the United Kingdom if it were decided that some of 
these should be restored. He had never considered that Germany had any claim to 
the restoration of all her colonies, but he felt that she had a claim to a certain 
partial restoration. If any such partial restoration could be carried out without 
involving the transfer of Tanganyika Territory, he felt that this would be in the 
interests of the Union. But if Germany could be pacified and peace secured for 
Europe and the world by the restitution of Tanganyika, the Union would not stand 
in the way if the United Kingdom felt this course to be advisable. This was the 
considered view of himself and of his colleagues." 
(See E. (P.D.) (37) 11th Meeting, pages 10 and 11). 
He (Mr. MacDonald) was confident that it should be possible to secure the 
agreement of the Government of the Union of South Africa to a scheme on the lines 
of that suggested by the Prime Minister. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that at a later stage of the Conference 
he had discussed this matter with General Hertzog who had assured him that in 
speaking at the Meeting on the 2nd June, 1937, he had not meant to refer to the 
whole of Tanganyika but only to certain Southern parts of it bordering on 
Portuguese territory. 
The Prime Minister observed that one of the advantages of his scheme was that 
there would be no necessity to stick rigidly to the existing political boundaries which 
4 South African minister of defence. 
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often had little or no relation to racial, economic and other considerations. He 
agreed that the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, British and Italian Somaliland and Abyssinia 
would lie outside the area comprised between his two lines. 
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs enquired what equivalent we should be 
prepared to offer if the concession to Germany of Tanganyika was ruled out. 
The Prime Minister thought that it would be unwise at the present juncture to 
attempt to lay down with precision what territory might be given up to Germany. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies explained to the Committee the position in 
West Africa by reference to an up-to-date map. As regards Nigeria, while it was most 
important to maintain intact and under British rule the province of Bornu with its 
Moslem population, it would be possible to surrender to Germany much of the 
Adamawa province, which was mainly inhabited by Negro pagans and which the 
Germans could readily develop from the Cameroons if that territory was returned to 
them. 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer enquired why it was thought that Germany 
would reject the Prime Minister's plan. He himself thought that Germany would be 
quite ready to discuss proposals on these lines which gave her most of what she was 
demanding. It was true that she might object to the conditions subject to which she 
would have to administer her African territories, but the reply would be that these 
conditions would apply also to all other Powers administering territories in the area. 
The Lord President of the Council thought that the Germans would say that we 
had only thought of this scheme of administration with its limitations and 
restrictions after we had come to the conclusion that we could not resist Germany's 
claim for colonies. We had never suggested the institution of such a claim during the 
long period when we and Powers other than Germany enjoyed full sovereignty over 
the areas in question. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies pointed out that arrangements very similar 
to those now proposed had been laid down in the Congo Basin Treaties which had, of 
course, been negotiated in Berlin. 
The Home Secretary again repeated his view that Germany would react badly to 
the proposals. He urged that all the subjects, including the colonial question, should 
be discussed in the Conference itself, and he was very apprehensive at any idea of 
taking this colonial question by itself and attempting to deal with it outside the 
Conference. He believed that we should do better with the Germans if we could get 
them into discussion and negotiation over the whole field . 
The Minister for Co-ordination of Defence did not at all like the idea of putting up 
the Prime Minister's plan to the Germans, and if the Germans rejected the plan then 
to say to them that we would give the matter further consideration, unless we had 
made up our minds in advance what we were prepared to discuss with them as an 
alternative proposal. 
The Lord President of the Council enquired whether this meant that Sir Thomas 
Inskip would say that unless Germany agreed to accept the Prime Minister's plan we 
should say that the negotiations must be regarded as at an end. 
The Minister for Co-ordination of Defence said that he did not think that it was 
necessary to come to any final conclusion now as to the action that might have to be 
taken in such an event, provided we were clear about what we could offer in the event 
of the Prime Minister's plan being refused. 
The Prime Minister enquired as to the best way of presenting the proposals to the 
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Germans. Might it not be desirable to invite H.M. Ambassador in Berlin to London 
for purposes of discussion and consultation. 
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs thought that the Germans were very 
likely to say that they were prepared to discuss the Prime Minister's plan but they 
would wish to know in advance precisely what territory they were going to receive. 
The Prime Minister said that he had not contemplated going further at the outset 
of the discussions than enquiring whether Germany was prepared to accept the plan 
in principle. He certainly would not inform the Germans at this preliminary stage of 
what territorial concessions it was proposed to make to them. 
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs agreed, but thought that it was 
imperative that the Government should have made up their own minds as to the 
quantum that they were prepared to concede before the first step in the discussions 
with Germany was taken. 
The Prime Minister indicated his agreement with this view. 
The Minister for Co-ordination of Defence suggested that the question whether it 
was right to hand back her former Colonies to Germany should be considered on its 
merits. Assuming a division of Africa among the European Powers, could the 
exclusion of Germany be justified? If looked at solely from the strategical point of 
view the case against handing back could be powerfully argued, but Germany could 
no doubt make out a case for handing back based on moral considerations. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies pointed out that the territories in question 
had now experienced 20 years of British administrative and educational etc. methods 
and practices, the use of the English language and other substantial changes. After 
the Napoleonic Wars we had handed back to Holland at once the Colonies which we 
decided not to retain and the position then was far simpler and easier than the 
position was to-day. A very strong case based on moral grounds could be urged 
against any handing back, but he himself had always held that Germany must have 
some Colony where she could fly her flag and where her scientists could carry on 
research and other similar work. 
The Lord President of the Council thought that on balance it was more important 
to the world at large that war should be avoided than that the natives in the 
territories to be transferred should remain permanently in the position they had 
been in during the last 20 years. 
The Minister for Co-ordination of Defence agreed but doubted whether public 
opinion which was fluid and ill-informed would take quite the same view. 
The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs thought that it would be much easier 
to get public opinion to accept transfer to Germany under the Prime Minister's 
scheme than if a simple transfer with full and unrestricted sovereign rights was in 
question. The fact that all the Powers interested in tropical Africa would in future be 
subjected to rules and regulations designed for the protection and betterment of the 
natives might well cause pro native public opinion to favour the scheme. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies observed that while Germany would not 
accept any control such as the Mandates Commission of the League, she would 
probably not object to the general supervision of a body composed solely of 
representatives of African Colonial Powers. 
The Lord President of the Council urged that before opening negotiations we 
should make up our minds quite definitely what we were prepared to do and how far 
to go in certain events. 
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The Prime Minister did not think it necessary to reach any definite or final 
conclusions beyond recognising that we could not hope to reach a Colonial 
settlement with Germany at the expense of some other Power. It must be realised 
that there would have to be a great deal of hard bargaining before an acceptable 
solution was reached. 
The Home Secretary asked whether it would not be possible to include other 
items-such as quantitative limitation of air armaments, in the djscussions prepara-
tory for the Conference and so avoid the criticism that one topic-Colonies-was 
being dealt with outside and in advance of the Conference. 
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs pointed out that in any case there would 
have to be much preparatory work done before the Conference opened-this indeed 
would be the normal procedure. 
The Prime Minister said that he was very anxious that time should not be lost and 
that any suspicions there might be, removed. He saw no objection to a list of subjects 
being prepared which the Germans could be told we were ready to discuss. 
The Home Secretary saw great advantage in such a procedure. The Germans 
might also be invited to furnish us with any subjects they wished to have examined. 
The Lord President of the Council agreed with the Home Secretary. Could not it be 
suggested to Sir N. Henderson that Germany should be examining our desiderata 
simultaneously with our examination of the Colonial issue. He thought the Prime 
Minister was right in thinking that any Colonial settlement would have to be on 
liberal lines, and he would much regret, if, in the end, we only found it possible to 
contribute some strips of territory which Germany rejected as wholly inadequate. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies warned the Committee of the great danger 
of making an over-generous offer to Germany, especially in the early stages of the 
discussions. 
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that he was concerned at the 
prospect of having to ask France to give up practically the whole of her Colonial war 
gains, and frankly he did not at present see any equivalent British contribution. 
The Lord Chancellor observed that France had recovered Alsace-Lorraine. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies thought that probably our strips in West 
Africa would be of considerably greater value to Germany than vast areas of France's 
unhealthy and uninhabited West African territories. He would be prepared to 
compensate France in the New Hebrides by retiring from the Condominium and 
possibly in the last resort by Dominica. 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer was impressed with the Home Secretary's point 
of view. Could we not say to Germany that a general settlement must include our 
desiderata A, B and C, and also a Colonial agreement, we should like your views on A, 
B and C; as regards the Colonial question our proposal is as suggested by the Prime 
Minister. 
The Home Secretary said that he would tell the Germans that we were anxious for 
a Conference and recognised that in order · to be a success it must be carefully 
thought out and prepared in advance- adding that we had formulated certain ideas 
on the various questions including the Colonial question and would like to have the 
Germans ideas on them. In short, he wished the normal procedure to be followed in 
the preparation of an international conference. 
The Prime Minister suggested that perhaps the best way to ensure progress would 
be for a draft telegram to Sir N. Henderson to be prepared setting out the proposed 
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scheme and asking for his views upon it, adding that before coming to any final 
conclusion the Committee would like him to come to London to consult with them 
on the matter. 
The Committee agreed:-
To invite the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to arrange for the preparation of 
a draft telegram to Sir N. Henderson on the lines suggested by the Prime Minister. 
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that when at Geneva he was certain 
to be asked by the French how this Colonial matter stood, and he proposed to inform 
them that we had been examining the problem and to inquire whether they had done 
the same. He would, however, make no mention to the French of the Prime 
Minister's plan. 
This was agreed to. 
Position of Northern Rhodesia 
The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs observed that under the Prime 
Minister's plan the southern line would pass north of Southern Rhodesia which, 
being a self-governing territory, must in any case fall outside the proposed 
'administrative area'. A Commission was on the point of going out to inquire into the 
future relationship etc. of the Rhodesias, and Southern Rhodesia was looking 
forward to the Commission reporting in favour of the amalgamation of Southern and 
Northern Rhodesia. The possibility of such amalgamation should be kept open. If by 
any chance the southern line should get settled while the Commission was sitting in 
Africa, we might be open to a charge of breach of faith . In these circumstances was it 
desirable that some warning of what was contemplated should be conveyed to the 
Commission? 
The Prime Minister expressed the view that it was unlikely that any difficulty 
would be created whether Northern Rhodesia fell within or without the suggested 
'area'. He was therefore of opinion that no action need be taken in regard to the 
matter. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies hoped that Northern Rhodesia would be 
excluded from the area. 
The position of Italy 
The Minister for Co-ordination of Defence thought that there would be advantages 
in bringing Italy into the proposed plan. Our position in Kenya would be greatly 
improved if Italy agreed not to recruit native troops in Abyssinia. 
The Home Secretary hoped that this matter would be dealt with in the 
Anglo-ltalian conversations. We could not bring Abyssinia into the 'area' without also 
bringing in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. 
British colonial adjustments 
The Lord President of the Council suggested that the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies should circulate a Memorandum to the Committee with a map showing the 
kind of adjustments in British West African territories which might have to be 
contemplated. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies thought that it would be dangerous to 
attempt such an appreciation, which would in any case necessitate consultation with 
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the local Governors and might well give rise to rumours, excitment and unrest. 
The Prime Minister agreed, that as yet we had not reached the stage of requiring 
detailed information of this character. 
General settlement 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer inquired what were our desiderata in regard to 
the 'general settlement'. He hoped that this did not include Germany's return to the 
League as he thought that would be a hopeless proposal. 
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs agreed that the return to the League 
might be put last on our list of requirements. Other items included Air Disarma-
ment, Western Pact and Central and Eastern Europe. 
The Committee agreed:-
(1) To request the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to circulate to the 
Committee a Memorandum prepared in the Foreign Office on Germany's Con-
tribution towards General Appeasement, together with Sir N. Henderson's views 
on the subject. 
(2) To request the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to arrange for the 
circulation to the Committee of a summarised revise of the Memorandum 
mentioned in (l)above. 
(3) To take note that a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air on Air 
Disarmament would shortly be ready for circulation to the Committee.5 
5 The part that colonies might play in a settlement with Germany was still an issue in 1939. In May 1939 
Lord Francis Scott, a member of the Kenya Executive and Legislative Councils, wrote to Chamberlain and 
referred to the prime minister's recent parliamentary statement to the effect that the main British interest 
was the maintenance of peace and that to achieve this the colonial question would have to play a full part 
in any settlement. Scott insisted that any colonial settlement with Germany would be 'a betrayal of the 
British Empire' but his letter continued: 'There is only one legitimate argument that the Germans can use 
in favour of the return of their Colonies, & that is the criminal neglect on the part of our Home Govts. to 
develop the natural resources of the dependent overseas Empire. Even today Italy & Belgium can afford to 
build magnificent roads through their colonies, but our Colonial Office and Treasury in London prevent us 
from using our own money to have even one properly hard surfaced trunk road through East Africa, & 
consequently all the tourist traffic is forced to the Congo instead of coming through British Africa. I must 
not dilate on the iniquities of the Home Govt. in regard to our Colonies, or I should go on too long.' 
Chamberlain sent a brief reply on 12 June reiterating the position outlined in his parliamentary 
statement. Scott wrote again on 21 June, going over much the same ground but also repeating a request 
made in his first letter that the Ministry of Supply should provide Kenya with two or three anti-aircraft 
guns: 'In case of war with Italy, Mombasa & Nairobi are bound to be bombed, & we have no anti-aircraft 
defence at all. Surely we have as much claim here as some of the less important parts of Great Britain.' The 
Joint Home and Overseas Defence Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence decided that 
Kilindini, with its oil supplies, was the only place of strategic importance in Kenya and recommended that 
two anti-aircraft guns should be made available. The recommendation was rescinded in Aug 1939. The 
guns could not be spared because of other priorities and it was decided instead to disperse the oil stocks 
(PREM 11304). 
150 CHAPTER 2 [21) 
21 CAB 16/183A, DP(P)44, pp 130v-131v 20 Feb 1939 
'European appreciation, 1939-1940': part Ill of a report by the Chiefs 
of Staff Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the 
broad strategic policy for the conduct of the war [Extract] 
The opening phases 
250. In April 1939 the war preparations of Germany and Italy are likely to be 
considerably more advanced than those of Great Britain or France. We conclude that, 
if war occurred, our enemies would endeavour to exploit their preparedness by a 
rapid victory-within a few months; and that the Allies would have no means of 
winning quickly. We must, therefore, ensure that our peacetime preparations are at 
least adequate to guarantee security in the opening phases of war. These should 
include measures for countering enemy propaganda and disseminating British 
propaganda. 
251. We depend to a very great extent upon our power to apply economic 
pressure for our ultimate success, but this weapon is slow in operation. It is therefore 
extremely important that, from the outset, we should adopt every recognised means 
of denying supplies of all kinds to the enemy. 
252. After mobilisation the Allied naval dispositions, which should ensure 
command of the North Sea and English Channel, give control of the Mediterranean 
exits and safeguard the trade routes as far as possible from sporadic attack, would 
also enable us to begin economic pressure on Germany and Italy immediately by 
interrupting their seaborne trade, except in the Baltic. German and Italian shipping 
on the high seas should be brought quickly to a standstill, while we should hope to 
ensure the uninterrupted flow of our own trade, although we must expect some 
losses by enemy action. 
253. The defence of the United Kingdom will be a commitment of primary 
importance. Invasion is out of the question while the Navy keeps command of the 
sea. Our land forces retained in the United Kingdom must be adequate to man the air 
defences, and to maintain order among the civil population in the event of air attack. 
Our air forces must be employed with the object of defeating the enemy's air attacks, 
either on this country or on France. 
254. The invasion of Holland and Belgium by Germany would have an important 
bearing on the decision to despatch the field force. If His Majesty's Government 
ordered the Field Force to France, the maximum strength at the outset would be one 
Corps of two divisions, deficient in many types of modern equipment. It would 
probably be impossible to spare troops for offensive operations elsewhere until the 
position in Western Europe was consolidated. The position in the Low Countries and 
Northern France would have an important bearing on the security of the United 
Kingdom. 
255. Our territories overseas and naval bases must be secure. The necessity for 
sending reinforcements for this purpose during an emergency or immediately after 
the outbreak of war would ultimately be obviated to a large extent if our 
recommendations are accepted. By April 1939 some immediate reinforcements will 
still have to proceed overseas, and the escort of these transports would hamper naval 
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operations, and prolong the period before complete control of sea communications is 
achieved. 
256. We assume that it would be no part of our national policy, and it would 
certainly not be in our own interests, to initiate air attacks against objectives which 
must involve casualties to the enemy civil population. We understand that the 
French would conform to this policy. Although these conditions are unlikely to 
continue for long, they would seriously restrict our air effort-particularly at night. 
257. Moreover, the majority of our present striking force consists of bombers 
whose range-so long as we have to observe the neutrality of the Low Countries-
enables them to penetrate only a short distance into Germany. This emphasises the 
importance of making full preparations to establish a high proportion of our striking 
force in France.* 
258. In the Mediterranean and Red Sea areas, from which our through shipping 
would be diverted, we should bring immediate pressure to bear on Italy, by offensive 
action whenever possible against her Naval forces and bases and defended ports, by 
interrupting her seaborne trade and isolating her overseas territories. If Spain should 
prove hostile and, in consequence, Gibraltar became untenable, it might be 
necessary either to use Lisbon or to seize Ceuta. Close co-operation would be 
required between the available British and French Naval Forces. The reinforcement 
of our land and air forces in Egypt and the Middle East from India, and ultimately 
from the United Kingdom, would be an 1.ugent security commitment. The position in 
the Red Sea may necessitate the use of the overland route via Basra. In April 1939 it 
will also still be necessary to reinforce Malta in emergency. 
259. In the Far East, Singapore must be reinforced as a precautionary measure. 
260. We consider that Germany would direct her main offensive to defeat either 
Great Britain or France, and that the efforts of Italy would force us to disperse our 
resources to a greater extent than if we were facing Germany alone. 
261. Broadly speaking, the general policy for the initial employment of our 
armed forces should be to combine closely with France so as to concentrate our 
efforts on the defence of those vital interests attacked. The security of these interests 
must have priority, but we should lose no opportunity of taking such offensive action 
as would contribute, even though indirectly, to the success of our defence. We 
consider, in particular, that this would be of great importance against Italy, which is 
more easily attacked and is likely to be more sensitive to such action. 
Subsequent developments 
262. After the enemy's initial offensive has been held, we must be prepared for 
the war to enter a second phase, during which we must intensify the development of 
our war industrial output, backed by the economic power and resources of the 
Empire. Our object would be to assume the offensive as soon as possible. Meanwhile, 
the steady and rigorous application of economic pressure would be reducing the 
enemy's powers of resistance. 
263. Any substantial increase in the strength of whatever British forces may have 
been sent overseas could only be made after a considerable time, but large scale 
* The advanced air striking force should be able to operate, although at reduced intensity, from French 
bases on the seventh day after the outbreak of hostilities. At the outset it should be possible, by refuelling 
in France, to operate our bombers based in England on the second or third day. 
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reinforcements would be necessary to enable the Allies to launch effective counter-
offensives on land and in the air, and thus to bring the military pressure to bear on 
Germany and Italy which will be essential to secure their ultimate defeat. 
264. Once restrictions on bombing have been abandoned successful attacks on 
targets such as the Ruhr, fuel reserves at Hamburg &c., would bring considerable 
pressure to bear on Germany, but we emphasise that the air striking force is an 
essential component of the air defence of this country, and that we would go to war 
with limited reserves and deficient of trained personnel. For these reasons we must 
endeavour to conserve our resources. 
265. In planning the offensive measures which would be open to us as our 
strength develops, the possibilities of combined operations by two or more Services 
must be constantly envisaged if we are to be in a position to take full advantage of our 
control of sea communications. While German territory is confined entirely to 
Europe, Italy has overseas possessions in North and East Africa and in the JEgean, all 
of which are dependent on seaborne maintenance and reinforcement. Cut off from 
the home country, these might well fall to vigorous attack, from Egypt and Tunis 
against Libya, and by combined operations against the bases at Massawa, Assab, 
Leros and Rhodes. Such losses might cause Italy to lose heart in the struggle, and 
thus hasten her defeat. 
266. Furthermore, although combined operations against the coasts and har-
bours of a first-class Power, in the face of modern defences, may not at present be 
feasible, the development in peace-time of the means and methods for this form of 
offensive may, when the opportunity arises, enables us to strike effectively against 
any suitable objectives which may offer. 
Summary of policy 
267. To sum up, we should be faced by enemies who would be more fully 
prepared than ourselves for war on a national scale, would have superiority in air and 
land forces, but would be inferior at sea and in general economic strength. In these 
circumstances, we must be prepared to face a major offensive directed against either 
ourselves or France. To defeat such an offensive we should have to concentrate all 
our initial efforts, and during this time our major strategy would be defensive. 
268. Our subsequent policy should be directed to weakening Germany and Italy 
by the exercise of economic pressure and by intensive propaganda, while at the same 
time building up our military strength until we can adopt an offensive major 
strategy. Command of the sea would then confer freedom of choice in striking at the 
enemies' most vulnerable points. Once we had been able to develop the full fighting 
strength of the Empire, we should regard the outcome of the war with confidence. 
Intervention of Japan 
269. The addition of Japan to our enemies would modify our policy for the 
conduct of the war to the extent that our Eastern Empire would then be threatened, 
as would the vital communications to Egypt and the Middle East through the Indian 
Ocean. In these circumstances the despatch of a British Fleet to Singapore would be 
imperative and the position in the Mediterranean would depend on French naval 
action to contain and restrain the Italian fleet. 
270. The British Empire would be threatened simultaneously in Europe, the 
Mediterranean and in the Far East by an immense aggregate of armed force, which 
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neither our present nor our projected strength is designed to meet, with France as 
our only major ally. The outcome of the war would be likely to depend on our ability 
to hold on to our key positions and upon other Powers, particularly the United States 
of America, coming to our aid. 
22 PREM 11345, ff 4-14 25 Mar 1939 
'Memorandum on sea-power, 1939': memorandum by Mr Churchill. 
Note by Lord Chatfield 
[Churchill sent this memo to Chamberlain with a covering note which read: 'Knowing 
how busy you are, I have reduced it to the shortest compass, stating conclusions rather 
than arguments for them.' Chamberlain passed the memo to Chatfield for comment.) 
(1) To Germany, the command of the Baltic is vital. Scandinavian supplies, 
Swedish ore, and above all, protection against Russian descents on the long, 
undefended northern coast-line of Germany, (in one place little more than a hundred 
miles from Berlin), make it imperative for Germany to dominate the Baltic. We may 
therefore be sure that in the opening phase, she will not compromise her command 
of this Sea. Thus, while submarines and raiding cruisers, or perhaps one pocket-
battleship, may be sent out to disturb our traffic, no ships will be risked which are 
necessary to the Baltic command. The German Fleet, as at present developed, aims at 
this as its prime and almost its sole objective. 
If this be true, no very large British naval forces will be needed to watch the 
debauches from the Baltic or from the Heligoland Bight. British security would be 
markedly increased if an air atack upon the Kiel Canal rendered that side door 
useless, even if only at intervals. 
(2) Assuming Italy is hostile, which we may perhaps hope will not be the case, 
England's first battlefield is the Mediterranean. All plans for sealing up the ends 
must be discarded in favour of decisive victory there. Our forces alone should be 
sufficient to drive the Italian ships from the sea, and secure complete command of 
the Mediterranean, certainly within two months, possibly sooner. 
The submarine has been mastered, thanks very largely to Lord Chatfield's long 
efforts at the Admiralty. It should be quite controllable in the outer seas, and 
certainly in the Mediterranean. There will be losses, but nothing to affect the scale of 
events. 
In my opinion, given with great humility, (because these things are very difficult 
to judge) an air attack upon British warships armed and protected as they now are, 
will not prevent full exercise of their superior sea power. The British domination of 
the Mediterranean will inflict inevitably injuries upon Italy which may be fatal to her 
power of continuing the war. All her troops in Libya and in Abyssinia will be, as I 
said: "cut flowers in a vase." The French and our own people in Egypt could be 
reinforced to any extent desired, while theirs would be overweighted, if not starved. If 
the French Fleet and French naval bases are added to our own, this task is what the 
Admiralty should readily accept. Not to hold the Mediterranean would be to expose 
Egypt and the Canal, as well as the French possessions, to invasion by Italian troops 
with German leadership. We cannot tolerate this on any account. Moreover a series 
of swift and striking victories in this theatre, which might be obtainable in the early 
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weeks of a war, would have a most healthy and helpful bearing upon the main 
struggle with Germany. Nothing should stand between us and these results, both 
naval and military. 
(3) On no account must anything which threatens in the Far East divert us from 
this prime objective. In war one only has to compare one evil with another, and the 
lesser evil ranks as a blessing. 
If Japan joins the hostile combination, which is by no means certain, for she has 
her hands full, all our interests and possessions in the Yellow Sea will be temporarily 
effaced. We must not be drawn from our main theme by any effort to protect them. 
Only if the United States comes in against Japan could we supply even a squadron of 
cruisers to operate with them. On this tableau we must bear the losses and 
punishment, awaiting the final result of the struggle. 
(4) The farthest point we can hold in the conditions imagined is Singapore. This 
should be easy. A fortress of this character, with cannon which can hold any fleet at 
arm's length only requires an adequate garrison and supplies of food and ammuni-
tion, preferably for a year; but even six months would probably do. Singapore must 
hold out till the Mediterranean is safe, and the Italian fleet liquidated. 
Consider how vain is the menace that Japan will send a fleet and army to conquer 
Singapore. It is as far from Japan as Southampton from New York. Over these two 
thousand miles of salt-water, Japan would have to send the bulk of her fleet, escort at 
least sixty thousand men in transports in order to effect a landing, begin a siege 
which would end only in disaster if the Japanese sea communications were cut at any 
stage. 
One can take it as quite certain that Japan would not run such a risk. They are an 
extremely sensible people. They would have the opportunity of obtaining for the time 
being complete satisfaction for all their ambitions in the Yellow Seas. Their fleet 
protects their homeland and overseas empire from the worst perils. To send a large 
part of their strictly limited naval forces on a wild adventure such as the siege and 
reduction of Singapore, will never commend itself to them until England has been 
decisively beaten, which will not be the case in the first year of the war. If, per 
impossibile, they were to attempt it, a British victory in the Mediterranean might be 
followed a few months later by a decisive naval relief of Singapore. Do not therefore 
let us worry about this bugbear. Minor naval dispositions may be made to increase 
the deterrents against an attack on Singapore, but you may be sure that provided it is 
fully armed, garrisoned and supplied, there will be no attack in any period which our 
foresight can measure. 
(5) As long as the British Navy is undefeated, and as long as we hold Singapore, no 
invasion of Australia or New Zealand by Japan is possible. We could give Australasia 
a good guarantee to protect them from this danger, but we must do it in our own 
way, and in the proper sequence of operations. Can one suppose that Japan, enjoying 
herself in the mastery of the Yellow Sea, would send afloat a conquering and 
colonising expedition to Australia? It is ludicrous. More than one hundred thousand 
men would be needed to make any impression upon Australian manhood. The 
sending of such an expedition would require the improvident diversion of the 
Japanese fleet, and their engagement in a long, desultory struggle in Australia. At 
any moment a decision in the Mediterranean would liberate overwhelming naval 
forces to cut any such expedition from its base. 
One does not know what the attitude of the United States would be to an attempt 
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by Japan to conquer and colonise Australia. It would be easy for the United States to 
tell Japan that they would regard the sending of Japanese fleets and transports south 
of the Equator as an act of war. They might well be disposed to make such a 
declaration, and there would be no harm in sounding them upon this very remote 
contingency. 
I am aware of the promise that we made to send a powerful fleet to the Pacific, but 
this would be folly in the opening stages of the war, and I am sure if the strategic 
argument is laid before the Australian Commonwealth, they will play the game by us 
as they have always done. Tell them the whole story, and they will come along. In the 
first year of a world war, they would be in no danger whatever in their homeland, and 
by the end of the first year, we may hope to have cleaned up the seas and oceans. 
My main conclusion in this section is that there is no danger of Japan sending 
large expeditions against Singapore or Australia until matters have been decided in 
Europe; and that if they did so, so long as we hold Singapore, they would be placing 
themselves at a great disadvantage. No, they will take Hong Kong and Shanghai, and 
clean us out of all our interests there. But then, if we are still alive, we will put that 
right later on. 
(6) Assuming that the foregoing argument is accepted, and that events generally 
conform to it, that our command of the Mediterranean is unquestioned and that no 
expedition has been launched against Singapore or Australia, the question would 
arise where the next operation of the British Fleet should be. This is a matter we 
cannot attempt to decide at this stage. But clearly the one great naval offensive 
against Germany is the Baltic. If, for instance, we had to-day a superior fleet in the 
Baltic, one might almost say for certain that Germany would not declare war. We 
have not got the naval power to attempt this before the Mediterranean has been 
conquered, but there is no hypothetical operation which should be studied more 
carefully, and for which plans should be made for use should conditions allow, than 
the domination of the Baltic. Here is the sole great offensive against Germany of 
British sea-power. Ardent officers should be set to work for a year upon the problems 
of entering the Baltic and living there in indefinite ascendancy. Kronstadt presents 
itself as the chief base. However, much blood will have flowed under the bridges 
before any question of application can arise. But if we are happy in the Mediterra-
nean, and no Japanese expedition had been launched (which it will not be) in the 
Pacific, this would be the sovr'an plan. However by that time the entry will probably 
be fortified, & Denmark in German hands. Therefore the whole idea is purely 
hypothetical as well as remote. 
Note on 22 
Mr. Churchill in this letter expresses his previously expressed thoughts to me on this 
subject. Generally I consider they are sound and, of course, as is well known to 
members of the C. I.D. Strategical Sub-Committee, the general policy proposed of 
immediate and decisive action in the Mediterranean has been approved. 
As regards the Far East. I concur generally that we must take some risk in the Far 
East while we are settling the Mediterranean, but I very much doubt whether the 
Mediterranean problem will be settled in two or three months. It may be, but it may 
on the contrary take six months. If, however, we have the United States fleet at 
Honolulu, our Far Eastern position will at once become much easier, and we do not 
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know that Japan will immediately come into war. It would seem much more likely 
that she will wait to see what losses we have in our fleet and how we get on generally 
in Europe before she decides to come in, if at all. 
The above remarks, of course, I have already made at our official meetings, and 
there is nothing very new in them. 
Mr. Churchill's last proposition is to be prepared finally to dominate the Baltic. It 
is quite possible after we have settled the Mediterranean problem and when the 
situation in the Far East is clear to consider some such action, i.e. to risk our fleet in 
the Baltic in order to bring Germany to heel and so cut off her supplies from 
Scandinavia. This is a problem for the Admiralty. 
c. 
29.3.39 
23 CAB 16/183A, DP(P)48, annex 1 5 Apr 1939 
'Despatch of a fleet to the Far East': memorandum by Sir A 
Cunningham1 for the Strategical Appreciation Sub-Committee of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence on the despatch of a fleet in the event 
of war with Japan 
This memorandum is written in accordance with the conclusions of the second 
meeting of the Strategical Appreciation Committee, which were as follows:-
"(a) to invite the Chief of Naval Staff to submit an appreciation of the naval 
situation in the event of-
(i) war with Germany and Italy with the threat of a hostile Japan; 
(ii) war with Germany, Italy and Japan simultaneously, 
to enable the Committee to formulate the recommendation on the question of the 
despatch of a Fleet to the Far East." 
2. Before any firm conclusions can be reached as to the dispositions of our capital 
ships in the circumstances set out above, it is necessary to draw the attention of the 
Committee to two factors which have a vital bearing on the question under 
examination. 
3. In the first place, it must be pointed out that the Chiefs of Staff have repeatedly 
stated that, in their opinion, our present and potential naval strength is insufficient, 
and indeed is not designed to engage three naval Powers simultaneously without 
grave risks. 
4. Secondly, the number of capital ships which we have available is at present at 
its lowest ebb. Of our fifteen capital ships the Queen Elizabeth, Valiant and Renown 
are under reconstruction. The Hood is at present at about 6 weeks' notice, and the 
Revenge is at three months' notice until the 1st May, 1939. We are thus reduced to 
ten capital ships immediately available for active service. These ships are disposed as 
follows in peace:-
1 Deputy chief of naval staff, 1938--1939; c-in-c, Mediterranean, 1939-1942. 
(23) DEFENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 157 
Home fleet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
Mediterranean Fleet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
5. The naval strategical situation that would exist in the event of war with 
Germany and Italy, simultaneously with the threat of a hostile Japan, has been fully 
considered in the Chiefs of Staffs' European Appreciation of 1939-40, Paper No. D.P. 
(P.) 44. In these circumstances it is intended that our initial capital ship dispositions 
should be as follows:-
North Sea . . . . . . . .. 
Channel . . . . . . . . . 
Eastern Mediterranean 
5 
2 
3 
With the gradual bringing forward of ships at extended notice it would be possible to 
increase our capital ship strength in Home Waters to nine ships. 
6. In a European war certain cruisers will be retained on the China station, and in 
Australian and New Zealand waters. Moreover, the Military and Air Garrison of 
Singapore will be reinforced. These measures should serve to make it clear to Japan 
that we have no intention of abandoning our position in the Far East. 
7. As already stated, the intervention of Japan would be a serious threat to our 
position in the Far East. The action which we should take to counter this threat 
must, of necessity, depend upon a variety of circumstances, none of which can be 
accurately foreseen to-day. These include-
(a) The number of capital ships which we shall have available at the time. 
(b) The strategical situation which then exists both in Home Waters and in the 
Mediterranean 
(c) The strategy adopted by Japan when she enters the war. 
(d) The reactions of the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America to Japan's 
intervention. 
(a) As already stated, we may have only ten capital ships immediately available 
when Japan intervenes. It is even possible that this number may have been reduced 
by fortuitous circumstances or by enemy action. In such circumstances the number 
of ships which could be spared from more vital areas to proceed to the East would 
necessarily be strictly limited. Should Japan's entry be delayed, the position should 
gradually improve, both in respect of the number of capital ships which we shall have 
available, and because we may have succeeded in reducing the enemy forces by 
successful action. It is not open to question that a capital ship force would have to be 
sent, but whether this could be done to the exclusion of our interests in the 
Mediterranean is a matter which would have to be decided at the time. 
(b) Japanese intervention may be designed to relieve the pressure which we are 
successfully imposing with our Fleet on Germany, Italy or both countries. In these 
circumstances some delay in the despatch of a Fleet to the Far East might enable us 
to eliminate one of these adversaries, thereby putting us in a position to direct our 
efforts against Japan in due course. 
(c) The courses of action open to Japan when she enters the war are numerous. It 
may be that she will content herself with threats and feints designed to draw off our 
main forces to the East without actually embarking upon an aggressive form of 
strategy affecting our vital interests in this area. The despatch of a Fleet in those 
circumstances would be playing Japan's game. It is desirable, therefore, to see what 
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course of action Japan adopts before we relax our hold on other areas. Further, the 
effect of the evacuation of the Eastern Mediterranean on Greece, Turkey, and on the 
Arab and Moslem world are political factors which make it essential that no 
precipitate action should be taken in this direction. 
(d) It seems that the open decision of Japan to align herself with the Axis Powers 
would inevitably involve her in hostilities with the U.S.S.R. The necessity for 
safeguarding her lines of sea communication to the Asiatic mainland against the Far 
Eastern naval forces of the U.S.S.R. would have a hampering effect of Japanese 
strategy. 
8. The attitude of the U.S.A. to a declaration of war by Japan would also exercise a 
profound effect on Japan. The movement of the U.S. Fleet to Honolulu would have a 
restrictive effect upon Japanese strategy, and might thereby enable us to delay the 
despatch of a Fleet to the Far East. 
Conclusion 
9. The conclusion which emerges from the foregoing considerations is that there 
are so many variable factors which cannot at present be assessed, that it is not 
possible to state definitely how soon after Japanese intervention a Fleet could be 
despatched to the Far East. Neither is it possible to enumerate precisely the size of 
the Fleet that we could afford to send. 
24 CAB 66/10, WP(40)276 18 July 1940 
'Grant of air facilities to the United States'; War Cabinet memorandum 
by Lord Halifax on the grant of air and naval bases to the US in the 
Caribbean and Newfoundland. Annexes 1-3 
[Under an agreement concluded in Sept 1940, the UK received from the US fifty First 
World War destroyers in return for the granting of leases of land, to extend over 
ninety-nine years, on eight British territories in the Caribbean and Western Atlantic 
(Newfoundland) on which the US could construct air and naval bases. For domestic 
political reasons and to satisfy the American military, the Roosevelt administration drove 
a hard bargain. The Americans insisted, not only that the two elements in the agreement 
should be publicly linked but also that the UK should give a public assurance that the 
Royal Navy would not be surrendered if Britain fell and that it would, if necessary, fight 
on from North America and the empire. Initially the British government resisted these 
terms. Churchill believed that an assurance over the fleet would be damaging to British 
morale, that it was not justified on account of the age of the vessels being offered in 
return and that any such declaration should be made dependent upon America's entry 
into the war. Reluctantly, however, the prime minister and the War Cabinet gave way. 
The Sept agreement was followed by prolonged and at times acrimonious negotiations 
over the precise sites and terms for the bases to be leased and it was not until Mar 1941 
that these matters were settled. The destroyers part of the bargain was not immediately 
fulfilled. Only nine were in service by the end of 1940 and only thirty by May 1941, largely 
because the Royal Navy lacked experienced crews and because the vessels in question 
required lengthy refits to enable them to conduct anti-submarine operations. The CO 
contested the terms for the lease of bases. Lloyd, the secretary of state, presented to 
Cabinet evidence in support of his view that the US seemed determined to usurp Britain's 
position in the Caribbean (CAB 66/14, WP(40)485, 27 Dec 1940; in private to an FO 
official Lloyd described the Americans as 'gangsters', FO 371/24263, no 4285, minute by 
D Scott, 11 Dec 1940). Officials in the North American Dept of the FO saw no danger to 
British sovereignty but Eden, who replaced Halifax at the FO in Dec 1940, reflected 
almost immediately on the difficulty of reconciling the need for Anglo-American 
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co-operation with Britain's determination to retain its status as an independent power. 
He described the arrangements as a 'grievous blow at our authority and ultimately I have 
no doubt at our sovereignty'. The consequences for Britain's position in the Americas and 
in Canada were likely to be 'most unhappy for those who believe in the value of the British 
connection'. The bargain was a 'poor' one but Eden recognised that no purpose would be 
served by Lloyd's continued opposition: ' . .. we can only lose more than we have lost 
already, & throw American goodwill out of the window after the British connection' (FO 
371/24262, no 5203, minute by Eden, 29 Dec 1940). The War Cabinet agreed, leaving 
Lloyd isolated. Although of the view that if 'went against the grain to make further 
concessions in this matter', ministers believed that they had to be made 'in order to avoid 
the risk of providing ammunition to the isolationist opponents of President Roosevelt in 
Congress in the discussions as to the extent of financial help to this country in providing 
munitions for the war'. The issue was of 'overriding importance, and others matters had 
to give way before it' (CAB 65/10, WM 311(40)7, 30 Dec 1940).) 
In a telegram of the 24th May, 1940 (attached as Annex 1), His Majesty's 
Ambassador1 at Washington outlined proposals for the grant of naval and air facilities 
to the United States in neighbouring British colonies and Newfoundland. These 
proposals were strongly endorsed by the Chiefs of Staff Committee in their 
aide-memoire W.P. (4) 174, but were rejected by the War Cabinet at their 146th (40) 
meeting on the 29th May, 1940. The decision of the War Cabinet was conveyed to 
Lord Lothian in a telegram of the 2nd June (Annex 2). On the 22nd June Lord 
Lothian replied (Annex 3) intimating that, whilst in view of the War Cabinet's 
objections he did not propose to press his proposals, he would be grateful to receive 
authority to inform the State Department that His Majesty's Government would 
agree to enter into the following arrangements, which he had ascertained through 
informal channels would meet what the American Army and Air Force regarded as 
their immediate needs for purposes of national defence:-
(a) Facilities for United States military aircraft to land in Jamaica, Georgetown 
(British Guiana) and Trinidad. 
(b) A lease to Pan-American Airways, acting as agents of the United States 
Government, of a small area near the Trinidad aerodrome where certain facilities 
would be required. 
(c) A lease of approximately a square mile for an aerodrome in British Guiana. 
(d) Permission for Pan-American Airways to construct an aerodrome near 
Kingston, Jamaica. 
(e) Authority for the United States Army to send occasional training flights to a 
Newfoundland airport. 
2. Following upon interdepartmental discussions, it was suggested to the Chiefs 
of Staff Committee that Lord Lothian's above-mentioned proposals should be 
considered. I understand, however, that the Committee's full endorsement of the 
Ambassador's earlier and wider proposals applied a fortiori to the more restricted 
facilities now suggested, and that there was, therefore, no occasion for a further 
report on their part. Lord Lothian's latest proposals have been referred to the 
Governors of Jamaica, Trinidad and British Guiana, who are in favour of their 
adoption so far as local considerations are concerned (see their telegrams attached as 
Annex 4).2 The Government of Newfoundland (Annex 5) see no objection to proposal 
1 Lord Lothian, UK ambassador in Washington, 1939--1940. 
2 Annexes 4--6 not printed. 
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(e) above, and the Canadian Government (Annex 6) have replied that they consider it 
highly desirable that the facilities in question should be afforded. In subsequent 
telegrams Lord Lothian has emphasised the need for an urgent favourable response 
to his recommendations (i) because of the rising popular demand in the United 
States that all the Caribbean islands should be acquired in the interests of American 
defence, and (ii) because the question of acquiring all Caribbean islands may possibly 
be raised by the Latin American Republics at their forthcoming conference at 
Havana, which is to open on the 20th July. Lord Lothian has also drawn attention to 
the fact that Congress has just voted large sums to enable Pan-American Airways to 
construct aerodromes in South and Central America, and he expresses his conviction 
that by hook or by crook this expenditure will be made effective for aerial defence for 
the whole of the Central American region. 
3. Whilst there is force in Lord Lothian's argument that by making the offer 
recommended in his telegram of the 22nd June it will prove possible to stave off 
wider demands, the main argument in favour of action in the sense proposed is that 
it corresponds to a realistic view of Anglo-American relations both in the present and 
in the future. For not only do we require all the help we can get in the present, but 
the future of our widely scattered Empire is likely to depend on the evolution of an 
effective and enduring collaboration between ourselves and the United States. This 
may be an obvious necessity for us, but for America it is a new and startling doctrine. 
4. Our aim should surely be to assist America in the task of assuming a new and 
heavy responsibility for which so little in her tradition and history has prepared her. 
A successful relationship between the two English-speaking groups implies not only 
an assumption of responsibilities on America's part but, equally, a generous 
recognition by us of the fact that a responsibility involves a right to the means for 
discharging it. Until late in the last war it was Great Britain, almost alone, who for 
nearly a century had guarded the English-speaking peoples by sea, and it is still the 
British Empire, rather than America, who possesses the naval and air facilities 
(actual and potential) which protect the American continents. But in future we may 
well neither be capable of performing these functions unaided, nor can we reasonably 
hope for cordial co-operation from America unless we share with her the strategic 
facilities which these duties will require. At this very moment it is only fair to 
recognise that if Britain were to be defeated America would have the task of 
defending her eastern shores without any prepared air bases under her own control 
in the Atlantic Ocean. It seems inconceivable that America should tolerate such a 
situation, or that anything except bitterness could result from a failure on our part to 
recognise it. 
5. The practical alternatives open to us would seem to be either to make America 
a free offer of the immediate facilities she needs or to drive a bargain and attempt to 
obtain some specific quid pro quo in exchange. The second alternative is open to the 
objection that we are already heavily in debt to America as a result of the last war, 
and that we shall shortly be still further in her debt as a condition of winning the 
present war. We have no hope of ever repaying the enormous sums which will be 
involved, nor do well informed Americans ever expect this of us. 
6. The Americans are hard bargainers, but they are generous and largehearted 
friends, and they do not stint their kindly impulses. Thus, thousands of our poorest 
children are being offered homes on the other side for the duration of the war, but we 
have not been asked for anything in return. Nor did it occur to any American that the 
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modification of their neutrality laws, shortly after the beginning of the war, might be 
made the basis of a "deal." It is with America's consent, and very much against her 
immediate economic advantage, that we maintain our contraband control. She could 
break our blockade of Europe to-morrow if she wished, and thereby greatly ease her 
political and economic relations with the republics in the Southern Continent. For 
none of these things does America exact a price from us. 
7. If our aim is to foster a havit of cordial co-operation between the English-
speaking countries, this can hardly be achieved on a basis of "tit for tat"; it can only 
develop through the habitual exercise of friendly assistance freely given, together 
with a general recognition of the other country's needs and feelings . It must in any 
case be remembered that it is not within the power of the United States Government 
to grant any substantial concessions to us, e.g., destroyers, without the consent of 
Congress, which depends in turn upon the evolution of public opinion. 
8. On grounds of immediate advantage and also of our future relations with the 
United States I would therefore suggest that Lord Lothian should be authorised to 
offer to the State Department without asking for any quid pro quo, the facilities 
immediately required by the United States Army and Air Force detailed earlier in this 
paper, subject to such temporary safeguards as may be required by His Majesty's 
forces, for the duration of the war. Unless, however, these safeguards are kept to an 
absolute minimum, not much of value will be left to offer to the Americans, and in 
practice the added security resulting from closer and more cordial relations with the 
United States should in the long run abundantly outweigh any security we could 
obtain by pursuing a narrowly self-centred policy. 
Annex 1 to 24: inward telegram no 814 from Lord Lothian to Lord Halifax, 24 May 1940 
American anxiety about its own security has brought to the front in public 
discussions the question of the future of British and French islands off eastern coast 
of America. Many suggestions are being made for their disposal to United States in 
part payment of war debts . President has always discouraged such discussion. 
Privately, I say that there can be no question of discussing any such transaction at 
present. I think, however, that His Majesty's Government should seriously consider 
officially a formal offer to United States to allow it to construct aerodromes and naval 
stations on British islands which are of importance to its security. I understand that 
the two places United States authorities are most concerned about are Trinidad and 
Newfoundland: Trinidad because an air base there would enable United States to deal 
with possible German and Italian air developments in (? Brazil) threatening the 
[Panama] Canal, and Newfoundland because of possible German threats (two groups 
undecypherable) (? overthrow rights of Iceland, and which to-day is quite unde-
fended). They are also interested in facilities at Bermuda. If you agree, I should like 
to be authorised to inform the President that His Majesty's Government recognise 
the seriousness of the new threat to America's security, and that, while they are not 
in a position to discuss any modifications of sovereignty, they would be prepared to 
consider immediate lease of areas to the United States for construction of air fields or 
naval stations on any of these islands which the United States consider important 
from the point of view of its own defence. In effect, this is only an extension of the 
proposal that was informally agreed to last year, but never carried out. I would not 
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connect it at all with war debts instalment, but I consider public announcement of 
our readiness to help the United States in organising its defence in this way would 
make a deep impression here, and, in practice, would add to security of our position 
and would involve active co-operation between the United States and British 
Commonwealth in naval and air defence. No member of Administration has said 
anything to me. 
If you act now it would have all the advantage of spontaneity. The sooner you can 
give me the decision the better, as if proposal is to have full effect Congress ought to 
vote appropriation before it adjourns early in June. 
Annex 2 to 24: outward telegram no 981 from Lord Halifax to Lord Lothian, 2 June 
1940 
Your telegram No. 814 [of the 24th May: Suggested grant of facilities in British 
possessions to United States of America]. 
2. Your suggestion has been examined by War Cabinet, who see following 
objections:-
( I) If His Majesty's Government were to make a formal offer of this kind with the 
express object of facilitating the defence of the United States of America the 
question of sovereignty could hardly fail to arise . United States would at our 
invitation be spending large sums of money on fixtures in the islands and would 
naturally require security. In particular leases on a large scale at Trinidad with its 
vital oil fields would involve investment of large American plant and capital and 
United States Government would tend to obtain a controlling interest there. 
(2) Only facilities in Newfoundland which are likely to be of value to United States 
of America would be those of airport. This has only just been completed and cost 
three quarters of a million pounds and negotiations are in progress for Canadian 
Government to assume responsibility for it for the duration of the war. His 
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are at present in the position of 
trustees for people of Newfoundland, and handing over of the airport to Americans 
might well arouse resentment there . It would in any case be necessary to consult 
Newfoundland before proceeding to action, and it would also be necessary to 
consult Canada, both because Canada's defence is intimately bound up with that of 
Newfoundland, and because of the wartime arrangement referred to in the second 
sentence of this paragraph. 
(3) Once the matter had been broached with the President it would be difficult to 
recede if the foregoing political objections appeared insuperable. 
(4) As we see it Isolationists in the United States of America might well make 
political capital out of any offer which came from our side, as either attempt to 
involve United States of America, or as evidence that we were in mood of despair. 
(5) A definite assurance of concrete results sufficiently advantageous to us should 
be a prerequisite for concession on our part. 
3. In these circumstances we should be glad to learn what reasons you have for 
considering that if political objections could be overcome really substantial advan-
tages would accrue to us from approaching the United States with such an offer, 
which in the meantime should not be broached with the President. 
4. Incidentally, following upon the United States request last year, arising out of 
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proposed neutrality patrol but ostensibly with a view to facilitating American naval 
manreuvres, His Majesty's Government agreed to negotiations with the colonial 
authorities concerned which resulted in lease of sites to United States naval 
authorities at Trinidad, Bermuda and St. Lucia. Although nothing further has since 
been heard of the matter, we have no information that the United States Government 
have relinquished their rights. It would therefore seem that if they wish to do so 
United States Government are in a position to take at least some action without any 
further offer on the part of His Majesty's Government. The fact that they have not 
moved suggests that at present they do not wish to do so. 
Annex 3 to 24: inward telegram no 1086 from Lord Lothian to Lord Halifax, 22 June 
1940 
Your telegram No 981. 
In view of objection seen by the Cabinet, and to the march of events, which is 
rapidly educating American public opinion to vital importance of Great Britain itself 
as first line of American defence, I do not purpose to press my proposal for the 
present. I have, however, been able to ascertain through informal channels what 
American army and air force regard as their immediate needs for purposes of 
national defence. 
In the first place, they would like American military aircraft to be given the right 
to land in Jamaica, at Georgetown (British Guiana) and at Trinidad. Secondly, they 
would like Pan-American Airways, acting as their agents, to be leased a small area 
approximately 1,500 feet by 500 feet adjacent to Trinidad aerodrome, where they 
could store supplies, erect a small radio station, &c. Thirdly, they would like 
Pan-American to be leased an area of approximately a square mile, on which the 
company could construct an aerodrome with the necessary building near George-
town. British Guiana. Fourthly, they would like Pan-American Airways to be allowed 
to construct an aerodrome near Kingston, Jamaica, on similar terms to seaplane 
station they already have there. 
The advantage of this proposal is that there is no question of the United States 
Government acquiring any long lease exercising any kind of authority in the islands. 
The work would be done and paid for by Pan-American Airways on an ordinary 
commercial basis, but the United States army would use these aerodromes, &c., in 
connexion with defence of approach to Canal Zone and also with a view to speedy air 
reinforcement of South American republics in the event of Nazi-inspired trouble 
there. Proposal, in fact, is on all fours with one which was worked out for the navy 
rather more than a year ago. In view of value to ourselves of defensive collaboration 
between American forces and our own, and in order to cut away part of the ground 
from under growing demand in popular press that the United States should take over 
all islands off coasts, partly to improve their own defences and partly to forestall 
claims by Germany, I hope that you will authorise me to inform State Department 
that His Majesty's Government would agree to enter into such an arrangement if 
details could be worked out. 
Army would also like authority to send occasional training flights to Newfound-
land airport. 
Arrangement would, of course, be for the duration of the war. 
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25 PREM 3/296/2, ff 51-56 28 Apr 1941 
[Middle East strategy]: directive by Mr Churchill. Minute by the Chiefs 
of Staff 
Japan is unlikely to enter the war unless the Germans make a successful invasion of 
Great Britain, and even a major disaster like the loss of the Middle East would not 
necessarily make her come in, because the liberation of the British Mediterranean 
Fleet which might be expected, and also any troops evacuated from the Middle East 
to Singapore would not weaken the British war-making strength in Malaya. It is very 
unlikely, moreover, that Japan will enter the war either if the United States have 
come in, or if Japan thinks that they would come in consequent upon a Japanese 
declaration of war. Finally, it may be taken as almost certain that the entry of Japan 
into the war would be followed by the immediate entry of the United States on our 
side. 
These conditions are to be accepted by the Service Departments as a guide for all 
plans and actions. Should they cease to hold good, it will be the responsibility of 
Ministers to notify the Service Staffs in good time. 
2. The loss of Egypt and the Middle East would be a disaster of the first 
magnitude to Great Britain, second only to successful invasion and final conquest. 
Every effort is to be made to reinforce General Wavell1 with military and Air forces, 
and if Admiral Cunningham requires more ships, the Admiralty will make proposals 
for supplying them. It is to be impressed upon all ranks, especially the highest, that 
the life and honour of Great Britain depends upon the successful defence of Egypt. It 
is not to be expected that the British forces of the land, sea and Air in the 
Mediterranean would wish to survive so vast and shameful a defeat as would be 
entailed by our expulsion from Egypt, having regard to the difficulties of the enemy 
and his comparatively small numbers. Not only must Egypt by defended, but the 
Germans have to be beaten and thrown out of Cyrenaica. This offensive objective 
must be set before the troops. 
3. All plans for evacuation of Egypt or for closing or destroying the Suez Canal 
are to be called in and kept under the strict personal control of Headquarters. No 
whisper of such plans is to be allowed. No surrenders by officers and men will be 
considered tolerable unless at least 50 per cent. casualties are sustained by the Unit 
or force in question. According to Napoleon's maxim, "when a man is caught alone 
and unarmed, a surrender may be made." But Generals and Staff Officers surprised 
by the enemy are to use their pistols in self-defence. The honour of a wounded man is 
safe. Anyone who can kill a Hun or even an Italian has rendered good service. 
4. The Army of the Nile is to fight with no thought of retreat or withdrawal. This 
task is enforced upon it by physical facts, for it will be utterly impossible to find the 
shipping for moving a tithe of the immense masses of men and stores which have 
been gathered in the Nile Valley. 
5. In considering reinforcements for the Middle East, the question of the defence 
of Great Britain against invasion does not arise, as the available shipping would be far 
less than the ships which would contain the number of troops who could be safely 
sent. 
1 C-in-c, Middle East, 1939-141. 
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6. Should TIGER2 succeed, the empty ships should be returned by the short cut, 
keeping their deck armaments for this purpose. It must be remembered that General 
Wavell has, with the troops returned from Greece, a trained personnel of 8 or 9 Tank 
Regiments, for which the Tanks now sent or in his possession are barely sufficient. 
Moreover, the personnel of the Tank Corps now going round the Cape will require 
other Tanks besides those already provided to await them on their arrival. Therefore 
we must contemplate a repetition of TIGER at the earliest moment. The situation, 
however, must be judged when and if the M.T. ships return. 
7. DOUBLE WINCH having succeeded again, should be repeated with the utmost 
speed, all preparations being made to the aircraft in the meanwhile. 
8. There is no need at the present time to make any further dispositions for the 
defence of Malaya and Singapore, beyond those modest arrangements which are in 
progress, until or unless the conditions set out in paragraph 1 are modified. 
Minute on 25 
We have considered your Directive of the 28th April, (Flag A) and we feel that we 
should be failing in our duty if we did not submit a frank expression of our opinion 
before it is regarded as final. 
2. As we see it, the main purpose of the Directive is to ensure that there is no 
uncertainty in the minds of either the High Command in the Middle East or of the 
troops under their command as to the general conduct of the campaign. As to this, 
we entirely agree that "the loss of Egypt and the Middle East would be a disaster of 
the first magnitude", and we would welcome an exhortation to the Army of the Nile 
that they are "to fight with no thought of retreat or withdrawal". 
3. There are, however, certain points which in our opinion call for amplification 
or amendment. 
4. We note that "it will be the responsibility of Ministers to notify the Service 
Staffs in good time" of any change in the political hypothesis laid down in paragraph 
1 of the Directive. We wish to emphasise that, when dealing with the Far East, "good 
time" means at least three months, since that is the minimum period within which 
reinforcements and equipment could reach Malaya. 
5. With reference to paragraph 2, we submit that it is an overstatement to say 
that "the life ... of Great Britain depends upon the successful defence of Egypt". 
Surely our life continues so long as we are not successfully invaded, and do not lose 
the Battle of the Atlantic. 
6. With reference to paragraph 3, we share your view that the very existence of 
any plan for evacuation should be known only to a most secret circle, and we can 
assure you that the outline plans which were prepared by General Wavell to meet the 
"worst possible case", have been seen and discussed by only very few officers in 
London or the Middle East. At the same time, we think it necessary that these plans 
should be continually revised and kept up to date. However confident we may be of 
victory, it would be tempting providence to disregard the possibility of a reverse . In 
2 Code name for a convoy of fast merchant ships carrying tanks and aircraft sent in absolute secrecy via the 
Mediterranean to Egypt in May 1941. 
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particular, should we be forced to abandon the Canal, it is essential that it should be 
blocked. 
This cannot be done effectively unless the necessary preparations are made in 
advance, and in particular the provision and preparation of blockships, which it is 
estimated will take some weeks. 
It is therefore essential to prepare the necessary blockships at once. This can be 
done under the pretext that they are required for blocking enemy ports. 
7. If the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force should be unable to interfere 
sufficiently with the enemy's sea communications, it is possible that the Germans 
may be able to build up a superior force in the Western Desert. They may develop a 
serious threat from the Islands and from Asia Minor as well. Should their 
preponderance of strength in the Middle East become overwhelming, we could not, it 
is true, ever hope to evacuate the great mass of stores and base installations in Egypt. 
They would all be required to sustain our forces in the fierce fighting which would 
take place. 
8. But, if the worst came to the worst, we should certainly hope to withdraw in 
good order a large proportion of our personnel and their fighting equipment to areas 
further south and east. We have room to give ground and would still have behind us 
ports on which to base an offensive later on, when the enemy's strength became 
diminished by his extension. 
9. We feel that paragraph 5 of the Directive requires some qualification. It is true 
that at the moment shipping is a limiting factor, but the accession of American naval 
forces and shipping might enable us to despatch reinforcements to the Middle East to 
an extent which would jeopardise the safety of the United Kingdom. 
10. For the Germans a successful invasion is the only quick way of ending the 
war. As American aid increases, up to the point of actual participation, our naval and 
mercantile fleets will be augmented and the weight of our bombing attack on 
Germany will increase. At the same time Germany's military and economic 
commitments grow with every conquest. Hitler must realise that time is fighting 
against him, and he will be more and more tempted to make the desperate gamble of 
invasion in the hope of gaining a knock-out before American help destroys his last 
hope of success. 
11. The enemy on interior lines can change front over the land from East to West 
far more quickly than we can by sea. It is therefore essential that sufficient forces be 
kept in the United Kingdom to provide adequate defence against invasion.4 
4 The minute was signed: Dudley Pound (chief of naval staff, 1939-1943), J G Dill (chief of imperial 
general staff, 1940-1941) and C Portal (marshal of RAF, 1940-1945). 
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26 CO 323/1858/20, no 3 25 Aug 1941 
[The Atlantic Charter]: letter from Mr Amery to Lord Moyne on the 
interpretation of article 3. 1 Enclosure: draft memorandum for the War 
Cabinet 
My dear Waiter, 
The Eight-Point Declaration has, inevitably, let loose a lot of questions about its 
application to the Empire-strictly speaking irrelevant in view of the specific 
reference of that declaration to war issues. It is obviously desirable that there should 
be an authoritative interpretation by the War Cabinet and I have drafted a 
Memorandum, primarily with reference to India and Burma where the question is 
most acute. But it affects your field as well and on second thoughts it has occurred to 
me that a joint Memorandum from us both would be even better. I have accordingly 
tentatively added a paragraph about the Colonial Empire, which, of course, you may 
wish to amend, expand or wholly rewrite. Or, indeed, you may wish to send in an 
entirely different memorandum. Anyhow Jet me know as soon as you can what you 
would like done. 
Enclosure to 26 
Yours ever, 
Leo Amery 
It will be seen from the telegrams appended2 that Point Ill of the Eight-Point 
Declaration has already been fastened upon by the Burman Ministers as an argument 
for a promise forthwith of full self-government immediately after the war, regardless 
of the actual circumstances either of Burma itself or of the international situation. 
The Viceroy, too, is anxious as to the meaning that will be given to Point Ill by Indian 
politicians, and would be grateful for an authoritative interpretation of it upon which 
he can base a reply to enquiries, whether by his Council or leaders of political 
organisations. Lastly a motion is down in the Ceylon Legislative Council too. This 
question of interpretation in its application to the component units of the British 
Empire is certain also to be raised in Parliament, whether by questions addressed to 
one or other of us or in the course of debate on any oral statement that the Prime 
Minister may make in regard to the Eight-Point Declaration when the House meets. 
As I read it, the Declaration itself, or rather its preamble, makes it clear that it is a 
general affirmation of the principles for which we are waging the present war and 
which we aim to see established in the peace that will follow victory, and that the 
object of Point Ill in particular is simply to give an assurance that we have no desire 
to impose against their will, either upon the peoples with whom we are at war or 
upon those whom we hope to liberate, any particular type of constitution. Though 
1 Article three of the joint declaration made on 12 Aug 1941 by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister 
Churchill declared: '[T]hey respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which 
they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of 
them' (Cmd 6321). 
2 Telegrams not printed. 
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animated by the same spirit of liberty as has guided the development of self-
governing institutions in the British Empire-with regard to which both the general 
aim of our policy and its particular application in the case of India, Burma and 
certain of the more fully developed Crown Colonies, has been made abundantly 
clear- it has no direct reference to that process. 
What I would suggest is some slight amplication of the above reading of Point Ill 
somewhat on the following lines:-
The development of self-governing institutions to the fullest extent within the 
British Empire has been, and is, our declared policy. This applies to every people 
within that Empire; but the extent to which the policy can be applied in any 
particular case at any given date must, of course, depend on the special 
circumstances of each case. In the case of the Dominions the principle has already 
attained its fullest fru ition. In the case of India we are pledged to help her to obtain 
the same position of equal freedom in partnership with ourselves. By the 
Declaration of Policy of August 1940 we undertook to implement that pledge so 
soon after the war as agreement is arrived at between the main elements in India's 
national life with regard to the form of her future constitution, and the subsequent 
necessary provision made for the due fulfilment of obligations arising from our 
long historic connection with India. That declaration did, in fact, not only give our 
pledge as to the attainment by India of free self-government in the fullest sense 
and at the earliest possible moment, so far at any rate as the matter is in our 
hands, but also dealt on the most generous lines with the specific issues raised by 
Point Ill of the "Atlantic Charter" of liberty of choice of the form of constitution. 
Similarly in Burma, the Governor's address to the Legislature on 26th August 
1940 stated that full self-government, which is the essence of Dominion status, is 
the goal for Burma as for India, and that the discussions for which we have 
undertaken to give an opportunity at the end of the war, with regard to an 
expansion of the already extensive measure of self-government already enjoyed by 
the Burmese people, will afford an opportunity to Burmans to devise and 
propound amendments of this constituion suited to what is, in their view, required 
to meet their country's needs. 
In the Colonial Empire every type and degree of self-government has evolved, 
and is continuing to evolve, in accordance with the particular circumstances of 
each territory. Here, too, as has been notably demonstrated by the varied 
application of the general principle of what is known as "Indirect Rule", we have 
throughout endeavoured to insure that the form, as well as the substance, of 
self-government should be that most in accordance with the traditions and 
conceptions of the peoples concerned, and to avoid imposing any stereotyped 
constitutional system based on purely British analogies. 
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27 CO 323/1858/20, no 4 26 Aug 1941 
[The Atlantic Charter]: letter (reply) from Lord Moyne to Mr Amery. 
Enclosure: alternative draft statement on the colonial empire 
My dear Leo, 
Many thanks for sending me your draft memorandum. 1 I would, of course, like to be 
able to agree to a formula to cover both India and the Colonies: but I am afraid I 
would have difficulty accepting your first two sentences.2 Self-governing institutions 
would probably be interpreted in many quarters to rule out all reserve powers. Some 
Colonies are so small, or strategically so important, that complete self-government 
seems out of the question: and I cannot, for instance, imagine any conditions under 
which we would give Dominion status to Aden, Gibraltar, the Gambia or British 
Honduras. 
I enclose an alternative to your first sentence and I would suggest that, when you 
have considered the matter, we might meet and see whether your draft can be 
modified to meet the Colonial case. I think I could accept your last paragraph if the 
world "self' in the first and [sixth]3 lines were left out. 
Enclosure to 27 
Yours ever 
(Sgd) Waiter M 
The third of the eight principles of the Atlantic Charter contains the phrase "they 
respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they 
will live". That principle is of universal application. It has long been the principle 
that has governed the relations of H.M.G. with the various peoples of the British 
Empire. These peoples live under many different forms of government according 
with their varying traditions and wishes. It has never been the policy of H.M.G. to 
impose any uniform pattern upon the British Empire, any more than it is their desire 
to impose a uniform pattern on Europe. In some quarters the sentence which I have 
quoted has been interpreted as giving the right to full self-government. That is 
placing upon the phrase an interpretation wider than it should be made to bear. 
While not in any way whittling down the principle which, as has been stated, they 
regard as of universal application, H.M.G. must retain to themselves the right to 
judge whether any such request is justified by the capabilities of the people in 
question. They must take into account not only the wishes, maybe the transient 
wishes, of the more vocal section of the community but the real welfare of the 
community as a whole, including the interests of many racial and cultural groups 
which must live together in many parts of the Empire. 
The phrase thus introduces no new principle into our Imperial policy. What that 
1 See 26. 
2 Beginning 'The development of self-governing institutions' and ending 'circumstances of each case'. 
3 Entry in square brackets indicates line of draft as printed here. 
170 CHAPTER 2 [28) 
policy is in regard to particular territories has often been stated. In the case of India. 
4 
4 In the event Amery and Moyne submitted separate memos which Cabinet discussed on 4 Sept 1941. 
Ministers decided that Churchill should make a shorter statement about the Atlantic Charter in response 
to a parliamentary question. In his statement of 9 Sept the prime minister made plain his view that article 
3 of the charter was intended to apply only to 'the restoration of the sovereignty, self-government and 
national life of the States and nations of Europe now under Nazi yoke .. .'. He described 'the progressive 
evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions and peoples which owe allegiance to the British 
Crown' as a 'quite separate problem' and concluded: 'We have made declarations on these matters which 
are complete in themselves, free from ambiguity and related to the conditions and circumstances of 
territories and peoples affected' (H of C Debs, vol 372, cols 67-69). 
In June and July 1942 Arthur Creech Jones, Labour MP and chairman of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, 
sought clarification of the declarations to which Churchill had referred. He extracted from Harold 
Macmillan, parliamentary under-secretary of state at the CO, a pledge to have the declarations published 
in a white paper. Subsequent research in the CO revealed what G E J Gent described as 'the absence of any 
satisfactory organisation for collecting and recording constitutional material of the sort now required' (CO 
323/1848/19, minute by Gent, 21 Aug 1942). A number of general statements about the colonial empire, 
together with particular statements on individual colonies, were collected and submitted to Macmillan 
who described them as 'scrappy, obscure and jejeune' and totally unsuitable for publication. The prime 
minister, according to Macmillan, could not have realised 'the true nakedness of the land' when he made 
his statement in Sept 1941. 'We have no complete list of our pledges and commitments. In private life, this 
leads inevitably to bankruptcy.' The CO sought refuge in a personal appeal to Creech Jones to let the 
matter drop (ibid, minute by Macmillan, 1 Sept 1942). 
28 FO 371/30673, no 431 26 Dec 1941 
'Proposal for Anglo-American co-operation in the Caribbean': memo-
randum by T N Whitehead1 
[American interests in the Caribbean were economic and political as well as strategic. In 
1937 two members of President Roosevelt's 'New Deal' group-Charles Taussig and 
Rexford Tuxwell (see 34)-visited seven of the islands and submitted a critical report to 
the effect that economic and political conditions alike gave cause for concern. Conditions 
in the British territories were particularly criticised, Tugwell later describing economic 
life in the British territories as being 'held in a vice by a few merchants and planters' (R G 
Tuxwell, The stricken land: the story of Puerto Rico (New York, 1947) p 64, quoted in DJ 
Morgan, The official history of colonial development vol1 (London, 1980, p 159). These 
concerns over economic and social conditions resurfaced after the agreement of Mar 1941 
over bases (see 24, note). The Roosevelt administration was keenly aware that bases in 
hostile or unstable territories would lose much of their value. For CO responses to the 
American proposal to establish a joint commission, see 34.) 
On the lOth Aprill941, Lord Halifax2 forwarded to the Prime Minister a memoran-
dum which had been handed to him by Mr. Welles3 on the same day. This 
memorandum refers to the recommendations of the West India Royal Commission in 
most complimentary terms and states that these will prove of value to the U.S. 
Government in connexion with Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Among other 
1 Professor T North Whitehead, a specialist on the US recently recruited by the North American Dept of 
the FO. Whitehead drafted the War Cabinet memo by Halifax about the lease of bases (see 24). 
2 Now UK ambassador in Washington, 1941-1946. 
3 Under-secretary of state, US, 1937-1943; special representative of President Roosevelt on provisional 
administration of European colonies and possessions in the Americas. 
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things, this memorandum expresses the opinion that "in a larger sense, the 
recommendations of the Royal Commission point the way toward a general 
rehabilitation of the people of the entire Caribbean area .... The programme as laid 
down by the Royal Commission is in itself a definitive and major objective for 
postwar development". The memorandum goes on to say that the U.S.G. is 
considering the creation of an advisory committee for the Caribbean area, to consist 
of a representative of the State Department, War Department, Navy Department, and 
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, together with attached consultant experts from 
various other Departments of State (Agriculture, Labour, Justice, etc.). Finally, it is 
suggested that the Advisory Committee and the British Welfare Fund (now 
functioning) should initiate co-operative research and exchange of information in 
various fields to prevent duplication of effort. To this end, it is further proposed that 
a joint committee be set up by the two Governments to consist of not more than six 
members, with the Chairmen of the United States Advisory Committee and the 
British Welfare Fund as eo-Chairmen of this joint advisory committee. 
2. In his covering letter to the Prime Minister, Lord Halifax says that in more 
than one conversation with the President the latter expressed his strong feeling that 
whatever is possible should be done to strengthen the economic life of the West 
Indian Islands, and that this could best be done in co-operation. Moreover, Mr. 
Welles told the Ambassador that "they would be very glad to be able to make some 
progress in the course of the next three or four weeks". That statement was made on 
the lOth April 1941. 
3. After consulting the Colonial Office, we informed the U.S.G. of our agreement 
in principle, and on the 18th July sent to Lord Halifax, for submission to the U.S.G., 
a draft of a joint communique for simultaneous release. We received back an 
alternative draft submitted by Mr. Welles .... In this draft the following paragraph 
occurs:-
"Members of the Commission will concern themselves primarily with matters 
pertaining to labour, agriculture, housing, health, education, finance and related 
subjects in territories under British and United States flags within this territory, 
and on these matters will advise their respective Governments." 
On the 24th November, the Colonial Office suggested a purely technical alteration to 
the American draft, and meanwhile telegraphed the American text to the Govern-
ments of the various British islands affected, to obtain their views; these views have 
not yet been communicated to the Foreign Office.4 
4. On the 21st December Mr. Welles again approached Lord Halifax in the matter, 
saying that he understood "that the food situation was becoming difficult in some of 
our West Indian colonies, and that the early establishment of the Commission would 
make it easier for the United States to concert measures with us for the relief of the 
food situation. He accordingly pressed us to accelerate the matter with the colonial 
Governments" .... With reference to this telegram, Mr. Downie5 of the Colonial 
Office informed us orally that the Colonial Office do not like the introduction of the 
4 With the exception of the governor of the Windward Islands, who expressed concern about a revival of 
fears of US domination, the proposal was welcomed by governors. In Mar 1942 the Jamaican People's Party 
protested that no provision had been made to associate representatives of the British West Indian people; 
they were assured that any proposals would be referred to local legislatures (CO 318/452/3). 
5 Assistant secretary, West Indian Dept, CO. 
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relief suggestion into the picture, and that already the Colonial Office feel that the 
United States proposals, particularly the inclusion of finance within the Committee's 
terms of reference (see paragraph of American draft communique quoted above) go 
beyond what the C.O. consider to be desirable. Mr. Downie added that consideration 
of this latter point is holding up expression to us of the C.O. views on the subject. 
5. Already over 8 months have elapsed since Mr. Welles handed his memorandum 
to Lord Halifax, and so far, beyond an agreement in principle with the U.S.G.'s 
proposal for a joint committee, no practical steps have been achieved to implement 
the co-operative action desired by Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Welles. This appears to be 
largely due to the reluctance of the Colonial Office to agree to the wide terms of 
reference proposed by the U.S.G. This is a most unfortunate state of affairs, and for 
the reasons listed below, any failure on our part to co-operate willingly with America 
in the Caribbean is likely to have the worst possible result. 
(a) It would appear that conditions in our Caribbean possessions leave something 
to be desired, and it could hardly create a good impression, either at home or 
abroad, if we were to become known that H.M.G. had failed to accept an offer of 
co-operation by the U.S.G. in order to attack our mutual problems in this area. 
(b) After the war, the United States will be far stronger economically, commercial-
ly and militarily than ourselves. If we fail to co-operate with the Americans now in 
the Caribbean, then it is only too likely that they will go ahead on their own and 
improve conditions in the islands of the United States. The comparative strength 
of America, combined with the relative paucity of her overseas possessions, makes 
it only too probable that she will do a far better job than we, acting alone, can do 
for our Caribbean possessions, and we may be faced with an unpleasant example 
on our doorstep of relatively satisfactory colonies contrasting to our disadvantage 
with our own islands. This is not likely to help either the loyalty or the satisfaction 
of our own subjects in this area. 
(c) The Caribbean is an area which, for geographical reasons, is bound to be of 
more immediate and vital importance to the New World, specifically to the U.S.A., 
than to us. In the long run, our failure to collaborate in a generous spirit on 
Caribbean affairs can only result in the United States strengthening her influence 
in this region at our expense. 
(d) The Prime Minister and others have expressed their hope, and indeed their 
belief, that British and American affairs will be increasingly interlocked as time 
goes on. It is widely believed in Britain that no other course would offer us 
reasonable security for the future . The present proposal by the U.S.G. to 
collaborate with us in the rehabilitation of the Caribbean Islands would seem to 
present an excellent and particularly favourable occasion for promoting closer 
relations between the two countries. If we are too suspicious of American motives 
to accept this, then it can only be presumed that we do not really intend to foster 
closer relations between the two nations-at any rate, this is the conclusion which 
the Americans would be likely to draw, and we must not be surprised if this has its 
repercussions in America's postwar actions. 
6. For the various reasons given above, it is submitted that we should accept the 
American draft communique without further delay, and that we should show every 
willingness to collaborate in the Caribbean on a wide basis. I submit that this can 
only be achieved if the matter is taken up at a high level. 
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29 CO 875/18/10 15-17 June 1942 
[America and the colonial empire]: minutes by N J Sabine, 1 
J B Sidebotham, 2 and G E J Gent on information measures and a new 
definition of colonial policy 
Mr. Sidebotham 
I am recording on this file a note of the conversation we had on Thursday afternoon 
with Mr. Harold Butler,3 who is going to America to take charge of British 
information services. 
The following are the main points. 
(1) We made it clear to Mr. Butler that it was a preliminary discussion and that 
any specific proposals would be made through the American Division of the 
Ministry, in consultation with the Empire Division. 
(2) We put to him the suggestion that it was of great importance to set up some 
machinery for spreading knowledge about the Colonies in America, not so much 
as a negative defensive measure but in a more positive way and with the object of 
trying to interest the Americans in an aspect of our activity here which, if they 
became interested in it, might provide common ground for discussion and 
possible collaboration in the future. 
I understood that Mr. Butler agreed strongly with this view. We outlined to Mr. 
Butler very briefly our ideas (see (40) on 1941 file) for an organisation in America 
including a university lecturer, a journalist and a series of lecturers on a rather less 
academic plane. In this connection Mr. Butler told us that he hoped to arrange for 
Professor Hancock4 and Professor Coupland5 to proceed to America later in the year 
to lecture to universities and other bodies about the Colonies. We gave Mr. Butler a 
brief account of the activities in this direction which we have been able to carry out 
so far, including the arranging of the series of articles for "Bulletins from Britain", 
one of which, of course, he has prepared himself. 
Mr. Butler gave me, and I think you too, the impression that he was convinced 
that what we had in mind could and should be done. Our talk with him will, I think, 
be useful as a basis upon which to approach the American Division of the Ministry 
through the Empire Division, and we may perhaps hope that more progress will be 
possible now than it has been in the past. I think higher authority should see this 
note and I think the next step should be for us to prepare a provisional scheme based 
on the information already at our disposal. 
N.J.S. 
15.6.42 
1 Acting public relations officer, CO, from July 1940; public relations officer, with rank of assistant 
secretary, from Nov 1942. 
2 Assistant secretary, CO. 
3 Of the Ministry of Information. 
4Professor of history, Birmingham University, 1934-1944; author of Survey of British Commonwealth 
Affairs (1937, 1940 and 1942); Chichele professor of economic history in the University of Oxford, 
1944-1949; director of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies and professor of British Commonwealth 
affairs in the University of London, 1949-1956. 
5 Beit professor of the history of the British empire in the University of Oxford, 1920-1948. 
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Mr. Gent 
I think you should see Mr. Sabine's record of what I felt was a very useful meeting. 
I was glad to have the opportunity of meeting Mr. Butler. In the course of the talk 
he suggested that there was real need for a new definition of Colonial policy or 
something like a Colonial Charter. I referred to the fact that the Prime Minister 
appeared unwilling to go beyond the explanation he had himself given in the 
House of the Colonial position vis-a-vis the Atlantic Charter, but Mr. Butler 
'A' emphasised the fact that from the point of view of propaganda in America, at any 
rate, a clear statement of our post war policy in relation to the Colonies would 
probably be extremely useful. However, this file is not, I think, the proper place to 
consider that question. 
I understand that Mr. Butler has since seen the Secretary of State and had further 
discussions with him. I Agree with Mr. Sabine that now is the time to put some plan 
in relation to propaganda in America in train, and this should be done in close 
collaboration with the Ministry of Information. But plans cannot be finally worked 
out until, I think, we have had, as we should certainly hope to have, Mr. Butler's own 
views as to the best form they should take when he has had time to look around after 
reaching America. In the meantime, I think there is a certain amount of preliminary 
work which can usefully be done, and if you agree, we should go ahead with it as Mr 
Sabine suggests. 
J.B.S. 
15.6.42 
I entirely agree with the view that there is a need for 'A' which will face frankly the 
political problem & will not take refuge in economic ideals of material betterment. 
But the whole question of British information in the U.S.A. has to be handled over a 
very wide field, & the F.O. is especially concerned: the F.O. has, of course, no policy 
at present & is, as far as I gather, extremely nervous at the prospect of having to 
formulate even the outline of one for the forthcoming Pacific Relations Conference. 
Mr Ashley Clarke, head of the F.O. Far Eastern Dept, has just returned from America 
& has written a full memorandum (which I have not yet seen: it is being printed & 
will then be circulated) on American present ideas on the postwar organisation of the 
Far East including a probable reluctance to see 'British rule', in status quo ante, 
restored in H.K., Malaya & Burma. 
Nonetheless we shd not be delayed by this in our own purposes of spreading in the 
U.S. the truth about our administration in the Cols., and the provisional scheme of 
lectures, publications etc which Mr. Sabine has in mind shd be pressed on in 
consultation with the M. of I. 
G.E.J.G. 
17.6.42 
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30 CO 825/35/4 17 June 1942 
'Post-war policy in the Far East': minute by G E J Gent on Dutch views 
and 'defeati~m· in the FO Far Eastern outlook 
[Gent commented in this minute on the record of a discussion between Cranborne and Dr 
H J van Mook, the Dutch colonial minister, on 12 June. Van Mook (a) broached the idea of 
a federation between Holland and the Netherlands East In dies at the end of the war and 
(b) expressed concern that in the long run, America and China posed greater threats than 
Japan because they would come to the peace conference 'claiming to have won the war in 
the Pacific, and would demand a say in the post-war set up over the whole area' (CO 
825/35/4, no 15, minute by Cranborne, 12 June 1942, reproduced in BDEEP series B, vol 
3, A J Stockwell, ed, Malaya, part I, 3.] 
This is a most interesting expression of Dutch views and the Dutch apprehensions 
... are I think shared by many of us. I have had some conversations in recent days 
with Sir John Brenan1 of the Foreign Office who is concerned with the prospective 
Pacific Relations Conference in the U.S.A.2 and the need for formulating at least an 
outline of British post war policy in the Far East for the guidance of the British 
delegates at the Conference. Mr. Ashley Clarke, head of the Far East Department of 
the Foreign Office, has recently come back from America, where he has been 
impressed by the volume and nature of certain vocal American criticism of British 
Colonial Administration in the Far East. He has written a long, and in Sir John 
Brenan's view, interesting memorandum on his visit, and it is being printed and a 
copy of it will in due course come to us. 
But what seems to be lacking in the F.O. is any sign of robust reaction to American 
largely uninformed criticism on this matter such as the practical line the Dutch take 
in the Secretary of State's note about Mr. Van Moek. There is a kind of defeatism in 
the Foreign Office Far Eastern outlook which is not a new phenomenon. They suffer 
from what to my mind is a quite fatal lack of belief and confidence themselves in our 
position in the Colonies, and they seem to be fascinated by the belief that H.M.G. 
must be subservient to the supposed American policy of preventing the restoration of 
British sovereignty in Malaya, Hong Kong, and possibly Burma too. There are 
various side currents which tend to encourage the Foreign Office in their inclination 
to abase themselves before "American" opinion right or wrong e.g. the possibility of 
American Forces themselves being in the position of liberators of Malaya and Hong 
Kong when the time comes: and also the predominant part which it is likely that 
American relief and reconstructive organizations will play in the Far Eastern sector. 
It is certain that the Foreign Office need stimulating in order that their phobia in 
these urgent practical questions of the formulation of post war policy in the Far East, 
including the restoration of British Authority in Malaya and Hong Kong, may be 
removed. I told Sir John Brenan, when I saw him yesterday, that it seems to me that 
it may be necessary for the Colonial Office to start the ball rolling by convening an 
interdepartmental meeting if it was impossible for the Foreign Office (whose 
function it ought to be) to do so, since any plans we make in the Colonial Office must 
envisage our restoration in Malaya and Hong Kong whatever changes might 
thereafter result from negotiations with China or other of our present allies. 
1 Consul-general Shanghai, 1929-1938; FO adviser on Chinese affairs, 1937-1943. 
2 In fact the conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations was held at Mont Tremblant, Quebec, in Dec 
1942. 
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31 FO 371/31777, no 5965 18 Aug 1942 
[Post-war policy in the Far East]: letter from Lord Cranborne to Mr 
Eden. Minutes by Sir J Brenan, H Ashley Clarke, 1 H M Gladwyn Jebb2 
and N M Butler3 
My dear Anthony 
I send you a paper4 which I have produced in the Colonial Office regarding the 
post-war policy of His Majesty's Government in the Far East. I gather that the 
Foreign Office are also working on a similar paper. When this is completed, I suggest 
that it would be useful if we had an interdepartmental meeting, including, in 
addition to our two departments, representatives of the Dominions Office and the 
India Office, both of which are vitally concerned, to try and hammer out an agreed 
policy. 
I feel very strongly that this is a question on which we must, from the start, take a 
firm line. We must not allow ourselves to be manoeuvred by the Chinese and 
Americans into the position of standing in a white sheet. Our record is not a bad one. 
On the contrary, over a long period, we established a reign of peace and prosperity, in 
the areas over which we exercised control, hitherto unknown. We created Hong 
Kong and Singapore. We developed the rubber and tin industries of Malaya. It is true 
that in one vital sphere we failed. We were unable to defend our territories against 
Japan. But even here we were not the only nation, or indeed the main nation, at 
fault. As we both know, the chief sinner was the United States. Had she been willing 
to throw in her weight in the Pacific in the years preceding the war, when we were 
preoccupied with the deteriorating situation in Europe and she was not, the Japanese 
menace might have been strangled before it became really dangerous. By all means, 
let us shoulder our share of the blame, but not hers too. It is for that reason that I 
think it essential that any concessions that we make should not be unilateral. If we 
do not insist upon this, we shall be regarded as accepting sole responsibility for what 
has occurred. We all have a contribution to make, in the future as in the past, if peace 
is to be preserved in the Pacific. But His Majesty Government should make it clear 
that our contribution should be dependent on a similar contribution being made by 
others, whose responsibility for the unhappy situation which exists to-day is at least 
as great as ours. 
Minutes on 31 
Yours ever 
Bobbety5 
The Colonial Office has necessarily been somewhat vague and cautious in setting out 
their ideas, but I gather that in essence they are:-
(a) the return of Hong Kong to China, on terms; 
1 Head of Far Eastern Dept, FO. 
3 Head of North American Dept, FO. 
2 Head of Economic and Reconstruction Dept, FO. 
4 Not printed. 
5 Eden minuted on this letter, 19 Aug: 'Dept for views. This seems cheerfully robust.' 
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(b) a Union of the British colonies and protectorates in the South Seas comprising 
the Malay States, the Straits Settlements and the territories under British 
protection in Borneo. The different areas in the Union would have their separate 
local administrations much as before, except that North Borneo would cease to be 
managed by a chartered company and become a direct responsibility of H.M. 
Government; 
(c) it is further conceived that this Union would form part of a wider cooperative 
scheme in the Pacific area to be arranged by the United Nations for defence and 
economic development. Within this wider framework the Malaya-Borneo Union 
would be regarded as a sphere of British influence. 
It is emphasised that the concessions made by the British to achieve the above 
results must be reciprocated by the other nations concerned. 
The policy outlined in the memorandum accords with the views already expressed 
on other papers by this department, and I think we can welcome the paper as a 
valuable contribution to the discussion. 
I would point out, however, with reference to paragraph 7 of the section about 
Hong Kong, that however much in confidence we may tell the Chinese Government 
of our intentions in respect of the colony, these will soon become public. Not that 
that matters very much. 
J.F.B. 
25.8.42 
After this paper had been prepared, but before it had been communicated by Lord 
Cranborne to the Secretary of State, the former had a discussion with Mr. Law6 at the 
Colonial Office. There were also present Sir George Cater and Mr. Gent of the 
Colonial Office, Sir David Scotf and myself. It transpired that Lord Cranborne 
thought that three papers were required. 
(a) a kind of "Colonial Charter" or summary of our main pronouncements and 
undertakings in regard to our Colonial Empire; 
(b) a joint Foreign Office and Colonial Office paper on the post-war reconstruction 
of the Far East, and 
(c) a document to provide the basis for publicity setting forth the achievements of 
all the Colonial Powers (including the United States and the Dutch). 
In regard to (a) the Colonial Office were making a search through their archives, but 
it appeared that there had never been any very comprehensive statement of colonial 
aims. This and (c) would depend a good deal on what we did in regard to (b). 
Lord Cranborne then developed the general positon which he thought we should 
take up on the lines of the covering letter to his memorandum. We expressed our 
agreement. Sir David Scott pointed out, however, to Lord Cranborne the rapidity 
with which American notions appeared to be crystallizing and the consequent 
urgency of formulating a policy of our own. 
Lord Cranborne indicated in general terms some of the points contained in his 
memorandum, but there was no detailed discussion of these pending receipt of the 
6 Mr R K Law, parliamentary under-secretary of state for foreign affairs. 
7 FO assistant under-secretary of state. 
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text. Since there appeared, however, to be no marked divergence of view between the 
two Departments, it was decided that the Foreign Office should attempt to produce a 
paper into which the Colonial Office memorandum could be embodied. 
I share Sir J. Brenan's view concerning the Colonial Office memorandum and have 
now prepared and will circulate separately a draft Foreign Office- Colonial Office 
paper. 
But I must draw attention to one point on which there are strongly divergent 
views. This is the question of the future of Hong Kong. The Colonial Office proposals 
are at variance with the view expressed by Sir M. Peterson8 in his minute of 17th 
August on F 5506, namely that we cannot afford to contemplate failing to retain this 
Colony. The Secretary of State for India has also expressed himself strongly on this 
point (see F 5964/0087/G). 
For the immediate purposes of the Foreign Office-Colonial Office paper I have 
embodied the views of the Colonial Office pending any decision as to whether we can 
accept them. The views of Far Eastern Department are contained in Sir J. Brenan's 
minute on F 5506. These, combined with the observations of the Colonial Office, 
certainly seem to point to the rendition of Hong Kong. 
I think this is a sensible paper. 
H.A.C. 
27.8.42 
With respect, I cannot understand the view that we should insist on the retention 
of full British sovereignty over Hong Kong. After all, the Leased Territories will after 
not so long a period pass out of our possession anyhow, & it is surely out of the 
question to believe that after the war we shall be in a position to impose a settlement 
in the Far East against the wishes of the U.S.A. and China. 
With regard to Malaya it may not be good tactics (from the point of view of getting 
agreement here) to make use of the word 'responsive', but it is of course entirely 
meaningless as it stands. 
Generally speaking I believe that we shall only get the Americans to play in Europe 
( & this will be difficult enough in all conscience) if we go a long way towards meeting 
their wishes in the Far East. The essential thing is to try to ensure that we in any case 
administer the colonies from which we have been evicted. Whether we call ourselves 
a 'parent-state' & accept the overriding authority of some 'Regional Commission' 
seems to me to matter much less. I also think that we ought to try to take the wind 
out of the American sails by suggesting ourselves some rather high-falutin' 
declaration about a New Order for the Colonies. 
H.M.G.J. 
28.8.42 
I agree that is is a mistake to suggest meaningless words like "responsive" to the 
Americans; they only create suspicion and stand no real chance of survival. 
As regards Hong Kong it seems to me that we should put politico-strategic 
interests first. If we want the U.S. to accept defence commitments in parts of the 
world such as Singapore far further afield than anything she has accepted hitherto, 
8 Ambassador temporarily employed in FO; superintending under-secretary of state, Far Eastern Dept. 
[32) DEFENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 179 
we shall have to make a general agreement that is satisfactory to her, and I wd. 
certainly expect the rendition of Hong Kong, on terms, to be an essential part of such 
a settlement because of a) the Atlantic Charter, and b) of Americans' passion for the 
Chinese. 
Further, if as C.O. rightly desire, the rendition is to seem spontaneous, we shall 
need to make our intention known in advance as proposed by C.O. 
I believe too that if at a pretty early date we show the Americans that we are to be 
liberal to their beloved Chinese we shall stand a very good chance of getting the 
Americans early on our side in resisting possible extreme manifestations of Chinese 
Imperialism in places inconvenient to us-such as Malaya where a complication is 
that of Chinese immigration-not unfamiliar to the Americans elsewhere. 
I do not think that in American eyes at least we should lose face or prestige by 
'rendering'. For the present I hope we shall stress that Hong Kong is our creation. 
N.M.B. 
28.8.42 
I continue to believe that the F.O. paper shd. reflect the F.O. views, whatever these 
may be found to be, & should be uninfluenced by the views of the C.O. After all, the 
primary objective of the C.O.-entirely rightly-is to defend the rights & interests of 
the British Colonial Empire. The primary objective of the F.O., on the other hand, is 
to ensure that, as far as possible, America comes into the peace. 
H.M.G.J. 
2.9.42 
32 FO 371131777, no 6225 10 Sept 1942 
'Post-war settlement in the Far East': FO record of an inter-
departmental meeting. 1 Minutes by H Ashley Clarke, J E Coulson, 
RAsh ton, A C E Malcolm, F E Evans2 and N M Butler 
The meeting had before them a paper which embodied the views of the Foreign Office 
and the Colonial Office and the meeting directed their attention more especially to 
the colonial aspect of the proposals made therein. 
Doubt was expressed whether the position in the Far East could be considered in 
isolation, since many problems, notably the relationship between the administering 
Powers and the indigenous populations, were common to colonies in all parts of the 
world. The Secretary of State for the Colonies explained that he attached consider-
able importance to the differentiation between Far Eastern colonies and those, for 
example, in Africa. Conditions varied widely in the different colonies especially in 
regard to their capacity of self-government and he preferred that no precedent 
should necessarily be created by any international regime agreed upon for the Far 
1 Present: Mr Attlee (in the chair), Mr Eden, Mr Amery, Lord Cranborne, Mr Emrys-Evans (parliamentary 
under-secretary of state for the dominions), SirE Machtig (DO), Sir M Peterson, NB Ronald and H Ashley 
Clarke (FO), Sir D Monteath (India Office), Sir G Cater and G E 1 Gent (CO). 
2 Coulson and Ashton were officers in the FO Economic and Reconstruction Dept; Malcolm and Evans 
were officers in the FO North American Dept. 
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East. This should be possible in view of the much less direct interest of the United 
States in Africa. 
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs explained that the origin of the paper 
had been twofold, (a) because it would be necessary to give some general guidance to 
Lord Hailey, who was heading a delegation to an unofficial Pacific Relations 
Conference in the United States later in the year, and (b) because it was desirable to 
make known in the United States our aims as well as our record in view of the 
widespread public interest there in the future of the Pacific area. Subsequently Lord 
Halifax had mentioned to Mr. Hull3 our intention of making a general declaration of 
aims in regard to colonial matters. Mr. Hull responded by suggesting that it would be 
preferable to make a joint declaration. The paper before the meeting was an attempt 
to discover whether there were the heads of a possible declaration which we could 
now suggest to Mr. Hull. On the assumption that this was so, the Foreign Office were 
preparing the outline of a declaration which could be communicated to Mr. Hull. 
The Secretary of State for India suggested that the basic considerations were 
strategic and that the solutions proposed in the paper should be judged from the 
point of view of the present and prospective requirements of the Services. During the 
last war territorial changes had been considered by committees on which the Chiefs 
of Staff were represented and he thought it wise that Service experts-and of course 
the Dominions-should be consulted before anything was said to the Americans. 
There was one major point of detail on which he disagreed with the paper, namely 
the implication that Hong Kong should be given up. There was no reason why Hong 
Kong should not continue to exist as it was (as, for example, Macao and Pondicherry 
would no doubt continue). He thought that we should not abandon any territory 
without at least considering what essential strategic desiderata we could obtain in 
return. If China were unified and strong, he thought we should require some better 
strategical situation such as Hainan. But he did not think we should be called upon 
to cede any British subjects, even though of alien race. If China were anarchic, Hong 
Kong might well form a haven of refuge. 
It was pointed out that in the paper before the meeting what we gave up was 
contingent on what other Powers were prepared to do in the common interest. It was 
only proposed that we should declare our readiness to discuss Hong Kong in return 
for certain advantages. If conditions in China were not favourable to such discussions 
or if such advantages were not forthcoming, the proposal would naturally fall to the 
ground. 
The Chairman said that his objection to the paper was firstly that it appeared to 
propose a reversion to pre-war ideas, including a balance of power and uncontrolled 
free trade. Secondly, the people of this country would not wish to have the exclusive 
privilege of paying for the defence of all these territories at the expense of their own 
standard of living and for the benefit of certain privileged classes. Thirdly, instead of 
national armaments he favoured an international force and a general sharing of the 
burden of defending these colonial areas. This could be best achieved by internation-
al control and administration of these territories. 
The Secretary of State for India urged that, apart from the examples there were of 
inefficiency resulting from an attempt at internationl administration, the chief 
objection to such administration was that it removed ultimate responsibility from 
3 US secretary of state, 1933-1944. 
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particular governments and placed it on the shoulders of an international body 
which would have to act as a kind of super State. He considered that we had a direct 
moral responsibility for the welfare of native populations in the territories with 
which we have been associated and that we must continue to bear that responsibility 
in our own territories. Our failure in the past had not generally speaking been in 
respect of administration but in respect of defence. This must be remedied. Moreover 
it was our duty to promote a higher standard of living not only in this Island but 
throughout the Empire. 
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs emphasised that it was incumbent upon 
us to construct a system in which the Americans would wish to cooperate, since we 
wanted them to develop a common interest with us in maintaining order in the Far 
East. To that extent we must adapt our own former position in the colonial 
territories to take account of certain essential American requirements, for example 
free access to rubber and tin at a reasonable price. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that in his view the functions of the 
international supervisory body would be analogous to those of the Mandates 
Commission but that instead of being composed of representatives of small States 
having no practical experience of colonial administration it would consist of 
representatives of the administering States themselves and would be in a sense an 
expert body of which the members, in considering particular problems, would be 
aware of kindred problems in the territories under their own administration. It was 
admitted that there would be no sanction behind the decisions of such a body except 
that of war between the constituent members, but it was pointed out that there 
would be a broad sanction in the fact that the disregard by one government of the 
recommendations of the body would ipso facto weaken the general solidarity in 
collective defence which it was in the interests of all the members to maintain. 
· The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs thought there were only two alterna-
tives: (1) that proposed in the paper before the meeting, which, while providing for 
international supervision, allowed for direct responsibility on the part of the 
sovereign Power administering any individual territory, and (2) direct control and 
administration by an international body under some uncertain form of international 
sovereignty. It was evident that some means of reconciling or choosing between 
these two conceptions must be found. 
A discussion then ensued as to the best practical means of overcoming the 
divergence of view which had become apparent. The Chairman expressed a wish that 
the economic implications of a settlement in the Far East should be carefully 
examined. The suggestion was also made that the matter should be referred to the 
Chiefs of Staff for a strategical appreciation of the elements of the problem. It was 
decided that the latter course was scarcely practical without further political data. 
Attention was called to the fact that Mr. Hull might have been led by Lord Halifax 
to expect an early answer to his proposal for a joint declaration. 
Minutes on 32 
While the meeting showed that there were some important differences on points of 
detail as between the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs and the Colonies on the 
one hand and the Secretary of State for India on the other, there was no difference of 
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principle and in general Mr Amery gave his approval to the paper before the meeting. 
But the meeting disclosed a fundamental divergence of principle between these three 
Secretaries of State and the Secretary of State for the Dominions, who was in the 
Chair. 
This divergence may be briefly summarised as follows. The document in F 6441/G 
is based on the idea that after the defeat of Japan we and other colonial Powers 
concerned will resume direct individual responsibility for the administration of the 
colonial territories with which we have hitherto been associated; but that our 
administration will be subject to an international Council of the Pacific acting in 
somewhat the same capacity as the former Mandates Commission of the League of 
Nations; the members would be representatives of the colonial administering 
Powers. Defence would be on a collective basis, contributions being made for this 
purpose by the four principal Powers concerned and reciprocal strategic facilities 
being granted in each other's territories. The thesis advanced by Mr. Attlee as being 
the view of the Labour party was that the administration of colonial territories 
should be a matter for international responsibility and control; similarly the burden 
of armaments, including the financial burden, should be borne internationally under 
some new arrangement to be devised. The ultimate responsibility for both adminis-
tration and armaments would be not to individual governments but to some kind of 
super-State. 
For the purposes of the joint declaration with the Americans proposed by Mr. Hull 
it is probably not necessary to obtain a final solution of the difficulty noted above .... 
But for the purposes of the Delegation to the I.P.R. Conference it will be necessary to 
thrash the matter out. This will become increasingly necessary as the preparatory 
work of the Delegation has now reached a fairly advanced state and any documents 
which are to be laid on the table of the Conference have to be printed in good time. 
Furthermore the paper in F 6441/G shows the desirability of a campaign of 
education in this country and elsewhere concerning our Far Eastern responsibilities. 
This also can clearly not be launched until the Government are of one mind. 
Possibly the best way to proceed will be for us to prepare a potted version of F 
6441/G to be circulated to the Cabinet over the initials of the Secretary of State and 
Lord Cranborne together with a short note on the meeting which took place 
recently. If desired an attempt could be made to produce a paper which was also 
acceptable to Mr. Amery. If this course is approved the Department will submit a 
draft. 
H.A.C. 
19.9.42 
As regards the economic implications of a settlement in the Far East, of which Mr. 
Attlee wanted a further examination made, I have had a word off the record with Mr. 
Norman Young of the Treasury. His view was that in the past we unquestionably 
gained through our administration of our Far Eastern possessions. The Malay States, 
for instance, were self-supporting and we not only profited by the trade of the 
territories, but also by the position which control of world markets created for us 
financially. 
As regards the future, Mr. Young held the view that, provided we maintained our 
existing investments in these territories and any international administration set up 
was entirely trustworthy, it ought not to make any difference from the economic 
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point of view whether we administered them ourselves or not. On the other hand, 
there are too many unknowns as regards the future to make a detailed examination 
of this question very profitable. For instance, we do not know the future of 
international investments; nor do we know whether schemes for international 
control of primary products may be established, and, if so, what they will be; 
moreover, the whole question would depend on the trustworthy nature of the 
international administration. 
My own view is that it would be almost impossible for any international 
administration to be trusted by this country as much as if it were a British 
administration. This would inevitably mean that trade circles in this country would 
take less interest in the development of these territories and that we should obtain 
correspondingly less advantage from them. 
I hope therefore that we may regard Mr. Attlee's suggestion as a "red herring" and 
proceed on the lines suggested by Mr. Ashley Clarke in the last paragraph of his 
minute. 
J.E.C. 
21.9.42 
The dollar-earning capacity of our tin and rubber interests may well prove vital in 
preserving our balance of payments in the post-war years. 
R.A. 
21.9.42 
I do not think we should be wise to leave Lord Cranborne hoping that any 
international regime which we may create for the Far East would not be a precedent 
for Africa. That American interest (i.e. both public and material) in Africa is "much 
less direct" at present is true: but once the general subject begins to be discussed in 
public with a lesser sense of unreality than at present-i.e. once the war is visibly in 
its last stages--I shd. expect little less public interest to be shown in Africa than in 
the Far East. That it may well be woolly as it now is on India I wouldn't deny: but that 
America had an "interest" in India long before U.S. troops got there is also true & has 
proved important. 
A.C.E.M. 
13.10.42 
I agree; I am sure that American interest in the colonial problem will not 
differentiate between colonies in one part of the world and those in another. It is the 
colonial system of which American opinion is suspicious, and it is likely to hold that 
the sacrifice of American blood and treasure in the defence and conquest of other 
nations' "possessions" (and the N.W. African campaign will bring Africa as a whole 
within the scope of this consideration) justifies American insistence on the adoption 
of a different system of colonial responsibility from that at present prevailing. 
F.E.E. 
14.10.42 
Although the Americans' occupation of North Africa has not so far cost them much 
in the way of blood, sweat or tears, I agree that we must expect them to insist that 
they have an interest in Africa. Actually things have, I understand, changed since the 
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earlier minutes were written and Colonial Office are now prepared to admit this 
interest. 
I confess to sharing Mr. Amery's view that the basic considerations are not only 
political but strategic, and have always thought that a strategic approach to problems 
in the Pacific (including certain disputed islands there) was both necessary and likely 
to be useful, e.g. an opinion from the Chiefs of Staff on the value of Hong Kong. The 
strategic approach has moreover a strong financial aspect, and Mr. Coulson's enquiry 
of Mr. Norman Young, though it was pertinent and produced an interesting reply, 
surely touches only half the question. An equally important aspect would seem that 
raised by Dr. Salazar4 in one conversation with Sir. R. Campbell:5 namely how we are 
to be able to compete successfully in trade with disarmed countries who have no 
financial burden in respect of armaments if we retain ours. It may well be that the 
Admiralty who have ideas based on long experience of how much they can expect to 
get from the Treasury for their estimates will have views about the policing of the 
Pacific which will affect our political views. I do not know whether Far Eastern 
Department have considered asking the Joint Planners to put on their list of subjects 
for study their view of the policing of the Far East after the war. 
Mr. Coulson's view that we could not trust any international administration as 
fully as a British one seems to me incontestable; but I would think that we should 
have to reckon with other countries suggesting perhaps in connexion with Malaya 
that the Chinese Customs showed that an international administration can function 
efficiently and provides a good precedent for permitting nationals of all countries to 
enter an administration. 
N.M.B. 
16.11.42 
4 Portuguese foreign minister, 1936-1947. 5 UK minister in Washington, 1941-1945. 
33 CO 323/1858/22, WP(42)544 5 Dec 1942 
'Colonial policy': joint War Cabinet memorandum by Mr Attlee, 
Mr Eden, Lord Cranborne1 and Mr Stanley on a joint declaration with 
the United States. Annexes: 1 & 11 
Recent events in America, which are certainly not unconnected with the local 
political situation, have raised the Colonial question in an acute form. It is true that · 
Mr. Luce's article in Life2 was to some extent a boomerang and may have done more 
1 Now lord privy seal. 
2 On 12 Oct 1942 the editors of Life magazine published 'An Open Letter ... to the People of England' 
which contained the message: '[O]ne thing we are sure we are not fighting for is to hold the British 
Empire together. We don't like to put the matter so bluntly, but we don't want you to have any illusions. If 
your strategists are planning a war to hold the British Empire together they will sooner or later find 
themselves strategizing all alone' (quoted in W R Louis, Imperialism at bay: the United States and the 
decolonization of the British empire (Oxford, 1977) p 198). 
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good than harm. But Mr. Willkie's speech3 may have more serious effects and is 
undoubtedly typical of a widespread, though quite misguided, feeling in America that 
there is something archaic in the conception of the British Colonial Empire and that 
some new system ought to be substituted for it more in accordance with the spirit of 
the times. 
2. We are united in thinking that the time has come when His Majesty's 
Government should counter this feeling by issuing some statement to which it is 
hoped publicity will be given in the United States. It is, indeed, certain that much 
criticism in America is the result of almost complete ignorance regarding conditions 
in British Colonial territories, and the speech this week by the Leader of the House of 
Lords will have contributed to enlightenment in that respect. 
3. But enlightenment on these facts is only part of the problem. In addition, we 
must, if we can, endeavour to get the United States to express their willingness to 
enter some general defence scheme which would include the defence of Colonial 
areas. It is also desirable to commit the Americans, if possible, to the principle that 
we and the other Colonial Powers concerned should have the unquestioned right to 
administer our own Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories, including 
those which we have temporarily lost to the Japanese. Finally, it would be highly 
desirable to achieve a crystallisation in a form not unfavourable to ourselves of the 
existing vague but widely-held theories regarding Colonies. These suggest that all 
Colonial Powers should be regarded as trustees bound to take due account of the 
interests not only of the local population but of the world as a whole. It is quite true 
that this principle of trusteeship has long been accepted so far as the British Empire 
is concerned, but there would be every advantage in getting it accepted by other 
Colonial Powers as well. All these objectives cannot be achieved by ourselves alone: at 
the least, joint Anglo-American-Dutch action is required. 
4. In his telegram No. 4285 of the 25th August (Annex I) Lord Halifax reported a 
conversation with Mr. Hull in which the latter expressed his desire to proceed with 
some Joint Declaration regarding Colonial Empires, and introduced the term 
"Parent States." In many ways Mr. Hull's attitude as revealed in this telegram is 
unexpectedly satisfactory, particularly his desire to include in such a Joint 
Declaration some "very clear expression against officious intervention from outside 
with affairs which were the responsibility of the Parent State." 
5. As a result of our discussions, we now recommend that (after the necessary 
consultation with the Dominions has taken place) two telegrams should be addressed 
to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington in the drafts which form the second 
annex to this paper. We are all agreed that something on these lines is necessary if 
only to enable us to keep the initiative in our hands. We are afraid that if no response 
is made to Mr. Hull's proposal we shall be faced, in the near future, with some 
American initiative of a less friendly character. Our colleagues have seen what Mr. 
Wendell Willkie said to Sir A. Clark Kerr about the attitude of American public 
3 Wendell Willkie, Republican presidential candidate in 1940 who made a world tour in 1942. On his 
return to the US he made a broadcast in Oct 1942 in which he asserted that the people of Eastern Europe 
and Asia were 'no longer willing to be Eastern slaves for Western profits .... They are resolved, as we must 
be, that there is no more place for imperialism within their own society than in the society of nations' 
(ibid, p 199). Churchill gave his riposte on 10 Nov: 'Let me, however, make this clear, in case there should 
be any mistake about it in any quarter. We mean to hold our own. I have not become the King's First 
Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire' (ibid, p 200). 
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opinion towards the British Empire. All the information at our disposal goes to show 
that Mr. Willkie's estimate of the outlook of many of his fellow-countrymen is a 
correct one. The Administration has for long been under pressure to issue some kind 
of Declaration on Colonial territories. They have resisted this pressure and no doubt 
they will continue to resist it to the best of their ability. But the time will come when 
they are obliged to declare their attitude. In the meantime, they have expressed a 
wish to be associated with us (possibly with others) in a joint Colonial Declaration, of 
a character which, if Mr. Hull's view is final, would not be damaging to our interests. 
For these reasons and for those given in paragraph 3 above, we are convinced that we 
should respond to Mr. Hull's approach and enter into informal conversations with 
him on the basis of our own agreed plan. 
6. In regard to details, it will be noted that we have not followed up Mr. Hull's 
suggestion that the Declaration should "re-assert some of the principles of his 
speech, i.e., the necessity for fitness for and willingness to fight for freedom, &c .... " 
It would indeed be dangerous at this stage to come out with some statement which 
might be taken as an implied threat to deprive such nations as Portugal and Spain of 
their Colonies on the grounds that they were reluctant to participate in the war. 
Moreover, the French aspect is still very delicate and it would hardly be wise to create 
the impression that we were going back on the assurances given by the United States 
and ourselves to France, whether explicit or conditional. Equally, it would be 
unfortunate to suggest that any Colony which had contributed men to, for instance, 
the King's African Rifles, had qualified for self-government by that alone. 
7. We consider that it would be useful to be ready to discuss with the Americans 
as soon as these general principles had been accepted and published, their practical 
application to particular regions. For this purpose South-Eastern Asia would seem to 
be the area in which a beginning might be made. South-Eastern Asia is in many ways 
a special case, since (a) it has been almost entirely occupied by Japan; (b) common 
defence in that area is more urgent than it is in other Colonial areas; (c) it is an area 
in which the United States have practical experience of Colonial administration. 
8. For all these reasons we trust that the Cabinet will agree that after the 
necessary consultation with the Dominions two telegrams should be despatched to 
Washington on the lines of the attached drafts. 
Annex I to 33: inward telegram no 4285 from Lord Halifax to Mr Eden, 25 Aug 1942 
I had long talk to Hull this morning. We began on his speech and he repeated 
pleasure with which he had received your message. He developed at some length 
main ideas that he had sought to express and said that President had been personally 
concerned with getting speech fullest radio publicity. This is perhaps interesting 
from angle of alleged divergence of thought between Hull and Wallace. He had been 
very well satisfied with reception accorded to his speech here. 
2. He then spoke at length on how statements of Atlantic Charter could best be 
utilised to guide opinion wisely in relation to backward peoples of differing grades 
and capacities and said that his idea was to get some general statement in which we 
might all assert broad purposes making plain that attainment of freedom involved 
mutual responsibility of what he called parent States and of those who aspired to it. 
He would like to reassert some of principles of his speech, i.e., necessity of fitness for 
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and willingness to fight for freedom, &c., and especially paramount necessity at this 
stage of winning war. This with an eye on India. He thought by such means it would 
not be difficult to reconcile slightly differing comments in this regard that President 
and Prime Minister had made on Atlantic Charter. 
3. I agreed with him that there was nothing in this sort of thing that he had said 
which conflicted with what was our own thought and practice throughout Empire 
but that we were very conscious of two dangers. One was giving any encouragement 
to Chiang Kai-shek that it was his job to run empire or tell us how to do it and other 
was that of attempting over-simplification which would fit India, Jamaica and 
Nyasaland all at once. I then told him that I had some talk with Colonial Secretary in 
London who was considering seeking Cabinet approval for some unilateral statement 
which I thought might very well be in close accord with general views Hull had 
expressed. This might in Cranborne's view be best way of avoiding dangers to which I 
had referred. 
4. Hull, though disclaiming any right or desire to intrude in our business, was 
not convinced of wisdom of such unilateral action. It would not have nearly so much 
weight here or indeed elsewhere as a joint declaration of purpose which would have 
what he termed great defensive value. For he would include a very clear expression 
against officious intervention from outside with affairs which were responsibility of 
parent State and wide variety of problem could be appropriately stressed. 
5. I asked him who he had in mind should join in such a statement-! hoped not 
all United Nations. He said he thought "a few of principal nations," which I 
interpreted with his assent to mean United States, ourselves and Dutch. He added 
that Chinese always had an inferiority complex vis-a-vis United States and ourselves 
and he would like to bring them into it. They would not do any harm and it would 
soothe feeling. 
6. I told him that I would certainly put to you his suggestions which at this stage 
were only tentative. 
7. I had thought of asking him to put his ideas in more precise form on paper but 
held off this thinking it better to keep it all fluid. I think there is some force in what 
he said in paragraph 4 above as to the defensive strength against ignorant clamour 
provided we could agree on the non-intervention part of statement. And it is clear to 
me that Hull has been pondering this approach pretty carefully and will take a good 
deal of shifting off it. 
Annex 11 to 33: draft telegrams to His Majesty's ambassador, Washington 
(A) 
Your telegram No. 4285 [projected Joint Declaration on colonial policy]. 
We have been giving careful thought to this matter in the light of the remarks of 
Mr. Hull and Mr. Sumner Welles. We are greatly attracted by Mr. Hull's conception 
of "Parent States," and something on the lines of his remarks on that point would be 
an essential basis of any declaration. Before reaching any final decision as to the 
precise terms of the Declaration, we should like to have your own comments and 
advice on the idea of your sounding Mr. Hull on that point and others in the 
following list which together might form basis of Declaration of nature which he 
seems to have in mind:-
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(1) First aim of United Nations is to defeat present aggression and render future 
aggression impossible. 
(2) This aim requires for its successful achievement the establishment of 
conditions under which security and prosperity can be assured to all nations. 
Since it is evident that there are certain peoples whose social equipment and 
resources are not yet such as to enable them to achieve these ends by themselves, 
it will be a clear responsibility of all parent States to enter into general defence 
schemes designed to ensure freedom from fear for all peoples. 
(3) Defence having been assured, the parent States must aim to promote the 
social, economic and political well-being of peoples who are unable without 
danger to themselves and to others, to assume full responsibility for their affairs. 
The parent States, with their special qualifications for the task, must accept the 
duty of moulding and extending the social and political institutions of the 
territories with which they are concerned that they may become capable of 
discharging in due course the full responsibilities of government. 
(4) By this combination of defence and scientific and orderly development, the 
parent States will thus fulfil their responsibilities to those peoples and enable them 
to enjoy rising standards of life and to continue to advance on the path of progress. 
In pursuance of this policy the natural resources of Colonial territories will be 
organised and marketed, not for the promotion of purely commercial ends, but in 
the best interests of the peoples concerned and of the world as a whole.4 
(B) 
My immediately preceding telegram on subject of projected Joint Declaration on 
Colonial Policy. 
If Mr. Hull agreed that general Declaration on these lines fitted in with his ideas 
you should proceed to explain to him what we think practical application of the 
principles set out in the Joint Declaration would need to be discussed and agreed as 
soon as Declaration has been published. You should explain to him privately that our 
present line of thought is:-
(a) That necessary practical measures would take the form of machinery for 
consultation and collaboration between parent States with the aim of ensuring a 
common policy in those regions of the world in which they have interests as 
parent States. For this purpose Regional Commissions composed of representa-
tives of such States should be constituted. Provision should also be made for the 
4 Sections 3 and 4 were subsequently amended by the War Cabinet (CO 323/1858/22, WM 166(42)1, 9 Dec 
1942) to read:-
(3) The parent states must aim to promote the social, economic and political well-being of peoples who 
are unable, without danger to themselves and to others, to assume full responsibility for their affairs. 
Defence having been assured, the parent States, with their special qualifications for the task, must 
accept the duty of guiding and developing the social and political institutions of the territories with 
which they are concerned, that their peoples may in due course be able to discharge the other 
responsibilities of government. 
(4) By this combination of defence and orderly development the parent States will fulfil their 
responsibilities to those peoples and enable them to enjoy rising standards of life and to continue their 
advance along the path of progress. In pursuance of this policy the natural resources of Colonial 
territories will be organised and marketed not for the promotion merely of commercial ends but in the 
best interests of the peoples concerned and of the world as a whole. 
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representation of nations which have a major defence or economic interest in the 
regions concerned. Such regions might be, first, the Far East; secondly, Africa; 
and, thirdly, the Western Atlantic, and any others which at a later stage may seem 
appropriate. 
(b) That within this framework and subject to the principles laid down in 
paragraphs (2) and (3) of the Joint Declaration responsibility for administration of 
its own territories would rest with the individual parent State concerned. 
You could eventually explain to Mr. Hull that as soon as the general Declaration 
has been agreed and published we should be very glad to proceed to discuss with him 
privately its particular application to the Far East, in regard to which it might be 
possible to get out a detailed Declaration before tackling the more difficult question 
of Africa. 
34 CO 318/452/8 14-18 Dec 1942 
[Anglo-American Caribbean Commission] : minutes by T W Davies1 
and Sir G Gater on the functions of the commission and American 
interests in the West Indies 
[The Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, consisting of three members from each 
country, was established by a joint communique issued in Mar 1942. As an advisory body 
to the local governments it was concerned with matters relating to labour, agriculture, 
housing, health, education, social welfare, finance, economics and related subjects in the 
British and American territories. The eo-chairmen were Sir F Stockdale, UK comptroller 
for development and welfare, and Charles Taussig who, besides being a member of 
Roosevelt's 'New Deal' group, was president of the American Molasses Company which 
had connections in the sugar industry throughout the Caribbean. From the outset the 
personnel of the commission posed problems for the CO. As S Caine put it: 'In status I 
think we must concede the Americans are heavier metal than our team' (CO 318/452/2, 
no 72, Caine to H F Downie, 21 Apr 1942). The other Americans were Rexford Tugwell, 
also a member of the 'New Deal' group, a professor at Colombia University and a former 
assistant secretary in the Dept of Agriculture who became governor of Puerto Rico in 
1941, and Coert du Bois, chief of the Caribbean Office in the State Dept. All three 
Americans were permanent, devoted most of their time to the commission and had direct 
access to Roosevelt. They were also senior in status to Stockdale, the one permanent 
member on the UK side, the other UK commissioners being Caine, head of the CO 
Economic Dept, and Sir R Briercliffe, medical adviser to the comptroller. American 
attempts to invest the commission with executive authority, particularly over the 
problem of maintaining essential supplies, especially foodstuffs, also ran counter to the 
CO conception that the commission should be 'something in the nature of a debating 
society' (ibid, minute by G L M Clauson, 11 May 1942). Cranborne viewed Anglo-
American differences over the commission's functions as 'a very ticklish problem' and was 
anxious that in its handling of commission matters his depattment should avoid giving an 
impression 'of British officialdom at its worst, hobbled by red tape' (ibid, minute by 
Cranborne, 14 May 1942). Reflecting on UK and US perceptions of the functions of the 
commission, the minutes by Davies and Cater reproduced here also reveal, in contrast to 
Lloyd's earlier opposition to the bases agreement (see 24, note), reluctant CO acceptance 
of the legitimacy of American interests in the Caribbean.) 
As a newcomer to this Department I have been greatly struck after the two meetings 
so far held with Mr. Taussig and Mr. de la Rue2 by one thing. Our two American 
1 Principal, West Indian Dept, CO. 2 US State Depa1tment. 
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visitors, with the greatest tact and goodwill, are forever making proposals and 
suggestions for executive action in purely internal West Indian activities. Many of the 
matters they have raised seem to have only the very remotest connection, if any at 
all, with United States interests. 
I appreciate of course that this arises from the setting up of the Anglo-American 
Caribbean Commission, though I am not aware of the exact reasons which led to the 
setting up of this body. I appreciate that Mr. Taussig is not only very friendly but 
possibly the greatest expert on the British West Indies now living. Nevertheless, this 
one-sided examination of our affairs seems to me to be open to objection. 
It appears to me that it might in the long run make for [an] even better 
Anglo-American relationship if we established some reciprocity in the matter and at 
the same time we might gain some useful knowledge for ourselves. I have suggested 
previously tentatively, but would now like to suggest more formally after further 
consideration of the matter, that arrangements should be put in hand for the visit of 
a British official to Puerto Rico and to the American Virgin Islands in order to 
compare the position there with the British West Indies. I think it would be most 
desirable that such an official should not only report to us after his visit but should 
also visit Washington and make his various points, naturally in the most friendly 
spirit, to the American authorities in the same way as Mr. Taussig is making his 
points to us. It seems that the most suitable person to make such a visit would be Mr. 
Huggins.3 
It does seem to me that in Caribbean matters it is undesirable that we should put 
ourselves in the position of always accepting advice and never giving it. 
T.W.D. 
14.12.42 
I am grateful to Mr. Davies for the suggestion made in h is minute of 14.12.42. I 
would like, however, to take him up at once on one point. He states: "Many of the 
matters they have raised seem to have only the very remotest connexion, if any at all, 
with United States interests". I think, from the United States angle, it can be said that 
nearly all the matters discussed have a very direct United States interest. We must 
appreciate the immense difference which geography makes in the attitude of the 
United States to the West Indies as compared with our own. The West Indies are on 
the United States' doorstep. They now form part of the United States defensive 
scheme and the United States has a definite strategic interest in all happenings in the 
British West Indian Colonies. The strategic interest is further emphasised by the 
establishment of Bases in several of the Colonies, which are held on a 99-year lease. 
There is also the connexion between the black population in the West Indies and the 
black population in the United States. Rightly or wrongly, the American Government 
think that there is a direct reaction in the United States from events in the West 
Indies. If riots occur there, caused by economic discontent or political frustration, 
the United States Government believe that they will have a detrimental effect upon 
the negro situation in America. There is no doubt . .. that Mr. Taussig and the 
Administration in Washington are desperately afraid of communism and they seem 
3 Capt (later Sir John) Huggins, colonial secretary, Trinidad, 1938-1942; gov of Jamaica, 1943-1951. 
Between 1942 and 1943 Huggins was head of the British Colonies Supply Mission in Washington, an 
appointment intended to strengthen the British side of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission. 
[35) DEFENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 191 
to fear that communism may come to the United States through the West 
Indies-fantastic as this idea may appear to us. I think it is essential to the 
establishment of good relations between ourselves and the United States that we 
should realise the direct American interest in the Caribbean and in all that happens 
there. We may dislike it intensely, but, in present circumstances, we cannot avoid it. 
With the rest of Mr. Davies's minute I am in hearty agreement. Even if we are 
forced to recognise United States direct interest in our Caribbean territories, it is 
certainly unhealthy that our co-operation with them s ould be concentrated on our 
own British Colonies. It is most important that we should take an interest in the 
American Colonies, that we should visit them and report on them. I am sure that Mr. 
Taussig and the State Department would not resent this, and I do not think any 
difficulty would arise in arranging visits to Puerto Rico and to the Virgin Islands. 
Clearly, neither Sir Frank Stockdale nor Mr. Huggins can be spared for such visits 
and another alternative must be sought. I should like to discuss this matter as soon 
as the upheaval caused by Mr. Taussig's visit has subsided.4 
G.H.G. 
18.12.42 
4 Cater had first-hand experience of American views on the Caribbean. At the invitation of Cordell Hull, 
the US secretary of state, he visited Washington in Oct 1942 to discuss Caribbean issues. One of his 
meetings was an interview with Roosevelt. The pr~sident began by outlining his views on the economies of 
the Caribbean territories. He wanted to see the large estates broken up and the land leased by the 
governments to small-holders, each of whom would receive five acres, part devoted to subsistence crops 
and part to cash crops. Security of tenure would be offered subject to good behaviour and satisfactory 
tillage of the soil. Every effort should be made to improve the dietary conditions of the people; Roosevelt 
described as 'lamentable' the general absence of fresh meat and refrigerated storage. He wanted to see the 
West Indian islands become self-sufficient by closer co-operation based on inter-island trade, each island 
specialising in the product or products most suitable to its conditions. The president also favoured the 
introduction of universal suffrage and compulsory education during the war. He ended by outlining a 
vague scheme of federation over which the various nations concerned-British, American, Dutch and 
French-would exercise supervisory powers as trustees. He had no wish to interfere with the existing 
sovereignty of the islands. The US had no designs on Britain's Caribbean territories; he regarded the 
islands as 'headaches' and he wanted no 'British headaches'. In particular he had no wish to shoulder the 
heavy financial liabilities of the British and other colonial governments (FO 371/30674, no 10451, report 
by Cater of his interview with Roosevelt, 27 Oct 1942). The text of Cater's report is reproduced in DJ 
M organ, The official history of colonial development vol 1 (London, 1980) pp 161-163. 
35 CO 323/1859/10, no 1 31 Dec 1942 
[Future of Italian colonies]: record of a meeting of an FO Sub-
Committee on Armistice Terms with Italy [Extract] 
Minutes by G F Seel, 1 G E J Gent, Sir W Battershill, 2 Sir G Gater 
and Mr Stanley 
... The meeting then passed to a general review of the problem of the Italian 
1 CO from 1922, assistant secretary, 1939; secretary, Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission, 1938-1939; 
seconded to Ministry of Information, 1939, and to Ministry of Supply, 1941-1942; head of CO EastMrican 
Dept, 1942-1945. 
2 Assistant under-secretary of state, CO, 1941; deputy under-secretary of state, 1942; gov of Tanganyika, 
1945-1949. 
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colonial empire. In East Africa there was general agreement that it would be most 
undesirable to allow the Italians to retain possession of either Eritrea or Italian 
Somaliland. The Eastern Department and the Egyptian Department were particular-
ly emphatic that from their point of view it would be most undesirable that the 
Italians should re-establish themselves anywhere east of the Suez Canal. On the 
assumption, therefore, that the Italians do not get back these colonies, a discussion 
took place on the most desirable arrangements from our point of view. It was 
thought that there was a great deal to be said for the amalgamation of British, 
French and Italian Somaliland into some sort of Somali Federation. This would, 
however, also include the districts of Abyssinia, and notably the Ogaden, which were 
inhabited for the most part by Somalis. The resulting State could obviously not be 
expected to govern itself, being largely patriarchal in character; but it was thought 
that there would be no inherent difficulty in arranging for some sort of mandatory, 
or even international, regime which would be founded on the terms of the Atlantic 
Charter. It was realised that one stumbling block would be the reluctance of the 
French to abandon their sovereignty at Jibuti, but it was thought that the 
abandonment of British treaty rights in British Somaliland would prove a powerful 
argument to induce them to do so. Abyssinia would also have to abandon her rights 
over certain parts of her existing territory, but it was held that she might well be 
compensated by the absorption of the greater part of Eritrea in the Abyssinian State. 
It was true that while such absorption could be largely justified on ethnic grounds 
owing to the Tigreans being of the same stock as the Amhara, this would not apply to 
the coastal part which was largely inhabited by Arabs, nor would it necessarily apply 
to the Danakils, who inhabit the southernmost part of Eritrea .. But it would be 
absurd on the face of it to make any independent State out of the coastal strip and 
Massawa; while the Danakils are completely barbarous and for the most part are 
included in the existing Abyssinian State. There was a further complication in that 
the Sudan Government would be prepared to take over certain districts in the north 
west of Eritrea; but it was realised that a bad impression would be created in America 
if as a result of the Peace Treaty any increase of territory accrued to the British 
Empire. 
On the whole, therefore, it was thought that the best solution might be for the 
whole of Eritrea to be put under Abyssinian administration, but that the Allies should 
retain a base at Massawa and possibly exercise some right of supervision over the 
coastal Arabs. 
With regard to the Dodecanese, the meeting felt that the Italians would be bound 
in any case to lose control of these Islands whether or not Turkey came into the war. 
There was strong reason on ethnic and other grounds for their being handed over to 
the Greeks, but whatever arrangement was come to in this connection there was no 
clear reason why the Italians should retain sovereignty. 
In Cyrenaica the situation was governed by the promise which we had made to 
Sheikh Idriss el Senussi that his people would never again come under Italian rule. 
Taken literally this might conceivably be held to mean that we might reserve our 
right to deport them all to some other part of the world; but in practice it clearly 
meant that the Italians would not be allowed back in Cyrenaica. It was explained that 
the promise given to the Senussi did in fact cover the whole province. The situation 
had also been rendered less difficult by the fact that the Italian colonists had 
abandoned the neighbourhood of Benghazi after the latest retreat. 
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What exactly the future of Cyrenaica would be was not at all clear. The Greeks, for 
instance, had hinted to us, and had told the Americans more explicitly, that they 
would like in some way to be established on the southern shore of the Mediterranean 
close to the Greek coast, and there was no doubt that it might be possible for some of 
their surplus population to take the place of the departed Italian colonists. But on the 
whole it was thought that the best solution would be for the Senussi to take control 
under the general suzerainty of the King of Egypt. Moreover, we might well wish to 
make naval bases on the Cyrenaican coast and even to establish military centres 
there in the event of it not being practicable to maintain our forces in Egypt. 
Tripolitania remained, and seemed on the face of it to be the most difficult 
problem of all . It was likely that many Italians would stay and in some respects it 
might be doubtful whether we should in fact wish them to go. In these circum-
stances there were, broadly speaking, three main solutions: 
(a) that Tripoli should remain an Italian colony; 
(b) that it should be handed over to the French; and 
(c) that the inhabitants (Arab in majority) should, under the terms of the Atlantic 
Charter, either decide to govern themselves or alternatively opt for their inclusion 
in the dominions of the Bay of Tunis, which would in fact mean their becoming a 
sort of French dependency. 
If the "independent" solution was discarded this, however, would merely reduce 
itself in the last resort to either the "Italian" or the "French" solution. The Eastern 
Department were inclined to favour the "French" solution on the grounds that if this 
occurred there might be some hope of inducing the French to abandon their rights 
in Syria where they would be likely to be a thorn in our side so long as they 
remained. The "Italian" solution was, however, preferred by the Egyptian Depart-
ment on the grounds that a large French bloc continuous to Egypt might possibly be 
a menace in 50 years time .... 
So far as the Armistice terms are concerned, however, the conclusion seemed to 
emerge:-
(a) that the greater part, if not all, of the Italian Empire ought to be taken away 
from Italy especially those parts East of the Suez Canal; and 
(b) that there should be no insuperable administrative difficulty in disposing of it 
if it were .... 
Minutes on 35 
I rather feel that higher authority should see this and decide who is to represent the 
Office in these discussions, 3 though it hardly seems feasible to lay down any positive 
instructions for our representatives at this stage. The discussion within the Foreign 
Office, recorded in 1, is not very impressive and there are several things in the long 
paragraph on page 24 which strike me as being unusual to say the least. In particular, 
3 After the sub-committee meeting on 31 Dec, the FO extended an invitation to the CO to attend a meeting 
to discuss the issues raised. 
4 ie the first para of the record of the FO meeting. 
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this is the first that I have seen of any suggestion that we should abandon our Treaty 
rights in British Somaliland. 
I do not suppose that the terms of the Armistice to be imposed on Italy will be 
influenced very largely by Colonial considerations, but whatever terms are imposed 
will, of course, be of direct interest to us in East Africa. I am not one of those who 
would rule out altogether the re-admission of Italy under conditions to part of her 
former territories in that part of the world; and indeed it seems to me that if we want 
to keep the whip hand over Italy for the future, the most promising line would be to 
debar her return to North Africa but to allow her to re-occupy Eritrea. There, she 
would be dependent upon our good offices for access to her Colony via the Suez 
Canal, without being in a position to threaten our position in the Mediterranean, and 
I should imagine she would hesitate long before again entering the field against us. 
This is no doubt a heretical view and I mention it in case it should be thought that, 
holding it, I should be an unsuitable representative of the Colonial Office in the 
proposed discussions. 
Apart from the major question as to whether or not Italy is to return to East Africa, 
the main question is what are to be the boundaries of the former Italian East African 
Colonies, especially in relation to the Abyssinian question. This question has been 
remitted to a special Sub-Committee of the Africa Committee so that we need not 
concern ourselves with the details now, but it may appear necessary, in the course of 
the proposed discussions, to suggest an insertion of some provision that Italy, in the 
event of her eventual return, will accept whatever frontier modifications the United 
Nations may think fit to impose in this matter. 
G.F.S. 
20.1.43 
This paper-for a meeting now fixed for tomorrow-did not get off the mark quickly 
enough. 
Our desiderata seem to me:-
(1) The Mediterranean sea-route shd. not again be exposed to interruption by 
Italy, nor the safety of Malta. Accordingly ifTripolitania is to be returned by Italy it 
must be on condition of no fortifications. The 'Egyptian' solution of Libya wd. help 
to provide a safeguard against any use of air bases in Tripolitania by a hostile Italy 
in the future. 
(2) Italian territory & influence in the Red Sea shd. not be allowed to revive. We 
have had enough experience of the dismal effects of this in the Yemen, for 
instance. 
(3) We do not want to promote anywhere the idea of International Regimes as 
administrative bodies-not only are they ineffective (Tangier, N. Hebrides etc), 
but it wd. be a dangerous precedent for Colonial territories .... 
G.E.J.G. 
26.1.43 
I agree with Mr. Gent's 2 and 3. In regard to 1 I see no reason why there should 
necessarily be a negotiated peace with Italy or why Tripolitania should be handed 
back to Italy whatever the terms may be. The no fortifications clause proved itself of 
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little avail in the period after the last War and there is no reason to suppose that the 
post-War world will be much different in this respect, or that unanimity amongst the 
United Nations will extend for any long period of time. We shall be faced after this 
war with many claims for territories in the Mediterranean. Greece wants the 
Dodecanese, Cyprus and part of North Africa. Turkey wants the Dodecanese, Egypt 
wants a slice of North Africa and I have little doubt that there will be Arab claims in 
North Africa, while the French will expect something. There clearly isn't enough to 
go round and it would seem advisable not to assume that even a small part of the 
small cake available should be given back to its former owner. 
Secretary of State 
W.D.B. 
26.1.43 
1. I am afraid that this file must be handled at very short notice, as there is a 
meeting at the Foreign Office tomorrow. It is a pity that the Colonial Office was not 
associated earlier in the consideration of the Italian armistice problems. The Foreign 
Office seem to have indulged in a little family party, leaving us out in the cold. I think 
the point should be made by our representatives that a Colonial Office representative 
should be included at any future meetings. 
2. I suggest that the Colonial Office should be represented by Mr. Eastwood and 
Mr. Seel. 
3. The instructions for Mr. Eastwood and Mr. Seel should be on the following 
lines:-
( a) They should press the view that the disposal of the Italian colonial territories is 
a matter for the Peace Treaty rather than the Armistice. If, as we confidently hope, 
we are in firm possession of all Italian colonial territories before an armistice is 
being negotiated, I see no reason why we should not continue to hold them during 
the armistice period. 
(b) There should be no question of setting up an international administrative 
body. This is quite contrary to the policy underlying the Joint Declaration. 
(c) There should be no question at this stage of agreeing to hand over British 
colonial territories. 
(d) The question of allowing Italy to retain any of her colonial possessions is a 
matter for decision by the highest authority, and as this question need not arise in 
connexion with the armistice, I see no need for it to be decided now. 
G.H.G. 
26.1.43 
In a determined attempt to be charitable to the F.O. paper of Dec 30th [sic], I have 
decided to put it down to the Xmas spirit. What the F.O. representatives discussed in 
this mellow atmosphere are not armistice terms but peace terms-and very bad 
peace terms too. 
I approve the instructions and expect our representatives to take a firm line. In 
particular I should like it to be made clear to the F.O. representatives that their 
consistent policy (of which I have had 3 instances in the 2 months I have been here) 
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of treating bits of the Colonial Empire as cheap & convenient gratuities is neither my 
policy nor I believe the policy of H.M.G.5 
O.F.S. 
26.1.43 
5 A series of FO--CO meetings failed to reconcile the conflicting views of the two departments on the 
trusteeship question. Lord Hood, who conducted the talks on behalf of the FO, noted in May 1944: 'If we 
are to accept the Colonial Secretary's view that there can be no international trusteeship and that the 
mandatory system must be brought to an end, then we shall have to forget about the Atlantic Charter and 
enlarge the British Empire . ... If, however, our consciences or our purses rule this out, then we must, I 
submit, continue to think in terms of some form of international supervision ... .' (FO 371/40601, no 
4099, minute by Hood, 11 May 1944). 
36 CO 323/1858/23 21-27 Apr 1943 
[Anglo-American declaration on colonial policy]: minutes by T I K 
Lloyd, 1 G E J Gent and Sir G Gater on criticisms of the American draft 
I pass this through Mr. Gent who discussed No.71 with Mr. Eastwood2 and myself a 
few days ago. 
Loose within the tile is a Foreign Office analysis of the American draft, not quite so 
detailed as that made by Mr. Eastwood but making many of the points that he has 
taken. I am not quite sure whether this has been sent to Mr. Eastwood personally or 
whether we are permitted to take account of it in any discussions with the Foreign 
Office, and I have not been able to get Mr. Eastwood this afternoon to clear up this 
point. 
Further progress is hardly possible until the Secretary of State has discussed this 
with Mr. Eden and we have been given some general guidance. I therefore content 
myself with making what seem to me to be the three most important points:-
(a) unless there is some prospect of getting the Americans to change the theme of 
their draft from "independence" to "self-government", the attempt to secure a 
joint declaration might as well be abandoned now; 
(b) the Americans are so attached to preambles that we may have to concede the 
inclusion of one, though it should, of course, be quite different from their present 
draft; and 
(c) the notion of a definite t imetable of constitutional progress-see d. on page 4 
of the American draft-is understood to be very dear to President Roosevelt, but it 
is alien to our conceptions and we must certainly try to secure its removal. 
T.l.K.L. 
21.4.43 
1 Assistant secretary, CO, from 1939; assistant under-secretary of state, 1943--1947; KCMG 1947 (Sir 
Thomas Lloyd); permanent under-secretary of state, 1947-1956. 
2 Principal, CO, 1935; private secretary to S of S for colonies, 1940-1941; seconded to Cabinet Office, 
1945; returned to CO as assistant under-secretary of state, 1947. 
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& I would add:-
(d) the idea that British Cols. can suitably be subjected to similar treatment as 
enemy territories is a basic mistake; 
(e) the Prime Minister has already made it clear that he will not contemplate the 
role of presiding over the liquidation of the Colonial Empire .3 
A declaration by the U.K. and the Doms. may be the course now to be considered 
by the Cabinet Ctee. We certainly need an authoritative pronouncement on policy 
relating to British dependent territories, & if an Imp. Confer. can be convened this 
summer it may provide the opportunity. 
Secretary of State 
G.E.J.G. 
22.4.43 
1. I submit Mr. Eastwood's detailed comments on the American draft and also 
some Foreign Office comments which have been forwarded by Mr. Gladwyn Jebb. 
These two documents seem to me to bring out the principal points of criticism of the 
American draft, and I do not think I need make any further detailed comment. 
2. It was urged that we should take the initiative in submitting a draft joint 
declaration, because by doing so we should avoid being presented with an American 
draft which would probably be unpalatable to us. It now turns out that our initiative 
has been valueless. The Americans have put forward their own draft, which it is true 
takes some cognisance of our draft, but its basic idea is wholly different. 
3. After reading the American draft two or three times, I am left with a feeling of 
complete hopelessness. I do not think it is possible to secure such amendment of the 
draft as would make it acceptable to us and, I would add, to the Colonies. The whole 
theme of the draft is wrongly conceived and exhibits on the part of the draftsmen 
ignorance of actual conditions in British Colonies. It is only necessary to think of 
applying its principles to Colonies like Mauritius to realize its full absurdity. I 
suggest that if it is confirmed by Mr. Eden that the President and Mr. Hull are firmly 
attached to the present draft (if Mr. Eden cannot confirm this it will be necessary to 
make a specific enquiry from Lord Halifax), our only dignified course is to abandon 
the proposal for a joint declaration and to make a unilateral declaration, to which the 
agreement of Dominion Governments should be secured.4 
3 See 33, note 3. 
G.H.G. 
27.4.43 
4 To avoid further American attempts to force unacceptable commitments over the wording of a joint 
declaration, Stanley made a major policy statement about colonial policy during the course of a 
parliamentary supply debate on colonial expenditure on 13 July 1943 (H of C Debs, vol 391, cols 47-151) . 
'The central purpose of our Colonial administration', he declared, is 'to guide Colonial people along the 
road to self-government within the framework of the British Empire'. For self-government to succeed, it 
had to be underpinned by 'solid, social and economic foundations ', and it was no part of UK policy 'to 
confer political advances which are unjustified by circumstances, or to grant self-government to those 
who are not yet trained to use it'. Stanley then dealt at length with various aspects of current colonial 
policy-constitutional, educational, administrative and economic-before ending with some brief 
comments about international accountability. Here he endorsed the idea of regional commissions, with 
Britain being prepared to work on common problems in colonial areas in co-operation with neighbouring 
and friendly nations. While explaining that the commissions would comprise, not only those states with 
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colonial territories in a particular region but also other states which had major strategic or economic 
interests in the same area, Stanley refused to be drawn on the details of how many commissions, in what 
regions and with what powers. The people of a colonial territory would be associated with the work of the 
appropriate commission but on the point uppermost in CO thinking, the secretary of state for the colonies 
was emphatic: 'We retain complete control of our administration' (ibid, cols 142 and 144). From 
Washington, Halifax sought clarification about the purpose of Stanley's statement. Was it intended, he 
asked, to be a substitute for the joint declaration with the Americans? (FO 371/35311, no 3512, inward tel 
no 3212, Halifax to FO, 14 July 1943). FO officials were frustrated by what they saw as a yet further 
example of the CO's reluctance to co-operate and consult: 'The failure of the CO to cooperate with us in 
this and other matters is really exceedingly disheartening' (ibid, minute by N M Butler, 16 July 1943). 
Stanley had, however, consulted Churchill and Eden and, as the foreign secretary informed Halifax, 'We 
considered that at this juncture there would be advantage in giving public expression to our views as to the 
lines along which we hope progress can be made' (ibid, Eden to Halifax, 16 July 1943). 
37 PREM 4/3114, WP(44)738 16 Dec 1944 
'International aspects of colonial policy': War Cabinet memorandum 
by Mr Attlee. 1 Annex: memorandum by Mr Stanley 
1. In the memorandum prepared by the United States Government as a basis for 
discussion at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference reference was made to "territorial 
trusteeship," though the chapter dealing with this subject was left blank with an 
indication that papers would be circulated later. In fact, no such paper was 
circulated, nor was the subject raised officially during the Conference. A number of 
informal talks took place, however, between members of the United Kingdom 
Delegation and the State Department, at the last of which Mr. Pasvolski suggested a 
preliminary exchange of papers between His Majesty's Government in the United 
Kingdom and the United States Government covering particularly (a) the general 
outline of what he termed "trusteeship machinery," (b) the future of the present 
Mandates, and (c) the development of Regional machinery and its relation, if any, to 
the World Organisation. 
2. I now circulate a memorandum prepared as a basis for discussion by the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies with a view to its eventual communication for that 
purpose to the State Department. The draft of this memorandum was considered by 
the Armistice and Post-War Committee at their meeting on the 14th December, 
when the Committee approved it for submission to the War Cabinet, subject to 
certain amendments which have been incorporated in the text now circulated. The 
policy suggested follows fairly closely that described in the memorandum by the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies on "International Regional Bodies in Colonial 
Areas"; special attention is, however, invited to Part Ill, and in particular paragraphs 
25 and 26. 
3. It is essential that before any document of this kind is communicated to the 
State Department the views of the Dominion Governments should be ascertained. 
The War Cabinet are already aware of the discussions which took place at the 
Australia-New Zealand Conference in Wellington last month, as a result of which 
1 Attlee signed this memo in his capacity as chairman of the War Cabinet Armistice and Post-War 
Committee. 
2 Head of post-war planning staff, US State Dept. 
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public statements were made by those Governments on Regional Commissions and 
on international supervision of Colonies. If, therefore, the War Cabinet give general 
approval to the memorandum, we suggest that it should be sent to Dominion 
Governments at the earliest possible date with a request for comments by telegram. 
When those comments have been received, the document would again be submitted 
to the War Cabinet for final approval in the light of Dominion Governments' 
comments before it is given to the United States authorities. 
Annex to 37 
/-The objective of colonial policy 
1. In any discussion of post-war international organisation, one of the subjects to 
which public attention throughout the world will be directed is the future of colonial 
peoples and the creation of appropriate arrangements to ensure international 
co-operation in the solution of this problem. Some indication of its immensity is 
afforded by the figures given below*:-
Area of Colonies, 
Protectorates and 
"B" and "C" 
Mandated 
Territories in 
Parent State. Sq. Miles. Population. 
United Kingdom ... . . . 2,329,900 59,938,400 
Union of South Africa 317,700 359,500 
Commonwealth of Australia 183,500 785,500 
New Zealand 1,200 67,700 
France 4,502,500 63,552,000 
Netherlands 793,280 64,697,000 
Japan 101,400 29,280,000 
United States 711,500 14,143,900 
Belgium 941,860 12,900,000 
Portugal 807,900 8,720,000 
Italy 924,800 2,485,000 
Spain 129,000 1,005,000 
Condominium: 
Anglo-Egyptian 1,008,100 5,728,000 
Anglo-French 5,700 60,000 
Totals 12,758,340 263,722,000 
2. The test by which any such arrangements should be examined is a simple one 
which can be stated quite briefly. It is, whether or not they will help in achieving the 
objective of good colonial administration, which is to promote to the utmost the 
well-being of colonial peoples within the world community. This objective has long 
been recognised in the colonial policy of Great Britain who has set herself to follow 
those principles which should guide a trustee in the discharge of his duties. The 
* These figures taken from "The Colonial Problem" (Oxford University Press, 1937) exclude the two 
remaining "A" Mandated Territories, viz., Palestine and Trans-Jordan (British) and Syria and Lebanon 
(French). The United Kingdom figures, however, include the self-governing Colony of Southern Rhodesia. 
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analogy of "trusteeship" was a convenient way of summing up this essential feature 
of British colonial policy, but it was not thought of as carrying with it any 
implication that Parliament was accountable to any third party. The conception of 
trusteeship in this sense has been reaffirmed by successive British Governments; for 
example in the "Statement of Policy on Colonial Development and Welfare" issued in 
1940:-
"His Majesty's Government are trustees for the well-being of the peoples of the 
Colonial Empire .... The primary aim of colonial policy is to protect and advance 
the interests of the inhabitants." 
3. In recent years, however, doubts have grown up whether the attitude of mind 
reflected in the use of the word "trusteeship" sufficiently recognises the changing 
relationship between Great Britain and her colonial peoples resulting from the 
increasing part which they are taking in the task of planning and promoting their 
own welfare and progress. "Trusteeship" has now, therefore, been largely superseded 
by "partnership"-a term which is felt to interpret more correctly the outlook of the 
colonial peoples themselves towards the present phase of their political evolution 
within the British Commonwealth of Nations. The constitutions in many territories 
in the British Colonial Empire already provide for a wide measure of control by the 
local Legislature over the affairs of the territory; and there is a continuing progress 
in this direction. 
4. It has been stated above that the objective of good colonial administration is to 
promote to the utmost the well-being of colonial peoples within the world 
community. So far as Great Britain is concerned, this objective may be taken as 
implying:-
(i) the development of self-government within the British Commonwealth in 
forms appropriate to the varying circumstances of colonial peoples; 
(ii) their economic and social advancement; and 
(iii) recognition of the responsibilities due from members of the world commun-
ity one to another. 
These implications are complementary though they have not at all times received 
equal recognition in colonial administration. The close interrelation between 
political, social and economic progress has recently been re-emphasised by the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies*:-
"If self-government is to succeed it has to have solid social and economic 
foundations, and although without them spectacular political advances may draw 
for the authors the plaudits of the superficial, they will bring to those whom it is 
designed to benefit nothing but disaster .. . if we are to be true to our pledge, if we 
really mean as soon as practicable to develop self-government in these territories, 
it is up to us to see that circumstances as soon as possible justify political advances 
and to ensure that as quickly as possible people are trained and equipped for 
eventual self-government. The real test is . . . not only the aCtual political 
advances that we make but it is also, and I think more important, the steps that we 
are taking, economic and social as well as political, to prepare the people for 
further and future responsibilities ." 
• House of Commons Official Report, 18th July, 1943. 
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5. The promotion of economic and social development carries with it a positive 
obligation on the part of the Parent State to provide financial, as well as other, 
assistance to its dependent territories where their own resources are insufficient. 
Great Britain gave statutory recognition to this principle in the Colonial Develop-
ment and Welfare Act of 1940, which made available £5,500,000 per annum over a 
period of ten years for research, development and welfare in the Colonies, and 
remitted earlier loans from His Majesty's Government to the value of some £10 
million. Legislation will shortly be introduced to prolong the period covered by this 
Act, and will increase substantially the provision of funds authorised to be made 
under it. 
6. Nevertheless, in the pursuit of this objective, the Parent State must be mindful 
of its international obligations in such matters as defence and good-neighbourliness 
in social, economic and commercial policy: it must not, even for the apparent benefit 
of its colonial peoples, order its colonial policy any more than its home policy to the 
detriment of good international relations. At the same time proper development of 
the resources of colonial (as indeed of other) territories is a duty to the world no less 
than to the inhabitants themselves. 
//-A scheme for future international collaboration 
7. In order to achieve the objectives of sound colonial policy as defined in Part I of 
this memorandum, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom recommend 
the adoption of a general system of international collaboration:--'-
(A) on a regional basis through Regional Commissions, and 
(B) by the creation of further central functional bodies, such as the International 
Labour Organisation, attached to the World Organisation. 
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom believe also that full publicity is an 
important factor in the attainment of a progressive policy. This subject is treated 
separately in Part Ill of this Memorandum. 
(A) Regional commissions 
8. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have already announced in 
Parliament that they would welcome the establishment of machinery which will 
enable common problems which transcend the boundaries of political units to be 
discussed and solved by common efforts. As the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
said in the House of Commons on the 13th July, 1943:-
"Developments of modern transport and modern communications have brought 
close together vast areas which before were widely separated. Many of their 
problems to-day are common problems and can only be solved in co-operation, for 
problems of security, of transport, of economics, of health, &c., transcend the 
boundaries of political units. His Majesty's Government would therefore welcome 
the establishment of machinery which will enable such problems to be discussed 
and to be solved by common efforts. What they have in mind is the possibility of 
establishing Commissions for certain regions. These Commissions would com-
prise not only the States with Colonial Territories in the region, but also other 
States which have in the region a major strategic or economic interest. While each 
State would remain responsible for the administration of its own territory, such a 
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Commission would provide effective and permanent machinery for consultation 
and collaboration so that the States concerned might work together to promote 
the well-being of the Colonial territories. An important consideration in designing 
the machinery of each Commission will be to give to the people of the Colonial 
territories in the region an opportunity to be associated with its work. 
"In this way it would be possible to have international co-operation which 
consisted of something more than theoretical discussion but would be able to 
grapple with realities and get down to the solution of individual problems." 
9. In the promotion, under modern conditions, of that social and economic 
development which, as stated in paragraphs 4 and 5 above, is fundamental to good 
Colonial administration, there are many problems which in many parts of the world 
cannot be solved by one government working in isolation from its neighbours and 
the creation of Regional Commissions, wherever geographical circumstances re-
quire, seems to afford the best method of contributing to their solution. Such 
Commissions are the most fruitful way of ensuring the collaboration of governments 
in the formulation of regional policy on such matters as, for example, public health 
control, movements of labour within the region, regional economic problems and 
local communications, food and agriculture, and research. In formulating such 
policies it would be necessary for the Regional Commissions to have regard to the 
wider requirements of world policy. Many of the subjects with which they deal will no 
doubt fall within the scope of specialised international agencies and it will be most 
important that such agencies should work in close association with the Regional 
Commissions. In many cases, indeed, the agency might find it useful to establish a 
regional branch for this purpose. 
10. The areas in which Regional Commissions could usefully be formed are 
considered in paragraph 13 below. Their precise machinery and composition will 
naturally vary according to the circumstances of the region. The system should be 
flexible and should be allowed to grow to meet the needs of the region as revealed 
progressively by practical experience of its working. It would be a mistake to attempt 
to lay down rigid rules in advance, but certain requirements will be common to them 
all:-
(a) A permanent secretariat, at a suitable headquarters within the region drawn 
from the various countries represented on the Commission. 
(b) Local representatives of the territories concerned should be closely associated 
with the work of the Commissions wherever practicable, either by inclusion on the 
Commissions themselves, or in conferences held under the auspices of the 
Commissions. 
(c) Copies of all official reports and other publications relating to the territories in 
the region should be supplied to the Regional Commission. 
(d) The Regional Commission itself will no doubt publish from time to time 
reports on its own proceedings and on any general matters of public interest 
affecting the region as a whole. 
(e) The Regional Commission should work in close association with similar 
neighbouring bodies and with any specialised international agencies concerned. 
(f) The Regional representatives of each Government included in the Region 
would naturally have every opportunity to arrange, in consultation with the other 
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Governments concerned, visits to the various territories in the Region, in order to 
familiarise themselves with conditions there. 
11. The proposed Commissions, which would be composed of representatives of 
the member · Governments, would be consultative bodies not themselves exercising 
any executive or supervisory powers as Commissions. There are several reasons why 
this is necessary. First, a number of the regions will include sovereign States as well 
as dependent areas. Secondly, many British Colonial territories are already politically 
so far advanced that the exercise of executive or supervisory powers by an outside 
body would be deeply resented by the local inhabitants and would, in any event, 
become more and more impracticable as further measures of self-government are 
realised. Dependent status should be regarded as a transitional stage of political 
evolution, and any measure which might tend to suggest that this is permanent 
should be avoided. Thirdly, many of the members of the Commission would have no 
responsibility for carrying out a decision in a particular territory. The divorce of 
power and responsibility implied in the exercise of executive functions by a Regional 
Commission would result in a form of dyarchy that could only give rise to confusion 
and friction . 
12. The Regional Commissions should not concern themselves with the purely 
constitutional issue of the development of self-government, i.e., with the constitu-
tional relationship between a Colony and its Parent State. It is very doubtful whether 
any outside body could offer any useful advice in the matter. The Permanent 
Mandates Commission itself experienced this difficulty when the termination of the 
Mandate for Iraq was under consideration. Judgment must be based on long practical 
experience of the particular circumstances and capacity of the people of the territory 
in question for further measures of self-government. On the other hand, there will be 
many valuable lessons to be learned from the experience of different Administrations 
in their handling of problems of local Government and native administration, and in 
their efforts to resolve the conflicts of interest which arise in territories with plural 
communities. 
13. Possible regions.-The geographical area of a Region might include two 
categories of territory, namely:-
(a) Dependent territories in the Region. 
(b) Independent States in the Region. 
Further, there may often be:-
(c) Independent States outside the Region (other than Parent States) who have a 
major strategic or economic interest in the Region and are therefore represented 
on the Commission. 
It does not, of course, necessarily follow that representatives of all three of these 
categories would be found on every Regional Commission. 
( 1) The Caribbean 
The Anglo-American Caribbean Commission is the only Regional Commission yet set 
up and its scope so far is limited to the British Colonies and the United States 
Possessions within the Caribbean area. It has, however, already begun to widen its 
scope through the medium of the bodies which function under its auspices. For 
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instance, at the West Indian Conference held in March 1944, in addition to the 
territories mentioned above, Canada and the Netherlands West Indies were repre-
sented by one observer each; the French National Committee of Liberation was 
unable to accept an invitation to send an observer. It seems clear that any expansion 
of the scope of the Commission itself should immediately take in the dependent 
territories of France and Holland, and at the same time it might be desirable to invite 
Canada to join the Commission in view of her economic ties with the British 
Colonies in the Caribbean. Ultimately there should be machinery to enable the 
problems of the Caribbean area to be considered as a whole by the inclusion of the 
independent republics of Cuba, Haiti and Santo Domingo, and possibly some of the 
South and Central American Republics. The immediate addition of the independent 
republics, however, would complicate the working of the Commission proper and 
even of the West Indian Conference and reduce their present effectiveness. 
(2) The South Pacific 
The geographical area of this Region might include all the island territories South of 
Latitude 23 North (but excluding the islands of Hawaii) and East of Longitude 130 
East and West of Longitude 120 West. It would thus comprise:-
(a) Dependent territories within the region and their parent states 
Fiji. United Kingdom. 
Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony. 
British Solomon Islands Protectorate. 
British Line Islands. 
Tonga (Protected State). 
Pitcairn Group. 
Cook Islands. 
Tokelau or Union Group. 
Western Samoa (Mandated). 
Kermadecs. 
Australian New Guinea (Mandated). 
Papua. 
Australian Solomons. 
Norfolk Islands. 
Nauru (Mandated). 
New Hebrides. 
Canton and Enderbury Islands. 
New Caledonia and Loyalty Islands. 
Wallis and Futuna Islands. 
French Oceania. 
New Zealand. 
Australia. 
British Commonwealth. 
Anglo-French Condominium. 
Anglo-American Condominium. 
France. 
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Dutch New Guinea. 
Aru Islands. 
Kei Islands. 
Eastern Samoa. 
Johnston Island. 
Kugwa Reef. 
Palmyra. 
Howland and Baker Islands. 
Wake Island. 
Guam. 
Marshall Group. 
Caroline Group. 
Marianas. 
Palau Island. 
Netherlands. 
United States. 
Present Japanese Mandates. 
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The Governments of Australia and New Zealand, both at the Canberra Conference 
of January-February 1944 and again at the Wellington Conference of November 
1944, have recommended the establishment of a South Seas Regional Commission 
with advisory powers. Under the plan proposed by the two Dominion Governments 
there would be a Commission proper consisting of representatives of the Govern-
ments and Dominions in the Region; a secretariat, and research and functional 
bodies established by the Member Governments on the advice of the Commission. It 
is contemplated that provision should be made for associating with the work of the 
Commission existing research and functional bodies; and also that arrangements 
should be made for association of the native peoples in the work of the Commission. 
There might also be a standing conference meeting from time to time under the ;egis 
of the Commission. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom agree that the 
South Pacific is an area in which the establishment of a Regional Commission would 
be useful. 
(3) South-East Asia 
(a) Dependent territories within the region and their parent states 
Straits Settlements and Malay States. United Kingdom. 
North Borneo. 
Sarawak. 
Hong Kong 
Netherlands India. 
Timor. 
Indo-China. 
Philippines. 
(b) Independent state within the region 
Siam. 
Netherlands. 
Portugal. 
France. 
United States. 
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(c) Independent states outside the region but with interests in it 
Australia. 
China. 
India. 
[37] 
It will be for the Governments of Burma and Ceylon to decide for themselves 
whether they wish to be associated with the work of this Regional Commission. 
South-East Asia seems to be an area suitable eventually for the establishment of a 
Regional Commission, though clearly it is impracticable to make any progress with 
the formulation of a regional organisation while the area is still in enemy 
occupation. 
(4) West Africa 
(a) Dependent territories within the region and their parent states 
Nigeria, including Cameroons United Kingdom. 
under British Mandate. 
Gold Coast, including Togoland 
under British Mandate. 
Sierra Leone. 
Gambia. 
French West Africa, including 
Togoland under French Mandate. 
Cameroons under French Mandate. 
Portuguese Guinea. 
Spanish Guinea (including Fernando Po). 
(b) Independent state within the region 
Liberia. 
France. 
Portugal. 
Spain. 
(c) Independent states outside the region but with interests in it 
The States to be included in this category will require examination in the light of 
the general post-war settlement: for example, the United States of America might 
appropriately be included on the grounds of strategic interest. 
(5) Central, Eastern and Southern Africa 
(a) Dependent territories within the region and their parent states 
Kenya. United Kingdom. 
Uganda. 
Tanganyika (Mandated). 
Zanzibar. 
Northern Rhodesia. 
Nyasaland. 
Bechuanaland Protectorate. 
Basutoland. 
Swaziland. 
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Belgian Congo, and Mandated territory 
of Ruanda-Urundi. 
French Equatorial Africa. 
Madagascar. 
Reunion. 
Portuguese East and West Africa. 
South-West Africa (Mandated). 
(b) Independent states within the region 
The Union of South Africa. 
Belgium. 
France. 
Portugal. 
Union of South Africa. 
The self-governing Colony of Southern Rhodesia. 
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The Governments of Mauritius and Seychelles might be associated with the work 
of this Commission when matters of interest to them are under discussion. 
(6) North-East Africa 
(a) Dependent territories within the region and their parent states 
British Somaliland. United Kingdom. 
French Somaliland. 
Italian Somaliland. 
Eritrea. 
Sudan. 
(b) Independent state within the region 
Ethiopia. 
France. 
The Power or Powers entrusted 
with their future adminis-
tration. 
United Kingdom and Egypt 
(Condominium). 
In view of the close economic and other ties between Aden and the Somali Coast, 
provision should be made for the Government of Aden to be associated with the work 
of the Commission when necessary. 
(B) Functional agencies of the World Organisation 
14. Apart from the purely constitutional problem of the relationship between a 
dependent territory and its Parent State (which, it has been suggested in paragraph 
12 above, is not suitable for international handling) the problems of Colonial 
administration which have a legitimate international interest are common social and 
economic problems of public administration which arise in some form in all 
territories, irrespective of their international status. Many of them transcend all 
political boundaries and some cannot even be confined within any particular 
geographical region. To ensure proper international co-operation in the solution of 
such problems, functional agencies attached to the World Organisation are desirable. 
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This principle is recognised in Chapter IX of the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement. Some 
agencies of this kind, such as the I.L.O., have been in existence for some years and 
have already proved their value. 
15. What agencies would be useful, their precise relationship to the proposed 
World Organisation as well as to Regional Commissions and their method of 
operation are matters for international discussion . Some preliminary ideas are 
developed below (paragraphs 16 to 19 inclusive). Certain features, however, will be 
essential to all such agencies if they are to be fully effective and at the same time 
acceptable by the United Nations as being compatible with the doctrine of national 
sovereignty, which presupposes that responsibility and power cannot be divorced. 
These features, noted below, are suggested by experience of the working of the 
International Labour Organisation, the general structure and functions of which are 
set out in Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles. 
(a) The Charter of all such agencies must cover all territories irrespective of their 
international status. 
(b) Every State member of the World Organisation must agree in advance to 
publish periodical reports in respect both of its metropolitan area and of any 
dependent territories for which it is responsible: and to forward copies to the 
agency concerned: these reports to cover points laid down as being essential to the 
proper discharge of that agency's functions . (cf. Article 408, Treaty of Versailles.) 
(c) Each agency must be well staffed with technical or professional experts in the 
subject with which it is concerned. 
(d) The results of the agencies' deliberations would take the form of recommenda-
tions to the member States. It should be an obligation upon States which accept 
such recommendations to bring them to the notice of the competent authority in 
each dependent territory for which they are responsible, and to impress upon 
those authorities the importance of applying the recommendations unless, even 
with modification to suit local circumstances, they are definitely inapplicable. (cf. 
Article 421, Treaty of Versailles.) 
(e) Wherever possible, any recommendations for more progressive international 
policies and improved standards should be accompanied by some provision 
ensuring that any resulting privileges or advantages are withheld from those 
States which are not willing to accept the obligations. 
16. Suggested agencies.-Apart from the Economic Commission proposed in 
Chapter IX (D) (1) of the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement, the following is a list of social 
subjects for which functional agencies might, in the opinion of His Majesty's 
Government in the United Kingdom, be usefully established where they do not 
already exist:-
(i) Labour, 
(ii) Health, 
(iii) Food, Agriculture and Animal Health, 
(iv) Dangerous Drugs, 
(v) Penal Administration and Prison Reform. 
17. Relation to World Organisation.-The Dumbarton Oaks Agreement contem-
plates the creation of various organs, of which the following are relevant to the 
present memorandum:-
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(i) The General Assembly, which is to initiate studies and make recommendations 
for the purpose of promoting international co-operation in political, economic and 
social fields; to make recommendations for the co-ordination of the policies of 
international economic, social and other specialist agencies brought into relation 
with the organisation in accordance with agreements between such agencies and 
the organisations, and to receive and consider annual and special reports from the 
various bodies of the organisation. (Chapter V (6), (7) and (8).) 
(ii) Under the General Assembly there is to be set up an Economic and Social 
Council with functions as in Chapter IX (C) (1). This Commission in turn is to set 
up-
(iii) An Economic Commission, a Social Commission and such other Commis-
sions as may be required. (Chapter IX (D) (1).) 
The terms on which each of the specialist Economic, Social and other organisa-
tions or agencies should be brought into relationship with the main organisation are 
to be determined by agreement between the Economic and Social Council and the 
appropriate authorities of the specialist organisation or agency subject to approval by 
the General Assembly. (Chapter IX (A) (2).) 
18. In the last resort, the decision whether to adopt and put into effect any 
recommendations resulting from this chain of organisations must rest with the 
Governments of the member States. The objective is action, not merely discussion, 
and it is important, therefore, to avoid over-elaboration of the machinery. The exact 
status of the agencies carried forward from before the war- particularly the 
I.L.O.-will raise special problems which are outside the scope of this memorandum. 
19. Method of operation.-The method of operation of each agency can best be 
worked out in the light of experience; but, broadly speaking, in addition to the 
interchange of information, there are two ways in which these agencies could 
operate: They could make specific recommendations to individual States as to 
particular matters which have come to their notice in territories for which those 
States are responsible; and they could evolve new general codes of policy or 
standards of administration for multi-national adoption. His Majesty's Government 
in the United Kingdom feel that the real value of the proposed agencies is in bringing 
international thought to bear on general problems and thus progressively improving 
standards throughout the world. The preamble to Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles, 
dealing with the organisation of labour, points out that the failure of any nation to 
adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which 
desire to improve conditions in their own countries. This is equally true of social 
conditions other than labour. Hence the importance of dealing with these problems 
not only in relation to dependent areas but in relation to sovereign States as well. 
This point cannot be too often emphasised. The progressive improvement of 
standards can best be achieved by the preparation of draft codes, conventions or 
reciprocal agreements on the lines of the various International Labour Conventions, 
the International Sanitary Conventions, Dangerous Drugs Conventions, &c. The 
emphasis should throughout be placed on constructive achievement on the widest 
possible international basis. 
Ill-Measures to ensure publicity in colonial administration 
20. Part 11 of this memorandum has described the measures recommended by 
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His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for international collaboration in 
problems of colonial administration of common interest. Something further, 
however, is necessary. Whether in independent States or in dependent territories 
good government requires not only that the administrative machine should work 
effectively, but also that the public should be able to satisfy itself that the policy and 
practice of the Government accord with modern standards. In an independent State 
this requirement is met in various ways according to the custom of the country 
concerned; but the effectiveness of all of them depends entirely upon the necessary 
information being readily available to the public so that the actions of the 
Government may be open to public scrutiny and free criticism. The same general 
principles apply in regard to dependent territories, though the position is inevitably 
somewhat different, partly because in many such territories the bulk of the 
population is not sufficiently advanced, politically or educationally, to be able to act 
as an effective vehicle of criticism (though this handicap is by no means confined to 
dependent territories); and partly because in the last resort the power of decision 
rests, not with the people of the territory itself, but with the Government of the 
Parent State. This circumstance, associated with the idea of "trusteeship," has led 
many students of colonial affairs in Great Britain and elsewhere to advocate a system 
of international supervision of colonial administration. This doctrine has found 
expression in many forms, though the extreme conception of an international body 
with powers overriding those of the Government of the Parent State does not now 
find favour in many quarters. Nevertheless, this theory of accountability to some 
outside authority has been supported by many experts, and clearly deserves careful 
analysis. 
21. As has been indicated in paragraph 2 of this memorandum, the term 
"trusteeship" in relation to the British Colonial Empire has been used as a 
convenient description of the attitude of mind of successive Governments towards 
their colonial responsibilities rather than as a definition of the status of the Parent 
State; and it did not carry with it any implication that the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom was accountable for its actions to any third party. Indeed such a conception 
would be impracticable on constitutional grounds not only in Great Britain but in 
any sovereign country. It is impossible to divorce power from responsibility, nor 
could the Government of any Parent State bind itself in advance by any international 
obligation to act in all circumstances upon recommendations from an international 
body on matters within the State's colonial responsibilities . It must leave itself free to 
judge every case on its merits with a full knowledge of pertinent facts and criticisms. 
22. The position is that there arises in dependent territories as elsewhere certain 
joint problems which have an inherent international significance (for example, 
economic policy or public health control); and certain parallel problems, in tackling 
which the interchange of ideas and experience between nations can prove of the 
utmost benefit to individual Governments, even though the practice adopted in one 
country may not directly affect the interests of any other. In both these categories of 
problem, the case for international collaboration rests upon the nature of the subject 
and not upon the status of the territories in which the problems arise. For dealing 
with them, the most effective machinery is that described in Part II of this 
memorandum. It does not follow that every aspect of colonial administration, 
irrespective of its functional nature, is a matter of international concern merely on 
account of the dependent status of the territory. Indeed, with the progressive 
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political advancement of the colonial peoples the idea of international supervision of 
dependent territories as such becomes more and more unrealistic and inappropriate. 
In proportion as the inhabitants are entrusted with a greater share in the control of 
their own affairs they will become increasingly resentful of interference from outside 
in matters of domestic concern, and especially from a body which can have no direct 
interest in, or responsibility for, them. It is probable that they would much prefer to 
have to deal only with a single Parent State which understands their requirements 
and aspirations and which has the power to take decisions. This view is, in fact, borne 
out by articles in the local press in several British Territories. 
23. Nevertheless, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are con-
vinced that full publicity is one of the best vehicles for stimulating progressive 
policies, and consider that it should be perfectly possible to devise a means of 
ensuring world-wide publicity on colonial affairs, and of providing an opportunity of 
healthy constructive criticism, without contravening the constitutional principles, 
or giving rise to the local political resentment, referred to above. 
24. Some guidance can perhaps be obtained from the past experience and 
practice of Great Britain in this respect. It has long been the normal practice of 
British Colonial administration to publish annually:-
(i) a short general report on the social and economic progress of each of her 
dependent territories-not only those under Mandate; and 
(ii) full detailed reports on the various departments of each colonial administra-
tion (health, education, &c.) . 
(Although these reports have been discontinued during the war, they will be resumed 
as soon as circumstances permit.) All the annual general reports, and the more 
important of the departmental reports, are prepared in conformity with model forms 
drawn up in the Colonial Office. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom 
suggest that all the Colonial Powers should be invited to agree to publish annually 
reports on the administration of their dependent territories through whatever 
governmental procedure is normal in the country concerned. The general form of 
these reports should be standardised by international agreement. The way in which 
this might be done is developed in paragraphs 25 and 26 below. The primary 
justification for such reports is to satisfy one of the basic requirements of democratic 
government by providing the inhabitants of the territory itself, and of the responsible 
Parent State, with the material necessary for developing a healthy public opinion 
focussed upon the actions of the governing authorities. The reports would, however, 
also serve the wider, but subsidiary, purpose of enabling public opinion throughout 
the world to be fully informed as to the political, social and economic advancement 
of colonial peoples, especially if there were established some international centre at 
which copies of all published reports and other publications dealing with colonial 
affairs would be on record. 
25. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom accordingly recommend 
the creation of an International Colonial Centre, the primary function of which 
would be to determine and periodically revise the scope of the annual general 
reports. Where there is a specialist international agency, that body will obviously be 
the best suited to determine the scope of the relevant report, but the International 
Colonial Centre and the various functional agencies should work in close association 
in order to avoid duplication and overlapping of reports. The Centre would be 
212 CHAPTER 2 [37] 
entitled to receive copies of all official reports published on colonial affairs. (The 
functional agencies of the World Organisation would also, of course, receive copies of 
reports on subjects within their purview.) The Centre should also be provided with 
sufficient funds to enable it to buy copies of non-official publications on colonial 
affairs. For the reasons given in paragraphs 21 and 22 above, it should not have any 
supervisory or executive powers, though it would no doubt wish from time to time to 
summarise and collate the material at its disposal and would require a permanent 
expert staff. It would, incidentally, thus provide a means of ensuring that the benefits 
of international thought and experience are available to the Government of any 
territory which does not naturally fit into a Regional organisation, and upon any 
subjects not covered by a functional agency. The Centre would, in short, be an 
international centre of information and research on colonial affairs, and the 
document which establishes its constitution might usefully recite the main objective 
of colonial policy, with its three implications of (a) development of self-government, 
(b) social and economic advancement, and (c) the recognition of the responsibilities 
due from members of the world community one to another, as an accepted guide to 
world opinion. 
26. The Centre might be under the <egis of a Sub-Committee of the Economic 
and Social Council of the proposed World Organisation. This Sub-Committee would 
be composed of representatives of all the Colonial Powers plus a number of others 
whom the General Assembly might be invited to choose from other countries whose 
experience or interests enable them to make a special contribution in any particular 
field of colonial development. The Centre would form an integral part of the World 
Organisation, and it would thus be open to the General Assembly to discuss 
international aspects of questions arising out of the Centre's work. 
IV-Mandated territories and Italian colonies 
27. During the last 25 years an increasing interest in the well-being of Colonial 
peoples within the world community has resulted in much discussion of possible 
forms of international organisation to secure this end. After the war of 1914-19 this 
approach led to the creation of the Mandate System to provide for the administration 
of part of the Ottoman Empire and also of the ex-German Colonies. As a result of the 
present war similar problems will arise regarding the arrangements to be made for 
the administration of the former Italian Colonies and those ex-German Colonies the 
Mandate for which was entrusted to Japan. Moreover, it will also in any case be 
necessary to consider the future of the Mandatory Principle as a whole in relation to 
the post-war settlement. Before considering these problems, it will be useful to 
examine, in the light of some 25 years' experience, how far the Mandate System 
successfully achieved its object. 
28. The Mandate System3 was applied to certain parts of the Ottoman Empire 
mainly inhabited by Arabs and also to the German Colonies. It was appreciated that 
3 The mandates established under League of Nations auspices at the end of the First World War were 
divided into 'A', 'B' and 'C' categories. The 'A' mandates covered the territories of the Middle East which 
were deemed capable of self-government after a period of tutelage. The 'B' mandates covered the 
territories of tropical Africa which were destined for a prolonged period of guardianship. The 'C' mandates 
covered the territories of South-West Africa and the Pacific Islands, the inhabitants of which were deemed 
so 'primitive' that they would probably never be capable of governing themselves. 
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the former had already reached "a stage of development where their existence as 
independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of 
administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able 
to stand alone." These territories, known as territories under "A" Mandates, were in a 
class by themselves. The special problems of the two remaining, namely, Palestine 
with Transjordan (under British Mandate) and Syria with Lebanon (under French 
Mandate) will require separate consideration and these territories are not therefore 
included within the scope of the proposals now made. The German Colonies, 
however, were inhabited by peoples far less advanced both politically and economi-
cally; and it was realised that there could be no prospect of their being able to stand 
alone as independent nations for many years to come. Special arrangements had 
therefore to be made for these territories; and, in entrusting their administration to 
certain of the Allied and Associated Powers, an attempt was made to safeguard the 
basic principles of sound colonial policy by an internationally accepted system. These 
principles found expression in the "B" and "C" Mandates and in Article 22 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, the material passage in which reads:-
"To those Colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have 
ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them 
and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the 
strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principles 
that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of 
civilisation ... . " 
29. Practical weaknesses have been found to exist in the Mandate System. In the 
first place, it was designed at least as much to protect the interests of other Powers as 
to ensure the development of the territory in the interests of the inhabitants 
themselves. Some of the specific obligations were, therefore, rather negative in 
character, and the positive obligations to promote the material and moral welfare of 
the inhabitants were inevitably expressed in very general terms. Moreover, the 
limitations inherent in a document which attempted to prescribe a single permanent 
policy for a number of different territories in the light of then existing circumstances 
and ideas, made it difficult to effect the adjustments required to meet the new 
problems of Colonial administration arising in an ever-changing world: while, on the 
other hand, the uncertainty as to the future of these mandated territories did not 
encourage a long-term developmental policy on the part of the Mandatory. Apart 
from these general weaknesses in the system, many of the obligations imposed (e.g., 
those dealing with Forced Labour, and Slavery) were, or became, the subject of 
multilateral conventions which were applicable to other territories as well as to those 
under mandate. General problems of this nature can in any case be much better dealt 
with in relation to all territories where they arise, and not under a system confined to 
mandated territories. Specialised international arrangements of this kind (whether 
through the medium of functional agencies or multilateral conventions) can more 
readily be adapted to changes in world conditions or changing conceptions of policy, 
than provisions in documents such as the Mandates. Such provisions are inevitably 
drawn up in the light of views of world policy prevailing at the time, and if world 
conditions or policy change, are apt to remain as somewhat one-sided relics of past 
policy out of relation to conditions in similar countries not subject to Mandate. The 
provisions of the Mandates on defence matters provide one example. These aimed, in 
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effect, at the permanent neutralisation of the territories and could be interpreted as 
precluding the Mandatory from effectively providing for their security in modern 
conditions of global warfare. The requirements of non-discrimination in economic 
matters, commonly described as the "open door" policy, afford another instance. 
Economic arrangements in these territories should conform to whatever economic 
arrangements on a world-wide basis may be arrived at as part of the post -war 
settlement; and the freedom of these territories to adjust their economic policy 
should not be subject to special restrictions from which other territories are exempt. 
30. Although the spirit in which the Mandate system was conceived represented a 
genuine advance and its indirect influences were for the most part good, the 
Permanent Mandates Commission was not designed to encourage the Mandatory 
Powers to collaborate in adjusting their policies to meet the needs of the people in 
the territories, which will be the main purpose of the system now proposed. 
Experience of the administration of Mandated territories has convinced His Majesty's 
Government that the objectives which the Mandate system sought to achieve can 
better be realised for the future under a comprehensive system, on the basis outlined 
in Part 11 and Ill of this paper, which would be applicable to all dependent territories 
and would not involve the creation of a special international status for some of them. 
His Majesty's Government consider, therefore, that in respect of any dependency now 
administered under B or C Mandate by one of the United Nations, the Parent State 
should in the future be free to exercise its jurisdiction without the prescriptions of 
the mandatory regime but in conformity with the wider and more flexible system 
described in Parts 11 and Ill of this Memorandum. 
31. In determining the future administration of the ex-German islands Mandated 
to Japan, and also the Italian Colonial Empire, the same general cohsiderations 
apply, namely that it is undesirable to create a special international status for them. 
The islands under Japanese Mandate will clearly have to be transferred to some 
authority other than Japan and the same is doubtless true of much, if not all, of the 
Italian Colonial Empire. Provided that any changes in the Powers responsible for 
these areas are made contingent upon the acceptance by the new Power of the 
general system of international obligations for dependent territories described in this 
Memorandum, such changes, it is considered, could not be regarded as conflicting 
with the spirit of the Atlantic Charter. 
V -Conclusion 
32. The conclusions which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom 
have reached may be summed up as follows :-
(i) International collaboration is essential to achieve the objective of promoting to 
the utmost the well-being of Colonial peoples within the world community, with 
its three implications of (a) development of self-government, (b) social and 
economic advancement and (c) the recognition of the responsibilities due from 
members of the world community one to another. 
(ii) The majority of the problems to be tackled are not however confined to 
dependent territories, and do not arise out of their dependent status. Such general 
problems must be viewed in their relationship to the similar problems of sovereign 
States as well as those of other dependent territories. 
(iii) For th is purpose some system is necessary which is at the same time wider in 
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territorial scope than the Mandate System and more flexible and adaptable in 
organisation: one which will afford adequate recognition of the progressive 
advancement of the inhabitants of dependent territories, and their changing 
political relationship with their Parent States. 
(iv) His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom consider that the system of 
international collaboration best calculated to achieve the desired results is that 
described in Part 11 of this Memorandum. 
(v) Apart from measures of active international collaboration, His Majesty's 
Government also attach the utmost importance to full publicity in colonial 
administration, thus ensuring opportunities of free and well-informed public 
comment and criticism. They desire to see international agreement and uniform-
ity of policy on this question. This, they consider, can best be achieved on the lines 
suggested in Part Ill of this Memorandum. 
(vi) His Majesty's Government hope that all Governments concerned will be 
willing to co-operate in a general system of the kind proposed in this Memoran-
dum. It is, indeed, an essential feature of the proposals that they should be 
universally adopted and acted upon by all concerned in a spirit of friendly 
collaboration, with frank interchange of experience and ideas, towards the 
common goal.4 
4 The War Cabinet discussed and approved this memo on 20 Dec 1944. Stanley argued that it was 
important to take the initiative and not wait for the Americans to make the first move with 'unsatisfactory' 
schemes which might attract support. The chancellor, Sir J Anderson, drew attention to para 16 of the 
memo and the statement therein that the UK would support the establishment of functional agencies for 
the social subjects listed where they did not already exist. He urged that care be taken 'to ensure that such 
bodies were not a means of putting pressure on us to spend money which we had not got' (PREM 4/3114, 
WM 172(44)5). 
38 PREM 4/3114, ff 236-247 29 Dec 1944 
[Colonial trusteeship]: inward telegram no 6901 from Lord Halifax to 
FO on the American view as to the desirability of reaching 'a measure 
of understanding on colonial questions' before the UN security 
conference. Minutes by Mr Churchill, Mr Eden and J M Martin1 
My telegram No. 5614. 
Pasvolsky2 raised again on December 18th question of colonial "trusteeship". He 
said it would probably not be necessary for a settlement of the question to be reached 
at proposed United Nations Security Conference which would deal with Dumbarton 
Oaks but thought it was absolutely certain that it would come up if enforced because 
questions arising out of Italian colonies and Japanese mandated islands were bound 
to be raised. He felt strongly that the ball was with us in this matter now and that if 
we could get something moving before the United Nations Conference, it would be a 
very great advantage. Pasvolsky said he had particularly in mind the admitted failure 
of United States and United Kingdom to reach a prior understanding before recent 
1 Principal private secretary to the prime minister, 1941-1945. 
2 See 37, note 2. 
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Civil Aviation Conference and thought that a measure of understanding on Colonial 
questions on our initiative was most desirable before any United Nations Conference 
to discuss security. 
2. Pasvolsky also expressed the hope that he might have an opportunity of talking 
to the Secretary of State for the Colonies quite informally when the latter comes to 
Washington. 
No M.l257!4: Foreign Secretary 
How does this matter stand? There must be no question of our being hustled or 
seduced into declarations affecting British sovereignty in any of the Dominions or 
Colonies. Pray remember my declaration against liquidating the British Empire. If 
the Americans want to take Japanese islands which they have conquered, let them do 
so with our blessing and any form of words that may be agreeable to them. But 
"Hands off the British Empire" is our maxim and it must not be weakened or 
smirched to please sob-stuff merchants at home or foreigners of any hue. 
No P.M./45/11: Prime Minister 
Your minute M.l257/4 of December 31st. 
w.s.c. 
31.12.44 
You will recall that the question of colonial "trusteeship" was discussed by the War 
Cabinet on December 20th when the Colonial Office Memorandum on International 
Aspects of Colonial Policy (W.P.(44)738)3 was considered. This paper outlines a 
constructive policy of international co-operation in colonial development which fully 
safeguards the sovereignty and administrative authority of the responsible metropo-
litan Powers concerned. 
2. There is not the slightest question of liquidating the British Empire. On the 
contrary, we are anxious to persuade the Americans not to go in for half-baked 
international regimes in any ex-enemy colonies they may take over, nor to advocate 
them for others, but to accept colonial responsibilities on the same terms as 
ourselves. 
3. The Colonial Office memorandum has been sent (in accordance with W.M.(44) 
172, Conclusion 5) to Dominion Governments for comment. When the Dominion 
replies have been received it will, if the Cabinet so decide, be communicated to the 
State Department as the basis of an exchange of views before the United Nations 
Conference meets. 
4. Meanwhile, Lord Halifax's telegram (Washington No. 6901) has been repeated 
to Oliver Stanley in Jamaica with the suggestion that he might wish to have a 
prel iminary talk with Mr. Pasvolsky on his way home through Washington, as such a 
talk would enable us to retain the initiative and possibly forestall some embarrassing 
American move. 
5. I am sending copies of this minute to the Dominions Secretary and the 
Colonial Office. 
3 See 37. 
A.E. 
8.1.44 [sic]4 
4 The year should read 1945. 
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Mr. Martin 
Pray give your mind to this matter and see if we really are being jockeyed out or 
edged nearer the abyss. 
Prime Minister 
w.s.c. 
10.1.45 
Reference your note below, I do not think that the proposals now under discussion 
involve any danger to our Colonial Empire. On the contrary they seem to be the best 
scheme that can be devised:-
(1) to secure international agreement to the termination of the vexatious 
Mandate System and avoid its extension to enemy territories conquered in the 
present war, and 
(2) to allow foreign powers a means of expressing their reasonable and legitimate 
interest in Colonial territories without affecting our sovereignty and executive 
authority, or entitling them to meddle in consitutional questions, or establishing 
international bodies possessing powers of interference divorced from responsibil-
ity. 
The proposed Regional Commissions will be consultative bodies (without execu-
tive or supervisory powers), comprising states with Colonial territories in the region 
and states with major economic or strategic interests there, intended to secure 
collaboration in such matters as public health control, regional economic problems 
and communications, agriculture, research, etc. They would not concern themselves 
with constitutional issues. 
The international agencies will resemble the I.L.O. and deal particularly with 
general questions such as Labour, Health, Dangerous Drugs, Penal Administration 
and the like, and so progressively improve standards in such matters throughout the 
world, working particularly by means of international conventions, reciprocal 
agreements etc. 
The International Colonial Centre will be simply a clearing house of information.5 
J.M.M. 
10.1.45 
No P.M./45151: Prime Minister 
Your minute M.85/6 [sic: 85/5]. 
I have now discussed the matter with the Colonial Secretary and we both feel that 
our proposals cannot possibly involve any danger to our Colonial Empire. On the 
contrary, it seems to us that if they are generally adopted, the position of our 
Colonial Empire would not be endangered but rather buttressed and reinforced. 
2. A further great advantage in our now agreeing to present them to the 
Americans would lie in the fact that we should thereby gain the initiative and 
possibly succeed in preventing the Americans from circulating schemes of their own 
which, if adopted, would endanger our Colonial Empire. 
5 Churchill replied to Martin 'I will take your word for it' and asked his private secretary to draft a further 
minute to Eden. This minute (No M.85/5, 18 Jan 1945) repeated points (1) and (2) in Martin's minute and 
ended: 'If you are satisfied that this is so and that these proposals involve no danger to our Colonial 
Empire, I have no objection to further consideration proceeding on the lines you indicate.' 
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3. As I think you know, the Colonial Secretary has already talked unofficially on 
the lines of our paper to members of the United States Administration. Meanwhile 
our proposals have been sent to Dominion Governments for comment, on the 
understanding that they will be resubmitted to Cabinet in the light of any comments 
before they are communicated to the U.S. Government. 
4. I think, therefore, that if the President should revert to this question during 
the forthcoming conference6 (and only of course if he does) you might very suitably 
say that we hope very shortly to present to his Government a well-considered plan for 
international collaboration in these problems. You might add that you would greatly 
hope that the Americans for their part would not circulate any papers on this subject 
until they had carefully studied our proposals. 
6 A reference to the forthcoming conference at Yalta. 
A.E. 
24.1.45 
39 PREM 4/3114, ff225-227 5-10 Mar 1945 
[Yalta protocol on territorial trusteeship]: minutes by Mr Attlee and 
Mr Churchill 
Prime Minister 
1. At the request of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Armistice and 
Post-War Committee this morning discussed the line which should now be taken at 
the forthcoming meeting with the Dominion representatives, and subsequently at 
San Francisco, on the subject of "territorial trusteeship": 1 You will recall that 
Colonel Stanley prepared a Memorandum on the international aspects of Colonial 
policy which came before the War Cabinet (W.P.(44) 738, copy attached),2 and in 
which he expounded a system of international collaboration on a regional basis 
through Regional Commissions, and by the creation of further central functional 
bodies, such as the I.L.O. attached to the World Organisation. This system was to 
take the place of the Mandate system, which would be abolished. The War Cabinet 
authorised Colonel Stanley to discuss his proposals with the Dominions. 
2. Since then, two things have happened. First, the comments of the Dominion 
· Governments have been received, and from these it is clear that Australia and New 
Zealand advocate the retention of the Mandate system, or something very similar 
which will include the principle of accountability. The second is the Yalta Confer-
ence, the Protocol of which contains the following passage:-
"Territorial Trusteeship. 
It was agreed that the five Nations which will have permanent seats on the 
Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Confer-
ence on the question of territorial trusteeship. 
The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that 
territorial trusteeship will only apply to (a) existing mandates of the League of 
Nations; (b) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war; 
1 A record of the discussion is at CO 968/16111, no 73, APW 5(45)3. 2 See 37. 
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(c) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and 
(d) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United _ 
Nations Conference or in the preliminary consultations, and it will be a matter for 
subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be placed 
under trusteeship." 
3. The question discussed by the A.P.W. this morning was the interpretation of 
the above extract. Does it commit us to the continuance of a Mandate system? The 
Foreign Secretary expressed the personal view that it was still open to us to advance 
proposals for the abolition of the Mandate system. He interprets the Protocol as 
committing us to consultation on the question of territorial trusteeship, but as 
limiting the field of this consultation to the types of territories mentioned. He felt, 
however, however, that an authoritative interpretation of the extent to which we are 
committed should be sought from you, and the Committee accordingly requested me 
to put the matter before you. 
4. Whether or not we are committed to the continuance of the Mandate system, 
the line to be taken at San Francisco requires careful thought in the light of the 
attitude of the Dominions. On receipt of your reply to this Minute, Colonel Stanley 
will put forward for consideration ultimately by the War Cabinet his specific 
proposals. 
Lord President of the Council 
C.R.A. 
5.3.45 
The expression "Mandate system" was only used at Yalta to limit territories which 
would come within the scope of discussions affecting 'territorial trusteeship'. This is 
necessary in view of the disappearance of the old League of Nations on whose 
authority the mandates were held. It in no way governs any arrangement that may be 
made for the future. We are certainly not committed to the maintenance of the 
mandate system; but there is no question of subjecting any non-mandated British 
territories to any form of territorial trusteeship unless we choose to do so of our own 
accord. I should myself oppose such a departure which might well be pressed upon 
nations like Britain, France, Belgium and Holland, who have great colonial 
possessions, by the United States, Russia and China who have none. 
w.s.c. 
10.3.45 
40 CO 968/161/1, WP(45)200, annex 19 Mar 1945 
'International aspects of colonial policy': War Cabinet memorandum 
by Mr Stanley explaining why it is no longer possible to pursue the 
policy proposed in WP(44)738. 1 Appendix 
The Prime Minister's reply to the Lord President's Minute,2 which has been 
circulated to the Committee, states categorically that nothing was decided at Yalta 
which would prevent us proceeding with the plan approved by this Committee in 
1 See 37. 2 See 39. 
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December, 1944. It is, therefore, on other grounds that we must decide whether it is 
in fact wise to proceed on the lines then agreed. 
2. The Colonial Office memorandum approved by the Committee was the product 
of a long and careful examination. I thought then, and I still think, that it represents 
the best policy for our Colonial Empire. I must, however, confess that events since 
this paper was discussed by the Committee make me very doubtful as to our chances 
of getting it agreed elsewhere. The following are my reasons:-
(a) The Foreign Office paper dealing with the legal aspects of the liquidation of 
Mandates makes it clear that any substitute for the present system must be agreed 
by all members of the League of Nations as well as by the United States of America, 
as one of the original Allied and Associated Powers. 
(b) When I was in Washington in December I had many hours' conversation with 
officials of the State Department. Although, of course, I had no authority to put 
forward the Committee's memorandum officially on behalf of His Majesty's 
Government, I did try it out informally. The reception was most disappointing. No 
real attempt was made to appreciate its effect upon Colonial administration as a 
whole, but it was viewed entirely in relation to the occupation by the United States 
after the war of the Japanese islands. For this purpose, the one thing that matters 
is that the United States, while occupying the islands, should not appear to have a 
theoretical sovereignty over them (for that would be Imperialism). 
(c) The responses from the Dominions show that Australia and New Zealand are 
in favour of the continuance of the Mandates, and that Canada, while declining to 
express an opinion for itself, thinks that American public opinion will not be 
satisfied unless the Mandates continue. 
(d) It is unlikely, under present circumstances, that we should get much support 
for our plan from other Colonial Powers. The apparent alternative, which confines 
the relations of the new body to the Mandated areas alone, and so lets out Holland, 
Spain and Portugal completely, and France and Belgium to a great degree, will 
obviously be most attractive to them. 
I do not think, therefore, that we are likely to get a measure of general acceptance for 
the plan proposed. That in itself would not be a decisive argument against making an 
effort, as apart from the possibility that, with all the difficulties, we might succeed in 
getting agreement, even if we failed, we might be in a better tactical position for 
securing a favourable compromise. 
3. The timing of events has, however, turned out quite differently from that 
which I expected last October when I began the preparation of the Colonial Office 
memorandum. I had hoped then that such a policy, if approved by the Cabinet and 
agreed by the Dominions, could be discussed in the first instance with the United 
States alone. Subsequently it could have been agreed with the other Colonial Powers, 
and when eventually the time came for a Conference of the World Association, the 
whole thing would have been cut and dried. That now is obviously impossible. It is 
implicit in the passage in the Yalta Protocol that the future of Mandates shall be a 
subject for discussion at San Francisco. Our argument for the abolition of the 
Mandates is to put forward a plan which is applicable to the whole Colonial Empire. If 
we had to do that at San Francisco it would mean throwing the whole Colonial 
Empire open to discussion by this motley assembly, a procedure which I should 
regard as hazardous in the extreme. 
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4. The alternative to pressing on with our original plan is now to accept in 
principle the continuance of the Mandates, but to insist on their revision in order to 
eliminate their worst features . The chief objection to the Mandatory system was not, 
as some people suppose, the amount of supervision which it entailed. That on the 
whole did little harm, although some people may question whether it did much 
good. The real objections were:-
(a) certain conditions attaching particularly to the B Mandates (which most 
concern us); and 
(b) the sense of impermanence which the absence of permanent British 
sovereignty gave in the territories concerned. 
With regard to (a), I attach an Appendix which shows briefly the changes I should like 
to see made both in the machinery of the Mandatory system and in the conditions 
attaching to the Mandates. 
With regard to (b), there is no complete remedy other than the assumption by 
Great Britain of full sovereignty, but something might be done to allay anxiety by a 
declaration at the appropriate time by the Prime Minister on behalf of His Majesty's 
Government, and, if possible in conjunction with the Dominions, that there could be 
no question of a transfer of the Mandates without the consent of the Mandatory 
Power, and that, as far as Great Britain was concerned, such consent would in no 
circumstances be given. 
5. The choice before us is admittedly a most difficult one, but I have reluctantly 
come to the conclusion that, on the whole, the course suggested in paragraph 4 is 
the one for us to adopt. In reaching this conclusion I have been particularly 
influenced by the fears expressed in paragraph 3. I should, however, only recommend 
this course if it were agreed that we should put forward the necessary amendments 
and should be firm in our insistence upon them. If the Committee agree with this 
view, we should then have to consider the next steps. 
6. The first question is the attitude to be taken up at the Conference with the 
Dominions next month. We should, of course, have no difficulty with any of the 
Dominions, except South Africa, over a decision to support the continuance of the 
Mandatory system. It would, however, I think, be essential to tell them that, in view 
of the changed circumstances, we proposed, for the time being at any rate, to 
postpone the rest of our plan. I am quite certain that any attempt to discuss Regional 
Commissions at the same time that we are discussing Mandates would be to arouse 
hostility and suspicion among other Colonial Powers and completely to destroy the 
chances of securing what I believe to be far the most important and far the most 
beneficial step in international Colonial policy. The establishment of the Internation-
al Colonial Centre, which admittedly we had proposed more as a bargaining counter 
than as something wich was particularly valuable in itself, and to which none of the 
Dominions seem to have attached much importance, should now be dropped. 
7. We are then committed by the Yalta Protocol to consultation on this subject 
before San Francisco both with America and with the other major Powers, including 
of course, China. I do not know how the Foreign Office, in view of the time-table, 
thinks it possible to carry out this undertaking. It is clear that, if the discussions are 
to include not only a discussion on the principle of Mandates but also of the detailed 
changes which we desire, they will be long and hard, and I see no prospect of 
bringing them to a successful conclusion before the opening of the San Francisco 
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Conference. The best course would be to postpone any discussion on "Territorial 
Trusteeship" to some later meeting of an ad hoc body. But, if that were impossible, it 
might be practicable to confine the discussion and decision at San Francisco to some 
general formula making the new United Nations Organisation the residuary legatee 
of the League of Nations in the matter of Mandates, while fully preserving our right 
to changes in detail. The detailed discussion might then be referred to some smaller 
and more appropriate Committee to be worked out. 
8. There is one other point. The conclusion of the Crimea Conference refers to 
the possibility of the Mandatory System being extended not only to existing Mandates 
or territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war, but also to "any 
other territory which might voluntarily be placed under Trusteeship." This proposal, 
though it appears harmless, is fraught with the greatest difficulty for us in the future . 
We shall be continually under pressure from some elements in the United States to 
take advantage of this proposal to bring the whole of our Colonial administration 
under international review. I am sure that neither this Government, nor, I hope, any 
succeeding Government, would succumb to this pressure, but it will certainly raise 
for future Colonial Secretaries innumerable difficulties in the United States, in this 
country and in the Colonial territories themselves. I hope, therefore, that we shall 
resist any proposal of this character. 
Appendix to 40: Modifications desired in the mandate system and terms of B 
mandates 
I. The Permanent Mandates Commission 
(a) In future the Commission should be composed of Government representatives 
and not experts chosen for their individual qualifications. 
(b) The Commission should report to the Economic and Social Council, which, in 
turn, would make its recommendations on P.M.C. business direct to the 
Government of the Mandatory Power concerned. 
(c) All Mandatory Powers should be entitled to sit as voting members of the 
Economic and Social Council when P.M.C. business is under discussion. 
(d) On these conditions there is no objection to the representatives of Mandatory 
Powers continuing to be in a minority on the P.M.C., and subject to this the exact 
composition can be left to the general assembly. 
(e) The I.L.O. and any other functional agencies should be entitled to nominate 
experts to attend P.M.C. meetings when their special subjects are under discus-
sion. 
(f) No right of visiting and inspection to Mandated Territories by the P.M.C. 
should be conceded, but there is no objection to visits being arranged with the 
consent of the Mandatory Power. 
(g) Any suggestion that the P.M.C. should have a representative on Regional 
Commissions for areas which include a Mandated Territory must be resisted as 
conflicting with the whole nature and purpose of Regional Commissions. 
11. Terms of the B mandates 
(a) Defence. The prohibition of the establishment of military or naval bases, the 
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erection of fortifications or the organisation of native military forces is clearly 
obsolete and should be removed. The defence role of Mandated Territories should 
be determined in relation to the world security plan. 
(b) The provisions requiring equal rights for all nationals of States Members of the 
League with the nationals of the Mandatory Power in respect of entry and conduct 
of business may compromise internal security and should be abolished. 
(c) The open door economic provisions must be got rid of. The territories must be 
free to adjust their economic policy in the same manner as other territories. 
(d) The right conferred on all missionaries, nationals of States Members of the 
League to open schools in a Mandated Territory makes a planned educational 
policy impossible. 
(e) The inclusion of the essential features of the Mandates in Article 22 of the 
Covenant made the revision of the terms of the Mandates extremely difficult. This 
mistake should be avoided by making provision whereby the terms of the Mandates 
may be revised by the Economic and Social Council on the recommendation of the 
P.M.C. with the consent of the Mandatory Power. 
41 C0968/161/l,BCM(45)2 5Apr19451 
'Territorial trusteeship': minutes of the second meeting of the British 
Commonwealth meeting [Extract] 
[The UK delegation was led by Cranborne (DO, chair), Attlee (lord president of the 
Council), Amery (India and Burma) and Stanley (CO). The New Zealand delegation was 
led by Mr Fraser (prime minister), the South African by Field Marshal Smuts (prime 
minister), the Canadian by Mr Massey (high commissioner in London), the Australian by 
Mr Forde (deputy prime minister) and Dr Evatt (attorney-general and minister for 
external affairs), and the Indian by Sir Firoz Khan Noon (defence member of governor-
general's Executive Council). Stanley opened the proceedings with a statement of UK 
policy, explaining why the government was now prepared to accept, in principle, the 
continuation of the mandates system with the necessary modifications. Discussion then 
followed upon the basis of remarks made by Dr Evatt.) 
... Dr. Evatt said that before commenting upon the United Kingdom proposals in 
detail he wished to make two observations. 
First, regarding the procedure which was being adopted, he would recall that 
following upon receipt of the Colonial Office memorandum of December last,2 
Dominion Governments had been informed in Dominions Office telegram D. No. 342 
of 24th February that territorial trusteeship had been discussed briefly at the Yalta 
Conference, but that there would be full discussion with Dominion representatives at 
this conference. The Australian Government had certainly expected the United 
Kingdom Government to await such discussion before reaching any decision. 
Secondly, the Australian Government had expected to be consulted fully in 
advance of any decision. Indeed, their comments had been invited in the Dominion 
Secretary's despatch D. No. 172 of the 27th December, and subsequent telegrams 
had promised discussion. They were now informed that the United Kingdom 
Government had taken a firm decision that it would decline to agree that the 
Mandatory system might be extended to "any other territory which might voluntarily 
1 The meeting was held on the 4 Apr; the minutes are dated 5 Apr. 2 See 37. 
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be placed in trusteeship". In his opinion consultation with Dominion Governments 
should have taken place before a decision was reached. 
As regards Mandates, he did not think that there should be any insuperable 
difficulty about alteration of their terms, where necessary or advisable. But he did 
feel that this question must be kept distinct from the general principle underlying 
the Mandates system. In 1919 President Wilson had conceived the idea of trusteeship 
in order to provide for the administration of ex-enemy dependencies. At the end of 
this war a similar situation would arise. The Japanese could not be allowed to retain 
their colonial territories, and the Mandates system was the solution. It must be borne 
in mind throughout that the overriding consideration was the benefit and welfare of 
the native inhabitants of these territories. 
He had drawn up a statement which he would circulate and read to the meeting 
(attached as Appendix).3 Dr. Evatt then read the statement and stressed particularly 
the following points:-
(i) Paragraph/!. He reiterated that the primary consideration must be the welfare 
of the native peoples concerned. 
(ii) Paragraph // (iv). He was at a loss to understand why the inhabitants of 
colonial territories within the British Empire should be deprived of rights and 
privileges accorded to inhabitants of ex-enemy territories. He would like to see the 
United Kingdom take the lead. Refusal to accord such rights to the inhabitants of 
colonial dependencies could only be justified as a means of retaining and 
exercising to the fullest extent power and sovereignty. 
(iii) Paragraph Ill, 6 and 11. Provided that the central international body were 
properly constituted and competent, he did not see how any exception could be 
taken to the obligation to report to it upon the administration of dependent 
territories. Voluntary action in this direction by the United Kingdom would afford 
a shining example to other powers, whose administration of colonial dependencies 
was far from satisfactory. Surely we could at least go as far as the Colonial Centre? 
As a minimum, something like that should be attempted. 
(iv) Paragraph Ill, 15 and 16. The Australian Government had always understood 
that the whole basis of the proposed world organisation was that there should be a 
distinction between security and welfare matters. Surely problems connected with 
the administration of dependent peoples were primarily a matter of welfare? It was 
therefore inexplicable that tl~e nations invited to take part in the preliminary 
discussions on this subject should be the military powers while the Dominions 
which were directly concerned were excluded. 
In conclusion Dr. Evatt said that the main issue was whether the hopes aroused by 
the various declarations of the Great Powers and the United Nations were to be 
fulfilled or not. He did not think that it was asking much of the United Kingdom to 
acquiesce in the principle that the duty of parent states was to protect the welfare of 
native races in their territory and that this duty should be accompanied by an obligation 
to submit reports regularly to an expert and competent body. He could imagine 
nothing less onerous in the case of powers such as the United Kingdom, Australia 
and New Zealand which discharged their colonial obligations honestly and to the best 
of their ability. If they refused to do so it would set the worst possible example for 
3 Not printed. 
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others. He trusted that the conference would not end without some conclusion in 
this direction having been reached. 
Mr. Fraser said that he was disturbed to think from Col. Stanley's statement that 
the United Kingdom Government had reached a decision on the subject of 
trusteeship. The whole fabric of the Commonwealth Association had been built up on 
the principle of mutual consultation, and it would seriously prejudice the value of 
meetings such as these if irrevocable decisions on issues of principle were to have 
been reached before discussions begun. 
As regards Regional Commissions he entirely agreed with Colonel Stanley both as 
to their necessity and as to the principle that they should not necessarily constitute 
organs of an international body. In the Pacific the foundations had already been laid 
for a Regional Commission, to consist ultimately of the United Kingdom, Australia, 
New Zealand, the Netherlands East Indies, France, the United States and possibly 
Portugal. It was his earnest hope that in time these nations should come together. 
There was much good work that they could do. The Regional Commission 
established in the Caribbean represented a considerable advance, and formed an 
example for other areas to follow . Fully established Regional Commissions would 
undoubtedly constitute the main constructive agencies for the advancement of the 
dependent peoples, and the work already undertaken by New Zealand for the 
development of and welfare of the peoples entrusted to her charge, would find its 
natural continuation and fulfilment in the work of a Pacific Commission. 
Generally speaking, Mr. Fraser said he agreed with Dr. Evatt and that the 
contentions raised by him were those of New Zealand as well as those of Australia. 
Although he did not feel strongly on the point, he was opposed to the proposal to 
do away with the term "trusteeship" for which he considered the term "partnership" 
an inadequate substitute for psychological reasons. 
Our peoples, and many colonial peoples, had made great contributions to the 
common allied cause. The recent measures for colonial development announced by 
the United Kingdom Government constituted an obvious indication of goodwill and 
redounded greatly to the credit of the United Kingdom, so much so in fact that he 
was at a loss to understand why the United Kingdom of all countries should object to 
the principle of trusteeship. A bold and generous gesture in the direction which Dr. 
Evatt suggested would not only serve as a lesson to other countries, but would be 
highly acceptable to public opinion both in the United Kingdom and in the 
Dominions. He would himself have wished that the matter could have been discussed 
between the Commonwealth Governments, and an arrangement come to so that at 
the San Francisco Conference the British Commonwealth Group could speak with a 
united voice. 
Reports sent to an International body would have, in the nature of things, to be 
discussed and he could not himself see any objection to this. Certain territories in 
the Pacific were badly administered; their Social Services were neglected and the 
native populations exploited. It was no doubt true that we were committed to 
restoring the United Nations to the status and territories which they had enjoyed 
before the war, but it was a matter for serious consideration whether such territories 
as New Caledonia and Tahiti should automatically be restored to their former 
owners. We had a responsibility to the native inhabitants of these terrotiries and if no 
international organ was set up through which that responsibility could be operated, 
what hope was there of securing justice for those peoples? 
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This matter was a world question. In the Atlantic Charter certain promises had 
been made which it was necessary to find means to implement. Means must be found 
in particular to safeguard the interests of the native races, and the present vacuum 
could best be filled by setting up an international body to which reports were sent. 
There was no question of colonial territories being administered by such a body or of 
in any way infringing the present sovereignty of colonial territories. He earnestly 
hoped that the United Kingdom Government, taking note of the importance of the 
difference of view between them and certain other Commonwealth governments on 
this matter, would see their way to making a bold and generous gesture in the 
direction which he had indicated. 
Lord Cranbome said that he had the impression from Dr. Evatt's and Mr. Fraser's 
speeches that they thought that the United Kingdom Government had come in this 
matter to an irrevocable decision. That was not the case. What the Cabinet had 
agreed upon was the view which was to be expressed to the Dominions at this 
meeting. This view had now been expressed by the Colonial Secretary, but it was of 
course open to re-consideration in the light of the present discussion. 
Colonial Stanley concurred with Lord Cranborne's statement. 
Mr. Fraser and Dr. Evatt expressed their satisfaction that any misunderstanding 
had been removed, and that the position was as stated by Lord Cranborne. 
Sir Firoz Khan Noon inquired what would happen if agreement were reached 
between the Commonwealth Delegations that the existing system of mandates 
should be retained, but at the discussion in the Assembly at San Francisco the 
majority of those present voted in favour of a system of international trusteeship? 
Lord Cranbome said that it would be necessary to keep an open mind and to be 
guided by the situation as it developed. It was very difficult to predict the course of 
events. 
Dr. Evatt said that it was important to face the possibility that however one 
attempted to restrict the area of discussion, once the matter had come before the 
Assembly it would be hard to control the course of the debate. In the discussion on 
mandates in particular, no previous arrangement could prevent the matter from 
being discussed on broad lines. 
Lord Cranbome said that none of us yet knew how the question should be raised at 
San Francisco. For his part, he envisaged the matter arising only under the general 
head of transferring to some other body the residual functions of the League of 
Nations. To discuss details at the San Francisco Conference would be premature. 
Field Marshal Smuts said that in the discussion so far the questions raised could 
be divided into those of substance and those of procedure. 
(a) Questions of substance: He agreed with Colonel Stanley that there was no 
question of surrendering our existing mandates which were ours under inter-
national law, and represented rights which we should certainly retain. On that 
there was, he thought, general agreement amongst delegates. It was also generally 
agreed that there were certain features of the mandates which were out of date and 
could well be improved; in particular some different system would have to be 
found for the Permanent Mandates' Commission, the present working of which 
was far from satisfactory, but these were matters of detail which would be better 
discussed on some later occasion. 
(b) Questions of procedure: Here there appeared to be some difference of view. 
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For his own part telegram D.429 of 12th March, which stated that it had been 
agreed at Yalta that there should be no discussion of actual territories had 
reassured him. But the subsequent telegram (D.519 of 28th March) regarding the 
preliminary consultations, had renewed his doubts as to the value of discussing 
mandates with powers who knew little about colonial problems and had little 
interest in them. San Francisco seemed to him to be an entirely wrong place for 
such a discussion. 
Mr. Fraser suggested that the question of how to dispose of present Japanese-held 
islands would in any case cause the question to be raised at San Francisco. 
Field Marshal Smuts said that we wanted to keep existing mandates out of the 
discussion. 
Any system of territorial trusteeship would have to be applied generally to 
countries with colonial possessions. These were United Kingdom, and other 
Commonwealth countries, France, Portugal, Belgium and Holland, all of them 
sovereign countries with large and valuable colonial Empires. By what right could we 
suggest to them that they should curtail their rights? Although we might all agree 
that it would be most desirable, it would be extremely difficult to dictate in any such 
terms to sovereign powers. 
In his view, the furthest we of the British Commonwealth could go would be to say 
"we for our part are acting on this principle". To go further would risk encountering 
the opposition of other powers. 
For these reasons he felt that any discussions on colonial matters should be 
limited strictly to procedure. He certainly would not be prepared to agree to 
anything, whether decided at Washington or elsewhere, which affected any mandate 
held by South Africa without full previous opportunity being given to him for 
considering the matter. 
Dr. Evatt said that the future status of mandates also interested Australia and New 
Zealand who would not be represented at the Washington talks either. 
Colonel Stanley suggested that it was only right before we went to San Francisco 
to inform the Americans that we now held the view that the existing mandate system 
should be continued. The other object of the Washington talks was to confirm that 
the discussion at San Francisco would be confined to the acceptance of the general 
formula which might well be discussed as part of the general business rising out of 
the demise of the League of Nations. Any detailed discussions would have to be held 
later and in a more suitable atmosphere. 
The difficulty with regard to the publication of reports, arose not so much over 
publication as over ensuring that any discussion which took place on the reports 
should be objective in character and should be conducted only by informed persons 
concerned to ensure the welfare and progress of the areas in question rather than any 
ulterior political motive. 
Dr. Evatt said that he trusted it would be possible for the United Kingdom 
Governments to review the policy announced by Colonel Stanley before participating 
in the Washington talks? He felt that this was a matter of real importance. 
Colonel Stanley asked whether Dr. Evatt felt that San Francisco would be a good 
place to discuss the proposals contained in his original paper of December 1944, or 
whether he agreed that the San Francisco discussions should be limited to the 
general proposition that the existing mandate system should be continued and that 
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details should be left until later. 
Dr. Evatt replied that our prime object must be to secure the welfare of the native 
peoples. This subject should be discussed with the other colonial powers concerned, 
not necessarily at San Francisco. Of the other "security powers" Russia and China 
had practically no interest in colonial questions and the United States had only very 
limited colonial territories. 
Lord Cranbome said that the preliminary consultations at Washington had been 
decided upon at Yalta, and that it would be difficult now not to hold them. He felt, 
however, that there was general agreement that we should limit the subjects to be 
discussed at the San Francisco conference to a discussion of what was to be done 
with the existing mandates when the League of Nations came to an end. A later 
discussion between colonial powers could be held to discuss details. 
Mr. Fraser agreed but said that the danger was that the matter might well be 
raised at San Francisco by a majority vote of the Assembly. 
Mr. Attlee suggested that it was essential to limit the discussions at San Francisco 
to what was really necessary. If colonial questions were discussed by uninformed 
people there would be a tendency to blur the responsibility of the mandatary power. 
There should be a later discussion between the countries concerned upon functional 
questions, of which the principal one was how to implement the principle of 
territorial trusteeship without blurring the responsibility of parent States .... 4 
4 In the light of this discussion with dominion representatives, the War Cabinet discussed the approach 
which the UK should adopt at the San Francisco conference. Ministers agreed that the dominions should 
be told that there could be 'no question of our agreeing to place under any form of trusteeship any of our 
colonial territories other than those at present administered under mandate'. France and the Netherlands 
were identified as colonial powers sharing the UK viewpoint and, as matter of tactics, Churchill argued 
that they should be allowed to take the lead at San Francisco, the UK lending support to their arguments. 
The prime minister also saw no objection to Australia and New Zealand pressing their own point of view if 
the UK representatives made it clear that they did not share it (PREM 4/31/4, WM 42(45)7, 12 Apr 1945). 
Discussion became animated when the British Commonwealth meeting reconvened for its final session 
on 13 Apr. Fraser thought that the UK would be 'in a isolated position and stigmatised as reactionary'. 
Evatt agreed and argued that it would be better for the UK not to accept the principle of trusteeship than 
to accept it and then refuse to apply it to its own territories. He feared there would be 'no bar of world 
opinion' to judge 'countries which treated their native colonial populations badly'. Cranborne countered 
by claiming that the 'C' mandates held by Australia and New Zealand were easier to administer than the 
British 'B' mandates. Only Smuts supported the UK position (CO 968/161/1, BCM(45)12). 
42 CAB 66/65, WP(45)256 13 Apr 1945 
'Defence of the Middle East': War Cabinet memorandum by Mr Eden 
In their report on future defence policy in the Suez Canal area (W.P. (45) 197 of the 
20th March) the Suez Canal Committee formulate two questions, viz.; should they 
proceed on the assumptions:-
(!) that responsibility for the defence of the Canal should be vested in His 
Majesty's Government in perpetuity; 
(2) that His Majesty's Government, for political and strategic reasons, regard it as 
desirable that Great Britain should plan the predominant part in the defence and 
political control of the Middle East. 
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2. In leading up to these questions, the Committee remarked that the Foreign 
Office had hitherto regarded assumption (1), viewed as an objective, as axiomatic; 
but that certain members felt there was much to be said in favour of international 
responsibility for the defence of the Canal as being more in harmony with the aims 
which His Majesty's Government are trying to realise in the new World 
Organisation.1 The arguments in support of this view are contained in paragraph 5 of 
the report, sub-paragraphs (a) to (e). In particular, it is pointed out that, in the case 
of the United States and Russia, geographical facts tend to cause them to limit their 
defence commitments to the immediate vicinity of their territory, whereas the 
British Empire, being dispersed over the globe, involves us in commitments in many 
directions of a nature to strain our resources to breaking-point. It is suggested that it 
would be to our advantage that other nations, notably the United States, should 
share in the problems of security and defence in the Middle East generally, and that it 
might be easier to induce the French and Egyptians to acquiesce in new arrange-
ments for the administration of the Canal if both its control and its security were 
declared to be the concern of the United Nations rather than of Great Britain alone. 
3. I understand that any satisfactory reply to the two questions put by the 
Committee must take into account not only our future available resources, but also 
world (and in particular United States) opinions and tendencies, and must conform 
to them if we are not to be faced, later on, with pressure to reverse our policy. My 
submission, however, is that both questions must be answered in the affirmative, and 
in endeavouring to justify that submission I shall examine the questions first of all 
from the point of view of the Middle East itself and secondly from the broader 
standpoint of world security into which our Middle Eastern arrangements must be 
fitted. 
4. The Middle Eastern area (viz.: Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan, the Levant 
States, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Persian GulO, with Egypt and the Suez Canal as its 
core, is the meeting place of two continents and, if Turkey be added, of three. It is 
thus one of the most important strategic areas in the world, and it is an area the 
defence of which is a matter of life and death to the British Empire since, as the 
present war and the war of 1914-18 have both proved, it is there that the Empire can 
be cut in half. Consequently, we are bound to give the Middle East an extremely high 
priority when allotting our available resources to the areas where we have 
responsibilities. For this reason alone, we cannot afford to resign our special position 
in the area (even though in an emergency we may be able to accept the help of others 
in defending it) and allow our position to be dependent on arrangements of an 
international character. 
5. Secondly, the Middle East is the sole really large source of oil outside America 
which is available to us. Recent studies indicate that in ten years' time neither the 
1 Attlee, who chaired the War Cabinet Suez Canal Committee, was a strong advocate of international 
responsibility for the defence of the canal. The minutes of a meeting of the committee on 13 Mar 1945 
record his views as follows: 'Mr. Attlee said that he too favoured international control. He would like to see 
the Americans taking part, not only in the control but the defence. He thought that it was high time the 
Americans took their share in policing the waterways of the world. Up to the present we had borne the 
whole burden of the task, while others had profited from it. It was quite wrong that an international 
waterway of this importance should be left in the exclusive possession of the Egyptians. The whole cost of 
defence fell upon the British taxpayer, and he felt that it was time that someone else took a share' (CAB 
95/18, SC(M) 1(45)). 
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British Empire nor even the United States will be able to exert their full war effort in 
case of need without the oil supplies of the Iraq-Persian Gulf area. 
6. There is a further consideration. The quality which the Middle Eastern peoples 
recognise above all others is strength. If we retained our position there during the 
early part of the present war, it is because the Middle East never lost confidence in 
our resolution and in our ultimate ability to win through. If once we go to the 
lengths of inviting other Powers permanently to share the burden which we have 
hitherto carried in the Middle East, the countries concerned will construe our action 
not as statesmanship but as abdication: at best they would become confused and 
revert to the game of playing off the Powers against each other: at worst they would 
identify themselves with the interests of the newcomer whom they conceived to be 
the strongest. Our present position would thereby be forfeited: it is questionable 
whether it could ever be retrieved. 
7. To turn to the more general considerations outlined earlier in this memoran-
dum, it is true that His Majesty's Government are pledged to support the 
organisation of security by international co-operation. But the World Organisation, 
when it comes to devise practical means of ensuring peace, can scarcely proceed 
otherwise than by giving one Great Power special defence responsibilities in its 
particular area or areas: and the effectiveness of the World Organisation in the last 
resort in carrying out its decisions will depend on the efficiency of the defence 
facilities available there to the Great Power concerned. Whether, in a more or less 
distant future, this principle will give way to a more general sharing of responsibility 
it is difficult to say. Our hope and intention would be that any provision we made on 
our own account for the security of the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth 
would receive the eventual sanction of the World Organisation, by which it would be 
regarded as a contribution to the general security, and therefore as an arrangement 
to be adopted and fitted into the World Organisation's security arrangements. But at 
the present moment each of the Great Powers is, in fact, in the same position in the 
areas it considers vital to it as is this country in the Middle East. The position of the 
United States in relation to the Panama Canal is identical with our own in relation to 
the Suez Canal, as is the position of Russia with regard to certain areas of Eastern 
Europe. It is a practical certainty that, at present at any rate, those Powers would 
decline to share their special responsibilities with us (and it would be a grievous 
drain on our resources to seek to claim a share) and we are equally entitled to 
exclusive facilities (so far as we consider them expedient) in our own vital area. I 
recommend, then, to my colleagues that, pending the establishment of the World 
Organisation and its Military Staff Committee, His Majesty's Government should 
secure the vital interests of the British Empire and Commonwealth in the Middle 
East by their own means. In so far as this involves treaty arrangements with the 
nations of the Middle East, I might add that the conclusion of freely negotiated 
treaties can hardly be challenged as an undemocratic method and that such treaties 
have brought undeniable benefits to the countries concerned. 
8. I do not consider, therefore, that our claim to a predominant role in the 
defence and political control of the Middle East is out of harmony with the general 
international background. But I have one final point to make, namely, that the 
earliest possible consultation should take place on this subject with the Dominions, 
two of which (Australia and New Zealand) have always shown an acute-and highly 
justifiable-interest in the defence of Egypt and the Suez Canal. Solidarity with the 
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Dominions on this issue would strengthen our position vis-a-vis the United States, 
and their practical assistance-were they disposed to afford it-would lessen the 
strain on our resources, to which the Committee drew attention, which would be 
imposed by our assuming sole responsibility for security in the Middle Eastern area.2 
2 The report by the Suez Canal Committee to which Eden refers at the beginning of this memo was not 
considered by the War Cabinet. After the general election in July-Aug 1945, Mr Bevin, foreign secretary in 
the new Labour government, drew the attention of the new Cabinet to the questions posed and proposed 
to summon a meeting in London of HMG representatives in the Middle East to discuss the whole question 
of Middle East policy (CAB 129/1, CP(45)130, memo by Bevin, 'Middle Eastern policy', 28 Aug 1945). 
Cabinet approved this recommendation (CAB 128/1, CM 26(45)2, 30 Aug 1945). 
43 CAB 81146, PHP(45)29(0)Final 29 June 1945 
'The security of the British empire': report by the Post-Hostilities 
Planning Staff for the Chiefs of Staff Committee [Extract] 
[The PHPS was set up in 1943 as a sub-committee of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and 
reported to the War Cabinet Armistice and Post-War Committee and the FO as well as to 
the military chiefs. It was given the task of suggesting solutions to problems arising from 
the occupation of enemy territories in so far as these problems were concerned with the 
administration of instruments of surrender or with questions of general political and 
strategic significance. This report on the security of the British empire was the last survey 
undertaken by the PHPS. It was disbanded at the end of June 1945 and its functions taken 
over by the Joint Planning Staff. In dwelling on the potential Soviet threat, the most 
notable feature of the report was its elevation of the Indian Ocean area ahead of the 
Middle East into second place in the order of defence priorities. The report met with 
mixed reception. One FO official condemned it as 'unacceptable' (M Cresswell, FO 
Services Liaison Dept, minute, 9 July 1945, FO 371150775, no 4969), while the War Office 
believed that the strategic overview was too broad to provide guidance for the detailed 
planning of UK forces in the post-war world (WO 193/303, WO brief for chief of imperial 
general staff, 11 July 1945). Air Chief Marshal Sir C Portal felt that greater prominence 
should have been given to the need for alliances and queried why the Indian Ocean area 
had been given higher defence priority over the Middle East. The PHPS reponse to the 
latter point was that Middle Eastern oil resources appeared to be indefensible and that 
strategy would therefore have to be based on their non-availability in war. The COS took 
note of the survey as a staff study but did not formally approve it. Instead the Joint 
Planning Staff were instructed to produce a further report showing how, against the 
strategic background outlined by the PHPS, specific service requirements might be 
formulated (CAB 79/36, COS 175(45)5, 12 July 1945). The editors are grateful to John 
Kent for the reference to this document.) 
Introduction 
General 
1. This paper is a review of the needs of Imperial* security. Its objects are to 
establish the strategic aims of foreign policy, and to provide a background against 
which our long-term plans for Imperial defence can be formulated. 
2. The review has been projected to the years 1955-60. To take an earlier date 
might lead to long-term interests being prejudiced by short-term requirements in 
the period following the defeat of Germany and Japan. 
3. We have considered the interests of the British Empire* as a whole. Unless an 
* For the sake of brevity the expressions "British Empire" and "Imperial" have been used throughout this 
paper and are intended to include the United Kingdom, the Dominions, India and the Colonial Empire. 
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agreed strategic policy can be backed by the resources of the whole Empire on a 
co-ordinated Imperial plan, the influence and security of each one of its members 
will be seriously weakened. 
4. The essentials of Imperial security are:-
(a) To maintain the integrity of the British Empire against both external and 
internal threats. 
(b) To keep secure the world-wide sea and air communications on which depend 
the cohesion of the Empire, and access to essential raw materials and industrial 
capacity. 
5. Imperial security is, in its essence, a problem of preventing other Powers from 
imposing their will upon us. This requires both political action and military 
strength. Diplomacy can prevent some threats and reduce others; it can secure allies, 
whose armed help or whose territory is important in war. Diplomacy by itself cannot, 
however, succeed unless it has, and is known to have, an adequate backing of 
military strength, sufficient to convince both our friends and our potential enemies 
of our ability and determination to fulfil our obligations. Since the international 
situation can deteriorate far more quickly than armed forces can be built up, military 
preparedness is essential, however reassuring the international outlook may be. 
Military strength, of which Conscription would be notable evidence, is thus 
necessary both to enable diplomacy to succeed and to insure against its failure. 
Potential enemies 
6. We consider below those Powers which could either alone or together present 
a major threat to the security of the British Empire. 
7. Germany and Japan.-Provided that Germany and Japan are disarmed, and 
that effective measures continue to be taken to prevent their rearmament, neither 
could present a threat to the British Empire. We cannot, however, be sure that the 
control of these countries will still be effective in the period 1955-60. The forces of 
occupation may have been removed, and Germany or Japan may have achieved a 
considerable measure of rearmament by playing off one Great Power against another. 
Although it will be our policy to deal with incipient rearmament by timely offensive 
action, we must take account of the possibility that a major threat may arise from 
either of these countries during the period under consideration. 
8. France.-By 1955, France is unlikely to have developed the strength of a Great 
Power. The strategic interests of France and the British Empire are interlinked 
throughout the world, and it is to be hoped that France will appreciate that her 
interests are best served by a close association with the British Empire. If she does 
not associate with us, she would become a strategic embarrassment though alone 
she could not constitute a serious threat. 
9. China. - Although China has the man-power to do so, she is not likely to 
possess the political stability or industrial resources to enable her, by herself, 
seriously to threaten our interests. 
10. The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.-Both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. possess 
sufficient potential to constitute major threats to the security of the British Empire. 
In the case of the U.S.A., we feel entitled, upon grounds of common heritage and 
common language, to rule out the possibility that any differences or clashes of 
interests which may arise, could lead to war. Indeed, it seems reasonable to assume 
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that the British Empire and the U.S.A. will remain as united on fundamental issues 
of defence as they are at the present. With the U.S.S.R. we lack these ties. It would be 
foolhardy to attempt to predict the relationship which will exist between ourselves 
and the U.S.S.R. ten years ahead, but the fact remains that the U.S.S.R. has proved 
herself to possess the war potential to constitute a serious threat to the British 
Empire. In seeking to assess the requirements of Imperial security, common 
prudence therefore dictates that we should take full account of the potentialities of 
the U.S.S.R. A determined policy of military preparedness might well prove the most 
effective deterrent to the U.S.S.R. if she were to contemplate aggression. 
Military commitments 
11. To meet the essential requirements of Imperial security, our strategic policy 
must take account of:-
(a) The possibility of war with the U.S.S.R. 
(b) The need to insure against the resurgence of Germany and Japan. 
(c) The possibility of armed conflict with minor Powers. 
(d) The maintenance of internal security. 
(e) The obligation to place armed forces at the disposal of the World Organisation. 
In later sections of this paper we have examined these military commitments in 
detail. 
World Organisation 
12. The World Organisation will not enable us to avoid the burden of maintaining 
armed forces. In the first place, membership of the World Organisation implies an 
obligation to take a share in maintaining general peace and to contribute a quota of 
armed forces for that purpose. Secondly, it has been recognised that a World 
Organisation, as at present conceived, cannot itself prevent conflict between major 
Powers, and thus its existence cannot absolve us from providing for the needs of our 
own defence. 
Scientific development 
13. Technical developments during the next ten years may have a considerable 
effect on our strategic requirements and on the methods of meeting them. A report 
[COS(45)402(0)] on scientific developments in weapons and their effect on methods 
of warfare is now under consideration. Certain trends are discernible. For example, 
there is some reason to believe that an explosive may be developed whose power may 
be many thousand times that of existing explosives. Such a development might 
radically alter the character of war. Moreover, the raw materials required to 
manufacture such an explosive will assume very great strategic importance-greater 
even than that of oil. It will be necessary, in deciding the manner in which our 
post-war military commitments should be met, to take account of the implications of 
future scientific developments when they have been fully assessed. 
14. Scientific developments will increase the speed and power with which an 
aggressor can strike effectively. Further, the advantage obtained by a nation which is 
fully prepared over one that is comparatively unprepared, will be accentuated. It will 
thus be of the highest importance to be fully aware of foreign scientific developments 
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which could be applied to warfare, and to keep ahead of other countries in research 
for offensive and defensive weapons. 
The pattern of imperial defence 
15. The complete pattern of Imperial defence will depend upon many factors, 
some of which are not as yet ascertained. Apart from the fact that an assessment of 
the implications of future scientific development is not yet complete, an examination 
of the lessons of the present war with reference to the roles of the three Services 
remains to be carried out. Our review, therefore, deals only with grand strategy, 
which must form the background against which the size of the armed forces and 
responsibilities of the three Services can be planned. 
16. We have drawn attention in our Conclusions to certain organisational 
problems, fundamental to national preparedness for war, with whose importance we 
have been impressed in the course of our studies. 
Main conclusions 
Our main conclusions are:-
Imperial defence commitments 
17. The nations which in 1955-60 will have the military power to constitute the 
most serious threats to the British Empire are the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. Since the 
possibility of war against the U.S.A. is ruled out, our overriding defence commitment 
is to safeguard the Empire against the possibility of a hostile U.S.S.R. 
18. To make the Empire secure, the following military commitments must be 
met:-
(a) The safeguarding of British territories and of Imperial communications 
against Soviet aggression. 
(b) The continued control of Germany and Japan, and insurance against their 
resurgence. 
(c) The safeguarding of British interests against minor external threats. 
(d) The maintenance of internal security. 
(e) Our contribution to a World Organisation. 
19. The armed forces to the British Empire must be adequate to enable all its 
members to exert their due influence in international affairs, and to act as a 
deterrent against any potential aggressor. 
Imperial grand strategy 
20.-(a) A hostile U.S.S.R., provided she maintains her political cohesion and 
military strength, would represent so grave a threat to the British Empire that 
it must be a primary object of our policy to avoid a clash with her; the stronger 
we are, and are known to be, the more likely we are to achieve this object. 
(b) It is vital that the U.S.S.R. should not make common cause with Germany 
against us. 
(c) The members of the British Empire must act in unison if they are 
collectively to enjoy the status of a Great Power comparable with that of the 
U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. It is more than ever important that there should be an 
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agreed strategic policy backed by the resources of the whole Empire on a 
co-ordinated Imperial plan. 
(d) A united British Empire would by itself be unable to secure its world-wide 
interests against Soviet aggression without the help of powerful Allies. It is vital 
to ensure the full and early support in war of the U.S.A. 
(e) We should promote a close association between the British Empire and a 
strong France in furtherance of our common interests throughout the world. 
(f) A World Organisation would foster international co-operation; we have, 
therefore, a high strategic interest in its success. A World Organisation would 
not, however, relieve the British Empire of the responsibility for taking 
measures to safeguard its security. 
(g) In order that a World Organisation shall develop so as to provide the 
maximum contribution to Imperial security, our policy should be:-
(i) To support regional security arrangements in which each Great Power 
would accept primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace 
in the regions in which its interests are predominant. 
(ii) To induce the U.S.A. to undertake definite military responsibilities in 
those areas in which our common interests lie. 
21. The relative importance which should be accorded in peace to areas which 
might be seriously threatened by the U.S.S.R. is as follows:-
(a) First priority must be given to the defence of the United Kingdom, which is 
the heart of the Empire, an essential operational base, and contains our main 
source of white man-power and industry; and also to the protection of the vital sea 
communications and air routes of the Atlantic. 
(b) The defence of the Indian Ocean area ranks second only in importance to that 
of the United Kingdom. It forms a vital link in the chain of Imperial communica-
tions; India is of great potential value as a base, and as a source of man-power and 
industry. 
(c) The Middle East would in war be subject to an immediate threat, and the 
oilfields in Iraq and Persia, which constitute our most important strategic interest 
in the area, would be indefensible. The sea and air communications through the 
Middle East are less important than those through the Indian Ocean, and might in 
any case be interrupted as a result of operations in Europe. Defence requirements 
in the Middle East must not, therefore, be met at the expense of requirements in 
India and the Indian Ocean. 
(d) The defence of the Pacific area should be accorded lower priority than that of 
Western Europe, the Indian Ocean area, or the Middle East, since a threat in the 
Pacific would be comparatively remote. 
The pattern of imperial defence 
22. The armed forces of the Empire must be designed to meet Imperial defence 
commitments in accordance with the Grand Strategy outlined above. 
23. Since a hostile U.S.S.R. constitutes the maximum threat, provision must be 
made:-
(a) to play our part in limiting an initial Soviet offensive; 
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(b) to safeguard those areas, bases and communications which are vital, and 
thereafter, 
(c) to deploy our full resources, in co-operation with allies, to meet the needs of a 
long war. 
The readiness of the armed forces and of the war economy of the Empire must take 
account of the current assessment of the nature of the Soviet threat. 
24. The measures taken to meet the Soviet threat would, in general, cover our 
defensive requirements against a resurgent Germany or Japan. Appropriate forces for 
timely offensive action must, however, be held available to deal with incipient 
rearmament, and, if necessary, to re-occupy the latter countries. 
25. The provision of forces for internal security within the Empire constitutes a 
commitment which is not entirely covered by the measures to meet the Soviet threat 
and/or a resurgent Germany and Japan. 
26. The organisation of the armed forces must be sufficiently flexible to provide 
our contribution to the World Organisation, and to deal with minor external threats 
and emergencies. 
27. In designing our armed forces, we must overcome the inherent difficulties of 
the Empire's strategic problem by:-
(a) Technical superiority, especially in the application of science to warfare. 
(b) Maintaining highly mobile forces strategically located, and bases and facilities 
for their deployment by sea, air or land. 
(c) The maximum use of locally raised forces and of our large resources of 
coloured man-powered. 
(d) Adequate reserves of trained man-power, modern weapons and equipment and 
facilities for their rapid extension. 
(e) The highest state of training in all our armed forces. 
(0 Closer co-ordination both within the fighting services, and between them and 
the Civil Departments. 
28. The following fundamental problems affecting the preparedness of the 
Empire for war require immediate consideration:-
(a) The provision of a highly efficient intelligence service. 
(b) The exploitation of Imperial war potential; and measures for the dispersal and 
protection of industry throughout the Empire. 
(c) The storage of strategic raw materials, suitably dispersed. 
(d) The organisation of Civil Defence throughout the Empire, and particularly in 
the United Kingdom and India. 
(e) The maintenance of an adequate mercantile marine. 
(0 The establishment of a world-wide Imperial civil air transport service. 
(g) The use of propaganda, both in peace and war. 
(h) The development of an organisation for clandestine operations. 
Further conclusions 
Our further conclusions, by regions, are:-
Western Europe, the North Atlantic, and the Western Mediterranean 
29.- (a) The security of the United Kingdom and of her vital communications would 
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be seriously prejudiced if a hostile Power were to establish herself in strength in 
Western Europe or on the Atlantic coast of North-West Africa. 
(b) Germany's ability to make war must be eradicated. Incipient rearmament 
must be dealt with by timely offensive action and, if necessary, her territory 
must be reoccupied. 
(c) To meet a threat from the U.S.S.R., or from a re-armed Germany, we 
must:-
(i) increase the depth of our defences by establishing, in co-operation with 
allies, an air defence belt in Western Europe; 
(ii) be prepared to defend the United Kingdom against airborne or sea 
invasion; 
(iii) ensure the dispersal and protection of the industry of the United 
Kingdom; 
(iv) afford early help to our Continental Allies, and make provision in peace 
for the acceptance in the United Kingdom and France of reinforcements from 
the U.S.A.; 
(v) obtain the use in war of a system of naval and air bases in the Atlantic 
Islands, particularly the Azores, in Western Europe and in Scandinavia; 
(vi) control the Straits of Gibraltar and deny North-West Africa, Sicily and 
Sardinia to the enemy. 
(d) We should take the lead in the formation of a Western European Group, 
designed initially for the control of Germany. In addition to the United 
Kingdom and France, this group should comprise Eire, Belgium, Holland, 
Norway, Denmark, Iceland (C), Portugal, and, if possible, Spain and Italy. The 
effectiveness of this group in the presence of a threat from the U.S.S.R. would 
depend on the immediate support of the U.S.A. 
(e) While the above measures are the most effective that we can devise, we 
must not underrate the danger of the U.S.S.R. obtaining a footing in Western 
Europe and access to the North Sea and Atlantic seaboard. 
India and the Indian Ocean 
30.-(a) The immediate threat to India lies in air and/or airborne attack from the 
north-west. Although logistic difficulties are likely to limit the scale of Soviet 
attack by land on North-West India, the existence of threats of land or airborne 
invasion would make it necessary to provide considerable forces to meet this 
danger. 
(b) The air defence system covering India's land frontiers should be primarily 
designed to meet the threat from the north-west. Provision must be made for 
Civil Defence, and the dispersal of industry and of base facilities. 
(c) Forces for the defence of India against land or airborne invasion must be 
highly mobile. To increase the strategic mobility of these forces, land routes 
from Central India to the Afghan and Persian frontiers and to Burma must be 
improved. 
(d) The defence of our sea communications and air routes will require a system 
of naval and air bases throughout the Indian Ocean area including a main 
operational base in Ceylon. 
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(e) We should endeavour to prevent the spread of Soviet influence in 
Afghanistan. 
(0 It is of great strategic importance that the war potential of India should be 
developed, so that she shall be capable of making the maximum contribution 
both to her own defence and to the war effort of the Empire as a whole. 
(g) We have a high strategic interest in the maintenance of internal security in 
India and Burma; it is therefore of very great importance that politically stable 
and contented conditions should prevail in these countries. 
The Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean 
31.-(a) Oilfields in Persia and Iraq would be extremely vulnerable in the event of 
war with the U.S.S.R. and even the Suez Canal area cannot be regarded as 
secure. 
(b) It is, therefore, essential that steps be taken in peace to reduce the strategic 
importance to us in war of:-
(i) The oil resources of the Iraq and Persian Gulf areas. 
(ii) Our sea communications and air routes through the Mediterranean. 
(iii) Our main military bases in the Middle East, e.g., Egypt. 
(c) Nevertheless, in peace it is essential that we should maintain our predomi-
nant position in the Middle East, and that our military strength in this area 
should be adequate for this purpose. The Middle East is in any case the most 
convenient location for an Imperial Strategic Reserve. Any sign that we were 
willing to relinquish our present position would undermine our prestige and 
invite Soviet intrusion. These consequences are unacceptable on strategic 
grounds, as well as for political and commercial reasons. 
(d) We should endeavour to ensure that the U.S.A. accepts military commit-
ments for the defence of the Middle East, since this would provide a powerful 
deterrent against Soviet aggression. 
(e) To be in a position to delay a Soviet advance we must aim:-
(i) To increase the depth of our defensive system as far as possible to the 
north. 
(ii) To provide depth in rear of our defences by a system of alternative bases 
in safer areas. These measures would serve to limit the development of a 
threat to the Indian Ocean and to North-West Africa through the Middle East. 
(0 We should maintain our traditional friendship with Greece. We should try 
to prevent the U.S.S.R. from compromising the independence of Turkey and 
Persia. 
South-East Asia and the Pacific 
32.-(a) The strategic interests of the British Empire demand the continued 
suppression of Japan. To this end, we must be prepared to provide the necessary 
forces in co-operation with our Allies. 
(b) The threat from the U.S.S.R. to British interests in South-East Asia and the 
Pacific would be comparatively remote. Moreover, we can expect immediate 
reaction from the U.S.A. to Soviet aggression in this area. 
(c) The defence of the interests in the British Empire against aggression by 
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either the U.S.S.R. or a re-armed Japan, would best be achieved by establishing, 
in co-operation with the U.S.A. and China, a system of forward naval and air 
bases from Formosa, through the Philippines, Caroline and Marshal! Islands, to 
Midway Island. 
(d) If Formosa should become untenable, the strategic importance of Indo-
China would be greatly increased. The French must be encouraged to 
co-operate with the U.S.A. and the British Empire in measures for its defence. 
(e) We should endeavour to ensure that the great potential resources of China, 
particularly in man-power, should be made available to the U.S.A. and 
ourselves, rather than to the U.S.S.R. The U.S.S.R. should in any case be 
prevented from obtaining a greater influence in China than the U.S.A. and 
ourselves. 
(0 It is important that Holland and Siam, as well as France, should co-operate 
fully with the British Empire in regional measures for the defence of 
South-East Asia. 
The South Atlantic, Africa and the Caribbean area 
33.-(a) The capacity of the ports on the Cape Sea route, and of the airfields of the 
trans-African air routes, should be developed in peace to enable them to serve 
as adequate alternatives to the Mediterranean route in war. 
(b) Although a Soviet threat to the Caribbean area would be remote, it would 
be in our interest that a regional defence system should be established there, in 
which the U.S.A. would play a predominant role. This would serve to protect 
the sea routes to Australia and New Zealand via the Panama Canal, and the air 
routes via British Honduras .... 1 
Section Ill 
Minor external threats and internal security 
121. Apart from threats from major Powers, threats to the security of British 
interests, which may call for use of British armed forces, fall into three main 
categories:-
A. Aggression by minor Powers against British territory. 
B. Wars between minor Powers affecting British interests. 
C. Internal unrest. 
122. These commitments, particularly internal unrest, will constitute a consider-
able drain on our resources. Measures required to deal with A and B above will be 
taken under the C£gis of the World Organisation when it is established, but this will 
not greatly alter our overall military requirements-see Section IV. 
A.-Aggression by minor powers against Br!tish territory 
123. The following are examples of possible commitments under this heading:-
1 At this point the memo continued with Section I, on 'Germany and Japan', and Section 11, on 'The USSR' 
(which was divided into Part I, 'The threat', and Part 11 on 'Offensive counter-measures', 'Defensive 
measures', and 'Defence priorities') . These two sections, which expanded in detail on the points 
summarised in the 'The main conclusions' and the 'Further conclusions', are not printed here. 
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(a) In the Sudan, Kenya and British Somaliland, from Abyssinian aggression. 
(b) In the Aden Protectorate; from the Yemen and from neighbouring Arab tribes. 
(c) In North-West India, from Afghanistan. 
(d) In Burma and the Malay States from China or Siam. 
124. Our aim must be that locally raised forces should eventually be capable of 
meeting these threats as far as possible. 
B.-Wars between minor powers affecting British interests 
125. Commitments under this heading include:-
(a) Our Treaties with Egypt, Iraq or Portugal. 
(b) Wars between Balkan States. 
(c) Obligations which we may assume towards any independent States established 
as a result of the solution of the Palestine problem. 
126. It is to our advantage that any State, in whose territory we have a strategic 
interest, should maintain sufficient forces to defend itself against minor aggression, 
but not large enough to constitute a menace to its neighbours. 
C. - Internal unrest 
127. The diverse races and religions which are found in the British Empire, 
particularly in India, will constitute enduring threats to internal security. These 
threats are likely to be aggravated during the period under consideration by 
economic and social difficulties arising from the present war, and may not be 
confined to the coloured races. The use of coloured troops on internal security duties 
will, in many cases, be impracticable for political or religious reasons, so that the 
burden is likely to fall to a considerable extent on the white troops of the Empire. 
Internal security problems, serious in time of peace, are doubly dangerous in war, 
when an enemy is likely to exploit the potential causes of unrest to the utmost. 
128. The problems of internal security, which may be expected to exist in 
1955-60, are discussed below by regions:-
The Middle East 
129. The most probable causes of trouble at present are:-
(a) Arab Nationalism which is growing stronger throughout the Arab States, 
particularly in Egypt. 
(b) The Jewish-Arab problem in Palestine. 
(c) French policy in Syria and the Lebanon. 
While the latter cause may be eliminated by 1955-60, the two former are likely to 
continue. 
130. British strategic interests, lives and property are affected more than those of 
any other major Power by unrest in the Middle East. Such unrest may, moreover, 
have serious repercussions in India. We must, therefore, continue to play the 
predominant role in maintaining internal security in this area. 
131. The responsibility for maintaining internal security in the Middle East will 
involve a formidable military commitment. Our policy must aim at getting the Arab 
States to share the responsibility with us. This implies that they should maintain 
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armed forces sufficiently strong to meet that commitment. It is, however, highly 
probable that British land forces will have to be retained permanently within the 
area. Air and naval forces must be so disposed as to be available at short notice. 
India and Burma 
132. There is likely to be a continuing commitment for internal security in India, 
arising both from communal and other civil disturbances, and from tribal warfare on 
the North-West Frontier. In Burma the internal security commitment is also likely 
to persist, but will probably be small compared with that in India. Although it should 
be our aim that Indian and Burmese troops should ultimately assume the entire 
responsibility of maintaining internal security, the Governments of these countries 
are likely, for some years, to require the presence of British forces in such a role. In 
India, whatever the constitutional developments, the risk of a breakdown in her 
political and economic structure such as would lead to the necessity of our 
intervention with considerable forces cannot be dismissed. 
The Far East and the Pacific 
133. The effects of Japanese occupation of British territories and Mandates in the 
Far East and the Pacific, and of the growth of Nationalist aspirations, is incalculable. 
It will not be possible to estimate the extent of the long-term internal security 
problem until these territories have been liberated. There is no reason to expect any 
serious internal security problem from other causes, except possibly in Malaya. 
Other British territories 
134. There will be potential commitments in many other areas, e.g., West and 
East Africa, Ceylon, the West Indies, Cyprus, Malta, Aden and Mauritius. In the 
aggregate the forces permanently stationed in these areas will absorb an appreciable 
proportion of the peace-time strength of our land forces. 
The United Kingdom and the dominions 
135. Even in the United Kingdom, and in the Dominions, military forces may be 
required to act in support of the civil power. 
Section IV 
World Organisation 
Introduction 
136. The effect of a World Organisation on the security of the British Empire in 
1955-60, depends primarily on the extent to which the authority of the Organisation 
develops during the next ten years. If it is to be effective, its evolution must be a 
gradual process brought about through the building-up of mutual confidence 
between its members. 
137. A World Organisation on the lines provisionally agreed at San Francisco, is 
best considered, from the military point of view, as an alliance between the five Great 
Powers, designed to ensure, first, the prevention of aggression by Japan. The World 
Organisation will only assume responsibility for the latter task when it is decided to 
supersede the control machinery set up by the Great Powers. 
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138. We consider below the effect of a World Organisation under the following 
headings:-
A. Defence against a hostile U.S.S.R. 
B. The control of Germany and Japan. 
C. The safeguarding of British interests against minor external threats. 
D. The extent of our military commitment. 
A. Defence against a hostile U.S.S.R. 
139. An effective World Organisation would contribute to our security in relation 
to the U.S.S.R. in that:-
(a) Co-operation between the U.S.S.R. and the other Great Powers will be 
facilitated, and it should be easier to obtain recognition of our claim to primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in those areas where 
British interests predominate. It might also help to resolve conflicting claims to 
predominance in those regions where both the British Empire and the U.S.S.R. 
have strategic interests. 
(b) The U.S.A. might be expected to assume military commitments not only in the 
Pacific, but also in Europe and the Middle East, as part of her obligation to share in 
the maintenance of world peace. It is most unlikely that she could be persuaded by 
any other means to assume such obligations, owing to her aversion from 
"entangling alliances." These commitments on the part of the U.S.A. would serve 
as a deterrent if the U.S.S.R. were to contemplate aggression. 
(c) Regional security systems would help us to build up defensive alliances, e.g., 
in Western Europe, which might endure even if the World Organisation broke 
down. 
(d) Facilities required for the protection of British interests in certain areas, e.g., 
the Middle East and the Straits of Gibraltar, may only be obtainable through 
agreements under the regis of the World Organisation. 
140. The existence of a World Organisation would, however, confront us with 
certain potential dangers. In the first place, it will be necessary to educate British 
public opinion to appreciate that the existence of a World Organisation constitutes 
no permanent guarantee against aggression on the part of a Great Power. Misconcep-
tion as to its efficacy in preventing a major threat to our security, might lead to 
demands for the reduction of our armed forces . If such views were to prevail, the 
existence of the World Organisation would become a menace to our security. 
Secondly, it would be difficult to resist Soviet participation in regional defence 
systems in the Middle East and possibly in other areas in which British interests 
predominate. If she were to use the influence which she thus acquired for purposes 
of undermining our position, with a view to future aggressive action against us, our 
capacity to defend our interests in such areas would be seriously weakened. 
B. The control of Germany and Japan 
141. If the task of controlling Germany and Japan is taken over in due course by 
the World Organisation, the measures required would remain as outlined in Section 
I. Inasmuch as the existence of a successful World Organisation presupposes 
unanimity of the Great Powers and adequate forces at the disposal of the Security 
Council, the task would be the easier. 
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C. The safeguarding of British interests against minor external threats 
142. Measures required to deal with threats arising both from aggression by 
minor Powers against British territory, and from wars between minor Powers 
affecting our interests, will be taken under the regis of the World Organisation. 
Imperial forces will be required to participate, but our commitment will be to some 
extent fulfilled by forces which must in any case be available for the purpose of 
safeguarding British interests against minor external threats. 
D. The extent of our military commitment 
143. The obligation to place forces at the disposal of the Security Council is likely 
to constitute a substantial commitment. It may also involve the intervention of 
British forces in minor wars where British interests are not directly affected. 
Nevertheless, this obligation will add but little to our overall requirements since it 
can very largely be met by forces which are, in any case, required to ensure our own 
security. 
Ultimately it is to be hoped that a successful World Organisation will produce 
more settled conditions throughout the world by engendering confidence in the 
settlement of disputes by negotiation. By 1955--60, it is most unlikely that the World 
Organisation will have achieved sufficient success in this direction to warrant 
acceptance by the Great Powers of any general scheme of disarmament. 
Conclusion 
144. The British Empire has the highest strategic interest in supporting the 
establishment of an effective World Organisation inasmuch as it would:-
(a) Further a primary object of our policy, namely, the avoidance of a clash with 
the U.S.S.R. 
(b) Promote the closer co-operation of the U.S.A., which is vital to our security. 
Section V 
Dominion collaboration 
145. The character of modern warfare and, in particular, the speed with which an 
aggressor will in the future be able to strike, makes it more than ever necessary that 
Imperial strategic policy should be backed with the resources of the whole Empire on 
a co-ordinated Imperial plan, and that this plan should be agreed in peace. 
146. Further, it is only in this way that the members of the British Empire can 
collectively constitute a Great Power, comparable with the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., 
and each enjoy the benefits which such a status confers. 
147. It is not unnatural that Canada, and to a lesser extent Australia and New 
Zealand, should feel that their defence problems are very closely linked to those of 
the U.S.A. This paper has, however, shown that the security of all members of the 
Empire is interdependent and that the security of the interests of the United 
Kingdom, India and South Africa, like that of Canada, Australia and New Zealand, 
depends upon close collaboration with the U.S.A. 
148. In the past, the obstacle to a co-ordinated Imperial defence policy has been 
the inability of Dominion Governments to undertake firm commitments. The 
standpoint of the Dominions has been that, without an effective voice in the framing 
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of British foreign policy, they might become involved in a war in which their own 
vital interests were not concerned, and which their own public opinion would not 
support. Further, the Dominions tend to consider defence problems from an 
individual rather than from a collective point of view.* All these difficulties must be 
resolved if we are to achieve a co-ordinated Imperial defence policy. 
149. In order to enable the Dominions to accept military commitments, it is 
necessary that improved methods of Imperial consultation at all levels should be 
evolved, and that all the peoples of the Empire should be educated to understand 
that:-
(a) the security of the constituent elements of the British Empire cannot be 
considered in the light of local interests alone, 
(b) a threat to any member constitutes a threat to the Empire as a whole. 
It is very desirable that the United Kingdom should take the initiative in this 
respect in the immediate future, while attention remains concentrated on defence 
problems. 
150. An effective policy of Empire defence demands that:-
(a) All the constituent nations of the Empire should hold, in a sufficient degree of 
readiness, forces available as an Imperial strategic reserve; 
(b) Imperial forces should be organised, equipped and trained on a common 
model; 
(c) The interchange of personnel should be greatly extended; 
(d) The development of technical methods of warfare should be co-ordinated 
throughout the Empire. 
151. Political conditions in each of the Dominions vary and it may well be that 
service in areas remote from their homeland will not prove acceptable to public 
opinion. Nevertheless, it should be possible to ensure that an equitable contribution 
to the defence requirements of the Empire as a whole is made by all, whether it be in 
the form of man-power or of industrial or other resources. 
152. In the present war the Allies have drawn a very large quantity of supplies 
from the Dominions and India. The value of experience in this field should not be 
lost, and study must be given to the co-ordination and dispersal of the industrial war 
potential of the Empire as a whole. The industrial areas of the United Kingdom are 
very vulnerable in war. It must, therefore, be our aim to increase the industrial 
contribution to Imperial defence from parts of the Empire less vulnerable than the 
United Kingdom. 
153. The conception of a World Organisation and of a co-ordinated Imperial 
defence policy are complementary. The United Kingdom is the only member to have 
a permanent seat on the Security Council. If she is to speak with authority equal to 
that of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., it must be known that all members will 
collaborate with her when issues vital to the security of the Empire as a whole are at 
stake, and that the resources of the entire Empire will be immediately available to 
any particular member in case of need. Should the World Organisation fail, close 
collaboration within the Empire would become even more necessary. 
• The Anzac Agreement of 1944 suggests the desirability of a defence zone and generalline-Timor- New 
Guinea-Fiji-Cook Islands. The conception that the security of Australia and New Zealand can be based 
primarily on any local defence system of this nature, is unsound. 
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CHAPTER3 
Political Change and Constitutional Reform 
Document numbers 44-78 
44 DO 9/8, noD 10867 5 Oct 1927 
'South Africa: the High Commission Territories': memorandum by Mr 
Amery1 [Extract] 
[The Union of South Africa as established under the 1909 Act did not include the three 
High Commission Territories (often loosely referred to as 'the Protectorates'), Basuto-
land, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, although a schedule to the Act provided for the 
eventual transfer of their administration to the Union government. For fifty years all 
South African governments maintained the pressure for such a transfer. The only breaks 
in discussions with the British government were war-related (1914-1918, 1940-1949), 
together with a five-year gap between 1927 and 1932, produced by Amery's insistence on a 
substantial postponement. His visit to the Territories in Aug and Sept 1927 made him 
realise how little has being done for them as a result of the assumption that transfer 
(especially of Swaziland) was 'imminent'; they had become 'little stagnant pools' 
administratively, treated 'as a sort of game reserve' (DO 9/8, no D 10918, Amery to 
Baldwin, 24 Sept 1927) or, as he expressed it more pungently in his memoirs, 'museum 
pieces, human Whipsnades' (My political life vol II 1914-1929 (1953) p 415). Amery 
successfully provided elements of a more positive policy of development: new administra-
tive blood, more money, better transport. 1 B M Hertzog, the South African prime 
minister, resumed the pressure from 1932, and the British government found itself 
increasingly trapped between the constitutional provisions of 1909 and the related 
parliamentary pledges not to implement them without consulting the African popula-
tions, who remained plainly hostile throughout; and between its growing anxiety over the 
rise of Afrikanderdom and its ever-more objectionable 'native' policies, and its need to 
maintain the goodwill of South Africa with its potential economic stranglehold over the 
territories. However, several factors militated against the Union's 'Greater South Africa' 
policies, such as the decision of the Southern Rhodesian settlers in 1921 not to join the 
Union, the passage of the Statute of Westminster (1931) which removed the legal 
safeguards of the 1909 Schedule, and the consistent lack of finesse displayed by Hertzog 
in negotiations. Prime Minister Smuts launched a more favourable initiative in 1939 to 
obtain the transfer of Swaziland, but even he was sharply rebuffed, with the high 
comissioner SirE Baring concluding in 1945, 'we should never sacrifice the true interests 
of Africans to a desire to remain friendly with a United Party Government at Pretoria' (DO 
3511172/706/7, Baring to Cranborne, 2 Apr 1945). Still less would a British government 
be prepared to sacrifice these interests to a National Party government after 1948 (see 
BDEEP series A, Vol 2, R Hyam, ed, The Labour government and the end of empire 
1945-1951, part IV, 426, 430, 433). The eventual emergence of the independent states of 
Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland appears to owe much to the consistent adherence of 
permanent officials in the CO and DO to a policy of refusing transfer. South African 
irritation at this policy meant that the issue was second only to Ireland as the major DO 
headache in Commonwealth affairs, and none was more intractable.) 
I have already submitted to the Cabinet a memorandum dealing generally with the 
situation in the Union of South Africa and in Southern Rhodesia. It will, I think, be 
1 The editors are grateful to Ronald Hyam for the text of the explanatory link-note which follows. 
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convenient if I deal separately with the High Commission Territories. These 
territories are the only areas south of the Zambesi which remain under the direct 
control of the British Government. Their intimate geographical and economic 
association with the self-governing territories which surround them constitutes a 
problem of considerable difficulty, but also a by no means negligible opportunity for 
influencing the future political development of South Africa as a whole. 
Of the three territories by far the largest, and also the least developed, is the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate. Lying between the Union, Southern and Northern 
Rhodesia, and South West Africa, it covers an area of 275,000 square miles. With an 
area five-sixths that of Nigeria it has a total population of possibly 200,000 natives 
and 1,800 whites, almost all concentrated near the railway along the eastern border. 
The northern portion is rich and well watered, and most of the rest, though usually 
figuring in the map as part of the "Kalahari Desert" is bush and grass land, admirable 
stock country capable of supporting large herds of cattle, providing only a sufficient 
number of wells can be found by boring-a point which has never been tried out, but 
with regard to which all the indications are favourable. Its mineral resources are 
unknown, as prospecting has not been encouraged, but there is no reason to suppose 
that they will prove inferior to those of smaller adjoining areas. 
Basutoland is a small mountainous country of some 12,000 square miles with a 
relatively dense native population of approximately 500,000 of whom a large 
proportion make their living by working outside the territory. The chief problem 
there is that of finding room for a rapidly increasing population by improved 
agricultural methods and by the development of native industries. 
Swaziland, the smallest of the three, is only 6,700 square miles in area, but is the 
best watered and possibly the most fertile region of its size in the whole of South 
Africa. Only one-third of Swaziland is in native hands, but even that area will be 
sufficient for a long time to come for the expansion of the native population which at 
present numbers only about 130,000 for the whole territory. The remainder belongs 
to European companies and settlers, who, for lack of communications and ordinary 
development facilities, have so far been able to do very little with their holdings. The 
total white population is only about 2500. 
When the Union of South Africa was constituted the three territories remained 
outside. Their general control is vested in the High Commissioner, who is the same 
person as the Governor General for the time being, assisted by the "Imperial 
Secretary". In this way their administration is kept in close touch with that of the 
Union, with which they are joined in a customs union. The South Africa Act, however, 
provided in Clause 151 that on a formal address by both Houses of the Union 
Legislature being presented to His Majesty, the territories may be transferred to the 
Union, subject in that event to the provisions as to their separate administration laid 
down in the Schedule to the Act. During the passage of the South Africa Act through 
the British Parliament in 1908 very definite pledges were given that such transfer 
would not take place without consultation with Parliament after the views of the 
inhabitants of the territories, both European and native, had been ascertained. These 
pledges have been explicitly repeated in the present Parliament, and constitute a 
governing factor in the situation which has always been fully recognised by the 
Union Government. It may be worth adding that while transfer to the Union is 
contemplated in the South Africa Act there is, in the case of Bechuanaland, the 
possible alternative of transfer, in whole or part, to Southern Rhodesia, with which 
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Bechuanaland was originally intended to form a single territory, and from which it 
was only separated after the Jameson Raid. 
The ultimate destiny of the territories must inevitably be transfer to the control of 
their self-governing neighbours. The modern conception of Dominion status, which 
regards the Dominions as qualified to exercise such Imperial functions as the 
administration of mandates outside their own territory, makes it more than ever an 
anomaly that native enclaves within the confines of a Dominion should be 
indefinitely governed from Great Britain, and, indeed, the whole present arrange-
ment is one which can only work on the basis of mutual good will. Assuming, then, 
that the ultimate destiny of the territories is transfer the problem is to secure, as far 
as possible, that transfer, when it does take place, should take place under conditions 
most favourable to the general interests of the Empire in South Africa and consistent 
with our responsibility to their inhabitants. 
Apart from such leverage as the prospect of transfer may give us over the general 
policy of the Union, or over its native policy, the most effective method of achieving 
the first of these objects is to make sure that, when the time for transfer comes, the 
areas concerned are, in so far as they are available or suitable for European 
settlement, definitely British in sentiment. In the present close balance between the 
forces making for Imperial unity in South Africa, and those which would keep South 
Africa in sentiment and action, if not formally, outside the Empire, it would be 
difficult to over emphasize the importance of this point. Nothing during my visit has 
impressed me more than the powerful influence which a progressive and intensely 
British Southern Rhodesia may yet exercise-is, indeed, already exercising-upon 
the Union. To create similar centres of progress and British sentiment east and west 
of the Transvaal in Swaziland and in such parts of Bechuanaland as may be available 
for white settlement, instead of leaving the areas in question unused till, after 
transfer, they are filled up with unprogressive Dutch of the "poor white" class, is 
something that may still make a very valuable contribution to the whole future of 
South Africa. 
To come next to our responsibility to the inhabitants of the territories, that, in so 
far as the small white population in Swaziland and Bechuanaland is concerned, 
requires no more than a reasonably progressive administration which will give them 
a chance to make good. As regards the natives, who are our primary concern, much 
more is demanded of us. It is no less than to raise them to such a level of general 
civilisation that they may be in a position, when transfer takes place, to hold their 
own and to justify, in the eyes of the South African public, the retention of their 
privileged position. It is at the same time to afford South Africa such an example of 
what the native can achieve, if he is given reasonable opportunity, as may exercise a 
potent influence in shaping South African native policy on sounder lines. 
I must admit that my visit to the three territories has made me realise how very 
little we have done hitherto towards the fulfilment of those objects. It has, of course, 
been difficult to do much within the limits of their exiguous budgets. But I fear we 
have also allowed ourselves to be influenced by the essentially transitory character of 
our authority, and to let that serve as a reason for marking time instead of a reason 
for pushing forward as rapidly as possible while the opportunity is given us. Moreover 
we have also been too inclined, I think, to regard the territories as mere sanctuaries 
where the native could go on living his life under primitive tribal conditions, 
preserved from contact with the forces of white civilisation, without thinking 
248 CHAPTER 3 [44) 
sufficiently of what is to become of him when this purely artificial protection is 
withdrawn, or of how long South African public opinion will tolerate the contrast 
between progress and development under white self-government and stagnation 
under British rule in the territories. Whether compared with native territories under 
British control elsewhere in Africa, or even with the native territories in the Union, 
they have been allowed to Jag behind, both in respect of their general development 
and in the capacity of the natives themselves to hold their own under modern 
conditions. 
Meanwhile discontent with the unprogressive character of our administration had 
already led the white settlers in Bechuanaland and Swaziland to make direct 
overtures three years ago to General Hertzog with a view to the transfer of the whole 
of Swaziland and of certain border districts of Bechuanaland to the Union.* The 
matter has been intermittently discussed between him and the High Commissioner 
ever since, and on the occasion of the Imperial Conference last year I promised 
General Hertzog to look into the whole situation and discuss it with him when I got 
out to South Africa. 
It required no prolonged study of the situation on the spot to realise that transfer 
is not a possible solution at the present moment. The white settlers made it 
abundantly clear to me that transfer to the Union was only urged by them in despair 
of any progress under British administration. Since then certain steps taken in the 
last year or so in the direction of a more progressive policy have made them more 
hopeful of the future if they remain as they are, while the flag controversy,2 the 
exaggerated bilingual policy of the present Union Government and its policy of "poor 
white" settlement, have all increased their reluctance to risk a change. The natives, 
for their part, are more vehemently opposed to transfer than ever. The reactionary 
aspects of General Hertzog's proposed native legislation such as the "Colour Bar" Bill 
which forbids the natives doing skilled work, and the proposal to deprive the Cape 
natives of their franchise, have created widespread alarm. The progressive aspects of 
his proposals are regarded, and with some reason, as not likely to come to anything 
much in practice. The proposed change of flag is looked upon as only another 
indication of the resolve to make Dutch ideas prevail over English ideas, and has 
helped them to realise more clearly than ever that, once they are under the Union, 
the British Government will be powerless to help them. Their anxiety was shown 
clearly in all the public addresses I received from them, and even more clearly in 
private conversation with the chiefs. It was obvious to me that any attempt to 
ascertain native opinion on even a partial transfer would not only create unrest and 
alarm in all the territories, but would show an attitude on the part of the natives 
affected in face of which it would be impossible for me to defend any such proposal in 
Parliament. 
• The settlers in the Tati block, a small area in the north east of Bechuanaland, originally part of 
Matabeleland and quite close to Bulawayo, have for their part asked to be transferred to Southern 
Rhodesia. This proposal, reasonable in itself, and not involving the difficulties inherent in any other 
transfer, has been held up by me for the present so as not to embarrass General Hertzog in view of my 
decision on the other proposals. 
2 The flag controversy began in May 1926 with a proposal to omit the Union Jack from the new Union flag. 
It was marked by extreme hostility to the Union Jack which culminated in an incident at Bloemhof in Sept 
1927 when nationalists tore up the British flag. As a compromise the new flag , first flown in May 1928, 
included a diminuitive Union Jack. 
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I put these various aspects of the situation very frankly before General Hertzog, 
and told him that I had come to the conclusion that there was no hope of Parliament 
agreeing to any transfer, even of Swaziland, until his new native legislation had not 
only been passed but had been in operation for a sufficient period to reassure both 
the natives themselves and the British Parliament as to its really progressive 
character. Meanwhile the best thing for us both was to cooperate wherever we could, 
for the administration in the territories to push ahead with development, and for the 
Union to give substance to the more progressive aspects of their native policy, so as 
to make transfer an easy and natural process when the time for it eventually came. 
General Hertzog, who throughout has dealt with this question in a very reasonable 
spirit, accepted my conclusion without demur, and agreed with me that it would be 
in every way undesirable for the Union formally to raise the question of transfer until 
the conditions were such that the application would be reasonably certain of going 
through .... 
45 CO 67/227/4 23 Apr 1929 
[Cyprus]: minute by A J Dawe on a despatch from the acting 
governor, R Nicholson, proposing that the constitution should be 
abolished [Extract] 
Minutes by HR Cowell1 and Sir J Shuckburgh 
[Under British administration from 1878 and formally annexed in 1914, Cyprus became a 
Crown Colony in 1925. The constitution of Cyprus, modelled on that introduced in 1882, 
provided for the administration of the colony by a governor aided by an Executive Council 
and a Legislative Council, the latter consisting of the governor, 9 official members and 15 
elected members (3 chosen by Muslim voters and 12 by non-Muslim voters) . The 
movement among the Greek population for the union (Enosis) of Cyprus with Greece was 
a constant feature of local political life. It led in Oct 1931 to widespread disturbances, 
during which the governor's residence (a mid-Victorian military bungalow made of wood) 
was destroyed by fire. Order was restored by troops summoned from Egypt by sea and air 
and the government was reconstituted without a Legislative Council, power to legislate 
by order-in-council being vested in the governor. For several years before the 1931 
disturbances, British officials had been questioning whether representative institutions 
were suitable for Cyprus. The minute by Dawe from which an extract is reproduced here 
was written in response to a despatch to Amery from R Nicholson who was deputising 
(Dec 1928-July 1929) during the illness of the governor of Cyprus, Sir R Storrs 
(1926-1932).] 
A question of first-class importance to Cyprus is raised on this file. The proposal put 
forward for consideration by the Acting Governor is that the present Constitution 
should be abolished. There are on this file 8 despatches on the subject and certain 
subsidiary correspondence. The main despatch in which Mr. Nicholson elaborates 
detailed proposals for reform is at No. 5. 
I submit:-
(1) A Precis of Mr. Nicholson's main despatch; 
(2) A Memorandum in which I have dealt with the more general aspects of the 
Cyprus constitutional problem.2 
1 Cowell was an assistant secretary in the CO and head of the Ceylon and Mediterranean Department. 
2 The precis and the memo are not reproduced here but for a summary of the memo, see note 3 below. 
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Mr. Nicholson's proposal in brief is that a new Legislative Council should be set up 
composed of the Governor and 33 Members. 15 of these would it is proposed be 
Official Members, 3 of them Nominated Members, and 15 would be Unofficial 
Members who would reach the Council after going through a mixed process of 
election and selection. In this process the machinery of the old District Councils of 
Administration (Medjlis Idares)-a survival from Turkish times-is to be utilised. 
Three-quarters of the number of the Members reaching the Legislative Council 
through this avenue are to be bona fide Agriculturists; and the whole object of the 
proposed new arrangement is to ensure that in an agricultural country the unofficial 
representation shall be predominantly agricultural and to exclude the money-
lending and lawyer class who are not representative of the people, and whose 
activities have brought about the present constitutional impasse. 
This is the gist of the proposals. They will be found elaborated in much greater 
detail in the precis and in the despatch itself. Mr. Nicholson in paragraph 41 of the 
latter asks to be informed by telegraph whether the Secretary of State concurs in his 
recommendations. He also asks for an indication of the points to which the Secretary 
of State desires that further consideration should be given, and states that he will 
then work out the scheme in detail and submit the proposals in final form. He adds 
the Law Officers' estimate that they would require two or three weeks for the purpose. 
It is perhaps not necessary to take too seriously the implication of urgency 
contained in these requests. Mr. Nicholson has always been an ardent advocate of 
constitutional change. He is about to leave the Island on retirement next June, and 
he would, no doubt, like to carry through the reforms which he has at heart before 
he departs. But this is a question of annulling a Constitution which has endured for 
almost half a century, and of setting up new institutions which will probably have 
considerable effect upon the material and political development of Cyprus during the 
next half century. Such a matter is one which requires thorough study and is not one 
which should be rushed through in a few weeks. These constitutional changes 
elsewhere are preceded often by long enquiries by Commissions and by subsequent 
deliberations. Though the balance of the argument is, I think, against appointing any 
Commission in the case of Cyprus, there is no reason for taking a hurried decision. 
In fact, as Mr. Nicholson is inclined to be a little impetuous there might be distinct 
advantage if the change, should it be decided on, could be carried through by others. 
What is essential is that we should think out clearly exactly what form the new 
Constitution is to take and what are to be the detailed steps for carrying the change 
through. Nothing could be more unhappy for Cyprus at the present moment than 
that we should commit ourselves to some hastily conceived scheme which we could 
not wholly carry through. 
I agree, however, with Mr. Nicholson that the time for change has arrived. The 
present Constitution is open to so many criticisms in theory and is working so badly 
in practice that whether we like doing so or not we shall be compelled to abolish it. 
Some of its weaknesses are described in the annexed Memorandum, and it is 
unnecessary to describe them in detail here. The Constitution is mechanically 
defective since the Executive Government although permanently in office is deprived 
of the legislative power. For its practical working it has depended upon the 
exploitation of the racial cleavage between the Greeks and the Turks. It brings too 
much into prominence the noisy anti-British section of the community. It was 
devised in the hope of providing a training ground in which Cypriots could learn 
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something of constructive administration. Instead it has provided a stage on which 
the petty politician has been enabled to grind a variety of axes in the full limelight. It 
is hardly necessary, however, to draw a laboured picture of the Cyprus position. It is 
in all essential features the same as that presented elsewhere where power has been 
divorced from responsibility. 
The immediate situation is that we are being compelled to resort more and more 
to Orders-in-Council to keep the administrative machinery running. At the end of 
1926 the Legislative Council threw out the Budget for the ensuing year. Consequent-
ly the appropriation law and the revenue law for 1927 were enacted by prerogative 
legislation. In 1928 Orders-in-Council were passed to codify the criminal law and to 
regularise the paper currency. The criminal code had never been brought actually 
before the Legislative Council. It had, however, been referred to a Committee of 
Elected Members for consideration, and it was only decided to enact it by 
Order-in-Council after they had neglected to deal with it for several months and it 
had become evident that an obstructive attitude was to be expected. The currency law 
also was not brought before the Council, and this for the reason that certain of the 
Elected Members had previously shown themselves anxious to annex a portion of the 
Currency Notes Reserve Fund for investment in an Agricultural Bank. As their 
notions of public finance were so dubious it was thought best not to allow them to 
get loose upon the local currency. More recently the Elected Members have rejected 
the Pensions Bill which was introduced to bring Cyprus into line with modern 
pensions legislation. It has now been decided to pass this measure by Order-in-
Council. 
These instances show that we have reached a position where the frequent use of 
prerogative legislation has been found necessary. There are also signs that the 
deadlock may become so intensified as to compel the enactment of minor routine 
legislation by Order-in-Council if we wish to keep the administration running. But it 
is clearly impossible for us to allow this method of legislation to become the normal 
established practice. We cannot invoke this ponderous machinery every time we 
want a supplemental appropriation or a minor amendment to the Customs Law. 
In February, 1927 the Secretary of State sent a stiff despatch to Cyprus on the 
subject of the action of the Elected Members in throwing out the Budget for that 
year. The following passages from this despatch which are relevant to the present 
situation may be quoted:-
"The administration of Cyprus under its present constitution can only be carried 
on if the Executive Government can count on such support to its measures from 
the Elected Members as is needed for their passage into law. Helpful and 
responsible criticism of measures on their merits is a contribution to the common 
task which will be welcome to Government, but that criticism must be informed 
by a sense of the responsibility which the peculiar constitution of the Island 
imposes upon the Elected Members. It is particularly a part of that responsibility 
that upon all major occasions their adequate co-operation should be extended to 
Government". 
"His Majesty's Government, however, cannot contemplate the possibility of 
governing the Island of Cyprus by Imperial Orders in Council. They are none the 
less determined to discharge the duty which rests on them to provide the Colony 
with an orderly administration. Unless they can count upon the co-operation of 
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the Legislature in its present form, the alternative which will confront them is 
obvious. They must advise His Majesty to modify the constitutional arrangements 
which have made possible the recent unfortunate events". 
"They trust . . . that the people of the Island will weigh carefully the 
responsibilities which, through their representatives, they are called upon to 
assume in the Legislative Council, and discharge them in future in a manner 
which will make a change in its constitution unnecessary. If such a change is 
made, it cannot fail to curtail the privileges which they have enjoyed for many 
years". 
The Cypriots were thus given a clear warning that if they made it continually 
necessary for us to legislate by Order-in-Council, their constitutional privileges 
would be curtailed. A change in the Constitution giving the Government the power 
of legislation would, therefore, be a logical sequel to the Secretary of State's 
despatch. 
If such a change were made it could not fairly be said that we were adopting a 
high-handed attitude without making any attempt to secure the friendly co-
operation of the Greeks. Sir Ronald Storrs' initial policy was definitely one of 
conciliation. The first important step taken under his regime was the removal of 
what was admittedly a long-standing injustice to the Islanders. This was the abolition 
of the "Tribute". The annual payment by the Island of £42,800 a year into the 
Imperial Treasury which had been made before the war as the Turkish Tribute, and 
later after the Annexation under the guise of a contribution towards the Ottoman 
Public Debt charge was, in effect, remitted when the Treasury agreed to increase the 
grant-in-aid pro tanto . In return it was stipulated that the Island should contribute 
£10,000 a year to Imperial defence. The net annual gain was, therefore, £32,800. A 
further conciliatory effort was the attempt made to meet the frequent criticism of the 
Unofficial Members that all the best jobs were given to Englishmen. Sir R. Storrs 
secured the appointment of a Greek to the important post of Solicitor General, and 
also brought in as Crown Counsel a clever young Cypriot lawyer who had started as a 
politician on the anti-British ticket. Sir R. Storrs also made a lavish and ostentatious 
use of the advice of the three Non-Official Members of the Executive Council to an 
extent which was somewhat disconcerting to his officials. And in many other ways he 
used his particular personal gifts in an attempt to create a congenial atmosphere. 
There can unfortunately be no other conclusion than that these efforts have 
entirely failed. Their main result seems to have been to make the anti-British 
elements more vocal and more embittered than before. The Archbishop, who is the 
leader of the "Union with Greece" movement, has recently on behalf of his associates 
forwarded a Petition to both Houses of Parliament praying for the Island to be 
handed over to Greece. Great activity has been shown in broadcasting copies of this 
document to influential people in this country, and generally a good deal of 
propaganda work is going on. A deputation was sent to Egypt a month or two ago to 
interview Mr. Lloyd George who was apparently e~pected to call there on a 
Mediterranean trip. He did not, however, visit Egypt, so the interview never came off. 
There is now talk of a deputation to the League of Nations. These proceedings are 
reflected in the Legislative Council by the increased intransigeance of the Elected 
Members. 
It appears, therefore, that there is much to be said in support of Mr. Nicholson's 
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contention that the time has now arrived for a change of policy. The lesson of the 
past seems undoubtedly to be that from the Cypriot Greek we can expect no gratitude 
for complacency. Every time we take a step towards them they take a step back. The 
fact is that by their history and temperament they are unable to appreciate the 
Anglo-Saxon system of conciliation. They are apt to regard every concession which 
we make to them as proceeding from motives of weakness and surrender. It is not 
surprising, therefore, if attempts to win them over si111ply increase their hostility. 
Owing to the obstinacy of the Imperial Treasury we were unable to abolish the 
Tribute until the Elected Members had refused supply. What was intended as an act 
of justice was thus made to appear to the Greeks an act of timid expediency. They 
thought that they had at last frightened the British Government. These feelings have 
undoubtedly been somewhat strengthened by events in other parts of the Empire, 
and particularly by what has happened just across the sea in Egypt. 
The Cypriots have an oriental mentality. They are inclined, therefore, to regard 
liberal gestures rather with contempt than with gratitude. It is frequently said that 
the most popular Governors of Cyprus have been those who have treated the Cypriots 
with firmness. There is no doubt a large element of truth in this. They respect a firm 
policy, and the most important thing we can do in Cyprus is to keep up the feeling of 
respect with which the British were regarded in the past. This is a thing which we 
may be in danger of losing under the present system by which we are giving them a 
kick one day and a caress the next. 
A cardinal factor in the situation is the "Union with Greece" movement. What will 
be the effect of a system of "benevolent autocracy" as advocated by Mr. Nicholson 
upon this movement? If we set up this system, and it seems the only practical 
alternative, we shall embark upon a policy of administrative efficiency and material 
development. We should enter upon this new policy with our eyes open. It would be 
imprudent to expect that the disaffected elements will be reconciled to the British 
Government by a period of rising prosperity. Mr. Nicholson in his despatch draws a 
clear-cut line between the anti-British intelligentsia and the mass of the peasants. I 
doubt whether this picture entirely corresponds with the reality. The advocate and 
money-lender of today is Mr. Nicholson's "bona fide agriculturist" of yesterday. 
Under Turkish rule there was very little distinction of classes between the Greek 
Cypriots. They were nearly all peasant-farmers. The petty politician of the present 
time is, therefore, simply the peasant become vocal. The peasants in the mass are 
concerned with the immediate affair of getting a living. But the Greek is a political 
animal, and the question is what will happen when with the increase of material 
wealth and education they are set free to reflect on political matters. Will not then 
Mr. Nicholson's bona fide agriculturists follow the call of the blood? Material 
progress under British rule elsewhere has often been not a depressant but a 
stimulant of nationalist and separatist feelings. 
The "Union with Greece" movement seems to rest upon underlying racial forces. 
We only deceive ourselves if we think that it is a thing which we can reach by a 
gubernatorial gesture or some passing expedient. The Cypriots are "Greek" ethnolo-
gically only in a very doubtful sense. They are the inevitable mixed product of the 
Island's mixed history. Under the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires the Island was 
part of the same unit as Greece. But it has never been part of Greece in a political 
sense. It is, nevertheless, remarkable how under a series of alien rulers the Cypriots 
have persistently retained their Greek language and their consciousness of a Greek 
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patriotism. In a country with such a history it is not surprising that the British 
occupation should be regarded as a brief phase. We after all have only been there 50 
years. The Turks stayed for over 300 years: but they went. The Venetians went after 
only 80 years. This sense of the transient nature of the British rule has been 
increased by the utterances of British statesmen. 
I emphasize this point because it is desirable not to enter on a new policy under 
any illusions. The practical administrator on the spot is apt to take very short views 
about the "Union with Greece" movement. Being only concerned with immediate 
affairs he thinks it can be smoothed over by this or that expedient. The most 
optimistic probability I can see is that with the growth of education and the gradual 
shrinkage of the world, "Enosis" may merge into some wider European outlook. 
As I have said above the benevolent autocracy advocated by Mr. Nicholson seems 
the only practical alternative. A glance at the other possibilities only reinforces this 
view. Cyprus is not ready for responsible government. There is, I think, no section of 
the community which possesses the required qualities. I have endeavoured in my 
Memorandum to indicate some of the reasons which make it doubtful whether 
institutions which will work in Anglo-Saxon countries will work in Cyprus.3 The 
grant of responsible government would be hailed as a complete surrender by Great 
Britain. It would give a rapid impetus to the "Union with Greece" movement. It 
would be regarded by the Greek Cypriots simply as the penultimate step in the 
achievement of "national aspirations"; and it might well be that the final step would 
have to follow. It would make the position of the Turkish minority impossible. They 
have always been loyal to us, and it would be clearly a shameless proceeding to hand 
3 In his memo Dawe expounded his own views on why, despite its deficiencies, the constitution of Cyprus 
had survived for forty-seven years . He believed that each of his arguments was in itself a reason for 
changing the system. The first was that the executive had always retained the power to overrule an 
obstructive legislature by means of orders-in-councif: This had tended to encourage irresponsibility in the 
elected members. They knew, for example, that even if they rejected the budget 'the result will not be a 
state of chaos, but that things will go on just as before'. The second was the British use of divide and rule. 
Seats were distributed in the Legislative Council in a manner designed to produce a British-Turkish 
majority against the Greeks. With 9 official representatives, 12 Greeks and 3 Turks, the balance of power 
rested with the latter. The Turks represented between one-fourth and one-fifth of the island's population 
but they had the real legislative power. The Greeks had thus been forced into the position of 'a permanent 
and embittered Opposition' and Dawe argued that a 'sounder policy would have attempted to minimise the 
differences between the Christians and Moslems rather than to exploit them'. The final reason was the low 
level of government development activity. Before 1914 there had been no British capital for investment. 
Annexation had been followed by war and war by depression. But from 1925, when Cyprus became a 
colony, the situation had begun to change. British capital was beginning to take an interest in the island 
and greater priority had been given to development. Dawe argued that the existing constitution could not 
meet the needs of 'modern life' . It had been workable 'in the old days when Cyprus was a sleepy backwater' 
but now it had broken down because 'we are trying to use it as the instrument of a vigorous development 
policy'. The memo concluded with some reflections on the still more distant past. After three centuries of 
Ottoman domination, the Cypriots displayed 'all the characteristics of a subject race'. Their inability to 
operate British parliamentary institutions was therefore understandable. Dawe could see 'no reason why 
we should accuse the Cypriots of the lack of qualities with which they have not been endowed' and he 
questioned the wisdom of the decision in 1882 to 'impose on the Island a Constitution based entirely on 
English ideas'. Observing that representative institutions had also not prospered in Greece, Romania, 
Albania, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Italy, Spain, Egypt and Palestine, Dawe concluded that 'machinery which 
may work quite well in Anglo-Saxon countries will not function in the atmosphere of the Mediterranean' 
(CO 67/227/4, 'Memorandum on Cyprus constitutional question', 23 Apr 1929). 
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them over to the mercies of the Greeks.4 The system of order and justice which the 
efforts of the British officials have built up during half a century would give way to 
the intrigue, corruption and incompetency of Levantine politicians. The hopes which 
we have of developing the undoubted resources of the Island would collapse. There 
are also to be considered the interests of the British firms whom we have encouraged 
to establish themselves in the Island. The asbestos, the copper, the silk, the banking, 
and possibly the wine interests would be seriously prejudiced. We have entered into 
certain definite commitments with the silk industry and with the Ottoman Bank 
which would also make difficulties. There are also a few British who have bought 
land and settled in the Island. During the last four years there has been an 
encouraging flow of British capital to Cyprus, and there are signs that the stream will 
swell. Responsible government would check this. 
It is, however, hardly necessary to work out in detail the objections to responsible 
government. It seems only necessary to mention this alternative to reject it. There is 
the further possibility of some form of "fancy" constitution. The objections to this 
appear to be largely the same as those to responsible government. Such constitutions 
will, I take it, only work if there is among the Colonial population a large measure of 
administrative ability, and above all good-will and loyalty towards Great Britain. It 
seems hardly possible that any form of hybrid institution would work in Cyprus. We 
should have to depend for co-operation upon just that small class of Greek Cypriots 
who have raised themselves above the illiterate peasantry; and these are the most 
disaffected. Any such constitution would be merely an attempt to reconcile upon the 
surface things which are fundamentally irreconcilable. 
By whatever route we approach the problem it seems that the best system for 
Cyprus is Mr. Nicholson's "benevolent autocracy". It will be noted from my 
Memorandum that observers of such different experience as Colonel Josiah Wedg-
wood and Sir Charles Orr5 have come to the same conclusion. If Mr. Nicholson's 
conclusion that the present system cannot go on is accepted- and I think this 
conclusion would be supported by every responsible British official with experience 
of Cyprus-there are two sensible courses open to us. We must either make up our 
minds to govern the Island or we must clear out. 
If we are determined on the former course, and we sweep away what Colonel 
Wedgwood has described as "a sham responsible Parliament", we on our side shall 
have to provide the Island with an efficient administration. With an official majority 
in the Legislative Council and a handful of really efficient administrative officers 
Cyprus would, I believe, make considerable material progress in a few years. In the 
past it has been impossible to get men of the highest calibre for Cyprus or, if we have 
got them, to retain them. The Elected Members have always been particularly 
susceptible on the question of the salaries paid to the British staff. The cheese-paring 
policy into which the Government has been forced has been short-sighted and 
uneconomic. The result has been that the Departments from time to time have fallen 
for long periods into the hands of misfits and incompetents. The good men have been 
4 Shuckburgh sidelined this sentence and commented in the margin: 'But remember that we were 
prepared to do so in 1915, as the price of securing the entry of Greece into the war!' The 1915 offer of 
Cyprus to Greece, made in attempt to induce Greece to aid Serbia in the war, was declined by the Greeks 
and subsequently lapsed. 
5 Wedgwood was an MP and author of The seventh dominion (London, 1928); Orr was chief secretary in 
Cyprus, 1911-1917, and author of Cyprus under British rule (London, 1918). 
256 CHAPTER 3 [45) 
drawn off elsewhere. It will generally be found that the few capable men are invalids 
from a tropical Colony; but the practice of making the Island a sanatorium is, 
nevertheless, open to a good deal of criticism. 
At present we have to take for Cyprus what we can get. There is at the moment a 
technical post which has been vacant for as long as two years owing to the 
inadequacy of the salary offered. But if salaries are raised under a new regime we 
shall, I think, have to pay particular attention to the selections for the Cyprus 
Service. This point may at first sight seem somewhat irrelevant to the constitutional 
question. I mention it, however, to focus attention on its extreme pertinence to the 
main issue. We may discuss this or that form of government, but I think that the 
question of the type of British official we choose for service in the Island is at any rate 
of equal if not of greater importance. If under the new system we send to Cyprus the 
right men, it may have great influence in counteracting the dangers alluded to above 
which threaten us from the "Union with Greece" movement. Cyprus has characteris-
tics unique in the Colonial Empire. The qualities which are desirable in an official in 
East Africa may be the same as those desirable in West Africa or Malaya or Fiji. But 
quite different qualities may be required for Cyprus. The man who is successful in 
dealing with coloured people may fail in dealing with the Greek Cypriots. Our 
present difficulty in Cyprus is, I think, due in some measure to the fact that so many 
of the present officials are not of the type best suited for dealing with the Greek 
Cypriot. Many of them owing to their lack of education are very narrow in outlook 
and sympathy. They are unable to mix on friendly terms with the educated Greek 
without sacrificing something of their position as members of the governing race. 
The consequence is that an atmosphere of sullen suspicion and misunderstanding is 
apt to be created on both sides. If the officials were better educated and had more 
knowledge of the world they would probably be able to associate with the Greeks on 
friendly terms without any loss to the dignity of their positions. In smoothing over 
racial antagonisms in a small Island this personal factor is obviously of great 
importance. The proposed reform in the Constitution will give us the opportunity of 
testing this. 
It may be thought that the best way of dealing with the issues raised by Mr. 
Nicholson would be to appoint a Commission. It will be noticed, however, that Mr. 
Nicholson does not make the proposal, and there is undoubtedly a lot to be said 
against it. If a Commission were appointed, the very fact of its appointment would 
stir up many matters which are best left quiescent. The Greeks and probably the 
Turks would, no doubt, start intensive propaganda. The Greeks would be almost 
bound to hail the Commission as a signal for the approaching grant at least of 
responsible government. These hopes would presumably be disappointed, and the 
dissatisfaction would be greater than that caused by our accepting Mr. Nicholson's 
proposals and presenting them with a fait accompli. It may be argued that the Terms 
of Reference of the Commission could be so limited as to exclude them from dealing 
with the possibility of self-government. But if that were done, there would be really 
no need for a Commission at all. The problem is a political one of. a simple and 
elementary nature. It does not depend for its solution on the compilation of a mass of 
economic and other data. There is in Cyprus no public opinion to convert or which is 
convertible from its present standpoint. There is no need to fortify ourselves with the 
advice of a Commission in order to justify the repression of any public disorder 
following upon a change. There is little fear in this direction. A good deal of steam 
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would, of course, be blown off by a small handful of anti-British politicians and 
journalists. But by the large majority of the Island, perhaps not excluding the 
politicians, the promulgation of Letters Patent setting up Crown Colony Government 
would be hailed with relief. The weight of the argument seems, therefore, to be 
against the appointment of a Commission. 
To sum up. The present Constitution has laid a dead hand on the development of 
Cyprus. Had it provided a useful training ground for self-government and given 
general satisfaction to the Islanders we might have been prepared for a sacrifice of 
administrative efficiency. But it seems to have given neither contentment nor 
efficiency. It is a system under which we are in some danger of losing our greatest 
asset-the respect of the Cypriot. Responsible government or a "half-way" type of 
constitution would be unsuited to local conditions. We, therefore, seem to be forced 
back upon a policy of Crown Colony Government and efficient administration. The 
dangers of the "Union with Greece" movement are not to be underrated, and we 
should not delude ourselves as to the possible effects upon it of a period of material 
progress. But we should try to counteract it by raising salaries and trying to select for 
Cyprus the best possible type of officer. 
Cyprus offers a good deal of scope for a new policy of development. After Sicily and 
Sardinia it is the largest island in the Mediterranean; and it is bigger than Norfolk 
and Suffolk combined. The variety of its produce is considerable. It has tobacco, silk 
and wine-three things for which under the Imperial Preferences it should build up 
markets in this country. Professor Clarke Powell reported to the Empire Marketing 
Board that one of the varieties of its oranges was the best in the world; and it has 
generally good prospects for developing trade in "complementary products". For a 
tourist resort it has admirable attractions. As a remnant of classical antiquity it is 
unique in the Empire, and it is rich in mediaeval remains. With its natural beauties 
and Mediterranean sunshine it should, therefore, in future get a good share of the 
tourist traffic. Owing to the anomalous position of the country before the Annexa-
tion, the Government has never raised a penny in the open market. Its only loan was 
£314,000 lent by the Imperial Treasury between 1900 and 1906. The time is well ripe 
for a development loan. Harbours, irrigation, water supply and drainage are all 
waiting for attention. What is required are a few practical administrators on the spot 
who know how to put up sound schemes and carry them through .... 
Minutes on 45 
... In Ceylon6 there is a considerable class of educated men whose political leaders 
are familiar with British constitutional ideas and have no desire for a break in the 
imperial connection. What could be conceded but with slight feelings of 
apprehension to such a population could not be considered in the case of Cyprus 
where such a step would put the administration into the hands of a group of leaders 
of low political morality, whose sole proclaimed policy would be a union of the Island 
with Greece. If such a policy is to be entertained at all it should be considered openly 
and decently; if not, we ought not to put ourselves in the position of being driven to 
6 In this extract from his minute Cowell refers to the recent report (1928) of the Donoughmore 
Commission on the Ceylon constitution and states his own views on why the recommendations for Ceylon 
could not be relevant for Cyprus. 
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entertaining it through the efforts of a small and corrupt band in charge of the 
administration .... 
H.R.C. 
8.5.29 
. . . I should like to emphasise what Mr. Dawe says about the need for acting- if we 
do act- with our eyes open. Let us be under no delusion in the matter. Our action 
will be bitterly denounced as reactionary and tyrannical, not only by the local 
politicians, but by advocates of "democracy" everywhere. It will be useless to look for 
open support in any quarter. We shall have to face the music alone. The "bona fide 
agriculturist" may bless us in his heart (though I share Mr. Dawe's scepticism about 
this gentleman), but he certainly will not put his blessing into words or commit 
himself publicly to our support. These attempts to reach the peasant over the head of 
the politician are hardly ever successful. It is like trying to reach the individual 
working man over the head of the Trade Union leader. There is never any response. 
I take it that, in any case, H.M.G. would not wish to take so drastic a step until 
after the General Election .... 7 
J.E.S. 
13.5.29 
7 The general election was held on 30 May 1929 and won by the Labour Party. Amery, the outgoing 
secretary of state for the colonies, never saw any of these papers. The abolition of the constitution 
following the 1931 disturbances prompted the following observation from G D Chamberlain, a Colonial 
Service officer on secondment to the CO from the Gold Coast between 1930 and 1932: 'Probably the best 
thing for the Island which occurred during the regime of Sir Ronald Storrs was the insurrection. The boil 
which had been troubling Cyprus for years has come to a head and burst, the correct local treatment has 
been applied and the future diet has been prescribed which should prevent a recurrence of the trouble' (CO 
67/247/10, minute by Chamberlain, 21 June 1932). 
46 CO 583/162/34 7/1928 24June 1929 
[Indirect rule in Nigeria]: minute by J E W Flood on powers of 
taxation in the Northern Provinces [Extract] 
[The issue which prompted a sixteen-page minute from which an extract is reproduced 
here concerned the power to impose direct taxation in the Northern Provinces of Nigeria. 
Anxious to secure a large degree of financial independence for the north, H R Palmer, 
lt-gov of the Northern Provinces between 1925 and 1930, and the northern residents cited 
Lord Lugard as the authority for their view that taxes in the emirates were payable to the 
and emir and not to the central government. Within the CO, Flood, head of the Nigerian 
Dept, challenged this view by arguing that Lugard had ordained that when the chiefs 
collected taxes they did so purely in their capacity as wakils or agents of the government. 
Lugard himself confirmed that Flood's interpretation was correct (CO 583/162/34711928, 
no 26).) 
. .. So, on careful consideration, I am driven to the conclusion that the case put 
forward by the Residents' Conference and supported in this despatch has no 
foundation whatever in the writings or policies of Lord Lugard and that to accept 
their view would be to upset the sound theory that the Emirs, etc. are "the Wakils 
(i.e. agents, chief officers, etc.) of the Governor" and to destroy what Lord Lugard 
called "the basis of the whole structure". 
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But it is necessary to go further in this matter, and to consider why the matter was 
raised and the manner in which it has been done. Even if the Residents were right as 
to Lord Lugard's policy I should hold that the accidental upsetting of it in 1917 by 
dropping the Preamble was all to the good, and, by transferring the taxing power to 
Government from the chiefs, went far to put the theoretical system of Government in 
the North on a sound basis. Holding, as I do, that the Residents are all wrong and 
that Lord Lugard's political system was the exact reverse of what they say it was, 
there is no need to argue that point though it is proper to mention it. We now have to 
consider "why has all this come up?" The answer is, I fear, not very creditable. 
In the Northern Provinces, since the amalgamation of the two Nigerias, there has 
always been a school of thought which worked to preserve as absolute a separation as 
possible and to resist what they called "Government from Lagos". The head of the 
school is, unfortunately, Mr. Palmer, the Lieutenant Governor of the Northern 
Provinces and he is getting very difficult. There are two lines of activity on which 
they rely to keep the unification of Nigeria a dead letter. One is 'decentralization'. 
This sounds innocent and sensible so long as one believes that they object to the 
failure of heads of Departments to delegate sufficient powers to their Deputies in the 
North, but that is not the case at all . What they want is to centralize all control of the 
Northern Provinces at Kaduna under the Lieutenant Governor. This has to be fought 
whenever it is brought out and the present Governor's aim is to have one Nigeria 
with principal officers as advisers to him on policy and co-ordinators generally and 
deputies and assistants in the various provinces with as full measure of delegated 
power as is possible. 
The other trusted stalking-horse is "Native Administration" or "Indirect Rule", and 
this is the one in use here. There is nothing very strange about indirect rule through 
native rulers, even where they keep up much more actual independence than in 
Nigeria (as for instance in Malaya or some native States in India), but the 
ultra-Northern Nigerian makes a sort of fet ish of it, believes firmly that the system in 
the Northern Provinces of Nigeria is absolutely unparalleled, that it descended upon 
earth owing to the plenary inspiration of Lord Lugard, and that no one who was not 
trained up in it from youth can possibly begin to comprehend its meaning or the 
policy which underlies it. Further articles of this religion are that no man who has 
ever served elsewhere can really know it (that is to get over the awkward fact that Sir 
Hugh Clifford, 1 who had been running Native Administrations in Malaya twenty 
years before the capture of Kano, didn't agree) and that the chief end of all things is 
to keep the clock permanently stopped and Northern Nigeria cut off from the rest of 
the world, while every word written or spoken by Lord Lugard becomes the 
embodiment of a 'policy' with all the authority of a text of the Koran (which can't 
vary) to the good Moslem. 
I have written this rather metaphorically, perhaps, but I very much regret to say 
that I do not think it an overstatement. In this instance, the points stressed are (1) 
The principle of indirect administration and (2) The alleged policy laid down by Lord 
Lugard. Now the principle of the thing is quite simple. It is to govern the people 
through their own rulers. It is not necessary to treat those rulers as sovereign 
princes or to say that they are the taxing authority for this purpose. The reason for 
starting indirect rule in Northern Nigeria was not any revelation from above but 
1 See 3, note 1. 
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because the genius of -Lord Lugard grasped the fact that there was a system of 
government ready-made to his hand and that with the resources (especially financial) 
at his disposal, this was far the best solution of his difficulties in setting up a 
Government. .. . 
4 7 CO 54/894/10, CP 240(29) 31 Aug 1929 
'Ceylon constitution': Cabinet memorandum by Lord Passfield on the 
recommendations of the Donoughmore Commission 
[Sir S Wilson minuted (9 Aug 1929) to Passfield on the Donoughmore Report: 'As we 
have gone so far now, I don't think that we can go back: and I thin-k we must be generally 
guided by the Governor who is in close touch with local conditions. I may be wrong but I 
confess I don't like the scheme very much. In many respects I feel that in agreeing to the 
proposals we are "leaping in the dark": and that the scheme must be regarded more as an 
experiment than anything else. We must do something and I can't think of any other 
course now but to accept the recommendations generally' (CO 54/894/10/2).) 
The Constitution of Ceylon is at present governed by the Order in Council of 1923, 
under which, while there is a large Unofficial majority of Elected Members in the 
Legislative Council, elected on a narrow franchise, all executive power is centred in 
the Governor and the Official Members. The existing Constitution was regarded, on 
its inauguration, as merely a temporary expedient for extending popular control over 
the Administration. 
The late Government appointed a Commission to report on the working of the 
existing Constitution, and on any difficulties of administration which may have 
arisen in connection with it, and to consider and report what, if any, amendments of 
the Order in Council now in force should be made. 
The Commission, which consisted of the Earl of Donoughmore, P.C., K.P. 
(Chairman), Sir Matthew Nathan, P.C., G.C.M.G., the late Sir Geoffrey Butler, 
K.B.E., M.P., and Dr. T. Drummond Shiels, M.C., M.P., was appointed in August 
1927, and presented its report in June 1928. The report was laid before Parliament 
(Cd. 3131), and recommends the adoption of a Constitution of an original character. 
The Commission, after full examination, expressed their opinion that the grant of 
complete responsible government is, under present conditions in Ceylon, impractic-
able, and their recommendations took another form. Stated very briefly, the 
recommendations of the Commission had the object of transferring to the elected 
representatives of the people complete control over the internal affairs of the Island, 
subject only to provisions which will ensure that they are helped by the advice of 
experienced officials, and to the exercise by the Governor of certain safeguarding 
powers. The chief features of the new Constitution would be the substitution for the 
existing Legislative Council of a State Council, which would deal with administrative 
as well as legislative matters; the decentralisation of control from the existing 
Colonial Secretariat and the arrangement of the Departments of Government into 
ten groups in charge of Ministers, of whom seven would be Elected Members of the 
Council, the remaining three being Officials; and the association with each of the 
seven elected Members in the administration of his Department of a Standing 
Executive Committee of the State Council. The official Ministers would be the Chief 
Secretary (in charge of external affairs, defence, public service, administration, &c.); 
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the Treasurer, in charge of Finance; and the Attorney-General, in charge of judicial 
affairs, &c. 
On the assembly of a new Council, the members would proceed to divide 
themselves into these seven Executive Committees, each of which would select its 
Chairman for appointment by the Governor, the Chairmen so appointed being the 
Ministers, and being individually responsible, with their Executive Committees, to 
the Council for the direction and control of the Departments in their charge. 
The Executive Council would be abolished and the ten Ministers would be 
constituted as a Board under the Chairmanship of the Chief Secretary. The Board of 
Ministers would elect its Vice-Chairman, who would be ex officio leader of the State 
Council, from among the seven Chairmen of the Executive Committees. 
The proceedings of the Executive Committees would be reported to the Council in 
Executive Session, and, as approved by the Council, would be submitted to the 
Governor for ratification. Similarly, the legislative measures passed by the Council 
would continue to be submitted to the Governor for his assent. The Governor would 
have the unqualified right to refuse or reserve his assent, both in executive and 
legislative matters, but he would not normally exercise this right unless the 
proposals were such as, in his opinion, to conflict with the provisions of the Royal 
Instructions issued to him. Those Instructions would define certain classes of 
legislation to which the Governor would not be empowered to assent unless the Bill 
contained a suspending clause to permit of reference to the Secretary of State. 
The Special Commission recommended that the present Property, Income and 
Literacy Qualifications for the franchise should be abolished and the franchise should 
be extended, subject to minor reservations, to all men over 21 years of age, and to all 
women over 30 years, who (a) applied to be registered as Voters, and (b) have resided 
in the Island for a minimum period of five years. 1 Communal representation should 
be abolished, and the strength of the State Council should be increased from 
forty-nine to a maximum of eighty. I am inclined to regard this figure as rather too 
high, and am proposing to cut it down to 58. 
As regards the public services, the Special Commission recommended that the 
right to make all appointments should be reserved to the Governor, and that there 
should be reserved to the Secretary of State the final decision in all matters affecting 
the salaries and conditions of service of all public officers. 
The report of the Special Commission was laid before the Legislative Council in 
Ceylon and a prolonged debate took place on the proposals. Opposition to the 
proposals was no doubt strengthened by the resentment of the Council against 
certain criticisms made of their proceedings in the Special Commission's Report. 
Resolutions were passed by varying majorities, which, in effect, rejected the main 
proposals of the Special Commission's scheme. The Secretary of State in the late 
Government informed the Governor, towards the end of the proceedings in the 
Council, that in his opinion the recommendations of the Special Commission must 
be regarded as a whole and while, no doubt, modifications in detail would be 
necessary when effect was being given to them, he would not be willing to accept any 
amendments in principle which would destroy the balance of the scheme. If it 
appeared that a substantial majority of the inhabitants of Ceylon would not willingly 
agree to trial of the scheme as a whole he might feel compelled to reopen 
1 The CO reduced the voting age for women to twenty-one when the reforms were implemented in 1931. 
262 CHAPTER 3 [47] 
consideration of the whole question of any constitutional changes. He fully agreed in 
the conclusion of the Special Commission that the grant of complete responsible 
Government is, under present conditions, quite impracticable, and he could hold out 
no hope that failure to accept the recommendations of the Commission would in any 
way tend to expedite the possibility of such grant. A message in these terms was 
communicated to the Council by the Governor after the voting on the more 
important resolutions had been concluded. 
The Governor, after prolonged consideration of the situation, sent the despatch of 
which a copy is appended (Appendix A),2 in which he fully examined the situation 
arising from the publication of the Report and the discussion in the Council, and 
expressed the opinion that the scheme of the Special Commission should, with 
certain modifications, be given a trial. He stated his impression that the general 
public would be disappointed if the offer of the new Constitution were not made, or 
if, having been made, it were not accepted. He thought it not unlikely that many of 
the Unofficial Members, while they thought it necessary to record their dissent from 
certain of the recommendations, would not wish to press it, save perhaps in the 
matter of the franchise, to the length of wrecking the scheme. 
The one important modification which the Governor proposes relates to the 
franchise. There is no doubt that this proposal of the Special Commission has excited 
more opposition than any other, in view of the apprehension with which the 
Ceylonese regard the enfranchisement of the large floating population of Indian 
labourers who have no permanent settlement in the Island. To meet this difficulty 
the Governor proposes that, subject to special provision for the undomiciled, 
domicile should be made the standard test for enfranchisement. Under his proposals 
all persons possessing the preliminary requirements of British nationality, a 
minimum age qualification of 21 years for persons of either sex, the absence of 
mental disability or criminal antecedents, and a qualification of residence for six 
months in the electoral district, should be entitled upon application to be registered 
as voters if they are domiciled in the Island. For the undomiciled there would be two 
alternative qualifications. The one alternative would be compliance with the 
franchise conditions of the present Constitution, which would provide for practically 
all European residents of British nationality and for a number of British-Indians 
engaged in commerce or professional work. The other alternative would be the 
production of a certificate of permanent settlement, which would be granted to an 
applicant who furnished satisfactory evidence of five years' residence in the Island 
and, in addition, made an attested declaration to the effect that he was permanently 
settled in the Island or was residing in the Island with intent to settle therein, and 
that, while registered as a voter, he would renounce any claim to special protection 
by any Government other than that of Ceylon. 
I consider that the Governor's proposal is a fair and reasonable solution of the 
difficulty of the franchise, and I propose to adopt it. 
The Governor made certain proposals for the modification of the Commission's 
scheme in minor details, which I propose to settle in correspondence with him. 
I consider that the proposals of the Special Commission, with the modification as 
to the franchise suggested by the Governor, should now be placed before the 
Legislative Council for acceptance, and that, subject to their approval, I should take 
2 Appendices not printed. 
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steps for the preparation of an Order in Council to put the scheme into operation. 
Minor questions arising in the preparation of the Order in Council would be settled 
as they arose. I enclose (Appendix B) the draft of a despatch which I propose to 
address to the Governor with this object. 
48 IOR MSS EUR E 240/52 12 Dec 1930 
'Conservative policy at the Round Table Conference': memorandum by 
SirS Hoare on Indian policy for the Conservative Party Business 
Committee 
[This memo, drawn from the private papers of Lord Templewood (formerly Sir Samuel 
Hoare) for the period when he was secretary of state for India between 1931 and 1935, was 
written a month after the opening of the first Round Table Conference on India which was 
held in London between Nov 1930 and Jan 1931. The origins of the conference can be 
traced to the decision in 1927 to appoint an 'all-white' Statutory Commission to examine 
the working of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms which had been introduced in India at 
the end of the First World War. Concern that a Labour administration might make too 
many concessions to Indian nationalism persuaded Baldwin's Conservative government 
to bring forward the review of the Indian constitution by two years but it was largely upon 
the advice of the Viceroy, Lord lrwin (later Lord Halifax), that no Indians were 
represented on the commission which was chaired by Lord Simon. Indian politicians 
resented their exclusion and the Simon Commission was greeted by a widespread boycott 
when it arrived in India in 1928. Challenged by Lord Birkenhead, the secretary of state for 
India, to produce a constitution acceptable to all parties, Indian politicians convened an 
All-Parties Conference chaired by Motilal Nehru. The Nehru Report of 1928 called for 
dominion status under an essentially unitary system of government. Under pressure from 
radical elements within its own camp, the Indian National Congress resolved in Dec 1928 
that if dominion status were not conceded within a year Congress would demand 
complete independence and resort to civil disobedience. Against this background Irwin 
gained authority from the Labour government elected in June 1929 to make a declaration 
the following October which defined dominion status as the object of British policy in 
India and which invited representatives of the Indian political parties, together with 
representatives of the Indian princely states, to a conference in London to confer on the 
next steps forward . lrwin's declaration failed to satisfy Congress which wanted an 
assurance that the function of the conference would be to frame a dominion status 
constitution. When no such assurance was forthcoming, Congress opted for civil 
disobedience at the end of 1929. The conference went ahead without Congress 
representatives. When it opened in Nov 1930 two reports had already been published. 
First, the report of the Simon Commission which recommended the early replacement of 
dyarchy by full responsible government (subject to the continued retention of reserve 
powers) in the provinces, but which stopped short of recommending any measure of 
responsibility in the central government. However, as a long-term objective, the 
commission advocated the replacement of the Montagu-Chelmsford unitary system by a 
federal executive and legislature, the latter to be indirectly elected by the provincial 
assemblies (Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, Cmd 3568-3569, May 1930). 
Secondly, the Indian government's response to the Simon Report which endorsed the 
commission's findings but which advocated the principle of 'responsiveness' within the 
British Indian executive. Portfolios in which the UK parliament had a continuing 
interest-defence, foreign relations, financial obligations, the protection of minorities, 
the rights of the services, and the prevention of discrimination against British trade-
would remain in official hands. The others would be transferred to elected Indian 
members of the legislature selected by the governor-general, it being understood that 
transferred departments would be capable of resumption (Government of India's 
Despatch on Proposals for Constitutional Reform, 20 September 1930, Cmd 3700, Nov 
1930) . Federation was therefore not an immediate item on the agenda when the 
conference opened in London. The position changed because of the unexpected position 
taken at the outset by the princely delegations. Acting on the mistaken assumption that 
federation would enable them to escape the paramountcy restrictions placed upon their 
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domestic authority by the Political Department of the Government of India, the rulers 
and representatives of many of the medium sized princely states declared their immediate 
support for a federal ·constitution. Representatives of the larger states, most notably 
Hyderabad and Mysore, followed suit but for motives of their own. As a land-locked state, 
Hyderabad saw in federation a means of protection against nationalist inroads from 
British India. Mysore had financial motives and viewed federation as a means of relief 
from the burden of tribute which it paid to the British government. The princes' initiative 
made an immediate impact on the British delegations at the conference. As he revealed in 
the memo reproduced here, Hoare, the Conservative Party spokesman on India, was 
suitably impressed by the new possibilities. The strategy he outlined was essentially the 
one he subsequently pursued as secretary of state for India during the period which led to 
the Government of India Act of 1935.) 
This is no more than a memorandum for the purpose of posing the questions to 
which we must give an answer. It will be crudely expressed, for in the continuous 
rush of the Conference none of us have any time to produce a full and carefully 
prepared statement of a very intricate case. My colleagues of the Business Commit-
tee, therefore, must not assume that I am doing anything more than suggesting the 
main outlines for their decision, and on no account must they think that any of the 
Delegation has the least intention of weakly surrendering our position in India. 
This last observation I should have thought unnecessary to make were it not for 
Mr. Churchill's recent speech in the City. 
We have now completed the first chapter of the work of the Conference. An 
overwhelming majority of the members have declared in favour of the separation of 
Burma. A Committee is preparing a draft report upon provincial autonomy, and Lord 
Zetland has described the details in a separate paper. The third Committee, the 
Federal Relations Committee, is the subject of these notes and I will deal with it at 
some length. Let me, however, say by way of introduction that, speaking generally, 
the Indians on all the Committees and in many of their private interviews have 
shown thesmselves ready to deal with the facts of the problem and to deal with them 
as realists. When I say this, I do not mean that they do not all demand what they 
describe as responsible government. I mean, rather, that in the private discussion of 
details they get rid of the generalities that so much obscured the public sittings of 
the Conference. 
The stage that we have now reached is as follows. We have agreed, in accordance 
with the basic principle of both the Simon Report and the Government of India 
Despatch, that the problem is an all-India rather than a British Indian problem and 
that the future Government must be on a federal basis. Upon this point there is no 
difference between the Conference and the two Reports, except that the unexpected 
support of the Princes has brought federation from the distant horizon on to the 
immediate foreground. We have further agreed upon the Committee that there 
should be only one executive and one system of legislative Chambers for India and 
that the executive and the Chambers should be federal. This is a very remarkable step 
to have taken. If anyone three months ago had suggested that there was a practical 
possibility of eliminating the Legislative Assembly of British India, no one would 
have believed him. Yet by general agreement we have taken this step, and by taking it 
we have made it possible to rescue British India from the morass into which the 
doctrinaire liberalism of Montagu1 had plunged it. Thirdly, we have obtained the 
1 Edwin Montagu, secretary of state for India, 1917-1922, co-author with Lord Chelmsford (Viceroy of 
India, 1916-1921) of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report on Indian constitutional reform, Cmd 9109, 1918. 
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assent of the Princes to have their representatives in both Federal Houses. My 
colleagues will realise without comment from me the magnitude of the change that 
the participation of a substantial number of nominated representatives of the Indian 
States will make in the composition and policy of the two central Chambers. 
I hope that I have said enough to show that, not a little due to the efforts of the 
Conservative delegation, the picture at the centre is now materially changed from 
that portrayed by the Simon Commission or contemplated by the Government of 
India. The question that we now have to ask ourselves is whether the picture is so 
much changed as to justify us giving responsibility of any kind to an Indian 
executive. 
Both the Simon Commission and the Government of India came down on the side 
of no responsibility at the centre. How far has the immediate appearance of 
federalism changed the conditions in which the Commissioners and the Government 
of India came to their conclusions? Both were animated by a single idea, the need of 
stability at the centre whilst the great experiment of autonomy was being tried in the 
Provinces. I agree entirely with their insistence upon the need for stability. Stability 
at the centre is the ultimate bulwark against chaos in India. Almost every country in 
the world is suffering to-day from the weakness of the executive, and it would be 
criminal upon our part to agree to any change that might undermine the authority of 
the central Government. The trouble is that for various reasons into which I need not 
enter in this paper, the Government of India as at present constituted is, in my view, 
both weak and inefficient. Moreover, the recommendations of the Simon Commis-
sion if carried into effect would make it still weaker and the half-baked suggestions of 
the Government of India would get the worst of several worlds. I want to see a 
Central Government stronger than the present Central Government and stronger 
than either the proposed Central Government of the Commission or the Despatch. 
Is federalism capable of giving us this stronger government? I am inclined to think 
that it is. In the nature of things a federal government is inclined to be more 
conservative and stable than a unitary government. Almost necessarily, it operates 
under a written constitution and a Supreme Court. Its representation is based upon a 
less popular foundation, whilst the constituent governments, each regarding itself as 
much more sovereign than a Parliamentary constituency, exercise a steadying 
influence upon the legislature and the executive. 
The best form of federation for India would, in my view, be a single Federal 
Chamber and an executive irremovable and separated from the legislature as in the 
case of the United States. Unfortunately, the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms and the 
policies and promises of the last thirteen years have taken India so far on the wrong 
road that I must ask my colleagues the practical question whether it is now possible 
to abolish the Central India legislatures and to substitute for them a small Federal 
Council with an irresponsible and irremovable executive. If my colleagues think that 
this course is possible, I am naturally open to argument in a direction to which I 
should personally like to go. We must, however, face the fact that not a single 
politically-minded Indian will agree with us and that in practice it would be 
extraordinarily difficult to impose such a constitution upon India in 1931. I have 
talked with Indian delegates upon the subject. Each one of them has been quick to 
emphasise the obvious difference between India and the United States where in the 
one case the President is elected by the Americans and in the other the Viceroy is an 
Englishman appointed from Great Britain. 
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None the less I pose this question to my colleagues. Can we in the Conference 
stand upon a policy of a single Federal Chamber and an irremovable executive? 
If we cannot stand upon this policy, the next question that arises is, can we or can 
we not accept any responsibility at the centre? 
Here, it would probably be well if I set out in concrete form the kind of 
responsibility that even the moderate-minded Indians demand. I give the picture as it 
has been given by Sir Akbar Hydari,2 the most conservative member of the whole 
Conference. 
When he talks of responsible government he means the following. 
(1) The Viceroy, with (a) strong overriding powers for the maintenance of peace 
and tranquillity, the protection of minorities and the maintenance of financial 
stability, (b) defence, foreign affairs and relations with the Princes as his exclusive 
province under the control of the British Parliament. 
(b) An Indian Federal Ministry responsible to the Federal legislature, with 
portfolios for (a) finance, (b) home, (c) commerce, (d) development, (e) com-
munications, (f) labour and (g) justice. 
Upon the face of it such a system of government would appear to be an almost 
complete abdication of British control. I do not underrate the magnitude of the 
change that it would involve. I would, however, ask my colleagues to consider 
without prejudice the question as to whether or not it is possible to give a semblance 
of responsible government and yet to retain in our hands the realities and verities of 
British control. 
Would it, in a word, be practicable to hand over these portfolios to Indians and yet 
to keep for ourselves the threads that really direct the system of government? 
I will explain in rough outline what I mean. Firstly, we could insist upon a very 
wide interpretation of the overriding powers of the Viceroy. I have no doubt but that 
we could keep the Army, the ultimate instrument of control, completely in our hands. 
As to finance , we could so tie it up with (1) a Statutory Currency Board for the 
control of exchange, (2) a Reserve Bank for managing reserves and many kindred 
financial questions, and (3) a permanent prior charge upon the Federal revenues for 
interest upon loans, salaries and pensions, the payment of the army, etc., that the 
sphere of Indian responsibility could be reduced to a minimum. Indeed, I have at my 
disposal calculations that show that when a long-term agreement is made for the 
non-votable sums necessary for the upkeep of the Army and the prior charges 
guaranteed for the services of the Debt, pensions and other Imperial obligations, 
more than eighty per cent. of the federal revenue would be taken entirely out of the 
hands of any Indian Finance Minister, and retained in our exclusive control. 
As to commerce, it would, in my view, be practicable to safeguard the position of 
British traders by a trade agreement to be attached to the new Indian constitution. 
So also with Communications. We could keep the real power in the hands of a 
Statutory Railway Commission. 
If I had the time and space I could greatly elaborate these details and show that it is 
possible if we wish to proceed on this line to tie up each one of the services with 
safeguards so effective as to confine Indian responsibility within very narrow and 
clearly defined limits. 
2 Head of Hyderabad delegation at the Round Table Conference. 
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The same line of action might be adopted in the case of the removability of the 
executive. Technically the executive would be both removable and responsible. In 
actual practice an executive composed of such divergent elements as British India 
and the Indian States, the one depending on election, the other upon nomination, 
could never be responsible or removable in the British sense of the word. Moreover, 
it would be possible still further to safeguard the position by insisting upon a vote of 
censure only being valid by an overwhelming majority in each House, and by this 
means to make the executive practically irremovable for a term of years. 
With such points as these I can deal in detail if my colleagues so desire. They must 
not in the meanwhile misunderstand me. I do not wish them to draw the conclusion 
from my statement of the case that I am urging this or any other line of action. I am 
posing the question. 
Is it or is it not wise to create a measure of goodwill in India by giving the 
semblance of responsible government, though at the same time retaining the 
essential safeguards in our hands? I am inclined to think that if we proceed upon this 
line of action, we can probably obtain very effective safeguards from the Indian 
members of the Conference, and we can certainly maintain the unity of the British 
front. 
The important point is that we members of the delegation must know what is to be 
our general line of conduct. We do not at all ask for a categorical yes or no to the 
acceptance or refusal of any detailed scheme. But we must know whether or not we 
are to consider sympathetically any move forward towards responsible government 
within such limits as I have sketched. It is clear to us that both the Government and 
the Liberals are ready for a considerable advance. We have, therefore, to face the fact 
that if we remain rigid, our position will be isolated. Here again I do not say that the 
fear of isolation should necessarily deter us if we are convinced of the justice of our 
own line of action. We must, however, assess the value of a united British front when 
we decide for or against isolation. 
Lastly, it might perhaps help my colleagues to come to a conclusion if I inform 
them of tpe general line of procedure that the Prime Minister seems to favour. He 
has told us that he hopes to end the Conference in the middle of January with some 
kind of approval of a number of reports gathered from the committees and edited 
together. I imagine that these reports will be of a somewhat general character, and I 
feel sure that we shall be able to make reservations in them upon vital points when 
we think it necessary. Whilst, however, we shall be free to withhold our assent, we 
have constantly to show our hand in the course of the discussion. 
If we decide that we cannot make any move forward in the direction of 
responsibility, I am inclined to think that we should make our position clear in the 
course of the next ten days. If on the other hand we are authorized at least to 
investigate the question of responsibility on the lines that I have suggested, we shall, 
of course consult our colleagues of the Business Committee upon the specific 
questions as they arise. Moreover, we can throughout make it clear that any approval 
that we may give, is entirely dependent upon an effective federation being in actual 
existence in India. This last safeguard I feel that we must certainly make. Without it 
we may find that we have agreed to concessions and that we have obtained nothing as 
a result. Our line should be, in the case of our adopting this policy, something like 
this. "We agree to these proposals, but we shall make no change whatever at the 
centre until the Federal constitution is actually framed." We shall in this event be 
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sure that the States have really entered it, that the constitution is water-tight, that 
all the many safeguards are effective and that the deal that we have made with India 
can really be carried out. Much water will flow under the bridge before the Federal 
structure is in being. The Prime Minister and those with whom I have spoken 
evidently conceive of the period of preparation as a period of years. In the meanwhile 
the central Government would remain as it is, and if the members of the Conference 
cannot implement the agreement, we shall not have parted with any concession. 
Finally, let me impress upon my colleagues that, whatever answer they may give to 
the questions that I have set out, federation is the only effective system for ensuring 
strong and stable government in India. The atmosphere is at present surprisingly 
favourable for a federal development. We may not have again so good a chance for 
laying the federal foundations. 
49 CO 583/177/1056A/1931, ff 13v-15v 27 Jan 1931 
[Aba riots in Nigeria]: despatch from Lord Passfield to G Hemnantl on 
the causes and lessons of the riots 
[Disturbances in the Owerri and Calabar provinces of Eastern Nigeria in Nov and Dec 
1929 claimed over fifty victims, all but one of them women. The immediate cause of the 
unrest was the widespread belief that the government was about to impose a tax on 
women. Three years earlier, in the Owerri province, a census had been conducted without 
informing the inhabitants that the counting was for taxation purposes. A similar count of 
women, children and animals at the village of Oloko near Aba in Eastern Nigeria in 1929 
provoked a violent reaction during which property was looted, native courts burnt down 
and warrant chiefs attacked. The disturbances were led by women. They spread to Calabar 
and Opobo where, on 16 Dec 1929, troops of the Royal West African Frontier Force, which 
had been summoned to support an under-strength police force, opened fire killing 
thirty-two people and wounding a further thirty-one. Within the CO Or T Drummond 
Shiels, parliamentary under-secretary of state, was the first to respond to the Opobo 
incident. Commenting upon telegrams from Nigeria which were not yet accurate about 
the casualties he minuted: 'I believe that feeling in the House and in the country will be 
greatly aroused over the happenings in Nigeria. In spite of the assurance of the local 
responsible officials the story does not read well and there is certain to be a strong feeling 
expressed that certain people have blundered, and that they are being screened by 
superiors. I do not say this is true, but we shall have great difficulty explaining the killing 
of 35 women by rifle fire and the drowning of 8 by being pushed into the river by what was 
apparently a panic stricken mob. There will be insistent demands for a stringent inquiry. I 
think we should anticipate this .... It is a black chapter in our West African history and 
will be described as another Amritsar massacre with the worse aspect that all but one of 
the 36 victims were women' (CO 583/168/695/1929, minute by Shiels, nd, [Dec 1929]). 
Two commissions were appointed, the first to apportion responsibility for the loss of life 
(the officials concerned were exonerated), the second to investigate the causes of the 
riots. To the immediate cause about the rumoured taxation of women, the second 
commission added the following contributory factors to explain the riots: resentment at 
the imposition of direct taxation, the rate of which had been set too high; discontent over 
what the commission described as the 'persecution, extortion and corruption practised by 
Warrant Chiefs or Native Court members'; and economic grievances over the collapse of 
commodity prices (it being significant in this latter respect that women played a key role 
in the palm kernel trade). On the crucial issue of taxation, the report was sharply critical 
of administrative practices in the Eastern Provinces of Nigeria: 'There is strong ground 
for arguing that much greater progress in the policy of resuscitation and political 
education of the natural rulers should have taken place before any attempt was made to 
introduce direct taxation; for the Administrative Officers concerned would have come 
more closely into touch with the people by virtue of the very process of inquiry which is 
1 OAG, Nigeria, Nov 1930-June 1931, acting for the governor, Sir G Thomson (1926-1931). 
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now taking place after, instead of before, the introduction of taxation . ... Had the natural 
rulers and leaders, hitherto eclipsed for the most part by the Warrant Chiefs, been already 
established and recognised throughout the disturbed areas and in close touch with the 
administration we find it difficult to believe that this unprecedented mass movement of 
women would have been either necessary or possible. Such energetic, purposeful 
initiative taken by women is unheard of in native history' (CO 583/176/1002/1930/2, 
Report of a Commission of Enquiry into the Disturbances in the Calabar and Owerri 
Provinces, December 1929, Sessional Paper, No 28 of 1930, Lagos, 1930, to which is 
annexed the report of the first commission, Report of a Commission of Enquiry 
appointed to inquire into certain incidents at Opobo, Abak and Utu-Ekpo in December, 
1929, Sessional Paper, No 12 of 1930, Lagos, 1930). The CO did not dispute this particular 
aspect of the commission's findings. Commenting on the original decision to impose 
direct taxation in the Eastern Provinces, which had been made in 1926 against the advice 
of the secretary for native affairs and several residents and district officers, Alexander 
Fiddian, head of the West African Dept who responded to the commission's report, 
minuted: 'I do not see that the local Government of that day have much excuse. If there 
was ever a country that required close, detailed investigation before a measure, first of 
direction taxation, and then of native administration, was set up, it is just this part of 
Nigeria' (CO 5831176/1003/1930, minute by Fiddian, 1 Jan 1931).] 
I have the honour to inform you that I have given my careful attention to the Report 
of the Commission of Inquiry into the disturbances at Aba and other places in 
November and December, 1929, which reached me in September, 1930. I have also 
had the advantage of receiving, in addition to printed volumes of the evidence given 
before the Commission, the views of yourself and your leading officials, of Sir 
Graeme Thomson and the Inspector-General of the Royal West African Frontier 
Force, and the time has come when it is necessary to formulate my views as to the 
conclusions to be drawn from the Report and the various comments which I have 
received. 
2. In the first place, I should wish to congratulate the Chairman of the 
Commission, and his fellow-members, on the extreme care and thoroughness with 
which they have conducted what must have been a most troublesome and exhausting 
investigation. The results are set forth clearly and completely, and if I venture to 
express my dissent in some particulars, it must not be supposed that I am of opinion 
that it is due to any failure in care or reflection on the part of the Commission. 
Moreover, in my judgment, the Government of Nigeria and its officers are to be 
congratulated on the admirable way in which the technical work of reporting and 
reproducing the evidence, the printing, etc., has been performed, which has been of 
material assistance to me in studying the documents. I would ask that my cordial 
thanks may be conveyed to those responsible, from the Chief Justice downwards. 
3. Having said this, I may, perhaps, observe that, whilst the procedure which was 
followed in investigating these disturbances may have been inevitable under the laws 
of the Colony, none the less it is unfortunate that it should have entailed the 
appointment of two Commissions which appear, at any rate to some extent, to have 
covered the same ground and to have examined the same witnesses. So far as the 
personal responsibility of those officers and others directly concerned with the events 
of November and December, 1929, is involved, this second investigation conveys an 
unfortunate, but inevitable, appearance of, so to speak, "trying" them a second time. 
Indeed, I gather that the effect produced on the native mind may have been more 
suggestive of criminal proceedings than I feel sure was intended either by the 
Governor or the Commissioners. 
4. It will be convenient if I deal first of all with the incidents themselves, and then 
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proceed to the wider and deeper questions of their ultimate causes. The Commission 
give a history of the disturbances, and their account is not seriously challenged, but 
their criticisms of the actions and attitudes of individual officers and others are 
disputed; and it may be that the Commission have imported into their review of the 
heated and confused events of those three weeks or so something of the atmosphere 
of peace and calm in which their own deliberations were conducted. The situations 
with which the various officers were confronted were without precedent, so far as I 
can judge, I might almost say in the history of the British Empire. Disturbances in 
which women have taken the foremost, or the only, part are not unknown here and 
elsewhere in the Empire, but administrative, police, and military officers in Nigeria 
could hardly anticipate demonstrations by hundreds, or even thousands, of native 
women-sometimes accompanied by men, sometimes apparently entirely by 
themselves-developing, in some cases at any rate, into definite attacks on the 
property of Government or of private individuals; and in some cases threatening life. 
In these circumstances, the task of deciding on the steps to be taken to avert actual 
violence, or, later on, that such violence must be restrained by force, was not an easy 
or an enviable one. 
Having regard to all the circumstances, I am definitely unwilling to investigate 
further the actual measure of praise or blame which should attach to the officers who 
took the decision to send for troops, or to open fire; or whether, because in one 
instance crowds were dispersed without resort to firearms, other crowds could have 
been so dispersed on other occasions and in different circumstances; and still less am 
I prepared to say that on any given occasion firing was unnecessary. 
5. I come then to the wider aspect of the question-the cause of the disturbances 
and the responsibility attaching to Government and its officers for the administrative 
decisions which preceded the outbreaks. The conclusion at which I have arrived may 
be put shortly. It appears to me that it was probably injudicious and premature to 
introduce into these Provinces a system of direct taxation without first completing a 
more intensive survey of their social organization. 
6. As the Commission recalls, such a study was indicated as necessary by both Mr. 
Grier and Mr. Tomlinson;3 and I confess that it causes me some surprise that the 
Colonial Government, who, being on the spot, must be presumed to have been 
acquainted with the general condition of these Provinces, should not have devoted 
more attention than would seem to have been the case to the problems presented by 
the social organization, the variety of languages, and the economic circumstances of 
the people. It appears to me as if the somewhat more simple problems presented by 
the Northern and South-Western Provinces had received a disproportionate share of 
the attention of Government. It is clear from the Report of the Commission, as well 
as from the evidence, that comparatively little is known, even now, of large portions 
of the South-Eastern Provinces. The obstacle of the languages would appear to have 
been accepted, at any rate until recently, as insuperable, and the problem of 
continuity of administration as insoluble. I cannot refrain from a feeling that 
3 S M Crier, secretary for native affairs, Nigeria, 1921-1929; G J F Tomlinson, assistant secretary for 
native affairs, Nigeria, 1921- 1925. Tomlinson was appointed as an assistant under-secretary of state at the 
CO in 1930. For his minute (7 Jan 1931), commenting on the reports which he had written with Crier in 
1922- 1923 on the need for an investigation into the social organisation of the inhabitants of the Eastern 
Provinces, see CO 583/176/1003/1930. 
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inadequate attention was paid to the views of the officers in immediate contact with 
the districts concerned, when the introduction of the measure of direct taxation was 
under consideration. 
7. I am aware that it is easy to be wise after the event, and I realize that the 
approval of the Secretary of State was sought and obtained for this measure; but I am 
not prepared to accept the position that this is a conclusive answer to any criticism of 
the advice tendered to my predecessor. The Secretary of State for the Colonies rightly 
and, indeed, inevitably attaches the greatest importance to the views of a Governor 
and his advisers; and if they recommend, as they did on this occasion, that the 
introduction of a certain measure (not in itself objectionable) is necessary, and that 
there is no serious difficulty in the way, it would be impracticable for the Secretary of 
State to express, or at any rate to enforce, a contrary opinion. 
8. Even now, it is not clear-and what I have said must be read subject to this 
qualification-that it was the introduction of direct taxation in itself which was 
primarily and mainly responsible for these outbreaks. It is evident, indeed, that the 
actual proximate cause of the trouble in the various localities was a combination of 
various grievances, which may have predominated in different degrees in different 
places. In the circumstances of the districts concerned, it would probably have been 
better, on the first introduction of direct taxation, to have started off with lower rates 
of tax. It was also, no doubt, the case that the people in various places would have 
been more reconciled to this taxation ifthey could have seen some immediate results 
in the way of local services or local improvements. It is further to be remembered 
that neither the Government nor anyone else could have foreseen the fall in the price 
of local produce, which, naturally, would increase the irksomeness of any tax in a 
population living mainly by the sale of such produce. The part also which was played 
in the disturbances by the rumour as to the taxation of women, in addition to that of 
men, though very likely it has been considerably exaggerated, none the less cannot 
be left out of account. How far discontent with the Native Courts, and accusations of 
corruption and bribery against the Warrant Chiefs, may have been definite factors, is 
more obscure. But the one thing which is plain is that direct taxation was introduced 
among a population of whom comparatively little was known, in contrast with the 
Northern and South-Western Provinces; and that the subsequent unhappy events 
depended on this first step. It appears to me useless to pursue this subject further. It 
is more important to consider what should be done in the future. I notice, with 
satisfaction, that you concur in, and have indeed adopted, the greater part of the 
Commission's recommendations, but upon some points there are differences of 
opinion between you and the Commission, and it is to these points I wish to refer. 
9. I agree with you in deprecating the proposal to trouble the Provinces with the 
operation of yet a further Commission, whose duty it would be to enquire into and 
report upon the Native Courts system. There would be great practical difficulties in 
choosing the personnel of such a Commission, and following, as it would, on these 
two previous Commissions, it would prolong a state of agitation and uncertainty 
which it is to be hoped may come to a natural end at an early date. Moreover, the 
Native Courts are, after all, only a part of a much larger problem. Their constitution, 
composition, and functions can only properly be determined after an exhaustive 
enquiry into the tribal and social organization of the people. Indeed, I am not a little 
impressed by the statements in paragraphs 51 and 180 of the memorandum of 16th 
January, 1930, by the Secretary, Southern Provinces, to the effect that it was in those 
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areas in which investigation and consequent reconstruction had been carried 
furthest that the least disaffection was encountered. For all these reasons the main 
task of the future is to proceed with such immediate and ultimate measures as will 
enable the Native Courts to be fitted more effectively into the framework of native 
society. 
10. The need for further enquiry into the social organization of the inhabitants of 
the South-Eastern Provinces naturally suggests the question to what extent the 
services of investigators trained in anthropological science have been and may still be 
profitably employed. It will be remembered that when Sir Frederick (now Lord) 
Lugard recommended the termination of the appointment of Mr. Northcote Thomas, 
the anthropologist who was at work in Southern Nigeria from 1909 to 1913, he 
expressed the view that researches into native law and custom were best conducted 
by Political Officers, and stated that in Northern Nigeria there was no lack of officers 
who were deeply interested and quite capable of reproducing their work in book 
form. No doubt research of this kind was seriously interrupted by the war; but the 
1921 Census Reports compiled by Messrs. Meek and Talbot gave evidence of further, 
if somewhat diffused, activity. There then followed the appointment of two adminis-
trative officers, both possessing anthropological qualifications, for special work of 
this character in the Northern and Southern Provinces respectively. I am, however, 
without evidence as to the results that have accrued from the investigations 
undertaken in the South-Eastern Provinces. It may be supposed that attention was 
directed to those problems connected with social organization which had an 
immediate bearing on the work of administration. I should therefore be glad to have 
further information as to the value of the research actually accomplished and as to 
the manner in which its further prosecution is proposed.4 
11. I propose to take steps to improve and increase the amount of instruction in 
anthropology imparted to newly-appointed administrative officers. But it is, in my 
judgment, hopeless to expect officers who are busily engaged in the work of 
administration to carry out anthropological research of great value. 
12. It appears to me that some compromise is possible between the views of the 
Commission and the views of the Lieutenant-Governor in regard to the institution of 
the right of appeal in civil cases from a Native Court to a suitable Tribunal. I 
understand that some progress has been made between the executive and the 
judiciary in the consideration of the question of the provision of an appeal. 
13. I feel compelled, however, to express my view that a system of Native 
4 On the issue of employing anthropologists, opinion in the CO was sharply divided. J E W Flood agreed 
with Lugard that political officers were in a better position to conduct inquiries into social organisation. 
He described Northcote Thomas, whose appointment Lugard had terminated, as 'a recognised maniac in 
many ways. He wore sandals, even in this country, lived on vegetables and was generally a rum person. I 
can quite understand that the people in Nigeria did not want to have an object like that going about and 
poking into the private affairs of the native communities, partly because he was calculated to bring a 
certain amount of discredit upon the white man's prestige, partly because from the practical point of view 
they know a good deal about native habits and organisation.' Fiddian, by contrast, declared himself 
'unrepentant' in his support of anthropological inquiry: 'You might as well appoint a medical man to be a 
District Officer, and expect him to do both jobs. When they had the time they had not got the training: and 
if they have the training and aptitude now, they haven't the time .... It is no use arguing; anthropology is 
a science and must be treated as such. The trained observer will find out what the political officer knows, 
and check it by what he knows' (CO 583/176/1003/1930, minutes by Flood, 19 Dec 1930, and Fiddian, 1 
Jan 1931). 
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Tribunals, whatever their value for judicial purposes, cannot afford a satisfactory 
means either of administering backward regions or of making contact with local 
thought and conditions. It appears to me essential that early consideration should be 
given to the establishment of local Native Councils, not necessarily formed by direct 
popular election, but constituted, in part at least, on as democratic a basis as may be 
found possible. I shall invite Sir Donald Cameron to give this matter his attention 
when he assumes the Government. 
14. I do not consider that the result of the enquiry has been to establish the 
desirability of organizing the Royal West African Frontier Force, or rather the 
Nigeria Regiment, in a different way from the present, or assigning to it a different 
role. It appears to me that the function of the Frontier Force must remain as at 
present, definitely that of soldiers, not of armed police. The views of the Inspector-
General, though exception has been taken to the terms in which they are expressed, 
are substantially those which would be upheld by any authority on the employment 
of the military in aid of the civil power.5 It is obviously a course which should only be 
resorted to in the last instance. The Police Force, strengthened if necessary by the 
addition of special constables, or the calling up of police reservists, should be capable 
of dealing with any ordinary disturbances, but if the soldiers are to be called upon, it 
must be to act as soldiers, and to enforce the maintenance of law and order by the 
threat and, if necessary, the use of lethal weapons. 
15. In conclusion, I think it necessary to refer to an aspect of this matter which, 
though of general application, is perhaps of special importance in this connection. 
Stress is laid in the evidence before the Commission, and by the Commission 
themselves, on the increasing burden of work falling on the District Officers, and the -
extent to which, in consequence, they are losing touch, or failing to get into touch, 
with their people; a result to which the vast improvement in the means of 
locomotion which the motor-car and motor-bicycle have brought with them must, of 
course, contribute. It is not necessary for me in writing to you to emphasize the 
supreme importance of the direct personal touch between the District Officer and his 
people. I am aware of the difficulties-I have already alluded to them, in fact-
caused by the language problem, which is specially difficult in the case of the 
South-Eastern Provinces, as well as the various factors which tend to make the 
maintenance of continuity almost impracticable; but I think I have already indicated 
sufficiently that, in my opinion, the South-Eastern Provinces call for a degree of 
attention which has perhaps not been adequately realized in the past, and which I 
trust will be carefully kept in view in the future . 
5 The second commission challenged the views of the inspector-general that it had been necessary to open 
fire on the demonstrators in order to produce a deterrent effect. Notwithstanding the reservations 
expressed by Shiels, the permanent officials within the CO believed that the firing was justified. Sir C 
Bottomly, an assistant under-secretary of state, commented: 'It is unfortunate that the Police . .. were not 
adequate in numbers, but that is no reason for using soldiers as anything but soldiers. The point is of 
importance in the future . The lesson has been taught that soldiers will shoot to kill, even where women 
are concerned. If in any future disturbances they do not do so the value of the lesson will be lost. Of 
course, if on the other hand they are used without full cause there will be permanent resentment among 
the tribes.' Flood was more forthright: 'In connection with the disturbances generally, I think a bit too 
much fuss has been raised by the fact that the victims were of the gentler sex. · ... if a howling mob of 
excited female savages who would be quite ready to tear a man in pieces with their hands is about the 
place, the only thing to do is to take strong action. It is quite easy for us to criticise them here, but I 
wonder what anyone in this Office would do in a similar situation' (CO 583/176/1003/1930, minutes by 
Bottomley, 5 Jan 1931, and Flood, 19 Dec 1930). 
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50 CO 583/177/1058/1931, no 11 10 Dec 1931 
[Indirect rule in Nigeria]: despatch from Sir D Cameron to Sir P 
Cunliffe-Lister on the powers and jurisdiction of the native authorities 
in the Northern Provinces 
[The correspondence mentioned in the first para of this despatch concerned amendments 
to the native authorities and native courts ordinances which were first proposed in 1928. 
H R Palmer, the lt-gov of the Northern Provinces, requested that the ordinances be 
amended to the effect that persons entering or living in a native authority area should 
become subject to its jurisdiction. Sir F Baddeley, chief secretary to the government of 
Nigeria, supported Palmer's request on the grounds (a) that it was necessary to preserve 
the executive authority of native authorities against an ever increasing influx of 
foreigners not normally subject to their jurisdiction, and (b) that it conformed with the 
declared policy of administering the country through its native rulers and native 
institutions. As the amendments were not as yet to be applied to the 'pagan' areas or the 
Southern Provinces, the CO accepted them. The Lagos Chamber of Commerce feared that 
the amendments would give native authorities jurisdiction over Europeans but were 
assured that all persons other than those of Asiatic or African descent would be exempt. 
The Joint West African Committee, a London-based body representing commercial 
interests in West Africa, was still not entirely satisfied and questioned why an African 
from another country who was not a Muslim should be made subject to Islamic law. The 
issue was not resolved until Cameron became governor. It involved a lengthy correspond-
ence between the CO, the governor and C W Alexander, Palmer's successor as lt-gov of the 
Northern Provinces (1930-1932). Alexander engaged in a staunch defence of the 
arguments originally used to justify the amendments. Although they resented Cameron's 
disparaging remarks about the manner in which the matter had been handled, CO 
officials eventually gave way to the views of the new governor. They did so with a certain 
reluctance, acknowledging Cameron's expertise on such matters on the one hand but 
nurturing misgivings on the other. G Hazlerigg, a principal, minuted (23 Aug 1932): 
'Visualising the future, it is really a question whether eventually this vast country is to be 
governed on the lines of Western political institutions (the ballot box, Legislative Council, 
etc.) or whether we are to continue the administration of those parts of Nigeria which are 
not yet ready for such institutions through the existing system of indirect rule. No doubt 
with railway, road, etc. development, Western ideas may eventually govern the political 
evolution of Nigeria as a whole. The only danger to my mind is in these reforms being 
rushed through before large portions of Nigeria are ready for them'. G J F Tomlinson, an 
assistant under-secretary of state, put the issue more succinctly when he minuted (1 Sept 
1932): '[I]s the emphasis to be laid upon the ultimate potentialities of the Native 
Administrations or upon their present limitations?' (CO 5831184/1526/1932.] 
I have the honour to refer to the despatches noted in margin which deal with the 
important question of the powers and jurisdiction of the Native Authorities in the 
Northern Provinces. I use the term 'Native Authorities' here because the Native 
Courts are merely part of the machinery of those administrations. 
2. I have studied the question during the last five months and a half. I have 
discussed it at great length on two occasions with the Lieutenant-Governor and the 
Secretary, Northern Provinces, and it was again discussed with the Lieutenant-
Governor and his Residents at Kaduna on the 15th of November. I have reached the 
conclusion that for the reasons developed in this despatch it is unwise to continue to 
regard the question as a narrow sectional one affecting the more advanced Native 
Authorities only: it is advisable, I submit, that it should be considered from the point 
of view of Nigeria as a whole. 
3. Up to the present, so far as I am aware, no one in authority has seriously 
directed his mind to a study of the absorbing problem of the political evolut ion of 
Nigeria. Lord Lugard, with whom I have discussed the matter on more than one 
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occasion since my appointment to Nigeria, states quite frankly that the problem was 
not one to which he had to devote his attention when he was in Nigeria, and that he 
has not since made any serious study of it. His successor in the Administration of 
Nigeria, Sir Hugh Clifford, was not a student of the principles of Native Administra-
tion and in Malaya had been accustomed to the direct administration of natives (I 
write this advisedly), a sphere in which he achieved eminent success and a 
distinguished reputation. My immediate predecessor was not absorbed in the study of 
the principles of Native Administration. 
4. In the British dependencies on the East Coast of Africa Colonial Governments 
have (for reasons into which I need not enter here) been forced to devote a growing 
amount of attention to the problem of the political evolution of the native and the 
present policy in that respect is the declared policy of His Majesty's Government 
based on the results of the enquiries of a Commission which visited those countries 
from England nearly five years ago. The fact that the proposals placed before Lord 
Passfield in Mr. (now Sir) F. Baddeley's despatch of the 21st of December, 1928, 
affect in an important measure the whole future of Nigeria, does not seem to have 
been appreciated at the time and I found that neither the Lieutenant-Governor, Mr. 
Alexander, nor the Secretary, Northern Provinces, Mr. Lethem, had at all considered 
their probable effect from that point of view. 
5. I may say at this point that I found a tendency in the Northern Provinces to 
regard those Provinces as a separate political unit; a Province is a province of the 
Northern Provinces and not a Province of Nigeria; a Native Authority is a Native 
Authority of the Northern Provinces and not of Nigeria. This is an attitude that I am 
discountenancing and I believe that it can be corrected. 
6. It is impossible for me to attempt to make any comprehensive forecast of the 
politic~! evolution of the country; that is a matter for patience and study over a 
number of years, and not for prophecy. But I think that it is permissible to say, even 
at this stage, that for natural reasons that part of the country now known as the 
Northern Provinces is not likely to become a separate self-contained political and 
economic unit, and that any aspirations to the contrary are not likely to be fulfilled. 
For all time we need consider now, the Northern Provinces must be dependent on 
the Coast for their railways and their ports (which, it is pertinent to add, were 
constructed on the security of the revenues of the whole of Nigeria); indeed, if we so 
frame our policy as to foster the development of the Northern Provinces as a separate 
political unit we should merely be seeking to revive a state of affairs that the 
amalgamation of Southern and Northern Nigeria in 1914 was specifically designed to 
terminate. 
7. No one can foretell now whether and how the system of western political 
institutions, such as the ballot box and the Legislative Council, will be developed in 
Nigeria, or whether the tendency will be towards the formation, step by step, of a 
Native Council for the whole Protectorate or the greater part of it, but whichever 
may happen it is not improbable that the Yon.iba States would group with the Native 
Administrations of the north and seek with them to remain outside of any form of 
parliamentary government. The Colony would adhere to that form of government 
and with the example of Calabar (which now returns a member to the Legislative 
Council) it might be difficult to resist the demands of other parts of the coastal 
regions to develop politically on the same lines. 
8. But whatever the course those developments may take it would not be wise, I 
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submit, to adopt any measures, however limited in their consequences they may in 
themselves now appear on the surface, which might have a disruptive influence and 
thus tend to break the country up into separate and divergent territorial units. Above 
all, it is desirable that harmonious relations should be fostered between the coast 
regions and the interior; that no seed should be sown form which disunion and 
consequent political friction may be reaped by our successors. 
9. At present, there is one government only in Nigeria; not several governments. 
It is a fundamental principle of native administration, laid down many years ago by 
Lord Lugard in his Political Memorandum on Native Administration, both as 
Governor of Northern Nigeria and as Governor-General of Nigeria, that the Native 
Administrations are part of the machinery of Government. He wrote as follows in his 
Political Memorandum of August, 1917:-
'The prestige and influence of the Chiefs can best be upheld by letting the 
peasantry see that the Government itself treats them as an integral part of the 
machinery of the administration. That there are not two sets of rulers- British 
and Native-working either separately or in co-ordination, but a single Govern-
ment in which the Native Chiefs have well defined duties and an acknowledged 
status equally with the British officials'. 
Within this one government, parts of the country are administered through 
British officers, with a British system of justice which affords them the means of 
enforcing their orders, which are the orders of Government; and other parts of the 
country are administered through Native Chiefs so far as natives are concerned, with 
a native system of justice which affords them the means of enforcing their orders, 
which are, again, the orders of Government. Those Chiefs are advised and controlled 
by the British Administrative Staff. The first sphere embraces the greater part of 
Nigeria (although in some cases Native Courts of a minor degree exist as well as 
British Courts), and the second sphere is intended to embrace only those areas 
which, like Kano, are administered through fully organised Native Administrations. 
In the second sphere, however, the British system of administration is concurrent 
with the native system inasmuch as the latter, as I have written above, affects the 
natives of the particular unit only; a person subject to the British system of 
administration takes that system with him wherever he may be in Nigeria. 
10. Developing the argument a little further, the British system of administration 
is naturally a freer and, in this respect generally, a superior system to the native 
system of administration which is primarily designed for less educated and less 
advanced communities. 
11. The conception that the area administered by the Emir of Kano, for example, 
is a separate State apart from the rest of Nigeria is therefore entirely erroneous. As is 
the conception that those persons who enter that area and retain the protection of 
their own Courts (in the superior administrative system to which I have just alluded) 
are thereby enjoying extra-territorial privileges to which they are not by right 
entitled, privileges which may be withdrawn from them at any moment. The fallacy 
of these conceptions should be obvious as the Emir of Kano has, of course, no 
Sovereign rights; he is merely the delegate and instrument of the Government, as 
stated in clear and definite terms in his letter of appointment, in the same way that 
an Administrative Officer is a delegate and instrument of the Government. 
12. If the arguments which I have employed in the foregoing paragraphs are well 
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founded, as I believe that they are, the decision to deprive a person, merely because 
he enters a Native administered area like Kano, of the protection which he now 
enjoys throughout Nigeria under freer institutions is, I submit, a very grave one not 
lightly to be undertaken. 
13. Under the proposals approved by Lord Passfield everyone within the Kano 
Emirate, outside the Township (Supreme Court) area, would have been made subject 
to the jurisdiction of the Native Authority; even the Resident and other British 
Officers who live outside the Township area. This was mere pretence, of course; no 
one had any intention of placing Europeans under the jurisdiction of the Native 
Authority, except to a very limited extent to which I shall allude later. It was mere 
pretence intended to stifle the objections of the educated Coast natives who would 
actually (and not nominally as in the case of the Europeans) have been placed for all 
purposes under the jurisdiction of the Native Authority. Pretence has been a feature 
of the administration in Nigeria during the last few years-as I have already pointed 
out in previous despatches- and is a dangerous thing: in this case a dishonourable 
thing. 
14. It is almost ridiculous to add that had the Ordinance been amended in the 
manner approved by Lord Passfield every European and educated native from the 
Coast would legally have become subject to the jurisdiction of any Native Authority 
in the Northern Provinces whose area he might enter, even of the pagan Native 
Authorities. Some of the Native Authorities are very primitive, existing in little more 
than name. 
15. I have examined this matter closely with the Lieutenant-Governor, the 
Secretary, Northern Provinces and the Residents and am now in a position to say that 
all that is in practice actually required in this connexion is to bestow power on a 
Native Authority (such as Kano) to make certain municipal rules and regulations 
which would be binding on all persons within the area. This is quite proper and can 
be effected by a much simpler and less objectionable procedure. I have provided in 
the new Bill (which will be submitted to you in due course) that a Native Authority 
shall, with the approval of the Governor, have power to make certain rules binding 
on all persons within the area, e.g. rules with regard to the supply of electric light 
and water, although not everyone will be punished in the Native Courts for a breach 
of the rules. Europeans and others who may not be made subject to the jurisdiction 
of the Native Courts will be pursued in their own Courts (for the present the 
Provincial Courts). 
16. In the two preceding paragraphs I have dealt with the effect of the proposals 
so far as concerns the Native Authority Ordinance only. I turn now to the Native 
Courts Ordinance. If effect had been given to the proposals approved by Lord 
Passfield everyone in the Northern Provinces would by law have passed within the 
jurisdiction of the Native Courts, although power was taken for the Governor to 
declare by order that 'any person or class of persons shall not be subject to the 
jurisdiction of native tribunals or of any partiCular native tribunal or shall be subject 
to such jurisdiction in certain cases or classes of cases only'. The Governor would 
have had a full discretion: he might exercise it or he might not. Apart from grave 
objections in principle to which I shall refer, I have little hesitation in stating that I 
have no profound faith that such a discretion would always be wisely exercised. It is 
but a few years since a European arraigned in a neighbouring Protectorate on a 
capital charge applied for a transfer of the case to the adjacent Colony in order that 
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he might be tried by a Jury. The application was refused although the Governor had 
full discretion to grant it. The incident was recounted to me by the then Colonial 
Secretary of the Colony (himself now a Colonial Governor) who warmly supported 
the refusal. 
17. But, I submit with all the earnestness I can command, that (as I have written 
in my twelfth paragraph above), there is the strongest objection in principle to 
depriving a person, merely because he enters a Native administered area like Kano, of 
the protection which he now enjoys throughout Nigeria under freer institutions. He 
would remain within the Government of Nigeria but because he entered a Native 
administered area he would be deprived of the civil status to which he is now 
entitled. A native of the Colony, a British subject, would be brought within the 
jurisdiction of the Native Authority of Kano if he entered that Emirate and he would 
be subject to the jurisdiction of its Moslem Courts even on a capital charge. He would 
have no right of appeal from those Courts and no right to seek the protection of his 
own Courts. That is the position that would have been created if effect had been given 
to the proposals approved by Lord Passfield. 
18. I submit that if the rights and liberties of any person in Nigeria, particularly 
those of British subjects in the Colony of Lagos, are to be thus gravely impaired in 
issues that are to them vital, this should be done by a specific act of the Legislature 
and not by the Governor by a stroke of the pen. And what, I ask, is the object of 
raising this storm of grave resentment and ill-feeling when all that we desire to effect 
in practice can be achieved in a manner which is less objectionable? In the new Bill 
(a revised edition of the Native Courts Ordinance) which I shall submit to you in due 
course, only those persons who are ordinarily subject to the jurisdiction of Native 
Courts are brought within the scope of the Ordinance, although power is taken for 
the Governor to declare by Order, subject to the approval of the Legislative Council 
(signified by resolution) where persons belonging to the Colony and the Southern 
Provinces are concerned, that certain other persons or classes or persons may also be 
brought within the jurisdiction of a Native Court. This is necessary in order to bring 
within the jurisdiction of the Native Courts, in a place like Kano, Arabs and Syrians 
and certain other persons who deliberately elect to take up their life in that Emirate 
as part of the ordinary community. 
19. I am aware that the proposal that the extension of the jurisdiction of the Native 
Courts in the Northern Provinces should be subject to the consent of the Legislative 
Council where the rights and liberties of natives of the Colony and Southern 
Provinces are concerned raises a constitutional issue which will have to be examined. 
20. It is true that in the recommendation submitted to Lord Passfield it was 
proposed that when the Native Courts Ordinance was amended in the manner 
projected an order should at once be issued exempting from the jurisdiction of Native 
Courts 'persons of other than African or Asiatic descent'. It does not seem to have 
been realised that if a European gentleman from the Colony was to be exempted 
whereas an African gentleman of education such, for instance, as Sir Kitoyi Ajasa, a 
nominated member of the Legislative Council, was not to be exempted the former 
would be exempted merely by reason of his colour. A colour bar of this kind created 
deliberately under a British Administration would, I submit, be disastrous and I 
cannot believe that once the true position is realised His Majesty's Government will 
desire for a moment that I should proceed with a measure which is so fatally 
objectionable. 
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21. As my predecessor was advised when the Bills were before the Legislative 
Council previously and he withdrew the objectionable clauses, the whole of the 
unofficial section would be united in their opposition, and the measure is not one 
which could be passed by using the official majority. Why, I ask again, exacerbate a 
large number of influential people for no real and serious reason, especially when I 
shall be seeking their support and assistance in getting other important measures 
through the Council? 
22. There were two fundamental errors in the despatch of the 21st of December, 
1928, submitting the original proposals to the Secretary of State. First, it was stated, 
using a well known phrase in a loose way, that it was 'the declared policy of 
Government to administer the country through its native rulers and native 
institutions'. It is the policy of the Government to administer the tribes in this 
manner: it is quite obvious that the whole of Nigeria cannot be administered through 
Native rulers and native institutions. 
23. Secondly, it was suggested that persons in Kano and such places who were 
not subject to the jurisdiction of the Native Courts were outside the law altogether 
and were in consequence doing exactly what they liked. 'The result', I read, 'of this 
position is that much of the laws of Nigeria is a dead letter as far as these classes of 
persons are concerned, over the large areas which are directly under the control of 
those administrations'. This is, of course, pure fiction. The Provincial Courts 
jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the Native Courts and the Resident of Kano 
assures me that these people are not doing exactly as they please: if they commit a 
breach of the law they are actually being punished in the Provincial Court. 
24. No one will, I think, be desirous of accusing me of being lukewarm in 
preaching the doctrine of supporting native administrations and native institutions 
but grave mischief may be done if a Government proceeds too rapidly in this respect 
without exploring closely all the implications of a particular proposition, especially 
where it is of such fundamental importance. Proposals such as those submitted by 
Sir. F. Baddeley could not possibly be put forward in East Africa; even the Baganda 
Government does not aspire to such powers. We must not in Nigeria, I submit, do to 
our own people, because they are more or less at our mercy, what we would not dare 
to do to the Indian in East Africa because he has the Indian Government behind him. 
25. At the meeting at Kaduna on the 15th of November with the Lieutenant-
Governor and his Residents he again urged strongly that the two Bills (Native 
Authorities and Native Courts) which had been drafted by my instructions in accord 
with the views expressed in this despatch, should be redrafted so as to give effect to 
the principles originally approved by Lord Passfield. I explained the reasons which 
actuated me and replied that after anxious consideration of the views in the same 
sense that he had already submitted to me, I saw no prospect of being able to adopt 
his point of view. I instructed him to prepare a compendious memorandum on the 
subject which I might submit for your consideration, and thereafter at Kaduna I 
completed the preparation of this despatch to the end of the preceding paragraph. 
26. On the 21st of November, on the eve of my departure to Sokoto from Kaduna, 
with the Lieutenant-Governor, Mr. Alexander handed me a short note expressing the 
views of the Residents on the subject of the jurisdiction of the Native Authorities and 
Native Courts 'which', he wrote, 'was prepared after your talk with the Residents. In 
short, we feel that we should not press the extreme principle of general application of 
the Native Authorities and Native Courts Ordinances'. 
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27. This despatch is therefore no longer required for the primary purpose for 
which it was designed but as the advice previously tendered on the subject by the 
Nigerian Government is so misleading and inaccurate and the issues are so 
important it seems to me to be desirable that further advice by this Administration 
should be tendered for your consideration. 
51 CO 54/916/10, no 12 18 Jan 1933 
[Constitutional reform in Ceylon]: notes by Governor Sir G Thomson 
on the arguments against the immediate grant of self-government 
[Extract] 
[The Donoughmore constitution (see 47) was implemented in Ceylon after elections held 
in 1931. By the following year the Ceylon National Congress, the leadership of which held 
a majority of seats on the Board of Ministers, was articulating demands for constitutional 
revision. The establishment of a Cabinet system of government on the Westminster 
model in place of the executive committee system, the abolition of the ex-officio 
appointments and a substantial reduction of the governor's reserve powers were the 
principal reform demands. The minorities were opposed to change. Having lost the 
protection of communal and weighted representation which they enjoyed before 
Donoughmore, they viewed the executive committee system (elections to which had 
secured for them two representatives as ministers) as an essential mainstay of their 
political position. The CO and the colonial government recognised that there were defects 
in the Donoughmore constitution. H R Cowell, assistant secretary and now head of the 
CO Eastern Dept, minuted after an interview in London with D S Senanayaka (minister of 
agriculture and lands): '[H)e suggested that the Head of the Ministry should be selected 
by vote of the State Council and should nominate his fellow Ministers for the approval of 
the Governor. The present method of selection of Ministers, as we know, has had some 
very odd results and it can be said (though of course he was too discreet to admit this) 
that in two cases only have the best men been chosen as Ministers. He contended that his 
proposal would induce a measure of solidarity in the Board of Ministers which is at 
present lacking. It is interesting to note that the [Donoughmore) Commission were at 
pains to prevent the growth of corporate responsibility amongst Ministers and that this 
has proved to be one of the vital mistakes of their scheme' (CO 54/916/10, minute by 
Cowell, 20 May 1933). But neither the CO nor the colonial government were prepared to 
countenance any further measure of constitutional reform. The governor, Sir G Thomson 
(1931-1933) wrote these notes for Sir S Wilson who spent two weeks in Ceylon at the 
beginning of 1933 on his return journey after a visit to the Far East. Wilson's own notes, 
'Ceylon: working of constitution', are in CO 54/916110, no 12, 2 Mar 1933.] 
1. The demand of self-government 
Apart from the decisions of the State Council on Mr. E.W. Perera's reform motions, 
representations have been made by the more prominent Political Associations as well 
as by individual members of the State Council for the immediate grant of 
self-government. 
In my Confidential despatch to the Secretary of State dated 22nd September, 
reporting the result of the debate on Mr. Perera's motions, I enclosed a note of an 
interview with Mr. Wijeratne, a Member of the State Council. At that interview I took 
up the attitude that it was premature to consider any major amendments to the 
Constitution in the direction of a further advance towards self-government. The 
Secretary of State in his Confidential despatch dated 23rd November approved of that 
attitude. 
I am definitely opposed to the immediate grant of self-Government, my reasons 
among others being:-
[52] POLITICAL CHANGE AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 281 
(a) The present Constitution took some 3 years to devise and put into operation 
(November 1927 to July 1931) and it has been in operation for a period of 18 
months only. That period has been an abnormal one of unprecedented economic 
depession and financial stringency and the Constitution cannot be said to have had 
a fair trial. Nothing like sufficient experience has been gained to justify a more 
liberal measure of self-Government, particularly as the funds at the disposal of the 
State Council since its inception have been so exiguous that it has been impossible 
to judge with what wisdom they would make use of such funds as are normally 
available. 
(b) Danger to the Tea Industry if left unprotected from unfair treatment at the 
hands of politicians. The Industry accounts for three-fourths of total trade of the 
Island and the capital invested in it, approximately £100,000,000, is almost 
entirely British. Ceylonese capital invested is negligible, a fact which may well 
account for lack of sympathy towards the industry and a tendency to exploit it 
unduly. Recently this attitude has been very marked. 
(c) Danger to the Port of Colombo as evidenced by opposition to the establish-
ment of a Port Trust, difficulty in obtaining votes for essential services and the 
demand for appointment of Ceylonese to technical posts for which they do not 
possess the necessary qualifications. 
(d) The State Council has still to be convinced of the value of efficiency and 
discipline in public administration. Judging from the manner in which institu-
tions entirely under Ceylonese control have been conducted and the political 
opposition to official measures to secure and maintain efficiency and to enforce 
discipline there is little doubt that the immediate grant of self-Government would 
result in rapid deterioration if not complete disorganisation in departments where 
those requirements are essential, e.g. Police and Defence Force. 
(e) The attitude of the State Council towards the Public Services amply demon-
strates the need for continued protection of the Services for some considerable 
time. 
(f) Lack of courage on the part of the State Council in dealing with financial 
problems particularly with regard to taxation. 
(g) Communal feeling is still too strong .... 
52 DO 35/398/3, no 11111/447 [July 1933] 
'An Irish fantasy': second part of a memorandum by Professor 
R Coupland1 
[Coupland visited Dublin between 26 June and 3 July 1933. He had discussions at the DO 
before his visit and submitted a memo in two parts upon his return. Part one, giving his 
impressions of the political situation in the Irish Free State, is not printed here. It ended 
with the comment: 'My last impression, therefore-again it is a painfully obvious one-is 
the need, both for Ireland's sake and our own, to try to eliminate what Cecil Rhodes used 
to call the "imperial factor". We tried to do that by the Treaty [of 1921), and succeeded for 
a time. But now the old intoxicating ideas of "British tyranny" and "a fight for freedom" 
are uppermost again in too many Irish minds. It is doubtless impossible to kill those 
ideas; but can anything be done to undermine them and weaken their force?' Coupland 
~ 
1 See 29, note 5. 
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then proceeded to the second part of his memo which he called 'An Irish fantasy', the text 
of which is reproduced in its entirety. The emphasis in the above quotation and 
throughout the text below appears in the original.) 
1. Many publicists have burnt their fingers over the Irish Question, and I don't 
imagine that my historical knowledge of nationalist movements in other parts of the 
Empire entitles me to an opinion as to present-day Irish policy without long and 
close study of the subject. But one cannot spend a week in Dublin without feeling the 
tragic futility of the Anglo-Irish quarrel, deploring the seeming approach of a final 
break, and wondering how it could be prevented or, if that is impossible, how to 
mitigate the harm it will do. And it seemed worth while to note down the tentative 
ideas I formed to serve, perhaps, as a basis of discussion with one or two friends. 
'Die-hards' would call these ideas 'defeatist' because they involve still further 
concessions on our part: but 'Die-hards' do not realise that in these days the unity of 
the Empire cannot be conserved by force for any length of time or in any desirable or 
profitable way, and that the task of realistic statesmanship is to conserve it by 
consent. Happily the 'Die-hards' are only a small minority of the British people, and 
the great majority, especially of the younger generation, would, I believe, support a 
policy of concession if it were clearly explained-and if they could be induced to take 
an interest in a question so boring to most people as the Irish Question has now 
become. However that may be, I expect my ideas are quite impracticable. Political 
factors which I cannot weigh may make them almost fantastic. 
2. Perhaps the most fantastic idea is that, despite the mainfest strength of our 
case, or because of it, we ought to give in at once on the Arbitration issue. A good 
many people feel uneasy about our attempt, however natural and justifiable it may 
be, to 'distrain' for debts owed. It looks so like a 'tariff-war', and seems out of 
harmony with the spirit (though not, of course, the letter) of the Kellogg Pact and all 
that sort of thing. I noted this criticism, tendered in no unfriendly way, in New 
England and Canada last spring. But much more important, obviously, is the use 
made of the dispute by the Republicans in Irish politics. Many Irish electors do not 
believe we have any legal case at all: they imagine that we were engaged in our old 
business of tyrannous extortion till De Valera stopped it. Such misconceptions 
among the people seem to provide at least a faint excuse for our yielding to the 
Government. On that pretext I would offer a settlement at the Hague at once.2 
This is what Cosgrave3 told me he wishes we could do. He assumes we should win 
the case, and we might then make a generous settlement on the basis of an 
immediate and final payment, so as to prevent the annual recurrence of the question 
in budget debates. He would recommend the Hague also for disputes on the 
interpretation of the Treaty. 
I know this surrender is impeded by past controversy on intra-imperial versus 
2 The Free State wanted to submit the question of the annuities to the Hague Court or another foreign 
tribunal. The British government refused, insisting that arbitration should be conducted by an imperial 
tribunal, as laid down by the Imperial Conference of 1930. 
3 Unlike de Valera, William Cosgrave accepted the 1921 Anglo-Irish treaty. In 1922 he was successively 
president of the second Dail Eireann (parliament), chairman of the provisional government and, after the 
establishment of the Free State, president of its Executive Council and minister of finance until 1923. He 
founded the pro-treaty party Cumann na nGnaedheal, the precursor of Fine Gael, which he led in 
opposition from 1935 to 1944. 
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international status. But I think the unity of the Empire, at the present phase of its 
history, is only weakened by rigidity on any point which is not demonstrably vital. 
It seems more than likely that De Valera would seek to evade a settlement by 
widening the terms of reference: but, even if he succeeded, his position would surely 
be weakened and ours strengthened. 
3. I got the impression in Dublin that the annuities dispute was not regarded as 
of very great importance. It was overshadowed by the bigger question of a Republic, 
and, as to that, opinion seemed almost unanimous that a Republic was inevitable in 
the near future. I am convinced that De Valera can bring it about if he chooses. The 
doubtful points seem to be (1) whether he really wants a Republic without the Six 
Counties, (2) whether, if he prefers a South Ireland Republic to a Free State, he 
wants it soon, (3) to what extent his decision will be affected by pressure from the 
Extreme Left. 
But, whatever its pace may be, it seems certain that the drift towards a Republic 
will continue. Dublin opinion thinks nothing can be done to stop it going on to its 
end. That may be so. But is there nothing we can do to check the force of the current 
and, if it must flow on ultimately to final schism, to lessen the harm it does? 
4. Surely I am right in assuming that we do not intend to use force to prevent De 
Valera setting up his Republic (provided, of course, that he makes no attack on the 
Six Counties). Then why not say so? Does opinion in Parliament, especially on the 
Right and in view of the Indian controversy, make it quite impossible? I believe that a 
declaration on our part, made now or as soon as possible, to the effect that, if the 
people of the I.F.S . wish to secede from the Commonwealth, they are free, as far as 
we are concerned, to do so would be a shrewd act of statesmanship. 
5. As has been said ad nauseam, the problem is psychological. No Catholic 
Irishman feels quite free. 'Cosgravites' accept the Treaty Settlement because they are 
sensible; but they think it was forced on them, and, though they would certainly 
choose to maintain it in preference to a Republic, they would no less certainly like to 
be given the choice. It is no good saying the Dominions are content without it. Irish 
national pride, which is morbidly sensitive, resents the Dominion analogy: Ireland is 
not a young 'colonial' half-baked nation, but an ancient mother-country (in which 
connexion one cannot help deploring that nothing came of O'Higgins' idea of a 
'Kingdom of Ireland'). 
The Republicans, of course, make much more of the theory of coercion. De Valera 
imagines that he is making a great concession for the sake of permanent harmony 
when he offers to accept the 'external association' of his Republic with the 
Commonwealth of Nations and to recognise the King as the head thereof: the Crown 
in that case is the concern of other nations besides Ireland. But in Ireland he rejects 
the Crown because it is 'foreign' and imposed from without and not accepted by the 
Irish of their own free will. 
The vigour of the Republican movement, which is more intense, of course, where 
it is more extreme, is derived, I am sure, from the idea of lighting for something. It is 
represented as the last round of the century-old fight with England for a Republic; 
and the appeal to the memory of all the 'martyrs' is very powerful-especially to the 
young. The dominant note of Republican propaganda is "No compromise: one last 
effort of courage and sacrifice, and the victory for which the 'patriots' died is ours". 
I think there are very few Irishmen who think that Britain would not resist the 
establishment of a Republic, though nobody may visualise what form the resistance 
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would take: and I believe a declaration of non-resistance on our part would have a 
startling effect on the whole country. The 'fight' idea would be exploded. The 
material disadvantages of secession from the C. of N. could be considered without the 
passion of a 'war-mentality'. Just conceivably, enough votes might be turned to put 
De Valera out; but, if that is too much to expect, and if despite our declaration the 
drift to a Republic were to continue to its end, I still think that our declaration would 
have made the prospects for the future better and not worse. 
6. If a Republic is established without our prior acquiescence, it will be hailed by 
its supporters as an historic triumph achieved in the teeth of the old enemy. The 
more ignorant Irish will be confirmed in their belief that the Republicans have been 
the only patriots: they may even think that the more extreme Republicans-those 
who have done most to poison the political morals of the people-have been the 
truer patriots. As one pessimistic 'Cosgravite' said to me, 'The gains of the 
Republicans will be gloated over as though the giant-killer had brought the giant to 
his knees, even as though they were the victory of Good over Evil. What could be 
more harmful than that either to the morale of our people or to the future relations 
between your people and ours?' No doubt, the fact of our making no forcible 
resistance at the time would have some effect, but very much less, surely, than a 
declaration of pacific intention before the event. 
7. The institution of a Republic in the South would obviously intensify still 
further the quarrel with the 'Six Counties'; but even this aspect of the problem would 
be bettered, I believe, not worsened in the long run by our prior acquiescence, since 
anything which tends to lessen bitterness between South Ireland and Britain will 
slowly, no doubt, but surely have a similar effect in North Ireland. Perhaps the faint 
chance of a reunion of all Ireland at some future date on the basis of an acceptance, 
say, of a 'Kingdom of Ireland' would be a little less faint. 
8. It seems plain that relations between the Republic and Britain would be better 
if Britain has previously acquiesced than otherwise. We should have done all that 
could be done to 'eliminate the Imperial factor' from Irish politics. It would be more 
difficult to keep up the anti-British cry and so to confuse and distort the natural 
working of domestic Irish politics as to enable the fanatics of Economic Nationalism 
to carry their doctrines to disastrous extremes. De Valera's sincerity may perhaps be 
questioned, but he insisted that, if only Britain would withdraw her opposition to his 
Republic (and her encouragement of the Partition!), he would wish the Republic to 
favour trade with Britain and in return for Irish produce to import, with a 
preference, such British goods as machinery which would not compete with his new 
Irish industries. 
9. But the gain to Britain would go deeper than that. If we assume (as all these 
reflections assume) that a Republic is probably coming and that we will not prevent it 
by force, let us face the fact of defeat. However strong our case and weak De Valera's, 
the institution of a Republic against our known wishes will be a blow to our 
prestige- a final proof of our inability to solve the Irish Problem. But surely the effect 
of this will be lessened if we declare beforehand that we will not oppose it and give 
our reasons. For our reasons do us credit. Why do we refuse to prevent the Republic 
by force, when we certainly possess the strength to do it? There are doubtless several 
minor reasons, but the major reason is that our ministers and the mass of our people 
are convinced that in an issue of this kind the use of force achieves no permanent 
solution and is wrong. And, if that is the truth, why should we not obtain for it the 
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credit to which it entitles us? If we take our stand on practical post-war 'idealism', on 
the principles of the new world-order of peace and international co-operation, we put 
the Irish Republicans on the moral defensive. If they proceed to their Republic in the 
face of such a declaration, the fact that they are putting nationalism before 
internationalism will be more manifest to the world. 
No use to state our case after the event or even when the crisis is upon us. We 
should be accused of making the best of a bad job. 
10. If may be objected, lastly, that such a declaration would create a bad 
precedent and still further weaken the solidarity of the C. of N. as a whole: that it 
would amount to admitting the 'right of secession': and that it would undermine our 
future position in India. 
My own view is (it may be heretical) that, so far from weakening the unity of the 
Commonwealth, some such declaration is needed for its final consolidation-the last 
implementation of 1926. The claim to the 'right of secession' is lurking in the 
background of South African politics. In Canada last April I found one or two loyal 
champions of the 1926 settlement who were worried about it. Anyone, they said, will 
fuss about a right if it is denied, though he may not have the least desire to make use 
of it. · 
I do deny the 'right'. Secession is tantamount to rebellion or revolution: it may 
involve a duty, but not a right. So I would avoid the word and concede what is 
actually wanted in other terms. I would construe 'freely associated' in the 1926 
Declaration as meaning 'free to dissociate'. This construction may not have been 
accepted at the time; but, if it were not tacitly implied, I can see little meaning in 
that other important phrase: "Every self-governing member of the Empire is now the 
master of its destiny". 
As to India, the question, of course, has been raised already and it will presumably 
become more acute when, in the course of years, the status of India approximates 
more closely to 'Dominion Status'. But, so far from dreading the effects on India of 
an admission of 'freedom to dissociate' in the Irish case, I believe it would greatly 
strengthen our position and make it more likely that the Indian leaders will 
ultimately acquiesce in India remaining within the empire. 
11. In the light of the foregoing reflections, I imagine the declaration taking the 
following line:- 4 
(1) Our hopes of the Treaty Settlement. Our disappointment at the revival of 
friction and antagonism. Our concern at the form this takes in sections of press 
and platform. A complete misconception of the British attitude to Ireland 
apparently in the minds of a substantial part of the Irish people. 
(2) On the Annuities Dispute, our attitude based on our interpretation of legal 
claims. Our tariff only an attempt to obtain what we think justly owed. But Irish 
opinion seems often to be unaware of the nature of our claims and to imagine that 
we are making tyrannical exactions without even a pretence of right. We hiwe 
offered ' imperial' arbitration and still think this right. But in order to remove 
ignorance and misconception, injurious to our good relations, we are now willing 
to refer the dispute to the Hague. 
(3) As to the Oath, similarly, we stand on our interpretation of the legal 
4 From this point in his memo, Coupland adopted abbreviated note form. 
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obligations of the Treaty. This also might go to the Hague, if desired. 
(4) Another grave misconception as regards our attitude to Northern Ireland. It is 
suggested that we were responsible for 'partition' and desire it to be permanent. 
Quite untrue. Any impartial student of the facts knows that 'Partition' in 1921 was 
unavoidable. A heritage of the past for which all parties concerned, ourselves 
included, must share the blame. We have fulfilled the engagements then entered 
into, but we did not then think, and do not now, that 'partition' is the natural or 
desirable destiny of Ireland. The King's word at the opening of the Northern 
Ireland Parliament may have been forgotten: repeat them. 
(5) More serious in our view is the demand in some quarters for a Republic and, 
more especially, the tone of it. It is suggested that Britain is still Ireland's enemy 
and withholding her rightful freedom, and that Irish patriots must go on fighting 
for it. This is the worst and most injurious misconception. (1) What freedom is 
denied? Politically the I.F.S. is as free as the U.K. The King acts on advice of I.F.S. 
ministers. Economically, the same: I.F.S. as free to set up tariffs as U.K.; as free to 
pursue Economic Nationalism as Canada. (2) Why talk of fighting? Surely it is 
obvious that B.C. of N. is based on 'free association' not on compulsion. Obviously, 
the principles of the new international order and the spirit of the Kellogg Pact 
apply to the C. of N. If war as an 'instrument of policy' with a foreign state is 
illegal, with a member of the Commonwealth it is unthinkable. Secession a matter 
of interest to all members of the et~ but, speaking for the U.K. and with 
acquiescence of consulted Dom~, we declare that, if the people of the I.F.S. decide 
to establish a Republic and so withdraw from the et\ we shall not try to prevent it 
by force. 
(6) But we should deeply regret such a decision. 
(a) We think it would injure South Ireland: because 
(i) unity of Ireland made more difficult. 
(ii) advantages of economic co-operation with the et~ lost: Irish Republic no 
better terms than Cheko-Slovakian. 
(iii) advantages of 'British citizenship' lost. 
(b) But we take broader ground: 
(i) Secession of any part of et~ deeply wounding to U.K., and Ireland different 
from Dominions. Closer by nature, many personal and sentimental ties, and 
so, despite long quarrel, the break more felt. I~ also not 'colonial', but a 
'mother-country'. I~ shared in making and peopling Empire. Great Irish 
names among Empire-builders. Secession means a break with millions of 
Irishmen in the Dominions. 
(ii) Rupture of C. of N. a set-back to world ideals. C. of N. a practical example 
of international co-operation. Its continuance greatly needed just at this time. 
If B~ and I~ can bury the hatchet and co-operate, a lead given to other 
estranged nations. "If British League of Nations dies, no other League can 
live." 
(iii) Quote Abraham Lincoln: "We cannot remove our respective sections from 
each other nor build an impassable wall between them .... They cannot but 
remain face to face, and intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must continue 
between them. Is it possible, then, to make that intercourse more advan-
tageous or more satisfactory after separation than before?" 
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53 CAB 24/248, CP 110(34) 18 Apr 1934 
'Malta': Cabinet memorandum by Sir P Cunliffe-Lister on the question 
of abolishing the constitution 
[The constitution introduced in Malta in 1921 established a limited form of self-
government. A dyarchical system was set up in which the Maltese government, composed 
of a bicameral legislature and ministry, was responsible for local affairs while the Maltese 
imperial government, composed of the governor advised by a nominated council, had full 
control of reserved matters, including, in particular, defence, foreign affairs and language 
questions. The constitution was twice suspended: first, in 1930, owing to friction arising 
between church and state, and again in 1933, because of the pro-Italian activities of the 
Nationalist Party then in power. On the second occasion the language issue was the bone 
of contention as the Nationalist ministry attempted to restore the Italian language to its 
parity of status with English in the courts and primary schools. The question of 
abolishing the constitution which Cunliffe-Lister discussed in this memo to Cabinet was 
first raised in Nov 1933 by the governor, Sir D Campbell (1931-1936), shortly after the 
dismissal of the Nationalist ministry. Commenting on the crisis Campbell argued that in 
pursuing their 'harmful policy', nationalist politicians had 'found it necessary to enlist, 
and have been given in generous measure, the sympathy of Italy and of the Italian press, 
thus favouring a system of foreign propaganda to the detriment of British interests in a 
British colony. This danger will continue as long as there exists in the Island a Party of 
any importance likely to come to power at one time or another to pursue the same 
disastrous policy which has led to the dismissal of the late Ministry . ... Time must be 
given for the politicians of the old school, who have done so much harm to Malta, to 
disappear from the political arena, and for those who will next be entrusted with political 
leadershire to mature in an atmosphere very different from the present' (CO 158/470/ 
19508/5, no 1, letter from Campbell to Cunliffe-Lister, 9 Nov 1933, emphasis in 
original).] 
I think it necessary that I should circulate to the 'cabinet the attached despatches1 
from the Governor of Malta and ask for their decision. 
2. The first despatch raises a difficult question. The Governor strongly urges that 
an Imperial Act should be passed abolishing the Malta Constitution. The present 
position in the Island is that, in pursuance of the decision taken by the Cabinet last 
autumn, Parliamentary Government is temporarily suspended under a provision in 
the Constitution itself. This provision enables us to take over the administration 
provided that the Secretary of State is satisfied that a grave emergency exists. The 
Governor now argues that the present provisional regime should be placed upon a 
permanent and regular basis. This entails the abolition of the Constitution, which 
can only be effected by an Act of Parliament. I agree with the Governor that it would 
be impossible to restore the Constitution of Malta in its old form. There are, from the 
purely local standpoint, undoubtedly strong arguments for acceding to the Gov-
ernor's proposal, and although I see great practical difficulties in giving effect to it at 
this end, I think is it only right that the main points of the local case should be set 
out for the Cabinet's consideration. They are as follows:-
(1) The Parliamentary institutions granted to Malta in 1921 have been given a fair 
trial and have failed. Their temporary suspension last year was generally welcomed 
in Malta. The overwhelming majority of the population are at present in favour of 
Crown Colony Government. But this popularity will die down as the misdeeds of 
Ministers are forgotten and the criticism to which all Governments are heirs 
1 Not printed. 
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increases. If we are to take action, therefore, the present time is propitious. 
(2) If the present goodwill towards the Crown Colony regime is to be retained, 
it is essential that we should pursue an active and progressive policy in our 
administration of the Island. The Crown Colony administrations of the past have 
never been sufficiently constructive. For 100 years we have, by our expenditure 
on the Fighting Services, provided a more prosperous economic basis for the 
Island than it could otherwise have expected. This economic prosperity has of 
itself created, among those who by virtue of it have been able to reach a certain 
standard of culture and civilisation, a demand for progressive administration. 
Parliamentary Government having failed, they are quite content to accept a Crown 
Colony regime provided it makes an active attempt to satisfy their aspirations. 
There is undoubtedly a good deal to be done in the Island in the way of improving 
agriculture, education, the public health services, communications and so on. 
But if this work is to be carried out on a scale which will really satisfy public 
opinion, we must be able to make fairly long-range plans. How can we do this in 
the present conditional and transitory stage of things? There is no certainty as to 
what is going to happen in the next year or two. It is, therefore, difficult for those 
in charge of the administration to pursue with confidence a long-range policy. 
Under present conditions, whatever they do may be undone within a short time, 
and the uncertainty breeds a general disinclination to take constructive action. 
The Maltese officials, on whose efforts we must mainly rely, are thinking of what 
may happen when the present regime is altered and they have a new set of masters. 
(3) If Crown Colony Government does not pursue an active policy, it will 
gradually lose prestige. The incessant propaganda of a small group of politicians 
who have a vested interest in responsible government, but at present have little 
popular support, will become more and more effective. The temporary nature of 
the present Government is a considerable encouragement to their attacks. The 
politicians who control the Press cannot run the risk of giving any continued 
support to the present administration. They are afraid that the Constitution may 
be restored; and they are naturally anxious to be in a position, if it is restored, to 
claim the credit for having got it back. If it could be made plain that the present 
regime has come to stay, it is probable that most of the politicians would abandon 
the attack as hopeless. It is also likely that some of the newspapers, which are 
financed for political objects, would be aba11doned as a bad investment. It is 
contended that it would not sufficiently meet this point for further statements to 
be made in Parliament here that Parliamentary government will not be restored in 
Malta. It would be thought that a merely executive decision of this sort would no 
doubt be altered. It must be remembered that all that is required to restore 
Parliamentary government is a simple declaration in the Gazette that the 
emergency has ceased to exist. So long as the restoration can be effected so simply, 
the islanders will think that there is a chance that Ministerial government may 
return, If, however, the Constitution were formally abolished by an Act of the 
Imperial Parliament, it would be felt that definite and permanent action had been 
taken, and that the whole question of the constitutional future had been decided 
and closed. 
(4) The Governor argues that though the present "emergency" form of govern-
ment may be valid in law, there is in fact in Malta no emergency in any reasonable 
sense of the term, and that the fact must, therefore, be faced that the Government 
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reposes upon a legal fiction. This has a bad effect locally, is detrimental to our 
prestige and inconsistent with the dignity of the Imperial Government. 
(5) Apart from this consideration, the question arises how far we can fairly 
continue to say that a grave emergency exists to the satisfaction of the Secretary of 
State. This matter is referred to in the memorandum attached to the despatch, 
which has the authority of Sir Alison Russell, an experienced lawyer, whom I 
appointed specially to the post of Legal Adviser. He states that the matter is one of 
great difficulty, since powers which are strictly temporary powers exercisable in a 
time of grave emergency are being stretched, in his submission, beyond the limit 
of their contemplated exercise. 
(6) There are further legal difficulties, which are dealt with in the memoranda 
attached to the despatch. Examples may be cited:-
(a) A provision of the Constitution provides that there be a Session of the 
Legislature at least once a yeare. We are assuming that this provision only 
operates when there is a Legislature in being, which is not the case at present. 
But the question is doubtful; and the local lawyers hold the view that, if the 
matter could be brought before the local Court, the Court would express the 
opinion that the failure of the Governor to take steps for the holding of an 
election and a meeting of the Legislature before the expiration of twelve months 
from the last Session was unconstitutional. 
(b) The Constitution provides for the constitution of a Trade Union Council 
with the object of electing two representatives to the Senate. The law appears to 
require that action should be taken annually for the election of members to this 
Council. But if we do not mean to restore the Senate, it is obviously futile and 
mischievous to set in action part of the machinery for its election. 
(c) The Constitution also requires an annual registration of voters for the 
election of members of the Legislature. But the last thing we want to do is to 
encourage the idea that there will be a general election. 
We are, in fact, assuming that our powers cover all these matters. I have approved 
the enactment of an Ordinance suspending the revision of the Register, and it will 
probably become necessary to suspend action for constituting a new Trade Union 
Council. We shall, of course, not summon the Legislature. But there is always the 
risk that our action may be challenged in the Courts; and I am advised there is little 
doubt that a Maltese Court will decide against us if it can find grounds for doing so. 
3. The above are the arguments in favour of abolishing the Constitution; and I 
think it is desirable for me to add a word to explain why this can only be done by an 
Act of the Imperial Parliament. Malta is a conquered Colony and, therefore, the 
Crown has a common law prerogative to legislate for it and to provide for and alter its 
Constitution. But if the Crown once grants self-government, it cannot revoke the 
grant unless it has reserved the power to do so. When the Constitution was granted 
in 1921 the Crown, in the Letters Patent setting up the new form of government, did 
not reserve power to revoke the grant; and it was because of this that it was necessary 
to go to Parliament in 1932 in order to effect certain alterations in the Constitution. 
In order to give effect to the Governor's proposals, all that is necessary would be to 
put the Crown back into its position prior to 1921. It has been suggesteed to me that 
the Bill might simply take the form of providing that the King shall have in Malta the 
same power and jurisdiction as though the Malta Constitution Act of 1932 had not 
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been passed, and the Malta Constitution Letters Patent of 1921 had contained a 
clause reserving to His Majesty the power to revoke, alter or amend the Letters 
Patent. It will thus be seen that on the face of it the Bill could be presented as a 
technical measure and would not in terms provide for the "abolition of the 
Constitution." Such phraseology, which somewhat suggests the destruction of 
time-honoured representative institutions, would indeed be somewhat out of place in 
the case of Malta, which has enjoyed with considerable interruptions its limited form 
of self-government only since 1921. 
4. I am bound to add that the officer whom I sent specially to Malta from the 
Colonial Office, and who knows the people well and is a shrewd judge, shares the 
Governor's views and considers that, looked at as a Malta problem, there is a strong 
case for doing what the Governor asks. 
5. From our domestic point of view, the proposed course will be very awkward. 
Legislation in the present Session is a practical impossibility. We could, no doubt, 
find time next Session. But my colleagues will hardly relish the prospect of 
introducing a Bill to perpetuate the destruction of the Malta Constitution concur-
rently with the India Bill. 
Granted that the Bill can take the simple form which I have suggested in 
paragraph 3, we should still be faced with the question: "Why is it necessary to 
introduce a Bill at all?" That is naturally the first question the House of Commons 
would put about any Bill. The true answer would be that we want once and for all to 
abolish Parliamentary Government in Malta. I should very much like to give that 
answer. And if the Maltese problem could be isolated, I have no doubt that is the 
right course. But I cannot pretend that critics of the India Bill would not be quick to 
seize the contrast between India and Malta. I need not elaborate the easy speeches 
which the least adroit member could make. If that simple and true answer is denied 
(and who would not detect and expose the truth?) we are driven back on the defence 
of questioning the validity of our own actions. Should we not have to admit that the 
emergency under which we acted is something of a legal fiction, that we stretched 
our powers to declare an emergency, and that we cannot continue indefinitely to 
pretend that an emergency exists? But the fact remains that we acted in the same way 
as the Labour Government acted in 1930, when Parliamentary Government was 
suspended on the religious issue. No one pretended then that the fortress was in 
danger. Parliamentary Government was suspended because we could not get a fair 
election. We maintained that suspension for two years, and only restored Parliamen-
tary Government when we thought the religious controversy had been settled. We 
suspended Parliamentary Government this time because Ministers were conducting 
the Government improperly. Is there any reason why, if we had the right so to 
suspend, we should not continue the suspension indefinitely? 
While I appreciate the Governor's difficulties and accept his view that the abolition 
of the Constitution by an Imperial Act would be convenient and beneficial in Malta, I 
must admit that the situation here makes such a course very difficult at the present 
time. 
6. It is conceivable that circumstances may arise which will make an Act 
imperative. If, for instance, the Malta Courts should give a judgment which impeded 
the Governor in his administration or in the pursuit of the policy of Crown Colony 
Government, we should, I think, be bound to legislate on the lines suggested in 
paragraph 3. But in that event it would be easy to justify such a Bill; and I doubt if, in 
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those circumstances, it would arouse much opposition. 
7. In the second of the annexed despatches, the Governor puts forward a proposal 
with which I am in entire agreement. He suggests that an Advisory Council should be 
set up, composed of five official and eight unofficial members appointed by him. At 
present, the only body which the Governor has to advise him is the Nominated 
Council. This is composed of members representative of the Imperial interests in 
the Island, including the Fighting Services; and they were never intended to deal 
with the general range of civil affairs. It contains no unofficial members; and its 
proper function is to advise on matters which normally lie within the "reserved" 
sphere of the Dyarchy. 
It seems evident that, if we are to have a prolonged period of Crown Colony 
administration, an advisory body of a different character must be added to the 
government machinery. It is obviously desirable to enable the Governor to keep as 
far as possible in touch with unofficial opinion; and it will be a step in the right 
direction if we can bring in unofficial members of the new Council, and thus provide 
him with a definite channel with which he can make contact with it. In Cyprus an 
informal "Advisory Council" has been set up to provide the Governor with a means of 
ascertaining unofficial views on questions of legislation and other matters of 
importance affecting the relations between the Government and the unofficial 
community. I agree with Sir David Campbell that a Council on similar lines will best 
meet the existing situation in Malta. 
The proposed Council will have no executive or legislative powers. Its functions 
will be purely advisory. The Governor will be free to accept or disregard its advice as 
he thinks fit. It will, as in the case of the Cyprus Council, be an informal body, and 
for the time being at any rate will not be established by law as a part of the regular 
constitutional machinery. 
The Govenor does not propose to invite any persons who have taken a prominent 
part in the party politics in the past to accept nomination as unofficial members. I 
feel sure that the Governor's views on this point are sound. Malta needs a complete 
rest from party politics. It would be a great mistake, by setting up a Council of 
politicians aligned on the old basis, to perpetuate the political feuds of the past. 
It will be observed that the Governor warns me that the unofficials whom he 
proposes to approach, or, indeed, any other unofficials, may refuse to serve; and it 
must be admitted that the uncertainty as to the political future alluded to in the 
earlier part of this memorandum may increase the possibility of a "non-co-operative" 
attitude. Unofficial persons of the type we wish to see on the Council may not be 
willing to run the risk of the reprisals which might follow upon the restoration of 
Parliamentary government. But this is a risk which we must take; and I propose to 
authorise the Governor to sound privately the gentlemen whom he names as to their 
willingness to serve.2 
2 It was not until 1936 that legislation was passed annulling the Letters Patent of 1921. Malta 
reverted-with modifications in 1939-to Crown Colony rule. In 1943, following the award of the George 
Cross to Malta the previous year, the British government gave an undertaking to restore internal 
self-government at the end of the war. This was implemented in 1947. 
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54 CO 847/13/16 11 Apr 1939 
[Indirect rule]: minute by G F Seel1 on the integration of indirect rule 
into a parliamentary system of government [Extract] 
The Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission2 (in para. 443 of their Report) make a 
suggestion in relation to the "integration" of indirect rule into a system of 
Parliamentary government, and it would seem desirable to take it into account in 
considering what can be said to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland at this juncture. 
The Commission, for a variety of reasons, did not embark upon a theoretical 
discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of indirect rule. For one thing, they 
regarded the system which is being employed in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
and the Southern Rhodesia system of native councils and courts based upon 
authorities "appointed" by the Government, as both in an experimental stage, and 
they wished to avoid prejudicing the question of closer union by making speculative 
comparisons between these two experiments. They did advocate, however, that in 
both systems a beginning should be made in setting up a system of regional or 
provincial native councils, which would serve to enlarge the horizon of the local 
native authorities and at the same time, as they hoped, would facilitate the ultimate 
representation of native interests by natives in the central legislatures, by providing 
machinery for consulting the natives in the selection of representatives (para. 408) . 
By this means they considered that the progress of indirect rule, so far from offering 
any obstacle to the development of representative government, might indeed 
promote that development. 
The Commission, mainly Parliamentary in its composition and not expert in its 
knowledge of African natives (though it had plenty of evidence on that subject) may 
prove to have had too great a faith in the attractiveness of the Parliamentary system 
and in the adaptability of native institutions. They have, however, at any rate offered 
a suggestion for meeting the difficulty of integrating the indirect rule system with 
the Parliamentary system, a difficulty which Lord Hailey, in the extract from Chapter 
6, registered on 47093/38, found so formidable. 
We ought to be on our guard against overdoing academic discussion, and ascribing 
to the theory of indirect rule a divinity of inspiration which it does not really possess. 
Not the least valuable passages in the extracts from the "African Survey" at No. 1 on 
this tile are those which deprecate such an attitude .. .. If we are frank, we shall 
admit that where we have employed this system we have done so because, for 
financial or other reasons, no other means lay ready to our hands of spreading 
orderly government and the rudiments of social services. It is not everywhere, even 
in British tropical Africa, that the recognition of local dynasties has been held to be 
the only means of approaching these tasks:- witness the courses being followed in 
Kenya and Southern Rhodesia. Where it has been so regarded, it remains difficult to 
envisage these purely local chieftanships as continuing to constitute the backbone of 
political and administrative organisation. Not to enlarge upon the subject, there are 
two obvious reasons for doubting that this will be so:-
1 See 35, note 1. 
2 Report of the Rhodesia-Nayasaland Royal Commission (chairman, Lord Bledisloe) Cmd 5949, 1939. 
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(1) The improbability that, as an educated class develops, it will acquiesce in 
government under a patriarchal system .... 
(2) The impracticability of fitting in urban communities (which will grow 
wherever industrial development takes place) into a system of administration by 
rural oligarchies. 
The possible decline of the chieftanships themselves can be looked forward to 
without apprehension. It is of more importance to watch carefully the fate of the 
councils which are in most cases associated by native custom with the chieftanships 
or which, where indirect rule is not practised, are being created, as in Southern 
Rhodesia, for the local administration of native affairs . These will probably survive 
after the chieftanships have disappeared, just as English Parliamentary institutions 
have outlived the petty Saxon kingships under which they originated. The system of 
regional councils suggested by the Royal Commission may, if it is tried, possibly 
encourage the development of these local councils at the expense of the chiefs, since 
it will, as time goes on, offer careers in public affairs to persons with qualifications 
other than birth, and will also widen the range of native political interests beyond the 
geographical limits of tribal authority. 
The practical test of any native institutions which we may build up, whether under 
so-called "indirect rule" or otherwise, will come when it has to be decided whether 
they are to be used to bridge the gap between purely local self-government and 
African participation in the central legislatures, or whether they are only to lead to 
subordinate institutions like the Natives' Representative Council in the Union of 
South Africa. The South African system embodies the denial of full political rights to 
the natives, and it has yet to be seen whether, in the purely tropical Dependencies, 
there will not be forces too strong to enable equality of participation in representa-
tive institutions to be conceded to the natives. 
Most of the above is, of course, pure speculation and ... not in the realm of 
realities. I feel, however, that in any discussions about indirect rule we should be 
careful not to regard it as necessarily superior to other systems or destined to survive 
beyond the initial stages of political development. As regards the immediate action to 
be taken, while the publication of the "African Survey" does not in itself mark any 
turning point in history, I agree that its careful study of the existing position cannot 
be left unnoticed by the Colonial Office, and that we should take steps to ascertain 
the reactions of the various Governments .... But in writing to Northern Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland I think we should also draw attention to the suggestion made by the 
Royal Commission in regard to the setting up of regional councils as a further step in 
development, and enquire as to the advisability and practicability of acting upon that 
suggestion. Indeed, we might possibly include this point also in writing to Kenya, 
Uganda, and Tanganyika. It may be worth while suggesting that the Governments 
may desire to meet together for the discussion and exchange of views upon these 
general questions, possibly at some meeting of the East African Governors' 
Conference, to which the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland could be 
specially invited. 
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55 CO 847/15/11, no 1 5 Sept 1939 
[Future policy in Africa]: minute by Mr MacDonald of a discussion 
with Lord Hailey on 'the objects of our native policy in Africa' 
I asked Lord Hailey to come and have a talk with me this afternoon, when I told him 
that I thought the Government should pursue, unhindered by its war effort, a policy 
of constructive development in the Colonial Empire. We were now drafting in the 
Colonial Office a paper for the War Cabinet setting forth a series of proposals on 
which we had been at work for some months past. I would like to discuss these 
proposals with him a little later, and it was possible that I would accept his offer of 
service during the war by asking him to do some work in connection with this 
general policy of Colonial Development. 
But there was a particular piece of work which I thought wanted doing, and which 
he might prefer to do. It was time that we got our minds clearer as to the objects of 
our native policy in Africa. What exactly were we driving at in our policy of "indirect 
rule"? What was the next step in advance after we had set up efficient local native 
administrations? In Colonies where there was not only a large native population, but 
also a considerable European community, how was Government to be organised 
ultimately so that native interests were not subordinated to European interests and 
vice versa? In those territories how far could European legislatures be allowed to 
develop? And so on. There were a host of questions to be answered. Unless we had 
some idea of the general objects at which we were aiming we would find that we took 
steps in this or that direction, which we could not afterwards retrace, which would 
lead away from what ought to be our broad objective. Therefore we should now be 
conducting a careful enquiry into the facts of the present situation, and be 
formulating definite principles of future policy. 
The matter had arisen in the course of our discussions with Mr. Huggins1 on the 
proposal for amalgamation between Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland.2 Amalgamation was impossible unless there was agreement between us 
all on native policy. I had proposed that the next step should be examination by the 
authorities of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland of their respective native policies to 
see whether in fact they could be made to harmonize. I had proposed that the three 
local Governments should establish some appropriate informal Committee to 
conduct this enquiry in the near future without undue delay. Mr. Huggins had 
agreed to this. But at the talk which I had with him this morning he said that on 
further thought he believed that the work might be done more effectively if one 
individual who was impartial between Europeans and natives and who had an 
objective and statesmanlike mind could come out to the territories, make contact 
with everybody, and present a report to the Governments concerned. 
This proposal of Mr. Huggins fell in exactly with an idea which I had conceived for 
a wider enquiry on native policy. It seemed to me that one of the most important 
pieces of constructive work which a man could now do would be to formulate 
suggestions for the appropriate government of the African, European, Indian and 
other populations in Africa. I wondered whether Lord Hailey himself would be 
1 Godfrey Huggins (KCMG 1941, Lord Malvern 1955); prime minister of Southern Rhodesia, 1933-1953. 
2 cf 75. 
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prepared to go to Africa to do this piece of work, or, if for any reason he could not go, 
whether he knew of the right individual to perform that service. We did not want a 
man who would expect to be able to dictate native policy, but one who would help us 
with his advice. 
I said that I had not made up my mind about this yet, and indeed I would have to 
consult others. But if Lord Hailey would think about it, I would also think about it 
further, and we could consider the proposal again a little later. 
Lord Hailey said that he would much like to consider the proposal. He was 
prepared to do whatever work was most useful, and he agreed entirely as to the 
importance of this suggestion. He was a man with no private attachments now; his 
wife was dead and his son was doing war service. He was free to work in London or on 
the continent of Europe, or in Africa, or anywhere. 
I repeated that perhaps the most important work for him to do would lie in 
another field; possibly in connection with the general work of Colonial development. 
I would see him again in the course of the next week or two. 
56 CO 847/17/11, no 1 6 Oct 1939 
'Future policy in Africa': CO record of a meeting at the Carlton Hotel. 1 
Minutes by A I May hew, 2 H Vischer, J L Keith3 and Sir G Bushe4 
2. Mr. MacDonald explained that this meeting was for the purpose of discussion. 
It did not signify that any important change in policy was being inaugurated. But 
during the war they could advance certain policies, and he hoped that their 
discussion would bring out the main lines of enquiry and advance which were now 
desirable. He would give three examples of work which he regarded as urgent. 
(1) Political development. Where indirect rule is the recognised policy it is t ime 
we got a clear idea of what we are aiming at. We should also have a clearer idea as 
to how the development of Native Authorities and of Legislative Councils in the 
same territories was to be harmonised. Where there are important non-native 
communities, if we do not now decide upon ultimate objectives, we may take a 
step in the direction of giving more power to the European immigrant communi-
ties which can never be retraced, but which would be out of line with a proper 
policy of self-government for the whole people of the colonies concerned. These 
questions were ripe for investigation. He proposed to send someone to Africa to 
1 The first para of the record listed those present. They were, from the CO, Mr MacDonald, Lord Dufferin, 
Sir C Parkinson, Sir J Shuckburgh, Sir H Moore, Sir E Brocklebank (MacDonald's parliamentary private 
secretary), A J Dawe and F J Pedler (principal, see 57). From outside the CO, Lords Lugard and Hailey, 
Professors Coupland and Hancock, the biologist Dr J Huxley and Margery Perham (writer, lecturer and 
adviser to government on African affairs; first official and first woman fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford, 
1939). 
2 Indian Educational Service from 1903; acting educational commissioner to Govt of India, 1921; 
member, Eton College staff, 1922-1929; joint secretary to ACEC from 1929; educational adviser to S of S. 
3 Member, African Research Survey, Chatham House, 1937-1939; director of colonial scholars and head of 
Welfare Dept, CO, from 1941. 
4 Legal adviser to CO and DO, 1931-1941; gov of Barbados, 1941-1946. 
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advise on these questions, and he felt that when the necessary knowledge was 
available we ought to reach conclusions as to what our ultimate objectives are. 
(2) We ought during the war to press ahead with the development of Government 
technical and social services; but there will be an economy campaign which will 
conflict with intention. A possible means of combining economy and development 
is to make far more use of educated Africans in responsible posts. We must during 
the war seize every opportunity for training Africans. 
(3) The policy with regard to land is of fundamental importance. We need more 
knowledge on this subject, and we also need established principles to guide the 
changes which are taking place. It had been suggested that a Royal Commission 
might be appointed to consider this question, but he did not feel that this would be 
an appropriate method of tackling the problem. The best way of getting the 
necessary knowledge would be a series of local inquiries, but for establishing the 
general principles to govern land policy it would be necessary for the local 
inquiries to be reported to a central committee, which would co-ordinate them in 
a consistent and constructive policy. 
Mr. MacDonald also mentioned the need for thinking out some constructive 
settlement of the Colonial question if the peace which will be made after the war is to 
have a prospect of being permanent. 
3. Lord Lugard felt that the most urgent problem in the Colonial Empire was 
that of effecting economies. He agreed that the best way of meeting it would be to 
employ more Africans in place of British staff, especially in the technical and clerical 
posts. New schemes for training Africans for such posts should begin at once. The 
Government ought to increase bursaries, reduce fees at schools and colleges, and 
increase training facilities in Government Departments. It might be necessary to 
increase direct taxation on the wealthier members of the communities. For the sake 
of British trade, attention ought to be given to increasing the native's purchasing 
power. 
4. On the home front it was important to increase the interest of Members of 
Parliament in the Colonial Empire. Lord Lugard referred to the recent discussions 
on the question of setting up a Standing Committee of Parliament. He felt that such 
a Committee would be most effective if charged to investigate questions referred to it 
by the Secretary of State or by a majority of Members of Parliament at the discretion 
of the Speaker. If it were given the function of reviewing Annual Reports, it must 
inevitably infringe on the responsibilities of the Secretary of State, and its business 
would be too heavy for its members to discharge. He commended Sir Robert 
Hamilton's proposal that there should be a quarterly debate on Colonial questions, 
limited on each occasion to some specific geographical area. 
5. Lord Lugard said that the most urgent political problem was that of the 
relations between European settlers and Africans. He thought that the recent report 
of the Kenya Settlement Committee raised in an acute form the question whether a 
closer settlement by Europeans would be compatible with the policy of trusteeship. 
Many people felt that, if during the war it should become necessary to convince 
European and American opinion of our sincerity with regard to trusteeship, it would 
be impossible for us to do so if we continued to govern the Colonies as we have done 
for the last few years. As instances of the type of action which cut away the moral 
basis of our rule, Lord Lugard referred to the extinction of native rights to land 
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without any procedure for appeal; the disproportionate expenditure on social services 
for Europeans and Africans; and the denial to Africans of any direct voice in the 
making of laws. 
6. There were some who said that we could never establish a sound moral basis 
for our rule in the Colonies unless we placed them under some form of international 
control. He had not seen any precise definition of the meaning of that phrase, but he 
felt that if it meant sharing sovereignty in any way it must result in a betrayal of the 
promises we had made to the natives. If it meant the day-to-day supervision of 
administration, the machinery would necessarily be cumbersome and paralysing to 
Government. If it meant extending the mandate system, the only advantage to 
foreigners would be that of economic equality; but if this solution were adopted he 
thought it important to ensure that countries trading with our Colonies should 
import produce to approximately the same value as that of the goods which they 
exported to the Colony. 
7. Lord Lugard felt that, so long as there were European immigrant communi-
ties, neither the whites nor the blacks would be content until they controlled their 
own affairs . Parliamentary institutions were not, however, suited to Africans. The 
object of indirect rule should be to assimilate all small units, gradually and with their 
consent, to form Central Councils. When the time comes to establish such Central 
Councils, the power of legislation should be in their hands, and not in the hands of a 
Legislative Council on a Parliamentary model. 
8. With regard to land, Lord Lugard fully endorsed what the Secretary of State 
had said. This question should be the main feature of research work. He heartily 
agreed that it would be better to appoint an individual than to entrust the inquiries 
to a Royal Commission. He also supported the suggestion that the local investiga-
tions should be coordinated by an individual or by a Committee in London. 
9. Lord Hailey began by saying that he assumed that the object of the meeting 
was not to decide what policy ought to be adopted, but to explore what investigations 
it might be useful to initiate with a viewing to arriving at a policy. 
10. Lord Hailey felt that the African Governments were in a very dangerous 
political position. They were always being pressed to increase the powers of existing 
legislatures, for example by conceding elected majorities. Such a step would be 
irretraceable. He had never seen any attempt to square native administration as we 
see it now with the development of parliamentary institutions.5 Any investigation of 
this question must assume that the ultimate object is self-government. But must we 
assume that the form of self-government should be Parliamentary? He doubted 
whether it would be wise for one person to undertake the investigation both in East 
and West Africa, since the local reactions in East Africa and the Rhodesias to such an 
investigation might be embarrassing to the Secretary of State. If, however, the 
Secretary of State felt that it would not be embarrassing, Lord Hailey thought that 
the task would not be too great for one person. 
11 . In the matter of economies, Lord Hailey did not wish to question the need for 
increasing African personnel, but he doubted whether very far-reaching economies 
could be effected in that way. He thought that it was much more important to look 
for increased revenue. In the African Governments there is no one who deals solely 
5 0 G R Williams commented in the margin: 'But there is the Gold Coast method of indirect 
representation on Leg. Co. of Native Authorities via the Provincial Councils.' 
298 CHAPTER 3 [56) 
with the possibilities of increased commercial activity. He recalled the starting of the 
Commerce Department in India, which had very useful results, and he suggested 
that the larger Colonies ought to have a Department dealing entirely with the 
question of increasing production and commerce. 
12. Lord Hailey wished to see not merely a general determination to employ 
more Africans but a declaration by His Majesty's Government as to what place 
Africans ought ultimately to fill in the services. On this subject he had found 
different views in different Colonies. Were Africans only to be admitted to intermedi-
ate posts? It was important to decide now whether they are to appear in the major 
offices of Government, because until that it decided no one concerned with higher 
education can decide what they ought to be doing. Are Africans to be admitted to the 
Administration? The present uncertainty was cruel to those Africans who qualified 
for higher employment and failed to get it. No feelings could be more bitter than 
those of the African family which had beggared itself to educate a son in England and 
then found that the Government refused to employ him. 
13. Dealing with the problem of land, Lord Hailey said that there were two broad 
groups of questions:-
(1) the authority which the State assumes over land: this question is more or less 
settled: 
(2) the development of rights in native land. This is at present the more important 
group of problems. 
The Italians take pride in starting a scheme for the registration of all land rights in 
Abyssinia, but before we start any scheme for enregistering native land rights, we 
must declare what rights ought to be recognized. No Royal Commission could do 
that kind of work. It needed local inquiries centrally directed. He hoped that the 
central direction would not be in the hands of somebody who had only dealt with 
rights as known to Europeans. It ought to be possible to find three or four people 
who had experience of land rights in non-European countries. 
14. Lord Hailey said that there was a further question for discussion which he 
would like to add to those which had been already mentioned: he referred to law and 
justice, and he was ashamed that he had not been able to stimulate interest in it in 
legal and other quarters. In Africa we were developing English law side by side with 
native tribunals. We cannot tell which will get the upper hand, or how they will 
combine. 
15. We ought to tackle the question of co-ordinating procedure in native courts . 
There could never be much commercial development if the laws of debt and 
limitations differed locally. At present native courts consist of persons who have an 
interest in maintaining existing conditions. Their attitude in adapting law to 
changing conditions is therefore not sufficiently fluid . This subject needs to be 
explored, but not by lawyers. Lord Hailey recalled that the law in India had become 
unduly rigid because the lawyers had been allowed to codify it and gain control of it. 
The questions which he had mentioned were really ones for administrators trained in 
sociological affairs. 
16. Miss Perham put forward an additional problem: the new economic man in 
Africa. She said we had been letting economic forces rip. For example, in the Gold 
Coast 300,000 illiterate cocoa farmers had begun to operate as one man and to make 
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the chiefs follow them. As another instance we were bringing into existence a 
labouring class. The African labourer is regarded by most of the people who handle 
him as different from the European labourer. There is a great deal to be done to level 
up the treatment of the African labourer with the treatment accorded to the working 
classes elsewhere. We have to combat the idea that the African labourer, based on the 
reserve, does not need such good treatment as is applied to labourers elsewhere. 
17. Miss Perham said that land could not be studied in isolation. Subjects such as 
these should be studied in groups, and a new technique of study was needed. There 
might be three or four experts, each knowledgeable in a different subject, investigat-
ing the whole range of these subjects co-operatively. 
18. A propos of Miss Perham's suggestion, Lord Hailey mentioned that he had 
recommended to Mr. H Butler6 that there should be research into the problem of 
plural economy-a phrase now used by economists in which there were two different 
social groups with two different standards of living, methods of production etc. The 
phenomenon had been studied in Java, but it seemed impossible to interest British 
economists in it. 
19. Elaborating her views on the technique of study, Miss Perham urged that we 
should not expect too much from Government officers in Africa. They were 
handicapped in enquiries among natives by the very fact of being officials. She 
thought that the most useful type of research was that conducted by detached 
experts, provided that they received official assistance and that the views of the 
Governments were expressed with regard to their findings. 
20. Professor Coup/and: The war provides an opportunity for putting the 
dependent Empire on the same moral footing as the rest of the Empire. Nowhere is 
there any acceptance of the sincerity of our expressed intentions in the dependent 
Empire. Left opinion in England, general opinion in the United States, and even the 
young officials of the Oxford Summer School were unable to believe that there was 
reality in our professions of trusteeship. As a historian, he recalled that there had 
only been two periods when British public opinion had been interested in Africa-
namely, the fight against the slave trade and the time of Livingstone. In both periods 
that interest had been idealistic. You could get British public opinion, with its 
curious affection for the under-dog, behind a restatement of trusteeship. 
21. Professor Coup/and thought that in India we had alienated the educated part 
of the community by waiting too long before starting constitutional advances 
towards self-government. Now was the time to get educated Africans on our side by 
starting constitutional advances in Africa. He was interested in the suggestion to 
bring more Africans into the Civil Service, for he was convinced that in India the 
Indian Civil Servants had been a most stabilising influence. When he was in Nigeria 
he had wondered why there were not more African Civil Servants. There ought to be 
African members of Executive Councils. Legislative Councils ought to have more 
African members. He was not, however, suggesting unofficial majorities. He recalled 
that in East Africa there were no Africans in the Legislative Councils. 
22. Lord Hailey: Before you increase the political representation of Africans you 
ought to decide whether you are seeking to develop native political institutions in 
that way. If you begin with nominated representatives, you will not be able to stop 
6 (Sir) Harold B Butler (KCMG, 1946); deputy director, ILO, 1920-1932; director, 1932-1938; warden of 
Nuffield College, Oxford, 1939-1943. 
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there. Election follows almost inevitably. It might be better to try the alternative 
course of integrating the native administrations. 
23. Professor Coup/and agreed. In his earlier remarks he had been thinking only 
of the intellectual fringe of Nigeria and the Gold Coast. There we were already 
committed to Parliamentary institutions. He thought, however, that federations of 
native administrations might have representatives in the Legislative Councils: if we 
really intend to work towards self-government in the various dependencies we ought 
to take steps to create national feeling in them. 
24. Lord Hailey thought that in some places there was a tendency to put too 
much on native administrations. This tendency had, of course, a good side, but some 
things that ought to be centralized were being entrusted to native administrations 
with a wasteful localisation of revenues and services. 
25. Miss Perham thought that political life in Africa was moving on two planes. 
There was the plane of the tribes which corresponded to realities. Then there was the 
plane of our big state system imposed artificially from above. We have related the 
Africans to the big state through Legislative Councils and through the Civil Service. 
On the tribal plane political education through indirect rule is slow. Meanwhile, on 
the plane of the big state the intelligentsia are very rapidly acquiring political 
consciousness and naturally wish to capture the state system. We shall probably give 
in to them too soon. We ought to try to connect the two planes by setting up large 
regional councils of native administration. The object of this should be to speed up 
the political education of the native authorities and to head off the intelligentsia from 
the state system. 
26. Lord Lugard, Lord Hailey and Professor Coup/and signified their agreement. 
27. Miss Perham mentioned that for a long time the regional federations would, 
of course, be as artificial as the big state. 
28. Sir H. Moore agreed with Miss Perham's suggestion that in the political 
development of Africa we have to race against time. The educated African demands 
the "ordinary line of development", by which he means Parliamentary institutions. If 
we do not intend to travel along that line, it is urgently necessary to say what our line 
is to be. 
29. Dr. Huxley confined hb remarks to the effects of the war. We ought to 
investigate what Government activities must suffer permanently from temporary 
economies. He thought it would be found that the activities which it was most 
necessary to maintain fully in war time were those in which Governments were 
fighting against natural forces-e.g. erosion, tsetse and wild life preservation. In 
education we should declare our ultimate aims, and they should be the same for East 
Africa as for West. He thought that any developments of political regionalism should 
be associated with the development of regional cultures such as was being attempted 
at Achimota. It was important that all means of propaganda should be employed, 
including radio, cinema and newspapers. 
30. Dr. Huxley had been thinking about the position of the African colonies after 
the war. Unless we could establish the dependent Empire on a firm moral basis, it 
would be a continual source of weakness. He thought something useful might be 
done on the lines followed by the Tennessee Valley Administration. They had kept all 
the local organisations in being but had added representatives of the Central 
Government, who would help the local bodies with grants if their advice was taken. 
Perhaps there might be an "International Colonial Office" working on such lines. It 
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would have to have funds and a corps of inspectors and advisers. Only by some such 
means could we retain nominal sovereignty and acquire the support of enemy and 
neutral opinion. 
31. Professor Hancock said that in recent years Great Britain had ceased to 
export capital. This was fundamental to the situation since the problem of 
development is one of investment. For instance, Bechuanaland alone was costing the 
British tax payer £80,000 a year. Great Britain does not possess the resources to 
finance on that scale all her African Empire, let alone the West Indies and other 
places as well. With population, as with investments, we have ceased to be an 
exporting nation. In trade, the position is different, for we have plenty of surpluses. 
With an Empire in this position there is a very great danger that it should seize the 
weapon of monopoly. This is not the right solution economically, and dangerous 
politically. Professor Hancock thought that we had been too greedy at Ottawa, and 
since then we had, by our quotas in the Colonies, lost a great deal of good will. The 
great danger of war-time is that we shall get into monopolistic habits of thinking and 
carry them into the peace. There is no escape from internationalising the Empire 
economically, because we cannot develop it economically ourselves. It is therefore 
urgent to think out in economic terms the means of getting world co-operation. 
32. Professor Hancock passed on to a smaller point: the conflict south of the 
Congo between the small immigrant European communities and the interests of 
African workers. He thought that the idea of giving increased power to Europeans 
and of finding more jobs for the Africans were quite imcompatible. He did not agree 
that it would be useful to start further investigations of this matter. There was plenty 
of knowledge on the subject, and it now called for a decision. His own view would be 
that the opportunities of employment for Africans should be increased notwithstand-
ing the protests from the Europeans. 
33. In reply to a question from Lord Dufferin, Professor Hancock explained that 
since 1932 Great Britain had had no balance of resources for oversea investment. It 
was not merely a question whether we had capital to invest: it was a question 
whether any motive existed to encourage the investment of further capital in the 
African colonies. This depended on whether there was an expanding market for 
African produce, and that problem had no solution in the terms of the British 
Empire. On the marketing side it was essential to re-establish freer trade and to open 
the markets of the autarkies-France, Italy and Germany. 
34. Lord Hailey suggested that except for mining, African production did not 
need much European capital, and that Great Britain could easily supply all that was 
needed for her own colonies. Professor Hancock, however, maintained that Africa 
was crying out for enormous sums of capital for non-productive works, such as 
erosion control. Lord Hailey countered by inquiring how we could induce foreigners 
to supply the capital if it was for non-productive works, and Miss Perham suggested 
that only the United States would be in a position to supply capital for such objects. 
Lord Hailey mentioned that Italy had set aside £130 million for development in 
Abyssinia during the next five years, besides a subvention of £10 million a year for 
ordinary expenditure. Professor Hancock's comment was that nations would do that 
sort of thing for the sake of national pride if their Empires were not too big. He had 
little doubt that the Germans would bear an enormous loss in order to show results 
in any colonies they might acquire. But he wished to find some means for avoiding 
that kind of solution. 
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35. Lord Dufferin remained unconvinced that Great Britain had no capital for 
export. He thought that the great curse of present-day British economy was the 
inability to find openings for the investment of savings. He suggested that the 
mercantilist solution of exploiting the Empire's resources would be in the interests 
of Great Britain and the colonies alike. 
36. Dr. Huxley and Lord Hailey developed the idea that the investment required 
is of a nature which can only be provided by State investment. Lord Hailey went on 
to point out that the only stimulus for such investment is national pride, and that no 
State will put resources into an international undertaking. If, therefore, you are 
going to appeal for large amounts of capital for enterprises which are not 
immediately productive, you can only do so on a basis of the repartition of Africa. 
37. Professor Hancock said that the only alternative to repartition would be to 
tackle the problem on the side of consumers' demand. If you could, for example, 
double the consumption of cotton, ground nuts etc., you would restore the 
conditions for attracting private capital into Africa. 
38. Further discussion followed, mainly about economic potentialities, but no 
major points emerged. 
Minutes on 56 
Mr. Vischer will like to see paras 25 and 29. There is far too much loose talk, of the 
kind attributed to Miss Perham in para 25, about the African "intelligentsia"-their 
regrettable "political consciousness"-and the need for heading them off politics and 
"the state system". How can the English nation give higher education to Africans 
without making them politically conscious? And how can we avoid trouble if we try 
to exclude the products of our education from politics? 
We have much to learn from what has happened in India-where very much of the 
trouble and bitterness of feeling has been due to that attitude towards "the native 
intelligentsia" which is manifest in Miss Perham's remarks. You cannot keep the 
educated African within the sphere marked out for him by anthropologists and 
politically nervous administrators. 
A.I.M. 
2.11.39 
Read with great interest. Our whole system of education at present suffers by the fact 
that we have not settled yet what to educate Africans for. 
H.V. 
2.11.39 
I agree with Mr. Mayhew's and Mr. Vischer's remarks. Our colonial policy in 
education and in other fields suffers from the fact that we have not faced the political 
issue referred to by Lord Hailey in para 10 of the minutes. In spite of our endeavours 
to revive and adapt what we are pleased to call native customary institutions the 
Africans themselves are increasingly looking towards our own political institutions, 
however absurd that may be, as the goal for their political ambitions. I think with Sir 
H. Moore that if we do not intend to allow the Africans to follow this line it is 
necessary to say what political future we will allow them. I do not think we really 
have any choice. 
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I am glad to see that Lord Lugard and Miss Perham admit that indirect rule must 
be developed to give the Africans a wider political sphere but I do not believe that it is 
practicable or desirable "to head off the intelligentsia" (I suppose this means the 
educated people) from the "state system" or that we should allow ourselves to be 
influenced by Lord Lugard's pontificial declaration that parliamentary institutions 
are not suited to Africans. I think we should consider ways and means of marrying 
the dual political system in Africa as soon as possible. The South Africans, the French 
and the Southern Rhodesians are tackling this problem [because] they realise that 
the security of the state depends on its solution. 
J.L.K. 
3.11.39 
No matter what the Old Guard may say, you cannot turn Africa into Conan Doyle's 
"Lost World", and I feel sure that British ideas, British institutions, and British law 
are going to prevail. Indirect rule, to my mind, had much better be used as a means 
to the end of educating Africans to take their parts in those institutions than as a 
means to preserving them as interesting 'museum exhibits. 
57 CO 847/17/11, no 2 
H.G.B. 
7.11.39 
23 Nov 1939 
[Future policy in Africa]: minute by F J Pedler of a CO departmental 
meeting about the inquiries to be initiated 
[The meeting was held as a follow-up to the Carlton Hotel discussions (see 56). The 
references in the suggestions for inquiry or action are to paragraphs in the record of the 
Car! ton Hotel meeting. Pedler entered the CO in 1930 and was seconded to Tanganyika in 
1934. He was later secretary to the Commission on Higher Education in East Africa and 
the Sudan (1937), to the lord privy seal (1938) and to Lord Hailey in Africa (1939).] 
The Secretary of State emphasized the importance of the problems now to be faced in 
Africa, and expressed the hope that the inquiries which were being initiated into 
matters relating to native land tenure, native law, and the political development of 
the Native Authorities and the Legislative Councils, should be energetically pursued. 
He said that he wished to see a "seething of thought" in the African Division of the 
Office, and that even the most junior members of the Administrative Staff of the 
Division ought to be given an opportunity of thinking in terms of policy and of 
putting forward their suggestions. 
The items in the list at No. 2 were then briefly discussed one by one. It was found 
that such discussions or action as were possible or desirable on these various subjects 
were already in train, with the exception of item 4(a). The Secretary of State said that 
he would like a memorandum to be produced on this point by one member of the 
African Division, to serve as a basis for the comments and suggestions of other 
members of the Office. He added that the memorandum should not be a lengthy or 
ambitious document involving a great deal of research, but should be a plain 
statement of the ideas which are current on this question. 
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MAIN SUGGESTIONS FOR INQUIRY OR ACTION 
Inquiry 
1. (a) What is the objective of indirect rule? (paragraphs 2, 7, 24-29) 
(b) How can the development of Native Authorities and Legislative Councils in 
the same territories be harmonised? (paragraphs 2, 5, 7, 10, 21, 23, 25-38). 
2. Land policy (paragraphs 2, 8) by local inquiries centrally directed (paragraph 13) 
following a new technique of study (paragraphs 17-19). 
3. Constructive peace settlement of the Colonial question (paragraphs 2, 6, 30, 31, 
33-37). 
4. (a) Are Africans to be admitted to the major offices of Government, and to the 
administration? (paragraph 12) 
(b) Define the aims of education (paragraph 29). 
5. Law and justice 
(a) relationship between British courts and Native tribunals (paragraph 14) 
(b) procedure in native courts (paragraph 15). 
6. Effect of economic forces, e.g. 
(a) combinations of producers and (b) African labour (paragraph 16). 
7. What Government activities must suffer permanently from war-time economies? 
(paragraph 29). 
Action 
8. Send someone to Africa to investigate questions 1(a) and (b) above (paragraphs 
2, 10). 
9. Train Africans for, and make more use of them in, responsible posts (paragraphs 
2, 3, 11, 21, 32). 
10. Increase revenue by 
(a) taxation of wealthier members of communities (paragraph 3) 
(b) setting up a Department to stimulate production and commerce (paragraph 
11). 
11. Increase natives' purchasing power (paragraph 3). 
12. Increase the interest in Colonial Empire of Members of Parliament (paragraph 4) 
and of the general public (paragraph 20). 
13. Hold a quarterly debate in Parliament, limited on each occasion to some 
geographical area (paragraph 4). 
14. Take steps to create a national feeling in the dependencies (paragraph 23) . 
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58 CO 847/23/11 20 Mar 1941 
'Expansionist ambitions of the Union of South Africa': CO note for 
Lord Harlech 
1. The thrust of South African influences towards the north is causing some 
concern to the Colonial Office. The war in Africa has brought valuable aid from the 
Union which must be welcomed and encouraged. But there is a reverse to the medal: 
and the danger is that under the pressure of war necessities a situation may be 
allowed to develop which will create grave problems for the future in our African 
Dependencies. 
2. The Governor of Kenya reported in November last that in that Colony the 
Union authorities were already exercising a preponderating influence by sheer 
weight of men and money combined with rapid air communications.' Sir Henry 
Moore thought that this process was likely to gain momentum. The then Secretary of 
State, Lord Lloyd, informed Sir Henry in reply that he also had for some time been 
exercised over the possible future trend of events in Africa resulting from Union 
participation in the war effort. "My own feeling is" he went on "that while General 
Smuts retains his pre-eminent position in South Africa this development need not 
occasion concern: but a disquieting situation would clearly arise if the extreme 
Nationalist faction in South Africa should get the upper hand and seek to extend 
South African political influence to the north with a view to placing the Union in a 
dominant position north of the Zambesi". Lord Lloyd emphasised the delicacy of the 
topic and instructed Sir Henry Moore to regard this expression of opinion as having 
been sent to him in absolute confidence. 
3. The root of the problem lies in the possibility that South African Nationalism 
may, at some future time, take a strongly anti-British course. The optimists about 
the future of relations between Great Britain and South Africa may not agree with 
this view: but they proved wrong before the war when they scoffed at those who 
doubted the patriotic intentions of Mr. Pirow2 and his friends. They may prove to be 
wrong in future in thinking that the Union is likely to settle down as a loyal partner 
in the Empire. It is to be hoped that it may be so: but it would be dangerous to 
fashion our plans on that assumption and in our own colonial interests we must 
clearly keep in mind the possibility of unfavourable developments. The dissident 
forces in South Africa are inherent and powerful. History and blood will tell: and it 
may be that the fusion of two such peoples as Briton and Boer will not be an easy 
thing. 
1 To counter South African influence, Moore had suggested a quasi-ministerial appointment to 
co-ordinate economic and political activity in East and West Africa. The incumbent would need to be 
someone who could deal on equal terms with the prime ministers of the Union and Southern Rhodesia and 
with the governor-general of the Belgian Congo. Moore's proposal was discussed at an inter-departmental 
meeting between the CO and the DO. Here attention was drawn to the manner in which Imperial Airways 
had been squeezed out of the main north-south continental air route by a South African company. Lloyd, 
however, rejected Moore's idea on the grounds that co-ordination would involve the need for constant 
referral to the relevant departments-eO, DO and FO---and the service ministries in London. The CO 
decided that Union influence could more appropriately be countered by encouraging administrative and 
economic co-operation between, on the one hand, the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland, and, on the other, 
the three East African territories (CO 847/23/11, no 2A, CO note, Mar 1941). 
2 South African minister of defence. 
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4. As long as General Smuts is in charge there may be no immediate anxiety. But 
it is clear that even General Smuts looks towards the north with the eye of an ardent 
expansionist. If he should disappear from the scene we might quickly find ourselves 
confronted with a situation in which East and Central Africa were subject to powerful 
anti-British pressure which it was too late to control. The very fact that General 
Smuts is at present in power and that our war interests are leading us to co-operate 
closely with the Union may, in itself, be a danger: it may blind us to a situation to 
which we may well wake up too late. 
5. Looking at the past, British influence has been driven from the Orange River 
to the Vaal, thence to the Limpopo and from the Limpopo to the Zambesi. Should we 
not make our stand upon the Zambesi to safeguard the British north? 
6. The problem clearly calls for great diplomatic skill and political wisdom. On 
one side we must co-operate with General Smuts and foster the Union war effort. On 
the other, in doing so, we must endeavour to deflect from the north the expansionist 
danger. It is a conflict of short-term and long-term considerations which in the 
management of our relations with the Union must be balanced with great care. 
59 CO 273/667/1, no 5 20 Aug 1941 
[The Indian community in Malaya]: letter from SirS Thomas1 to Lord 
Moyne. Minute by G E J Gent 
I am grateful to you for sending me your letter dated the 12th of July with its 
enclosures on the subject of the political status of Indians overseas and I fully agree 
with the reply which on the same day you sent to Mr Amery. I shall be interested to 
see whether the Government of India will commit itself to making concrete 
suggestions for our consideration. 
Meanwhile, I think you ought to be made aware of the attitude of the Federated 
Malay States Rulers. In 1939 I set up a Committee to consider the whole question of 
the appointment of Asiatics to higher posts. In its Report the Committee drew 
attention to the claims of the Malays as opposed to other Asiatics and in sending the 
Report to the Rulers I supported these claims, but I pointed out that it would be 
unfair as well as unwise to bar all non-Malay Asiatics from such posts, and I 
suggested that it would suffice if one post in every three were regarded as reserved for 
Malays. 
I quote now from a letter from the Sultan of Selangor written on September 7th, 
1940:-
"All the rights that these people can claim are certain rights of citizenship such as 
the protection of person and property, freedom of movement and speech within 
the law. It is a matter of great surprise to me that, while in China the Chinese have 
clamoured for the return to them of foreign concessions and in India the Indians 
have been demanding not only Home Rule but also complete independence, these 
people should claim rights in a country in which they are privileged to live in 
peace and prosperity by the courtesy of the people of the country." He went on to 
1 Governor of the Straits Settlements and high commissioner for the Malay states, 1934-1942. 
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quote Ormsby Gore's Report on his visit here in 1928, how that "British influence 
became established in the Malay States not as the result of conquest or aggression, 
but at the invitation of the Rulers ... . Our position in every State rests upon 
solemn treaty obligations ... . They were, they are, and they must remain 'Malay' 
States." 
On the 21st of November, 1940, the Officer Administering the Government discussed 
the matter with the Rulers. The Sultan of Perak spoke on behalf of them all. He said 
that there is no country in the world where immigrants so completely swamp the 
people of the country and where there is such a danger of the exclusion of the 
original inhabitants from all profitable undertakings, including Government employ-
ment, by immigrants or their descendants . And there would not be the intermingling 
of races and the absorption of the immigrants into the people of the country such as 
has happened elsewhere. 
The Rulers unanimously said that on no account would they agree to any public 
pronouncement of policy, but that as a working measure they would not oppose the 
appointment of non-Malay Asiatics to higher posts if no suitable Malay was available, 
provided that their own consent was sought and unanimously obtained, that the 
proposed candidate had been born and had lived all his life in the Federated Malay 
States (excluding any period of higher education necessary in the United Kingdom or 
elsewhere), and that his father had done meritorious work here. 
I should point out here that (i) the posts referred to are in the technical 
Departments and not in the administrative service and (ii) that the Rulers consulted 
were only those in the Federated Malay States. It has for years been the rule that 
administrative posts shall be held only by Europeans of British birth or by Malays and 
the Rulers would never agree to any departure from this. As regards (ii), the Rulers of 
the Unfederated Malay States would not go as far as those in the Federated Malay 
States have done, and I have not thought it worth while to consult them. They would 
only be made uneasy and suspicious. 
I think we have been fortunate in securing this measure of agreement in the 
Federated Malay States. The Sultan of Perak is less severe than the Sultan of 
Selangor, but all that he says is perfectly true. The intensive development of Malaya, 
particularly of the Federated Malay States, in years gone by became a real danger to 
the Malay race who were in process of being dispossessed of their lands and their 
opportunities for advancement. Malay reservations have now been constituted, and it 
is the accepted policy to help Malays to take part in the administration of their 
country. We cannot go back on this: indeed, having regard to the past we might well 
argue that an extreme pro-Malay policy is justified in the Federated Malay States. 
India has no sound cause for complaint. Indians hold any number of responsible 
posts in the Railways, Veterinary, Medical, Public Works Department, Posts and 
Telegraphs, and other Departments, and there is no discrimination against them 
save that Malays have preference, given the qualifications, and that they cannot be 
members of the Malayan Civil Service or the Malay Administrative Service. This, I 
suggest, is no more than is right and proper. 
To carry out the policy of training Asiatics (especially Malays) for higher posts 
funds will be necessary, and when I sent the Report mentioned above to the Rulers I 
said that I had in mind to set aside say $1,000,000 as an Education Fund from which 
assistance could be given. It will mean that the Federated Malay States will have that 
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much less to offer to the Imperial Government as a war contribution, but I feel sure 
that no one at home will raise objections on this score. 
Minute on 59 
... The Malay Peninsula is made up, as the S. of S. knows, of (1) the Colony of the 
Straits Settlements, (2) Nine Malay States which in theory are independent 
Sovereign States under H.M.'s protection by Treaty. Of these nine, four are included 
in a Federation, viz. Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang. They constitute 
the central block of the Peninsula, and particularly include the chief rubber and tin 
producing areas. Owing to the intensity of the economic exploitation of those areas, 
British administration to ensure order and justice was virtually subsituted in those 
States for a Malay Administration, and because the Malay Rulers tended to become 
more or less a cypher in the Federated States as compared with the ruling authority 
which the Malay Rulers continued to exercise in the Unfederated States, there has 
always been a complete disinclination on the latters' part to join in the Federation. It 
was in an effort to remedy this distinction that the decentralisation policy was 
adopted on the recommendation of Sir Samuel Wilson in 1933 (Command 4276). 
The Malay Rulers have always shown themselves apprehensive that their States 
and people may be swamped by the increase and influx of the busy frugal Indian and 
Chinese immigrants. One could find such extracts from their writings and remarks 
as Sir Shenton Thomas quotes in this letter, repeatedly since the development of 
rubber before the last war which particularly brought in Indian immigrant workers, 
and going back further still in the case of Chinese immigrants who for centuries have 
exploited Malaya's tin ore. 
But a merely static policy of ignoring the undoubted interests (as well as the 
extravagant claims) of India is a barren policy and not made any more fruitful by the 
fact that it represents the traditional apprehensions of the Malay Sultans. In the case 
of the British territory of the Straits Settlements it has been recognised that any 
British subject of whatever colour has equal rights, and that the special regard for 
the Malay peoples to have a reasonable priority in political and administrative rights 
in the Malay States cannot be equally justified in the Colony of the Straits 
Settlements. 
If we are to have a right and orderly relationship between the different Empire 
territories in the East, it seems to me essential to have a progressive policy in respect 
of India and Indians. The problem is complicated, of course, by the fact that in this 
matter of Indians overseas the Government of India, Congress, and other politically 
minded circles in India find a common ground, and push their claims beyond the 
limit of reason. But the Indian community in Malaya is both numerous and 
economically important, and India is not likely to be, or could reasonably be, 
satisfied with the mere eligibility of Indians to subordinate public appointments in 
the Railway Service and other technical departments. They aspire, sometimes 
vaguely, to an improvement in the social status and civic rights of Indians residing in 
the territory and the removal of restrictions direct or indirect in the political as well 
as the economic field. 
The 1931 population figures were:-
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(1) Malaya as a whole-
Total 
4,400,000 
Malays. 
2,000,000 
(2) Federated Malay States-
Total Malays. 
2,100,000 688,000 
(3) Straits Settlements-
Total Malays. 
1,360,000 303,000 
Indians. 
625,000 
Indians. 
464,000 
Indians. 
150,000 
Chinese. 
1,700,000 
Chinese. 
922,000 
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Chinese. 
862,000 
G.E.J.G. 
23.9.41 
60 CO 865/14, no 2 30 Mar 1942 
'Some of the causes of the loss of Malaya': memorandum by H A L 
Luckham1 
As Singapore and the rest of Malaya have fallen into enemy hands, it is now necessary 
to investigate and, if possible, discover the reasons, military and non-military for this 
disaster and to see whether the lessons learnt can be used for guidance elsewhere. 
The disaster can, of course, be attributed to the shortage of men, arms, and 
equipment in Malaya and to the weakness of the allies at sea and in the air; but I am 
convinced that the faulty policies and methods of the Malayan Governments and the 
Colonial Office were important contributory causes. I do not say that with better 
policies and methods Malaya would necessarily have been saved, but with a better 
run country the conquest might have been considerably delayed and the Japanese 
advance slowed up until the arrival of reinforcements, which could halt it. 
2. It appears from the news that the Japanese were greatly assisted in their 
advance by fifth column work and by the ease with which small bodies of men were 
able to work their way round behind the British lines without being discovered or 
hindered. It is obvious that the population of the country could have played a much 
greater part in preventing these two things than it actually did. It could do this by 
finding and arresting enemy agents, by reporting the position of the Japanese and 
even by providing numbers of soldiers able to harass and delay the enemy, even if not 
sufficiently well armed to stop and destroy them. In addition, a population which had 
been better trained and disciplined might have been kept from panic, rioting and 
looting: the essential services might have been properly maintained in spite of air 
raids, and labour kept at the work of repairing roads and aerodromes and clearing up 
the devastation caused by hostile action. 
There is also the question whether Malaya could not have provided much more of 
the equipment, material, and even arms which were necessary for her own defence. 
3. The questions to be considered may be otherwise divided into the question of 
how the morale and the will of the people to defend themselves could have been 
1 Malay Civil Service from 1928. 
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strengthened and of how far the means of defence could have been improved by 
action taken within the country. The answers to these questions would vary in 
relation to each community considered, whether Malay, Chinese, Indian, or 
European; or in relation to the different classes, peasants, shopkeepers, clerks, 
entrepreneurs and others. 
4. One of the most vital necessities in the defence of any country is that there 
should be a strong spirit of patriotism and loyalty to and confidence in the rulers of 
the country. The failure to develop this was one of the major failings of the Malayan 
Governments. They did not go all out for the development of Malayan patriotism. In 
fact, I doubt whether it was considered that there was this problem to be solved. 
Furthermore, there was little effort to encourage loyalty to the Empire or to the 
ideals of the Commonwealth of Nations. 
On the other hand, most of the efforts of the Government in the Malay states 
seemed to be concentrated on developing a separatist Malay nationalism; a selfish 
nationalism which demanded a privileged position for Malays within the states, and 
more particularly power and wealth for Malays of the aristocracy, whether they 
deserved it or not. 
For this reason inefficiency and corruption were knowingly tolerated in all the 
unfederated states; immense sums were paid to the Sultans and the ruling Malay 
class in all states in allowances; and great prestige and influence given to them. In 
fact, in most states the Sultans and their Malay advisers knew how to sell their 
consent to the necessary measures of improvement in exchange for increased 
allowances or privileges, and used this form of blackmail frequently and successfully, 
while at the same time blocking all forms of reform which would appear to weaken 
their powers. It would appear that this policy was based on a naif [naive] belief that 
the principal element in patriotism was loyalty to a princely ruler, and that if the 
British Government made sure of the rulers it would be certain of the strong support 
of all Malays. 
5. This is a poor form of patriotism and could not do much to sustain the courage 
and endurance of any people in times of difficulty. Furthermore, when this 
patriotism was also based on hatred and jealousy of all non-Malays, even of Chinese 
who had been domiciled for generations within Malaya, it was a danger to the 
security of Malaya. The Malays, who were in a minority in Malaya, could not afford to 
antagonise the non-Malay majority. It was still greater folly for the Malays 
themselves to try to develop separatist tendencies in the states, to talk of Kenantan for 
the Kelantanese and Johore for the Johore Malays only. Patriotism is far stronger if it 
is built up on sacrifice and achievement; and the aim of the Government should have 
been to encourage much more vigorously than it did the distinct features of Malay 
civilisation that were developed by Malay skill and energy. A pride in Malay weaving 
was, for instance, far more valuable for Malay morale than respect for Malay Sultans, 
who had done little to deserve it. The Malays were rarely made to help themselves: far 
more often they were encouraged to lean on the Government and hope to get money 
from it, which would pay for their support or enable them to get out of working for 
the common good. 
6. This pro-Malay Government policy had its other side in its effect on the 
relations between Government and the Chinese, Indians and other non-Malays. 
Emphasis on Malay rights and privileges led to the assertion that non-Malays had no 
rights in the country, and that what advantages they got from the Government they 
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got as a form of charity. Government seemed to say to the non-Malays, "Malaya is not 
your country. You may settle here for the time being, make money and pay us taxes; 
but when we can do without you, we will do without you." It would be surprising if 
such a policy allowed patriotism to exist, even amongst people such as the East coast 
Chinese who have been domiciled there for generations. Owing to this general 
policy, I doubt whether the Malayan Governments got sufficient credit for the 
liberality which was often showed by them towards these non-Malays. 
As regards the vast numbers of immigrant labourers, Government was prepared to 
accept the fact that most of them would return to their native countries; and 
therefore little attempt was made to assimilate them. 
7. The problem which I have partially discussed above is that of the will of the 
people of Malaya to work for the country and, if necessary, defend it. The second 
problem is that of their ability to do so. It would obviously be useless for the 
population to be loyal and devoted to the Government, if it was badly organised and if 
it Jacked the education and training which would fit it to assist in the defence of the 
country. For a country to be well organised for war it must be so organised that 
decisions can be taken quickly and quickly put into effect. It is, of course, desirable 
that all interests concerned should be consulted before action is taken, if that is 
possible; but in a crisis speed is more important than consultation, particularly when 
the consultation is not for the purpose of improving the decision but only for the 
purpose of getting consent to decisions. 
8. It is quite obvious that the peacetime division of Malaya into the Straits 
Settlements, the Federated Malay States, and the six separate unfederated states, 
each with their separate Governments, would not conduce to speed in action and 
decision. That this was generally admitted was shown by the preparation of 
emergency legislation for all states vesting all powers in the Governor as soon as 
Malaya was attacked: but was it wise to wait until this happened? Malaya was in great 
danger as soon as France collapsed: the danger was greatly increased when the 
Japanese entered Indo-China, and when counter-measures including the freezing of 
Japanese assets were put into effect; yet during this time the necessity of consulting 
the different Governments, getting their assent to proposals, and passing any 
necessary legislation immensely impeded defence preparations and wasted the time 
and energy of Government officials, who should have been planning these and 
putting them into effect as quickly as possible. 
Organisation within most of the states imposed further unnecessary delays. Some 
states were much worse than others; but in all the necessity of informing, 
consulting, and persuading the Sultans and the state councils led to continual 
delays. Some of this work was necessary, but much was futile, as the Sultans and 
their councils were often unable to understand such measures and their reasons or 
to contribute criticism of any value; and in fact such consultations only gave 
openings for obstruction which were often taken. 
A most vital factor in the organisation of any country is the question whether the 
people of each locality have their own leaders, whom they are willing to follow, and 
whether these leaders are both capable and loyal. Throughout Malaya the smallest 
unit of local Government was the Mukim and these were usually in charge of 
headmen, ordinarily called Penghulus, who should know and be known by all 
persons resident in their mukims. It is amongst these men that the people of the 
countryside should have found their leaders. 
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It appears that in the fighting in Malaya one of the weaknesses of our position was 
the apathy of the local population and their failure to give assistance. Valuable 
assistance, for instance, would be given if the Malays reported all Japanese troops 
that they saw in their particular locality, and if they destroyed all articles such as 
boats or bicycles, which would be of use to the enemy. So, apparently, this 
organisation of local headmen was not of much use. Some of the reasons for this, 
which would vary from state to state, can be guessed. In Kedah, for instance, the 
headmen were not under the control of the European personnel: probably they were 
slackly supervised and their habit of obedience, so far as it existed, was owed to 
incompetent and possibly anti-British officers, who in their turn were not responsi-
ble either directly or indirectly to British officers. In Trengganu the headmen were 
badly paid, ill chosen and badly disciplined; many of them were responsible to two or 
more persons and on that account obeyed no one properly. 
In the Federated Malay States the position was probably better; but there were 
weaknesses. In Perak appointments and promotions were made by a committee of 
the State Council, which was reputed to pay attention to considerations other than 
those of efficiency in doing this work: a person of royal rank, for instance, or a 
relative of a chief would get preference. Consequently there was a tendency for the 
Penghulus to owe their loyalty not to the district officer but to persons outside the 
administrative machine. 
In Negri Sembilan the relations between the Penghulus and the numerous locally 
elected chiefs were not thought out and the two bodies of men undermined each 
other's authority. Throughout the Federated Malay States it had been the policy of 
Government to replace European by Malay district officers, and as the latter were not 
often as capable as the men whom they replaced, the hold of the Government over 
the people was to that extent weakened. 
10. The position was even less satisfactory with regard to the Indian and Chinese 
population. In some parts of the country where the population of non-Malays was 
small, they might be in fairly close contact with the headmen, and to a certain extent 
accept their leadership in times of difficulty: but the vast bulk of this population had 
no organised connection with Government. 
The officials of the Chinese Protectorate and the Labour Department were too few 
to be in close contact with the ordinary labourer and to give him guidance in 
emergency; nor were the two departments organised for this, although to a certain 
extent they did act as the Government's agents in handling non-Malays. The 
managers of estates and mines and their foreman would have some control over their 
labour forces; but the number of Europeans and other, who could be relied upon to 
give guidance in an emergency, was not many in relation to the number of labourers 
and had been further reduced by the mobilisation of the volunteer forces, in which 
many of these men were included. Besides this control of the non-Malay labour 
through managers and the Protectorate and the labour departments would not 
always work in well with the organisation for Malays. In any case the non-Malay 
population was a very shifting one and difficult to control: very many of them would 
have nowhere that they would consider to be their home in Malaya and so they would 
be peculiarly difficult to organise or to induce to take a share in the defence of 
Malaya. 
The vast floating population of towns would have very few ties and it is not 
surprising that men working in essential services did not have the courage to keep on 
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at work, when conditions became difficult. If the Municipalities had gone all out to 
provide against this contingency, they might have done a little to keep their labour at 
work; but I doubt whether the senior officers of these had much hold over them. 
11. In the states of Kedah, Johore, Trengganu, and Perlis, where some form of 
indirect rule was attempted, this policy was not intended to nor did it in practice 
strengthen the direct influence of the British officers over the population. The theory 
was that the power of [the] existing ruling Malay class would be strengthened, that 
they would be taught to rule wisely and build up their own administrative services 
and Government, and that in gratitude for this training and the independence left to 
them they would be loyal to the British Government. In practice few capable Malay 
administrators were found: inefficiency and corruption flou rished; the peasant was 
exploited as much as possible, and there was probably little loyalty to the British 
Government throughout these states. These were poor results which may have been 
due to the faulty execution of the policy or to a weakness in the policy itself. 
12. I do not know how far it would have been possible to increase the number of 
active combatants drawn from the local population or how far this would have been 
worth while. Possibly the supply of weapons and ammunition was insufficient for 
such an increase. The actual behaviour of the Malay, Chinese, and Indian volunteers 
and of the Malay Regiment and other locally raised units would be the best test of 
whether it was worth while raising troops from the local population. I think it 
probable that the disastrous shortage of labour for repairing aerodromes, roads, etc. 
damaged by bombs or shellfire might have been prevented, if labour corps had been 
raised sooner and if more labour had been under military discipline. 
13. I have mentioned the question of whether Malaya could have done more to 
manufacture war material, equipment, and arms; but I do not think that my 
knowledge of what was actually done or planned is sufficient for me to give much 
useful criticism. The fact, however, that little was done to explore the possibilities 
until a commission was appointed to report on this in the middle of 1940 reflects 
little credit on the Government. Quite a lot was done after this date which well might 
have been done earlier. 
14. In my opening paragraph I referred to the faulty policies and methods of the 
Malayan Government and in my subsequent paragraphs I have discussed some of 
these policies and their results, suggesting some measures that might have been 
taken to improve the position. I believe, however, that the most important point to 
be noticed is that such policies as existed were not systematically worked out, that 
their execution was not carefully watched and the results studied, and that they were 
not from time to time revised in the light of results or to suit changing conditions; it 
is also important to realise that on many subjects no real policy existed or that many 
matters were regulated or [? on] a number of inconsistent policies, changing with 
the officers who decided them and not because of real changes in the position. 
Responsibility for the initiation of policy or for failure to do so has in most cases 
lain with members of the Colonial Administrative Service, although from time to 
time, as in the case of the Ottawa duties, policy has been dictated by the Home 
Government; and even when this happens, it is possible for the colonial authorities 
to obtain modifications, if they put their case ably and strongly. 
15. The bad policies and bad methods to which I have referred have been to a 
great extent the result of ignorance amongst many civil servants of many facts and 
theories that directly effect policy-making and administration. There has been too 
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great a tendency amongst the Civil Service to believe that administration is a matter 
of common sense plus experience only and cannot be improved by research and 
study. They have failed to realise that theirs is a profession for which special training 
and study are just as valuable as they are for services such as the Medical Service. I 
agree that of recent years there has been some realisation of the necessity for such 
training: the courses for Colonial Administrative Service probationers show this, but 
unfortunately these courses have not included enough of economics, politics and 
kindred subjects to be of much value. 
16. This can be illustrated by one obvious instance: there are a number of canons 
of taxation generally accepted by economists; yet in the tariffs of Kelantan and 
Trengganu could be found numerous examples of taxes which broke most of these 
canons. There were taxes which were difficult to collect and gave small yields; taxes 
which were vexatious; taxes which impeded commerce and industry. Yet, although 
this was pointed out, they were not altered by the administration and proposals 
making the tariffs even more vexatious were approved by the High Commissioner 
and, I believe, passed by the Colonial Office without serious criticism. 
17. So as a first measure for the improvement of policy-making amongst civil 
servants I would suggest that a general knowledge of politics and economics should 
be insisted on for all recruits to the service, and that individual officers should be 
encouraged to become expert in special studies, such as those of taxation, indirect 
rule, unemployment, and local government; and their advice sought when policy on 
these subjects was being framed. In addition to this every colony should provide an 
up-to-date library of books on such subjects for the use of administrative officers and 
should arrange for them to be kept in touch with developments of thought and 
practice elsewhere. Research into all matters connected with colonial government 
should be subsidised and encouraged. Criticism of policy and practice by colonial 
officers should also be encouraged and suggestions for improvement welcomed. 
18. Another weakness in policy-making has been due to fear of making decisions 
and to procrastination amongst senior Government officials. I am sure that greater 
knowledge of the technique of Government would make decision easier in many 
cases; but at the same time new points for decision would appear; and therefore the 
question of increasing willingness and ability to take responsibility amongst senior 
officers should be studied. There have been two tendencies in Malaya, which must 
have done considerable harm, that towards administrative centralisation and that 
leading to withdrawal of junior officers from districts and their retention in 
secretariats. It is only as a district officer that a junior officer can usually hope to get 
much independent responsibility and learn to develop policies of his own. In addition 
to this most Residents in the Federation were unwilling to delegate enough to their 
European district officers, and the machinery of Government was not planned to give 
them wide enough powers. Local bodies for which they were responsible such as 
Sanitary Boards did not have independent budgets or have to balance expenditure 
with revenue. 
Another weakness was the principle of seniority in promotion which resulted in 
many men reaching positions of responsibility, who were not fitted for them or who 
had lost their earlier drive and enthusiasm. Particularly in times of war the same 
arguments which have been brought forward in support of the policy of reducing the 
average age of generals are equally cogent in support of a policy of reducing the 
average age of Governors, residents and heads of departments. 
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19. Most of my criticisms and suggestions are valid for peace as well as for war: 
but in war there are a number of Government objectives which gain greater 
importance, a number which lose importance and may even be disregarded. 
Administrative efficiency and close control of the population are of vital importance 
in war, and serious sacrifices of efficiency such as occurred in Malaya for the sake of 
some policy like that of indirect rule, are not justified particularly if such policies 
have brought poor results. Adherence to treaties with protected states is not of much 
use in war if this hinders the measures taken to protect these states. In such cases 
the only criterion is whether the advantages gained by measures which infringe the 
letter of the treaties are likely to be offset by serious disloyalty. The disaffection of a 
ruling class, which is effete and corrupt like the Malay ruling was in most states, 
matters very little. 
20. It is also as important in war as in peace to study how things have been done 
elsewhere and in previous wars; to study all available literature on the methods and 
policies used by states in war; to recruit for Government service men who have had 
experience of the civil side of warmaking elsewhere, and to send their own officers to 
see what happens behind the lines in other theatres of war. The study, for instance, of 
what happened to Italian labour in the Abyssian campaign might have suggested the 
measures to be taken to keep labour at work on the aerodromes and roads of Malaya 
in spite of Japanese bombs. 
21. With improvements such as I have suggested, in the training and technique 
of administrative officers it should be possible to devise more effective policies for the 
development of the colonies, for securing their safety, and for increasing the weight 
of their assistance to the Empire in time of war. The policies adopted in the colonies 
should have been much more flexible; much more effort should have been made to 
value their results so as to modify them to suit changing conditions. It has been said 
that the British Empire has been a laboratory of political experiments; but in the 
colonies these have been conducted in a thoroughly unscientific manner. Policies of 
centralisation, decentralisation, federalism, indirect rule and so on have been treated 
as ends in themselves, not as the means by which the people of a country may be led 
to rule themselves, to improve their conditions of life, and to co-operate with other 
peoples. 
61 CO 554/128/16 Apr-May 1942 
[Gold Coast administrative service] : minutes by F J Pedler and Lord 
Cranborne on Sir A Burns's proposal to appoint the first African 
assistant district commissioners in the Gold Coast 
[These minutes were written in response to a despatch which Burns sent to Moyne in Jan 
1942. The despatch explained that Burns had consulted the other British West African 
governors on his proposal to appoint the first African assistant district commissioners in 
the Gold Coast. From Nigeria, Sir B Bourdillon (gov, 1935-1942) replied that he did not 
regard the proposal as suitable for application in his own territory but he recognised that 
conditions were different in the Gold Coast. Burns's proposal might 'embarrass' the 
Nigerian government but Bourdillon stated that he was prepared 'to face this'. From 
Gambia, Sir T Southorn (gov, 1936-1947) reported that there might be 'mild repercus-
sions' but no serious difficulty. From Sierra Leone, Sir H Stevenson (gov, 1941-1948) 
replied that he was 'utterly opposed' for two reasons. First, only the Creoles in Sierra 
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Leone had the necessary academic qualifications to fill such appointments but they had 
nothing in common with 'the natives of the Protectorate'. Secondly, and of more general 
application, Stevenson argued that 'no real progress will be made in the political 
development of the British West Mrican colonies until the natives themselves take a more 
active part in developing them on lines best suited to thei r requirements'. He felt strongly 
that this result could 'best be obtained by fostering Native Administration and by 
entrusting increasing responsibilities to the Native Authorities'. Stevenson concluded 
that the appointment of Mrican assistant district commissioners would be 'a retrograde 
step and merely tend to create an Mrican bureaucracy which would be inimical to the 
natural political growth of the people'. In his own despatch, Burns dismissed Stevenson's 
arguments: 'I cannot agree that the Mricanisation of the Political Service would interfere 
with any development of Native Administrations which is now possible in the Gold Coast 
Colony' (Burns to Moyne, 31 Jan 1942, enclosing a letter from Stevenson to Burns, 2 Jan 
1942, CO 554/128/16, no 2). With Cranborne's approval, the appointments of A L Adu and 
K A Busia as the first Mrican assistant district commissioners in the Gold Coast were 
confirmed in July 1942.) 
Sir Alan Burns seeks approval for the appointment of one and possibly two Africans 
to the Administrative Service as cadets, for duty as Assistant District Commissioners 
in the Gold Coast. Suitable candidates are available. 
Several Africans in West Africa are serving in Administrative posts in the 
Secretariats. There is one precedent for a similar appointment in East Africa. In 
recent years, however, no Africans have been employed in Africa as Administrative 
Officers outside the Secretariats. In the more distant past there are precedents for 
the employment of Africans in Administrative posts in West Africa outside the 
Secretariats. The best known case is that of Mr. Henry Carr, an African, who shortly 
after the last war was Resident of the Colony of Lagos. 
The main argument against employing Africans in general Administrative Service 
has been derived from the policy of rule through the Native Authorities. It has been 
widely held that the European Administrative Service would contract and eventually 
disappear, its functions being taken over by the Native Authorities as they developed. 
On this assumption it was argued that Africans desiring to take up administrative 
work should seek the opportunity in the Native Authorities. It is believed that Lord 
Lugard supports this view generally. It received specific support in Miss Perham's 
book on Nigeria, and a favourable reference to this opinion was made in the report of 
the Commission on Higher Education in East Africa, 1937. In 1938, the Government 
of Nigeria, with the prior approval of the Secretary of State, made a statement in 
Legislative Council to the effect that Africans would not be employed in the general 
Administrative Service, for the reasons referred to above. 
In the last three or four years opinions have changed on this question. The view 
that the Native Authorities can ever take over the functions of central government 
has been generally abandoned. Their future is now generally accepted as being that of 
local Government bodies. Sir Bernard Bourdillon has expressed, during the Gov-
ernors' Conference in 1939, and more recently in private conversation in this Office, 
his own doubts about the policy which he supported in 1938. Lord Hailey 
recommends that Africans should be admitted to the Administrative Service; he 
would prefer to see them come in mainly at first as members of an "Intermediate 
Service" which would undertake subordinate administrative duties; but he recog-
nises that it would be politically unwise to attempt to form such an "Intermediate 
Service" while excluding Africans from the superior Administrative Service. The 
matter was discussed in this Office in 1939, and general support was accorded to the 
view that the time had come to appoint Africans to the Administrative Service. 
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The Gold Coast leads all the other African territories in education and political 
development, and it is reasonable that this innovation should first be made there. 
Repercussions must be expected in other African colonies; but it is felt that these can 
confidently be met, since the admission of Africans to the Administrative Service is a 
logical and essential step in the development of the African dependencies. 
Assuming that the principle is accepted, questions arise as to the salary scale and 
conditions of service of African Administrative Officers. If they are paid at the same 
rate as their European colleagues, they will be overpaid both in respect of their 
personal needs and with reference to what the Colony can afford. Sir Alan Burns' 
proposal, in the sixth paragraph of No. 7, seems to afford a practical solution.1 It is in 
the nature of a compromise and will need careful presentation when these proposals 
are publicly announced. There are precedents in Malaya for paying less to Asiatic 
Administrative Officers than to Europeans.2 The Ceylon position is not sufficiently 
clear to be of use as a precedent in the Gold Coast. The Indian precedents are 
confused and appear on the whole to be unhelpful.3 
F.J.P. 
[Apr 42] 
Sir A. Burns' proposals, as may be seen from Sir H. Stephenson's [sic] reactions, 
raise issues of the most fundamental character. Are we to train Africans to govern 
themselves, or are we to incorporate them, on a basis of equality, in the British 
Administrative system? This must lead us to further consideration, what is the 
ultimate aim of our policy towards the Colonial Empire? Do we intend to stay there 
permanently, or are we merely in the position of trustees until such time as the 
Colonial peoples "grow up" and are able to manage their own affairs without our 
tutelage? The latter, as Mr. Pedler indicates, has been the conception generally 
accepted by progressive thinkers of the last generation. But are we certain that it is 
the right conception? In the light of what has happened in India, in Burma, in Malaya 
and elsewhere in recent months, I am by no means sure. It has created an impression 
of the impermanence of British rule. We have ourselves indicated that our control is 
merely temporary and preliminary to something better. In such circumstances, can 
we expect subject peoples to co-operate with us or even to respect us? They are 
1 Burns proposed that the salary scale for African cadets, assistant district commissioners and district 
commissioners should be £335, £335, £350-£25-£600-£36-£780, which was the same as that for 
assistant colonial secretaries except for the additional year on the initial salary. African district 
commissioners would therefore reach the maximum of their scale one year later than their colleagues in 
the secretariat, but 'this scarcely matters as they will invariably be appointed at an earlier age'. 
2 Pedler later minuted (3 Apr): 'The Malaya position is that shown in the corres. on 50419/37 Straits. 
Asians, when appointed to "European posts", receive the "European" salary less 20%' (CO 554/128/16). 
3 In an earlier minute (12 Mar) on Burns's despatch, Pedler commented on Stevenson's opposition to the 
proposed appointments in the Gold Coast: 'I am convinced that the case is a bad one; to accept it would 
mean placing ourselves in a position from which we should be compelled, soon, to retreat ignominiously. 
As for Sir H. Stevenson's minor point about the Creoles, the place for them to receive administrative 
appointments is in the Colony ... .'Agreeing with Pedler, 0 G R Williams minuted on the question of 
salary: 'Ideally a much lower scale of salaries for Africans replacing Europeans would enable a West African 
Government to do more for its people with the same amount of money, but to appoint Africans for 
Administrative posts at a scale materially inferior to that of African Assistant Colonial Secretaries would 
nullify any good political effect which it is hoped otherwise to derive from the proposed policy' (CO 
554/128/16). 
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merely impatient to get on to the next stage, when they get rid of us and govern 
themselves. If we want the British Empire to endure, it is not essential that we 
should assume that it is to be a permanency, and that so far from teaching Colonial 
peoples to govern themselves, we should do the contrary, and welcome ;!ieir 
partieipation in our administration? Clearly one can lay down no hard and fast rule 
about this. In one case, we may wish to use one method: in another, another. That 
must depend on the peoples and circumstances with which we have to deal. But, 
broadly speaking, wherever there is a suitable opportunity, there is much to be said 
for dovetailing the British and indigenous elements of any Colony in the administra-
tion. That will be the effect of Sir A. Burns' proposals, which, like Sir C. Parkinson, I 
warmly welcome, including paragraph 7.4 
c. 
12.5.42 
4 Para 7 of Burns's despatch recommended that the African appointees should be accommodated in 
quarters usually provided for European officers of the same class. There would be no 'European 
reservations' or 'segregation'. 
62 CO 822/111/29 30 Apr-18 June 1942 
[East Africa]: minutes by Sir A Dawe and Lord Cranborne on the 
political implications of the Civil Defence and Supply Council 
[With the fall of Singapore in Feb 1942, East Africa assumed an important role in the 
drive to increase colonial production to replace those resources lost to the Japanese and 
to provide in particular supplies to the Middle East. In Kenya a 'Total Defence Union' was 
established as the white settlers clamoured for stronger measures to increase production 
and a greater say in how the war effort should be organised. Settler pressure led in Mar 
1942 to the creation of the Civil Defence and Supply Council which was chaired by Sir H 
Moore, the governor of Kenya, and administered by eight directors each with an allotted 
sphere (finance, agriculture, manpower, transport etc). Uganda joined the council in Apr 
and Tanganyika in June. The concern expressed by Dawe in the first of the minutes 
reproduced here was overruled at the time by Sir C Cater who, viewing the council as a 
sensible arrangement for wartime administration, minuted: 'as the needs of the war must 
be paramount, I do not think that we can pay too much attention to political 
repercussions after the war' (CO 822/111/29, minute by Cater, 1 May 1942). But as the 
area covered by the council was expanded to include the other East African territories, 
Cranborne insisted that post-war political repercussions could not be ignored.] 
1. This Council should provide a useful executive machine for dealing with the 
immediate war situation. From that point of view it is to be welcomed. 
2. But it has a long-range aspect which we must look at with our eyes open. This 
Council, to my mind, is another important step towards the subordination of the 
Executive Government in Kenya to white settler control. The white settlers aim at 
the domination of East Africa. They see that they cannot attain this by an agitation 
for the grant of responsible government. This would be an open and formal step 
which would be strongly opposed at present by Parliamentary and other opinion 
here. Even if they attained it, it would confine their powers to the small area of the 
Kenya highlands: and they would be in danger eventually of being swamped by the 
rising black tide in the rest of East Africa over which they would have no control. 
3. They are therefore trying to attain their objective by "peaceful penetration" 
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into the existing Executive Government which is formally, at any rate, in the hands 
of a Governor responsible to the Secretary of State. If they succeed in this aim it will 
suit their book very well. As they are not sectionally divided amongst themselves the 
idea of power to serve their own interests, without the inconveniences of responsible 
government, appeals to them. That appeal is increased if they can see the possibility 
of the executive power of the Kenya Government being extended over the other 
Governments in East Africa. It is, in their view, only by making their influence 
effective over a wide area that they will be able to counter the threat to their 
economic interests and racial position wihch is inherent in the "decadent sen-
timentalism" of the native policy of Westminster. 
4. The establishment of the new Council must be viewed against this back-
ground. It is part of a policy of gradual broadening down from precedent to 
precedent. It may, therefore, be expected that the Kenya Government will become 
more and more subordinate to settler influences: and I think it would be safe to 
predict that if the Secretary of State attempted to try conclusions with the Council 
on any big issue he would be riding for a fall. 
5. It may be that on a long view developments of this sort will best serve British 
interests in Africa. But it is quite clear that they represent a tendency which is in 
sharp conflict with powerful political influences in this country. 
6. The Governor ought, I think, to have consulted the Secretary of State before 
setting up the Council. He would, of course, defend it as an immediate war-time 
measure: but it is impossible to disguise its long-range political significance and its 
bearing on controversial issues. 
7. The Secretary of State has, I think, no alternative but to accept the situation. 
A.J.D. 
30.4.42 
I must record my extreme disquiet about the situation that is developing in East 
Africa. Since the formation of the Supply and Civil Defence Council in April, a step 
which was taken by the Governor of Kenya without any consultation with the 
Colonial Office, things seem to have moved at an increasingly rapid rate. There is 
ample evidence that the white inhabitants, both official and unofficial, are taking 
matters into their own hands, and that the Council is taking the form of a Cabinet, 
arrogating to itself the power to take decisions without any reference home, and 
increasingly intolerant of any guidance from the Colonial Office. So long as the 
Council confined its activities to Kenya alone, the danger, though considerable, was 
at least limited. But first of all Uganda came into line and there is now evidence that 
it is bringing within the sphere of its control Tanganyika also. It seems to me that 
immediate action is necessary if the position is to be held. If we dally, we shall be 
faced with what is in effect a white self-governing Dominion, backed by the whole 
force of white public opinion. 
In my view, the Governor of Kenya cannot be absolved from responsibility for the 
situation that has developed. In particular, he should certainly have consulted us 
before agreeing to the setting up of the Supply and Civil Defence Council. He must 
have known the state of public opinion in Kenya, and should have foreseen the 
far-reaching nature of the step which he was taking. But in fact we were told 
nothing. Nor is it any excuse to say that he had had insufficient guidance from here. 
320 CHAPTER 3 [63) 
He should have asked for guidance urgently, when he saw how things were going, in 
the local press and elsewhere. In the circumstances, it is for consideration whether 
he and the other East African Governments should not in future be asked to 
telegraph a weekly resume of the press, as is done to the Dominions Office by our 
High Commissioners in the various Dominions. 
In any case, we should, I am sure, get him home for consultation as soon as is 
practically possible, or the situation will get completely out of hand. It is suggested 
that a letter should be sent to him. I should have preferred a telegram. If it is thought 
that that would lead to too much disturbance, I would be prepared to consider a 
letter, though we were not so delicate in summoning Sir H. MacMichael back from 
Palestine, where the situation is equally difficult. But, at any rate, the letter should 
make it clear that there must be no unnecessary delay in his coming. 
c. 
18.6.42 
63 CO 825/35/2, no 1 [June 1942] 
[The loss of Malaya]: letter from A S Haynes1 to G E J Gent defending 
the pre-war record of British administration in Malaya [Extract] 
Some of the stuff said inside and outside the House lately about our Colonial 
Administration and the behaviour of Colonial peoples in warfare has needed 
correction (a mild word). I am glad to say that I was asked to give a talk at Oxford in 
April, did so gladly and gave some corrections. With all modesty I think I can say that 
they were thoroughly appreciated; and a letter from the Chairman just received says 
they were "very grateful for your lecture, which was much enjoyed and best sign of 
all talked about for some days afterwards". I did not mince words. 
We cannot allow these things to go by default. The fighting part of it is a matter for 
the fighting services; anyone not knowing facts cannot speak ('tho naturally one has 
views). 
One thing I can and did say: our administration in Malaya has had the admiration 
of the whole world. When I was Chairman of that International Commission in 19362 
and subsequently at the 1937 Conference in Java, the praise given to our administra-
tion was almost embarassing [sic]; and in considering other Countries, a common 
remark was that of course they could not be expected to come up to the standard in 
British Malaya. 
At the same time there are defects; and I was always a critic of some of them. I 
shall not forget the pertinent question put to me in English at Bangkok in 1936 by a 
very intelligent Siamese: "As regards your administration in the F.M.S. is it in the 
interests of the people of the country?" 
One very notable accomplishment, of permanent value, must be mentioned: our 
system of peasant proprietorship of lands, best seen perhaps in Kelantan and 
1 Retired Malayan civil servant and lecturer in Malay at Oxford for the Colonial Administrative Service 
course since 1935. 
2 Haynes toured Asia as chairman of a League of Nations Commission on Rural Hygiene in the Far East in 
1936. 
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mentioned in one or two of my annual reports. It needs someone who has lived side 
by side with it and had the job of administering it to describe it in the right terms. 
One would like to face some of those people who have talked the rot about our 
administration having no roots in the hearts of the people. What people? 88% of the 
people of Singapore and 43% of the people of Malaya were born in other countries; 
their homes, parents, wives, children are mainly in other countries- and so are their 
hearts. They come to grab, under the justice and security of our administration, the 
riches of Eldorado which we have made available to them. Imagine for a moment the 
confusion, the Babe!, if 88% of the people in England had their homes in other 
countries and all talked their own languages, with schools, press, books all in their 
own separate tongues. No one has stopped to think of this. Population of Malaya 5 
million (only half Malays); Java 45,000,000 home zealous. One thing I do hope; that 
there will be no attempt so to unify people according to the accident of geography as 
to suppress the identity of the small unit. Our Western ears are not generally close 
enough to the ground to catch, unmingled, the sounds from the hearts (not 
necessarily the lips) of an Eastern peasantry. A centralised efficiency cannot be our 
aim; the life of the small unit is too valuable. I was glad to read Lord Moyne in the 
Lords (Times 7/5/42) and the Times leader of 7/5/42 (Colonial Reforms) .... 
PS. I see London University is doing something about colonial study and research. 
I wonder if Oxford is. They must do something. They have now, as regards Malaya, 
the nucleus of a good collection of Malayan books, and I hope to get this added to 
from time to time. 
64 CAB 2111370 8 June 1942 
'The appointment of the Cabinet minister resident in West Africa': CO 
publicity note on Lord Swinton's appointment 
It has been felt for some time past that the situation in West Africa demanded the 
establishment of a high representative of His Majesty's Government to ensure the 
effective co-operation in the prosecution of the war of all Services, civil and military, 
in West AMca. Before the war the problems which arose in the British Dependencies 
in that area were the normal matters of colonial administration. After the fall of 
France a new situation began to develop. There was a complete change in the 
strategical picture: and the necessary military measures widely affected the life of our 
Dependencies. There arose at the same time the question of supplying the territories 
from outside and that of producing their indigenous resources to the best purpose 
for the war effort. These activities have transformed West Africa into an important 
field of action for many of the Home Departments. In addition to the three Service 
Departments, the Ministries of War Transport, Food and Supply have become 
engaged in important operations there. The interplay between the Free French 
territories, the Belgian Congo and our own Dependencies have, at the same time, 
created many new problems in that part of the world. It is also obvious that the 
importance of the area has been enhanced since the entry of the United States into 
the war. 
The new Minister will be charged with the duty of co-ordinating these new and 
varied functions of government. He will be empowered to settle promptly on the spot 
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matters within the Government's general policy: and he will give broad political 
guidance to the local authorities, both civil and military. He will be in a position to 
give directions to the four Civil Governors on all matters relating to the war. 
It will be seen that the appointment corresponds broadly to that of the Minister of 
State in Cairo. This appointment has proved most successful, and has shown the 
great advantage of having a Minister of Cabinet rank serving abroad who can resolve 
complex questions in which several Home Departments are involved. 
The creation of the new office is a war-time expedient, and its purpose is to meet 
war-time necessities. It has no long-range political significance. There will be no 
constitutional change entailed in the four Colonies of Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Sierra 
Leone and the Gambia. These will remain under their own Governors: and the 
Governors on all normal questions of colonial administration will continue to 
function as heretofore under the authority of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
It will be recalled that Lord Swinton was himself Secretary of State for the 
Colonies between 1931 and 1935. The combination of his experience in that office 
and in the other Cabinet offices which he has held will clearly be of special value in 
his new post: and he will be particularly well fitted to act as an interpreter of His 
Majesty's Government to West Africa and of West Africa to His Majesty's Govern-
ment. 
Lord Swinton is retaining the chairmanship of the United Kingdom Commercial 
Corporation. An acting Chairman will be appointed to the Corporation during his 
absence. 
65 CO 967/57, no 1 July 1942 
'A federal solution for East Mrica': memorandum by Sir A Dawe 
Part I. Background 
1. Is a federal solution possible for East Africa? The purpose of this paper is:-
( a) To set out some of the considerations relating to this question; and 
(b) To outline a possible scheme of federation. 
General African background 
2. The general African background against which the problem has to be viewed 
suggests that a marked transformation is taking place. Forces released by the war are 
gathering great velocity: and it seems possible that the present decade may see 
changes throughout the African continent greater than those which, in the past, 
have been achieved during the passage of centuries. 
The old 19th Century conceptions are dead. The African territories can no longer 
be regarded as appendages of the European Powers: and it would now no longer be 
possible to dispose of their affairs in the arbitrary manner of the Berlin and Brussels 
Acts. There is a movement of organic life working up from the African soil: and the 
immigrant and indigenous populations are rapidly becoming imbued with a sense of 
their own political rights, destiny and power. 
In the British Colonies it seems that there will be an increasing urge towards the 
self-government which colonial peoples, under the British system, have been led to 
expect. These forces are not likely to be contained for long by any policy of material 
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development and social welfare directed from London. Improved health services and 
education will not be accepted by these peoples as a substitute for the freedom to 
develop according to their own political consciousness. 
The problem before the British Government, therefore, is to find a method by 
which these inexorable African forces can be reconciled with future British interests. 
How are we to bind these people to us in such a way that their moral and material 
sources of strength will continue to be ranged on the side of Great Britain? It is to be 
expected that after this war this Island will be much exhausted and weakened by its 
long ordeal. It will be natural that, when we are weak at the centre, the territories 
overseas which are still bound to us by the old Crown Colony relationship will seek to 
improve their position and to obtain a wider measure of control over their own 
affairs. To surmount this danger period should not be beyond our capacity: but there 
will be stubborn obstacles to success and it will require much wisdom and 
statesmanship. The greatest obstacle may well be here and not overseas. In the 18th 
Century, George Ill and Lord North lost a continent: and it is yet possible that Great 
Britain may lose another in the 20th Century. 
3. In East Africa, the political problem turns at present upon one main question. 
Is it possible to resolve the conflict of forces between the settlers and the advocates in 
Great Britain of a pro-native policy? Though this is a dominant issue, it is far from 
being the only one. It is necessary to keep in mind three other prominent factors. 
First, there is the possible influence upon the Kenya question of the white population 
to the south, particularly that in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Secondly, 
there are the 60,000 Indians in Kenya who, though relatively quiescent now, may, at 
any moment, be galvanized into activity. They may well be in future the irreconcil-
able element in any proposals based upon a compromise between the other forces. 
Last, there are some 12,000,000 Africans in East Africa, 3,000,000 of whom are in 
Kenya. This population is backward and so far silent. The advocacy of its interests has 
been undertaken by others: but its political consciousness is stirring and may rapidly 
come into full life. It will then have the advantage of numbers over the other and at 
present more powerful racial elements. The white man's present difficulties may be 
the black man's opportunity. 
The power of the settlers 
4. In theory, the Secretary of State for the Colonies controls the Kenya 
Government. He appoints the Governor and the principal officials. He can issue 
instructions to the Governor: and through him can control the official majority in 
the Legislative Council. But these theoretical powers have for long been subject to 
sharp limitations. Like the Barons in the 12th Century, the settlers have constructed 
strong bulwarks against the power of the central government. This distinction 
between the theoretical and the practical gives rise to dangerous misconceptions in 
Great Britain, particularly among the "pro-native" critics of the Kenya administra-
tion. Why does not the Secretary of State instruct the Governor to pass a law 
restoring to the Masai the lands taken from them in the Highlands? An equivalent 
question relating to Great Britain might be: Why does not the King issue an 
Order-in-Council abolishing the trade unions? It is admittedly not easy to under-
stand why the British Parliament should find difficulty in imposing its will upon a 
small community of 20,000 British settlers. To get to the essence of the matter it is 
necessary to look into history. 
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Threat of armed rebellion in 1923 
5. Magna Carta year for the settlers was 1923. During that year the settlers 
delivered a blow at the prestige of the British Government in Kenya from which it 
has never recovered. In 1922, Mr. Edward Wood (now Lord Halifax) and Lord 
Winterton, the then Parliamentary Under-Secretaries at the Colonial Office and India 
Office, were asked to propose a settlement of differences which had arisen between 
the European and Indian communities in Kenya. The Indians, as the larger 
community, were claiming a greater voice in the affairs of the Colony. The European 
community, fearing Indian predominance in the future, strongly opposed the Indian 
claims. Mr. Wood and Lord Winterton examined the matter in Whitehall and issued a 
report known as the "Wood-Winterton Agreement". They recommended that the 
European and Indian representatives in the Kenya Legislative Council should be 
elected upon a common electoral roll. This recommendation was received by the 
settlers with an astonishment which only yielded to a wave of intense indignation. 
They saw in it an attempt by the Government of India and the India Office to secure 
Indian predominance in Kenya. They were determined that at all costs the 
Wood- Winterton plan should be rejected. 
The British Government, influenced by Indian considerations and overrating their 
power of intervention in Kenya, were anxious to secure its acceptance. The settlers 
were resolved not to submit to dictation from Downing Street. They decided to 
organise a military force and, if necessary, to resist by armed rebellion. A Vigilance 
Committee was established. The country was divided into districts: and supplies and 
military equipment were organised. Plans for mobilization were prepared. Among 
the settlers there were a large number of ex-soldiers, including many senior officers. 
The rebel organisation had, therefore, many trained leaders and much military 
experience at its disposal. These men were prepared to sacrifice their military 
pensions. All the settlers, and not merely those who had spent a life-time in the 
service of the Crown, accompanied their preparations by strong protestations of their 
loyalty to the Throne. Their potential rebellion was directed not against the King but 
against Downing Street. 
6. The British Government awoke, not without surprise, to the realities of the 
situation and saw that they were in danger of drifting into a position similar to that 
in Ulster in 1914. The Governor of Kenya and the leaders of the settlers, including 
Lord Delamere, were invited to London to confer with the Duke of Devonshire, the 
then Secretary of State. In the result, the Wood-Winterton plan and the common 
roll proposals were abandoned. The British Government retreated: and the views of 
the settlers carried the day. 
The question of federation 
7. The presence of this intractable settler element in Kenya has led to many 
attempts to find a system of government which would reconcile their aspirations 
with those of the larger communities of Africans and Indians. As a means of resolving 
the conflict plans for federation have often been considered. 
Sir Edward Grigg, when Governor (1925--1931), was asked to consider the matter 
by Mr. Amery, the then Secretary of State. Early in 1927 he put forward a scheme for 
closer union which included a Federal Council for East Africa as a whole. Sir Edward 
Grigg's main thesis was that, to meet the economic needs of the country, a central 
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authority was necessary. It was also desirable to co-ordinate and control all 
communications and transport services, the Customs system, defence and research. 
These were matters of straightforward administration. On the political side, things 
were more complicated. Uganda was a collection of native states: Tanganyika was 
governed under a Mandate: and Kenya was a Crown Colony with an electoral system 
giving big political privileges to the European minority. Sir Edward Grigg regarded it 
as axiomatic that no federal scheme would work if it aroused strong opposition from 
any powerful section of the population. He felt that it was inevitable that the settlers 
would strongly oppose any proposals to diminish their preponderating influence. If 
there was any question of detracting from their position in one direction, there 
would have to be some attractive compensating advantages in others. 
Appointment of Hi/ton Young Commission 
8. Sir Edward Grigg's proposals were considered by a sub-committee of the 
Cabinet. It was decided to send an independent Commission to East Africa to draw up 
a scheme for closer union. This decision was announced in July 1927 in a White 
Paper entitled "Future Policy in regard to Eastern Africa" (Cmd. 2904). It is useful to 
quote the Commission's Terms of Reference as the fundamental issues remain much 
the same:-
(1) To make recommendations as to whether, either by federation or some other 
form of closer union, more effective co-operation between the different Govern-
ments in Central and Eastern Africa may be secured, more particularly in regard to 
the development of transport and communications, customs tariffs and customs 
administration, scientific research and defence. 
(2) To consider which territories could either now or at some future time be 
brought within any such closer union, and, in particular, how best to give effect to 
Article 10 of the Mandate for Tanganyika Territory, which provides that the 
mandatory may constitute the Territory into a customs, fiscal and administrative 
union or federation with the adjacent territories under its own sovereignty or 
control, provided always that the measures adopted to that end do not infringe the 
provisions of the Mandate. 
(3) To make recommendations in regard to possible changes in the powers and 
composition of the various Legislative Councils of the several territories (a) as the 
result of the establishment of any Federal Council or other common authority; (b) 
so as to associate more closely in the responsibilities and trusteeship of Govern-
ment the immigrant communities domiciled in the country; and (c) so as 
ultimately to secure more direct representation of native interests in accordance 
with (4) below. 
(4) To suggest how the Dual Policy recommended by the Conference of East 
African Governors (i.e. the complementary development of native and non-native 
communities) can best be progressively applied in the political as well as the 
economic sphere. 
(5) To make recommendations as to what improvements may be required in 
internal communications between the various territories so as to facilitate the 
working of federation or closer union. 
(6) To report more particularly on the financial aspects of any proposals which 
they may make under any of the above headings. 
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Hilton Young recommendations 
9. The Commission was composed of Sir Hilton Young (Lord Kennet), Sir George 
Schuster, Sir Reginald Mant and Mr. J. H. Oldham. They did not report until January 
1929. The Commission proposed the establishment of a Governor-General for 
Eastern Africa to be endowed with wide powers of supervision and control. He was to 
co-ordinate all services of common interest: and in particular to "direct the course of 
native policy and to supervise its working". He was to have, for general purposes, a 
small Advisory Committee of officials and non-officials of the three Dependencies. 
The report held out no hope of responsible government for the settlers or of any 
increase of their powers in the Legislative Council. 
Bad reception in Kenya 
10. The scheme had a bad reception in Kenya. The settlers perceived that the 
wide powers given to the Governor-General under the scheme would be likely to 
undermine the strong political position which they had built for themselves. 
11. The Indians, who were anxious only to obtain the common roll, were 
unfriendly to any scheme for closer union. The natives of Uganda saw a threat to the 
special position of their native states and felt that closer union would mean 
domination by Kenya. It was clear that the Hilton Young scheme must follow the 
Wood-Winterton plan into the limbo of disappointed hopes. Mr. Amery hurriedly 
despatched Sir Samuel Wilson, the permanent head of the Colonial Office, to East 
Africa in the hope that he would be able to reason with the local parties and to save 
some shreds of the federal idea. Sir Samuel was instructed to discuss the Hilton 
Young recommendations with all those affected locally with a view to seeing how far 
it was possible to find a basis of general agreement. He was to find out on what lines a 
scheme for closer union would be administratively workable and otherwise accept-
able. Mr. Srinivasa Sastri was appointed by the Government of India to go to Kenya 
to assist the Indian communities in presenting their views to Sir Samuel Wilson. 
Sir Samuel Wilson s report 
12. Sir Samuel was successful in abating some of the antagonism which had been 
created. He was finally able to draw up a federal scheme with which all sections of the 
three Dependencies, with the exception of the Kenya Indians, were prepared to 
concur. There was to be a High Commissioner assisted by a Federal Council with an 
official majority on which all three territories were to be represented. The Kenya 
Legislature was to be remodelled on a complicated system of four groups, none of 
which was to have a majority. It is legitimate to doubt whether this complicated 
mechanism would ever have stood the strain of day-to-day life: but its great 
achievement was that it did, for the first time, represent a scheme of federation 
which secured a wide, though not unanimous, measure of local approval. But the 
matter was not to be put to the test as, by the time the Wilson Report was presented, 
a Labour Government had come into power in England: and after a period of 
procrastination the Wilson plan took its place in the Valhalla reserved for extinct 
Kenya projects. 
The White Paper of 1930 
13. Yet another plan was propounded in 1930. His Majesty's Government issued a 
further White Paper-"Statement of the Conclusions of His Majesty's Government in 
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the United Kingdom as regards Closer Union in East Africa", (Cmd. 3574). This 
outlined a scheme for a High Commissioner with very wide powers, particularly for 
the protection of native interests, to be established over Kenya, Tanganyika and 
Uganda. He was to be assisted by a nominated Council of 21 members, official and 
unofficial-7 for each of the three Dependencies. The Kenya Legislative Council was 
to remain substantially unchanged and the official majority was to be retained. It was 
stated, with regard to the franchise for the Council, that "His Majesty's Government 
are of the opinion that the establishment of a common roll is the object to be aimed 
at and attained, with an equal franchise of a civilization or education character open 
to all races." These proposals, which were regarded by the settlers as having been 
dictated by the India Office, provoked a further storm of controversy: and the matter 
was finally shelved when the whole question of closer union was referred to a Joint 
Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament. 
The Joint Select Committee 
14. The rapid succession of Commissions of Inquiry and of White Papers had 
produced an unfortunate feeling of confusion and uncertainty in East Africa. The 
local communities could obtain no clear conception of the attitude of His Majesty's 
Government to issues which vitally affected their future. They felt that their interests 
were being sacrificed to the chances and controversies of British Party politics. The 
constant vacillations and delays were undermining all respect for the Home 
Government. It was hoped that the establishment in London of a Joint Select 
Committee, composed of members of all Parties in Parliament, to examine East 
African problems in the heart of the Empire might lift them above Party and lay 
down for the future some continuous and permanent principles of policy. The Joint 
Select Committee sat from December 1930 until September 1931. It took oral 
evidence from 51 witnesses, including officials and unofficials, representing all the 
communities in East Africa. In addition, it received a large number of memoranda. 
The key-passage of its Report was as follows:-
"The Committee have weighed the broad arguments on the whole question and 
have considered various schemes submitted to them. Without pronouncing 
categorically between them or prejudging future developments, they feel unable to 
recommend the adoption, at the present time, of any scheme in preference to the 
existing system of government, on unitary lines, for the Colony as a whole. At the 
same time they consider that careful study should be made of the various valuable 
suggestions which have been laid before the Committee, so that, if at any future 
date, the adoption of an alternative system of government should be deemed 
desirable, full knowledge of the methods that have been proposed should be 
available." (Paragraph 86). 
The illumination cast upon the problem by this weighty body was little greater 
than that afforded by lesser luminaries. In this cloudy compromise between party 
tenets there was no clear guidance for people overseas. But one thing could be 
perceived-there was faint prospect of the British Parliament agreeing to a unitary 
state for East Africa. 
15. Since 1931 there have been no reports upon major policy. His Majesty's 
Government appears to have been no longer attracted by the search for consciously 
expressed solutions of the intractable problems of Kenya. The matter has been left to 
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the natural forces of evolution. The settlers have never dropped entirely their 
demand for closer union: and it has continued to be advocated from time to time by 
their leaders in public utterances and communications to the Secretary of State. But 
since the death of Lord Delamere, in 1931, the subject has not been agitated with the 
same persistence as during earlier years. It would appear that the main object of the 
settlers has been, as a first step towards wider aspirations, to secure effective control 
over the Executive Government of Kenya. They have made big advances in that 
direction: and being apparently not too dissatisfied with the reality of their power 
they have been ready to wait for an appropriate moment when they could force the 
British Government formally and constitutionally to ratify their position in Kenya. 
The next big step would no doubt be to extend their influence over the neighbouring 
British Dependencies and eventually establish the White Dominion through the 
whole of East Africa. 
Pro-settler policy of secretaries of state and local governors 
16. The policy of the home authorities has been one of appeasement and 
conciliation. With the lesson of 1923 in mind they appear, in general, to have avoided 
any head-on clash with the settlers. There has only been one case in which a major 
dispute arose. This was over the question of income tax, which Lord Swinton, then 
Secretary of State, wished to introduce in Kenya. The settlers were determined not to 
have it: and Lord Swinton, after a somewhat electrifying controversy, decided like 
the Duke of Devonshire before him that he must bow to the storm. Difficult 
questions in general have been avoided or shelved. The doctrine of the paramountcy 
of native interests, enunciated by the Duke of Devonshire in 1923 (Cmd. 1922) as a 
way out of the European-Indian impasse, has in Kenya become an unreal figment. 
The policy pursued by Mr. Amery and Sir Edward Grigg was very sympathetic to 
settler aspirations. Lord Harlech, when Secretary of State (1936-1938) also set a 
markedly pro-settler course. Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, whom he appointed 
Governor (1937- 1940), was commonly regarded as the "settlers' nominee": and it 
would be difficult to point to any action taken during his regime which would have 
given the settlers any reason to repent of their choice. The fitful advocacy of the 
native point of view in England does not appear to have opposed any effective 
obstacle to the steady pressure which, quietly upon the spot, the settlers have been 
able to bring to bear on the local government. 
Settler influence increased by the war 
17. The move towards settler domination has been much speeded up by the 
war. The Italian campaign in East Africa threw a big strain on the life and economy of 
Kenya. The pressure has been increased by the entry of Japan into the war, the loss of 
the Far Eastern Colonies and the threat to the Indian Ocean. The needs of the Middle 
East for manpower and supplies have, at the same time, called for great efforts. The 
settlers, who always show up well in time of war, have made a magnificent response. 
They have joined up in large numbers while their women-folk have been running the 
farms. In the civil sphere it has been essential for the Government to seek their 
co-operation to carry out the widely extended activities imposed upon it by the war. 
The services of farmers and business men have been enlisted to man the network of 
Boards and Controls which have become necessary in Kenya as in Great Britain. The 
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process of co-operation between the official and unofficial British communities has 
been as unavoidable as, in time of war, it has been natural. 
The establishment of the Civil Defence and Supply Council 
18. But it has been inevitable that the settlers should look beyond these 
immediate necessities and see in the war a chance of quickening up the processes 
which, for a generation, have been working in the direction of the White Dominion. 
The latest development has been the recent creation of the Civil Defence and Supply 
Council. This Council is a mixed body of officials and unofficials presided over by the 
Governor. Ostensibly, it is an informal and advisory body: and its establishment has 
entailed no change in the constitutional instruments of the Colony. The Council has 
been joined by Tanganyika and Uganda. At the same time, though independently of 
this development, the Governor of Kenya has been given in certain defence matters 
the power to override the Governors of Tanganyika and Uganda. To the settlers these 
events must appear as a further example of the beneficient working of evolution in 
their affairs. They must hope that this desirable piece of war-time machinery will 
prove to be the engine of policy which by its unobtrusive working will make the 
White Dominion an accomplished fact, beyond the power of the British Government 
to modify. 
Dilemma of home authorities 
19. The home authorities are placed in a difficult dilemma. The events in Kenya 
are obviously shaping in a way which is in conflict with the doctrines on native policy 
accepted in Parliament here. The process has been a gradual one: and its significance 
has probably escaped many who would strongly oppose it. When the true position is 
realised they may be galvanised into activity. 
20. What can the Secretary of State do? Can he, by the issue of instructions to the 
Governor, reverse or limit the tendencies at work? Is it possible for the British 
Parliament still to make its will felt in opposition to the white settlers? This is the 
essential issue: and it is very difficult to disentangle it in advance of the events which 
may produce the crisis. 
21. It seems likely that the settlers, from patriotism and interest, would be 
unwilling to provoke a big issue with the British Government in present war 
conditions: so long as the British Government, on its side, refrains from provocative 
action. It does not, for example, seem likely that they would wish at present to 
attempt anything in the nature of a coup d'etat. As loyal British subjects they would 
prefer to attain their object in the proper form of law when the time is ripe. But it 
cannot be assumed that this view will necessarily hold throughout the war. The 
chances of war are many: and it is impossible to foresee anything a few months 
ahead. Kenya is an inflammable country; and the combined strain of a tropical 
climate and a long war might eventually lead to an outburst. If some disaster 
occurred, or there was some drastic decline in the prestige of the Government at 
home, the settlers might take the law into their own hands. This is an extreme 
possibility which it is necessary to take into account only because of the hazardous 
conditions of the moment. It would be repugnant to strong and loyal elements 
among the settlers: and they would hardly associate themselves with such a course, 
unless events convinced them that it was a public duty to do so. 
22. The main point to be kept in mind by the British Government is the difficulty 
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that they would be in if matters were carried to the ultima ratio of physical force. The 
lesson of 1923 is always there: and the settlers would be a much sterner proposition 
now than they were at that time. It is possible now that many of the British officials 
would come out on their side: which would not have happened in 1923. But it seems 
unthinkable that any British Government would bring military force to bear upon a 
community of our own blood who have supported the British cause splendidly in this 
and the last war and are intensely loyal to the Crown. It is only necessary to consider 
the idea to reject it. A British Government in sending white troops to fight the white 
settlers would be running great risks. For one thing it is possible that the troops 
might refuse the duty. In 1923 the possibility of using black troops was in mind. But 
that now would clearly be inconceivable. It does not seem likely that the South 
African Government or the Southern Rhodesian Government would be prepared to 
allow white men in Africa to be coerced by black troops. Any such suggestion would 
create the gravest repercussions in Africa which might fatally impair any further 
control over that continent from this Island. 
The South African influence 
23. The South African factor in East African affairs is new. The framers of the 
earlier schemes for closer union do not appear to have attached weight to it. But 
since the war it has become a consideration which may have a decisive effect. That 
South Africa should have aspirations towards the north is a natural development. 
The great contribution made by the Union to the war effort in North and Eastern 
Africa has given them a practical form. The presence of Union troops in Kenya during 
the Italian campaign, and the continual passage of South Africans through Kenya to 
the Libyan front, has had a marked effect. The British settlers and officials have now 
had some years of contact with South Africans and a certain sympathy has appeared 
between them. They have a common African consciousness. They feel alike that in 
Africa there is waiting almost a whole continent for new development by the white 
man. They also share the belief that at a future date Africa is going to shape its own 
destinies and will gradually shake itself free from outside control. There are strong 
elements among the British in Kenya, who see in South Africa the ally which will 
enable them to break away from the trammels of Westminster and Downing Street. 
They are turning to this powerful ally to safeguard themselves against the rising 
black tide and the menace of British native policy. 
The Union Government are watching this growth with a correct and cautious 
attitude. General Smuts, in his speeches, suggests various visions for the future . 
Clothed in vague and impecccable language, these have all the charm of detached 
metaphysical speculation. At the same time, he takes every occasion to improve his 
contacts with the British Dependencies. He passes through them on his visits to 
Egypt; and he has entertained many of the Governors at Irene. The Union 
Government representatives in the British and foreign countries to the North are 
becoming more and more active and influential. The "United States of Africa", 
"Fuller co-operation with the north", are phrases in use at Pretoria. Behind this 
rather vague talk and activity there are other forces at work. The Johannesburg 
magnates feel that they would be well-fitted to develop the mineral and other wealth 
in the North: and they would regard closer South African control over the 
copper-mines of Northern Rhodesia and of the Katanga as an advantage to 
civilisation. It is difficult to assess the strength of these forces. But after the South 
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African contribution to the war it will be not unnatural that the Union should expect 
to receive at the Peace a reward in tangible form. An extension of South African 
political control to the north would be very acceptable to many elements, official and 
unofficial, in the British communities in East and Central Africa. If the Union were 
peopled like Australia or New Zealand this outcome, despite the native question, 
might be welcome also in this country as the best means of binding Africa to the 
British Commonwealth. But as things are, there would be many who feel that the 
future in South Africa is so uncertain that a solution on these lines would, from the 
standpoint of British interests, be too much of a gamble. 
The Kenya settlers ripe for self-government? 
24. If the white community in the Kenya Highlands could be considered in 
isolation from the native question, we should, according to normal British ideas, 
now be approaching a point where relief from an intolerable situation would be 
found in the grant of self-government. A constitution on Southern Rhodesian lines 
would be the obvious next step. Such a solution would be indicated by the whole 
history of British settlement overseas from the time of Lord Durham's Report to the 
Statute of Westminster. The settlers in the Highlands have created homes in a new 
land in a way which is a remarkable tribute to their endurance and capacity. They 
have all the energies and instinctive ideas of the most advanced civilizations of 
Europe. They have also the traditional qualities of independence of their race. They 
look to a political evolution according the to innate sentiments of the British 
tradition. These aspirations are strongly reinforced by special circumstances. They 
are a white enclave among millions of Africans. They have before them the fear that 
their efforts to found a home in the Tropics may be defeated: and that the wealth 
which they have created will be denied to their children. The physical effects of an 
equatorial climate add a note of feeling and excess to their Anglo-Saxon independ-
ence. They naturally chafe at what is left of Colonial Office control. The Colonial 
Office is bitterly unpopular among them: as was the old Colonial Office in the 19th 
Century among the Anglo-Saxon populations which have now grown up into the 
Dominions. The continuance of a shadowy and uneasy Downing Street regime 
creates an unhappy situation on both sides. The control is as ineffective as it is 
harmful to the prestige in East Africa of the British Government. Lord Harlech, after 
his study of the East African problem on the spot, supported the settlers' claim to 
increased responsibility. "It is not possible", he said, "in the twentieth century to 
govern people by the use of an official majority 6,000 miles away as it was in the old 
days". To disregard the convictions of the colonists, he said, "would be one of the 
worst failures in British colonial history." Lord Salisbury, in 1895, said "I do not 
think that our government (i.e. the Home Government) is of much advantage to the 
Englishmen who go into a new country. Almost everything that is done at home is 
apt to hinder them; and though we have officers unparalleled in the world, they come 
generally with their hands tied to their sides with red tape. . . . I do not think 
Governments aid our people much when they go into the possession of a new 
territory." 
Dangers of increasing central control 
25. There is a final point to add. It would be a grave misconception to think that the 
recent display of interest in the Colonies by the British public and Parliament will be 
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universally welcome in Africa. It will arouse apprehensions among strong African, as well 
as European, elements that this new interest may express itself in more interference by 
boards and bodies in London and by the central Colonial Office bureaucracy. A 
centrifugal reaction will be produced which will be all the more dangerous as it comes at 
a moment when the war is releasing powerful forces in the same direction. Those who 
wish to break away will be anxious to do so while there is yet time: and, in the war, they 
will see their opportunity. Even if administration from the centre meant efficiency, 
which they would not admit, they would prefer liberty to efficiency. 
Part /1. Outline of a federal scheme 
1. As is shown in Part I, the federal idea has been often examined. Apart from the 
schemes mentioned there, various other proposals have been made. All these 
schemes, owing to changed conditions, are now out-of-date. 
2. The scheme suggested below differs from all previous projects. It is only 
possible to sketch it in skeleton outline. It raises many issues, which, for full 
treatment, would require much research and time. Inquiries on the spot would be 
essential before the bare bones could be clothed with flesh and blood. 
3. Skeleton outline 
(i) The scheme covers East Africa, i.e. Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda. 
(Zanzibar would eventually have to come in: but that is a side issue). The area 
covered by these territories is some 800,000 square miles. Their total 
population is something over 12,000,000. Previous federal schemes have 
covered East and Central Africa: i.e. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 
addition. But it would be difficult to propose now a scheme embracing these 
two Central African territories. 
Five provinces 
(ii) The East African areas would be divided into five provinces. Each province 
would be placed under a Lieutenant-Governor. 
Responsible government for settler province 
(iii) One of these provinces would be constituted in the Highlands of Kenya. 
This would be a white settler state with a considerable measure of responsible 
government. 
Four native states 
(iv) The other four provinces will be native states. 
(v) The four native states will be governed on the Crown Colony system. The 
executive will be in the hands of the Lieutenant-Governors, who will be 
assisted by Provincial Councils. 
A federal governor-general 
(vi) Over the five provinces there will be a Governor-General. He will have 
certain powers of general control over the federation and direct administrative 
responsibility for certain common services. 
Problems raised by scheme 
4. A scheme on these lines raises a number of problems. Some of them will be 
extremely difficult to solve. These problems are briefly indicated in the following 
paragraphs. 
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Geographical delimitation 
5. First, there is the delimitation of the five provinces. The racial communities 
are not segregated from one another in clearly defined areas. It is difficult to find 
dividing lines which conform with the geographical and ethnographical realities . 
There must be one settler province. Uganda, subject to possible boundary adjust-
ments, would make one native state. The other three would be formed by carving up 
Tanganyika and Kenya (apart from the Highlands). This will afford an opportunity of 
adjusting the present Tanganyika-Kenya border which bisects the Masai Reserve. 
The division of the country into as many as four native provinces or states is 
suggested mainly for political reasons. Diversity in political units is the road to 
healthy development. 
Can the Highlands be made a separate state? 
6. Is it practicable to mark out a white state in the Kenya Highlands? The White 
Highlands are relatively small in area-only some 61/2 million square miles out of the 
800,000 in East Africa as a whole. A glance at the map will show how deeply 
interlocked the Highlands are with purely native areas. Jurisdiction must, for 
obvious reasons, be correlated with area: and it follows that either the boundary line 
between white and native areas must be straightened out or that administrative 
chaos will result. In order to carve out the white state it will be necessary to 
straighten out the boundary line: and this is not easy. 
What is to happen to the 200,000 native dwellers in the Highlands? If they are 
removed, European agriculture collapses. If they remain, they will be within 
European jurisdiction, i.e. an area which will be governed by the settlers with their 
self-governing institutions, in which the natives will have no part. The only way of 
dealing with this question would appear to be to give the Governor-General certain 
overriding powers of supervising the interests of the native in the white state. 
What is to happen to those European settlements in East Africa which are outside 
the Kenya Highlands? There are small settlements in north-eastern Tanganyika: and 
another group around lringa in the south-western Highlands of Tanganyika. In 
addition, there are certain municipal areas, such as Dar-es-Salaam and Mombasa, 
with small European communities. 
The Indian problem 
7. There are probably some 60,000 Indians in Kenya alone: and possibly some 
17,000 in Uganda and 30,000 in Tanganyika. They present a big problem in framing a 
federal scheme. They will wish for a common electoral roll with the Europeans: and 
will resent being kept out of the White Highlands. They are a scattered population: 
and it is not possible to assemble them in more or less defined areas as it is the 
Europeans. How, therefore, are they to be fitted in in the four native provinces? Are 
they to be given special communal representation in the Provincial Councils and sit 
side by side with Africans? If so, on what numerical basis, having regard to the 
relative size of the Indian and African populations, is this to be arranged? 
Finance 
8. Each of the six component parts, i.e . the Federal Government and the five 
provinces, will have its own revenues. So far as is compatible with the efficiency of 
the common services devolution in financial administration and control should be 
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the aim. This will be essential in the self-governing white area. As the four native 
states are political training grounds, it is desirable that their governments also 
should, in financial matters, be given a wide freedom. Each province should be able 
to levy income tax, poll tax and hut tax and should receive all revenue accruing in the 
area from licences, fees, fines, etc. Under this head one of the difficulties will be to 
secure that the common customs revenues are dealt with in a manner fair to each of 
the provinces. 
The provincial constitutions in native areas 
9. The provincial constitutions in the native areas should not follow any rigid 
common pattern. They should be framed to fit the stage of advancement achieved by 
the people of the province. For example, a more advanced form of constitution might 
be suitable to Uganda than to the native areas in Kenya. In general, there would be an 
official majority in the Legislature: but as large a proportion of the unofficial 
members as possible should be elected by a form of franchise suitable to local 
circumstances. 
Constitution for the Highlands 
10. It is an essential feature of this scheme that the White Highlands should be 
given responsible government. It cannot be denied that the settlers are capable of 
governing themselves: and there seems to be no escape from the present unsatisfac-
tory system unless they are allowed to do so. The chief reason for their rejection of 
the Hilton Young scheme was that it did not give them self-government and brought 
them too closely under the control of the federal authority. Any new scheme must 
avoid this obstacle. 
It is suggested that there should be a Legislative Assembly elected by the white 
population on an adult franchise. The Executive Government on the Southern 
Rhodesian model would be placed in the hands of Ministers responsible to the 
Assembly. It may be objected that in such a small community it would be difficult to 
run a government on parliamentary lines. But it is doubtful whether this is a valid 
objection. There are already signs that the community is ready to express itself 
politically on Party lines in accordance with the usual British method. It would be 
necessary, under the constitution, for certain wide matters of an "Imperial" 
character and certain matters relating to native affairs to be reserved. The 
disadvantages of the system of "reserved subjects" are realised: but there seems to be 
no alternative to it which would suit the case. But the aim should be to limit these 
reserved matters to as small an area as possible and to encourage the settlers to take 
the widest responsibility for their own affairs. 
It is likely that for some time the settlers would wish to employ officials of the 
Colonial Service. These could be specially seconded for service under the local 
responsible Government. 
The mandate point 
11. The future of the Mandate system cannot be foreseen at present. It is not 
possible therefore to judge how far the Tanganyika Mandate may be an obstacle to 
the above scheme. 
It would appear that, under the Mandate system as it existed before the war, it 
would not be permissible to vary the Tanganyika boundaries so as to separate from 
[65] POLITICAL CHANCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 335 
Tanganyika any of the areas at present administered under the Mandate. The status 
of the area and of its inhabitants must not be varied. The individuality of the 
territorial unit must be preserved. 
But it is accepted, on legal advice, that Tanganyika, as a unit, can come into a 
federal system in East Africa without contravening the Mandate. Article 10 of the 
Mandate authorises the mandatory authority "to constitute the territory into a 
customs, fiscal and administrative union or federation with the adjacent territories 
under his own sovereignty or control, provided always that the measures adopted to 
that end do not infringe the provisions of this mandate." 
In present conditions it is clear that the Mandate points are political and not 
juridical. It would seem likely that a technical departure from the terms of the 
Mandate might present little difficulty, provided that the policy behind it is politically 
acceptable as being in accordance with the spirit of the Mandate system. The guiding 
principle of the system is the trusteeship on the part of the mandatory for the 
inhabitants of the territory. The rearrangements suggested under the above scheme 
do not infringe this principle: and it ought not to be difficult to secure their general 
acceptance. Indeed, the whole spirit of the scheme is to extend and fortify the 
trusteeship principle in East African areas where otherwise it may be gra"ely 
weakened. 
A new capital essential 
12. It will be essential that the Capital town of the federation should not be at 
Nairobi. The Governor-General must, as far as praticable, be removed from any 
suspicion of being under white settler influence. If he was at Nairobi it would be 
impossible to avoid that suspicion. Nor would it in reality be likely that any 
Governor-General, however detached and impervious by temperament, could live 
there without yielding, in some degree, to the local atmosphere. 
The headquarters of the Federal Government should not be either at Nairobi or any 
other provincial Capital. At the same time, it should not be so remote as to be out of 
touch either with those Capitals or with the life of the territories. The problem 
presents difficulties: but with modern communications they are not insuperable. 
Arusha, in north-eastern Tanganyika, is one of the appropriate sites which might be 
suggested. 
The governor-general's councils and powers 
13. In considering the functions of the Governor-General there is one broad 
principle to be observed. It is desirable to combine with the efficiency of the common 
federal services a large latitude for the provincial governments. "Political diversity 
and economic unity" should be the key-note. 
It is suggested that the following common services should be placed under the 
Governor-General:-
(i) Railways, public air and motor services, and public shipping services on the 
Lakes. 
(ii) Ports and harbours. 
(iii) Customs. 
(iv) Posts, telegraphs, telephone and wireless communications. 
(v) Defence. 
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(vi) Central research. 
(vii) Any other "reserved" matter which may, by Order-in-Council, be placed 
under the Governor-General. 
The Governor-General will be the sole channel of communication with the 
Secretary of State. He will have both legislative and executive powers in respect of 
the subjects placed in his charge. He will be assisted by two Councils. There will be, 
first, an Executive Council composed of his chief officials and heads of departments 
dealing with federal subjects. These will advise him on the day-to-day questions 
arising from his direct administrative functions. He will not be bound by the advice 
of this Council. In addition, there will be an Advisory Council, composed of the 
Lieutenant-Governors and certain nominated or elected representatives from each of 
the five provinces, which will meet from time to time to discuss matters of common 
interest and projects for legislation. 
Wider political aspects of present position 
14. To revert to the wider aspects. From the background sketch in Part I, it would 
appear that there are three possible courses before His Majesty's Government:-
(i) To leave things as they are. The fate which has overtaken previous attempts to 
grapple with the closer union question does not encourage a further effort towards 
positive action. The chief advantage of leaving things to the course of nature is to 
be found in the stubborn obstacles to the other two courses mentioned below. War 
conditions make it additionally difficult to tackle the problem. But if matters are 
left to take their course we may drift into a position in which the White Dominion 
will become an accomplished fact and the Government here will have no power to 
control the development. His Majesty's Government will then be open to the 
accusation that through inaction, they have betrayed their moral trust for the 
Africans. There will also be the danger of strong Indian reactions. 
(ii) To set up a unitary state as a positive act by His Majesty's Government. This 
is the "White Dominion" solution: and it might be the best way of binding East 
Africa to Great Britain for the future. It would seem sure of a favourable welcome 
from Southern Rhodesia and South Africa: and, on the purely local situation, it 
would seem to be, despite the Indian factor, the one solution which could at 
present be adopted without evoking a reaction which might prove fatal to the 
scheme. But the strong political objection to this course here is obvious and 
apparently insuperable. 
(iii) To adopt a federal scheme. The advantage of this solution is that it should 
provide a balance between the aspirations of the settlers and of the Africans. It 
should give the former an outlet for political self-expression and at the same time 
provide a basis for native development. It should have an appeal here as being the 
only alternative to the present drift towards a White Dominion. 
But it is essential to keep a clear view of the obstacles. They are formidable. To 
start with the wartime uncertainties make this a bad moment to approach a 
long-range and controversial question. There are serious administrative difficulties 
inherent in any federal scheme. But the political difficulties are more weighty. It is 
not going to be easy to reconcile Indian aspirations with any federal scheme which 
reserves the Highlands to the white settlers. The settlers themselves have, in the 
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past, rejected various federal schemes: and it will not be practicable to adopt a federal 
solution without their consent. They regard themselves now as being in a stronger 
position than ever before. They can count on a large measure of sympathy from 
South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. They may well except that if things are left to 
go on as they are their long-range objective, the White Dominion, will soon be within 
their grasp. They have only to wait for the ripened fruit to drop into their hand. Is it 
likely that with this prospect before them they will accept a plan, one of the manifest 
objects of which is to curtail their future power in East Africa? 
If His Majesty's Government decided to consider a federal solution they would have 
first of all cautiously to try out the ground. Any settlement will have to be negotiated 
and not imposed. It is no good playing at power politics without power. It would be a 
disaster for the Government to embark on another federal plan and then fail. 
The goodwill of the Governments of the Union of South Africa and of India will be 
essential to any solution of the East African problem. It would seem desirable, 
therefore, for His Majesty's Government to consult with them at any early stage 
before commiting itself to a new approach to the question. If their support could be 
elicited the next step would be to consult the leaders of the settlers and find out how 
they would react to an offer of responsible government, coupled possibly with certain 
assured financial advantages for the future. 
66 CO 967/57 15 Aug 1942 
[East Africa]: note by Mr Macmillan on Sir A Dawe's federal solution. 1 
Minute by G F Seel2 
Sir Arthur Dawe's paper is based on two assumptions:-
(a) That the Highlands of Kenya are a "white man's country" in the sense in which 
other Dominions are to-day or the American colonies were in the 18th century. By 
tha1, I mean a country where an Englishman can work with his coat off at any time 
(except perhaps between twelve and three) for a wage: in other words, a country 
where-assuming that native and Indian labour were not available-Englishmen 
could do the jobs which are now done by the native or Indian wage-earning artisan 
or casual labourer, without fear of physical deterioration. 
(b) That on the analogy of the American colonies the claims to self-government of 
any substantial number of Englishmen who have settled permanently in a country 
cannot be resisted. Sir Arthur Dawe's plan is to limit their self-government at least 
to the territory which they propose to inhabit. 
Are these two assumptions correct? I accept (b) if (a) is true. Is (a) true? 
1. How long have the settlers been in Kenya? 
Since Lord Delamere's first development in 1900 or so. 
2. How many of the 20,000 white population have been there for what numbers of 
years? That is, into what age groups in terms of membership of the Kenya 
community do they fall? Have we any statistics? 
1 See 65. 2 See 35, note 1. 
338 CHAPTER 3 [66) 
3. Into what actual age groups do the 20,000 settlers fall? 
4. Have we any statistics of their fertility? This must, of course, have regard to age 
groups. 
5. What number of white children of the second generation are permanently 
domiciled in Kenya? Do we know? How many of these children, up to the outbreak 
of the present war, had left the Colony and become domiciled elsewhere? 
6. What proportion of children are educated locally, and what sent home? 
7. Into what economic groups are settlers divided? Is there yet a "poor white" 
problem, other than a farmer groaning under overdrafts in bad years? 
8. What proportion of the white population depend (a) for their livelihood solely 
on the income they derive from their farms or businesses, or (b) solely on the 
salaries they draw from employment in the Colony, and (c) what proportion, either 
wholly or partially, on home investments, i.e., are superior remittance men? 
9. What is their economic future? Will they be able to live as planters or managers 
only? Or will they be able to hold jobs lower in the economic scale? 
I do not ask these questions rhetorically or to pre-judge the issue. But I do not feel 
sure about the first assumption. And it is the premiss on which all turns~ 
If the premiss is false, Kenya's future is to be a "white governed" country but not a 
"white man's country". 
We have before us the warning of the West Indies and the Southern States of 
America about the problems involved in a "plantocracy". 
11. 
If it is decided that Kenya-because of climatic conditions-becomes a white 
dominion, what is to be its future? 
It can become a plantocracy-like some of the West Indies-with Scotts in the 
place of Lascelles' and so on. 
Gradually the white stock will become contaminated, either by the effect of the 
climate or by some inter-breeding. But this decadent or slightly decadent people-
not increasing largely in numbers by immigration-will be the proprietors of the 
land and all that implies, surrounded by a native population in or bordering on the 
Highlands, who-if our medical and other services continue to improve-will 
become increasingly crowded and land-hungry. 
A clash is bound to come. The whites cannot afford economically to abandon their 
supremacy. The Government will be torn between the rights of the settlers and their 
obligations to the natives. Even if the federal solution proposed by Sir Arthur Dawe 
were to be put into effect now, the land-hunger and the pressure of the natives will 
not be relieved. 
I suggest, therefore, that a quite different and much more radical policy be 
considered. At first sight it may seem quite fantastic; perhaps it is. 
I assume:-
(a) That Kenya is not fitted to maintain a white population of all classes. 
(b) That the role of the whites is administrators and organisers of production. 
Therefore, I say:-
Let us nationalise all or some of the land in the Highlands now belonging in fee 
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simple or long leasehold to the settlers. Let the purchase include buildings, 
machinery, etc., and compensation for improvements. 
Let the purchase be:-
(a) by buying in the market any land as it becomes available; and/or 
(b) by offering to purchase any land offered at attractive price; and/or 
(c) by compulsory purchase at a fixed date. 
The offer, or decision, to purchase would be accompanied by the announcement of 
a complete scheme for agricultural production in the future . 
This would be based on the Russian system. 
There would be two kinds of farms-State farms and Collective farms. In the case 
of State farms, the settlers will become the managers. They will be the managers to 
the State, just as some of them now are to the Estate Companies. 
Collective farms would be a group of farms, organised to form a good production 
unit. If they conformed to necessary agricultural technique, etc., they would be 
leased by the Government to the group; the Collective would pay a rent but would 
enjoy benefits of loans etc. from the Government for operational purposes. 
Indians. The question of Indian landowners will have to be dealt with at the same 
time. I would suggest the same treatment. 
Urban property. It will be a matter for consideration whether urban property 
should be nationalised as well as rural property. There is a great deal to be said for 
preventing any future towns being built except on nationally owned ground-
whatever might be done about Nairobi. 
Advantages of nationalisation of ownership and management of land 
(1) To the settlers 
After the first excited protects, they would retlect:-
(i) They would recover their cash which they have sunk in land, buildings, and 
improvements. This they would invest. 
(ii) They would have security of their money against the losses which may easily 
follow this war, as they followed the last, in spite of all the schemes of price 
stabilisation etc. about which everyone talks very glibly, but in which nobody has 
very great confidence. 
(iii) They would have security of employment, if they wish to stay as managers in 
the Government service. 
(iv) They will have pensions. (I would make the rates generous.). 
(v) If they prefer, they can return to England. 
(vi) If they are not serious farmers, but really out there for the fun of the life and 
as a rich man might in the past have resided in the South of France or in Italy, 
they could be allowed to keep the freehold of or rent their house and perhaps some 
land round it, as a sort of demesne (like Irish landlords). 
(2) To the Africans 
The interests of the Africans would be in the hands of the Government, who can 
make what arrangements they like for their wages and conditions on the State Farms 
or the Collectives, without perpetual friction with the white settlers. 
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The movement of Africans as between native reserves and land now reserved for 
whites becomes possible in the same way. 
The Africans obviously stand to gain in every way. 
(3) To the Government of Kenya 
The land can be farmed in the most productive way. Crops can be grown to suit 
economic needs of the Empire and the world. All the advantages of large-scale 
operation follow. Machinery, processing factories etc. can all be arranged much more 
easily. 
Bad managers, either because unscientific, impoverished, or not able to manage 
native labour, are eliminated. 
(4) To His Majesty's Government 
Instead of a policy such as Sir Arthur Dawe's, which would either produce political 
schism at home or (if it is one of drift) might lead to revolution in Kenya, a policy is 
put forward which (if you could get away with it) would have elements in it to please 
all. 
Those who like land nationalisation would like it. 
Those who think white people should continue to run African farming in the 
interests of production would like it. 
Those who support the interests of the settlers will be satisfied if the settlers can be 
satisfied. 
Those who are pro-native will like it, because it certainly is better for the natives. 
Disadvantages 
(1) The settlers may altogether turn it down. But that depends on how cleverly the 
matter is put to them and its advantages to them explained. It also depends on how 
generous the scheme is financially. 
(2) Africans may feel that it retards their political growth. But not more-as 
regards Kenya Highlands-than Sir Arthur Dawe's plan. 
(3) Government of Kenya will have to become a very efficient organisation; for it 
will be running the largest single agricultural business in the Empire. Will it be able 
to do the job? It will also have to take on all or the greater part of the risks of this 
business. But it will probably have to do that anyway, under settler pressure by 
guaranteed prices and so on. 
(4) To His Majesty's Government. It will be very expensive. The immediate capital 
expense will be great. 
The annual salaries and pensions etc. to the managers will have to be largely 
subsidised-no doubt-by His Majesty's Government. 
Losses on agricultural production will have be met by His Majesty's Government, 
in part at least, and gains will tend to be retained. 
But, it will be less expensive than a civil war. 
Minute on 66 
As regards part 1 of Mr. Macmillan's memorandum there has been no census report 
for Kenya since 1931 and we are short of up-to-date statistical material from which to 
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try and answer his questions. But the attached note by Mr. Watherston,3 although 
based largely on the 1931 figures, does I think help in forming a general picture. 
I would only add that I think it is a very fair answer to question 9 that the 1939 
Settlement Committee, which was certainly out to put the best possible face on the 
prospects of European settlement, assumed throughout that the labour on farms 
would be African, and that Europeans would not settle in the Colony as agriculturists 
except as owners or managers of farms. Before the war there was noticeable a 
tendency for youths passing out of the local schools to gravitate into such 
employment as garage hands, etc., and into the intermediate civil service. In these 
occupations, and especially the former, they would of course be in competition with 
Africans and as the latter advance in intellectual and technical attainment. 
My own view for what it is worth is that "Kenya is not fitted to maintain a white 
population of all classes" and I do not remember meeting anyone who would 
maintain as a 100% true proposition that she is. 
I feel some hesitation in commenting on Mr. Macmillan's part 11. Personally I am 
attracted by it and would like to see it developed. It might well receive a favourable 
reception in this country, but at the risk of being thought obstructionist, I ought to 
point out that it would be likely to excite a good deal of comment in Southern 
Rhodesia and the Union, where opinions on social policy have probably not moved 
nearly so fast, and it would probably be necessary to consider this aspect. 
I am not sure at the moment whether it would dispose altogether of the political 
troubles. One of the great fears of the European settlers is that they will be swamped 
by the local Indians. Mr. Macmillan suggests the same treatment for Indians as for 
Europeans as regards land holding. If this principle were extended to political rights, 
i.e., if the spectre of a common roll were raised, the Europeans would probably object 
to the whole scheme. I appreciate that the fear of undermining their economic 
position would have been largely removed, and that under the scheme they would no 
longer have the same aspirations to self-government; all the same Indian penetration 
professionally and economically is very persistent and racial feeling very strong. 
I ought also to mention that we have before us a despatch from Sir Henry Moore 
regarding the report of a Local Land Tenure Committee, which has recommended 
bestowing the right to convert agricultural land held on 999 years lease to freehold, 
and to convert 99 year leases in township plots to 999 year leases; also the abolition 
of the present system of revisable rentals at intervals of 30 years, and the making of 
provision for "redemption" of annual rentals. Sir Henry Moore has already rejected 
the recommendations as regards freehold and conversion of town leases to 999 years, 
and has asked for guidance regarding the taxation of undeveloped land. These 
proposals which are highly technical, will require careful study, and I was on the 
point of suggesting that Lord Hailey be asked to advise. But Sir Henry Moo re has now 
indicated that he would like to have a talk about them while he is here and a note will 
be sent on separately with a view to a preliminary discussion. I mention the matter 
now as it shows quite clearly that opinion in Kenya is thinking on quite different 
lines from the idea of nationalisation which Mr. Macmillan now puts forward. 
One other point I might mention. Mr. Macmillan says that the Government of 
3 D C Watherston, on secondment to CO (1939-1944) from Federated Malay States. 
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Kenya would have to become a very efficient organisation. So would the "competent" 
Department of the Colonial Office! 
(NOTE] 
G.F.S. 
21.8.42 
1. Organised settlement was started in 1903 by the Commissioner, Sir Charles 
Eliot, although there were already some Europeans in the Colony. The boom years 
for settlement were 1910, 1914 and 1920/1. 
2. Length of residence 
The most recent information is the 1931 census. This provides the following 
information:-
Nos. who in 1931 had 30 or more years of residence 
11 between 20 and 30 years of 11 
" " 
11 10 and 20 
, , 11 less than 10 , , , 
European population in 1911 was 3,175 
11 11 11 1921 11 9,651 
11 1926 11 12,529 
11 1931 11 16,812 
3. Age groups 
1931 figures were as follows:-
M. F. 
0-9 1,498 1,394 
10-19 801 801 
20-29 2,047 1,356 
30-39 2,140 1,870 
40-49 1,585 1,055 
50-59 788 514 
60 and over 328 272 
Not stated 245 167 
M. 
87 
816 
2,509 
5,992 
F. 
37 
507 
1,761 
5,103 
9,404 7,408 
4. Kenya Annual Report for 1938 (p. 10) assumes a natural rate of increase of 6% 
per annum, which gave an estimated population of 20,894 on the 31st December, 
1938. 
5. No information appears to be available about the number of white children of 
the second generation who are permanently domiciled in Kenya, or who have 
emigrated elsewhere. 
6. Judging from the much smaller number of children in the 10-19 age group 
than are in the 0-9 age group, a large proportion of the European children are sent 
home for their education. 
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7. Main occupational groups: 1931 figures 
Agriculture 
Metal workers 
Transport and communication 
Commerce, Finance and Insurance 
Public Administration and Defence 
Professional occupations 
Clerks, draughtsmen, typists 
Personal service (including hotels, clubs etc.) 
Retired or not gainfully occupied 
Married women and children 
Other employment 
M. 
2,385 
361 
248 
591 
1,529 
626 
510 
64 
244 
1,996 
850 
9,404 
There is not yet a poor white problem. 
343 
F. 
137 
3 
84 
206 
450 
387 
279 
507 
5,222 
133 
7,408 
8. The table in the preceding paragraph gives all the information which is 
available. Some of the farmers, in addition to those shown as "retired or not gainfully 
occupied" undoubtedly have private means. 
9. The Settlement Committee of 1939 visualised farms of not less than 300 acres 
(this was the absolute minimum) and up to 1,500. The former were intended for men 
who start in a salaried post (e.g. farm manager) and save enough to start on their 
own. A small Farm School for European boys has been started and an Agricultural 
School for older men. 
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[Constitutional reform and federation in the West Indies]: CO note 
of a departmental meeting following Sir C Parkinson's visit to the 
West Indies 
[Although the full report of the West India Royal Commission was not published until the 
end of the war, a statement of its main recommendations was issued in Feb 1940 (Cmd 
617 4) . On the question of reforming the constitutions of the West Indian colonies, the 
commission attached more importance to the representative character of legislative 
councils than to any major changes in their functions. While the object of policy was 
defined as the introduction of universal suffrage (members were divided as to whether 
this should be introduced forthwith or by gradual stages), the commission did not feel 
that the grant of immediate and complete self-government based on universal suffrage 
was possible, if only because it would remove the financial control which the commission 
considered necessary if substantial assistance was to be provided by the UK. On the 
question of federation, the commission recommended that a practical test of the 
advantages should be made by combining the Leeward and Windward Islands in one 
federation on the lines of that already existing in the former group. (In its final report the 
commission stated (Cmd 6607, 1945, p 93, recommendation 27) that: 'Political federation 
is not in itself an appropriate means of meeting the pressing needs of the West Indies. 
Nevertheless, it is an end to which policy should be directed.') The 1940 statement of 
recommendations was critically received in a number of quarters, including the Fabian 
Colonial Bureau which felt that the proposals did not go far enough (see correspondence 
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and minutes beginning with a letter to the CO from Dr Rita Hinden, secretary of the 
Bureau, 7 May 1942, in CO 318/453118, no 1). In a debate in the House of Lords in Jan 
1943 Lord Faringdon, a member of the Bureau's advisory committee, expressed regret 
that the government had not seen fit to produce an 'all-embracing scheme for the West 
Indies as a whole' (H of L Debs, vol125, cols 777, 791-792, 27 Jan 1943). It was against 
this background that Parkinson, accompanied by P Rogers, a principal in the CO West 
Indian Dept, visited the West Indies from Aug 1942 to Feb 1943 to consider the 
constitutional problem.) 
Sir C. Parkinson said that Lord Cranborne had asked him before he went out to 
consider the constitutional problem from the aspect of the antithesis, as it were, of 
self-government and good government. Except in the case of Jamaica, 1 which had 
since been disposed of by the new constitution, he considered that there was no real 
need for immediate constitutional advance. Where, of course, there was a general 
demand in the Colony for such advance, he thought that the Secretary of State 
should certainly give it sympathetic consideration, but he had not felt that there was 
any such general demand in any of the Colonies apart from Jamaica, or any necessity 
for it. 
Trinidad and British Guiana had committees which would shortly be reporting on 
the question of extending the franchise, and subject to the Governors' comments he 
felt that it would be reasonable to agree to any proposals which had general backing 
in this respect. But it would be a most unwise policy to impose from Whitehall 
constitutional advances tending to self-government, simply as a theoretically right 
step, or because of the pressure of U.S. opinion. Each case should be considered on 
its merits. 
It was undoubtedly right, however, that the people of the West Indies should 
participate to a greater extent in the work of government, as the Royal Commission 
had pointed out. But he felt that it was unwise to follow the tradition of achieving 
this by the development of self-governing institutions at the centre. Too often in the 
West 'Indies this had produced barren opposition by unofticials in councils and 
inefficiency and corruption in the large municipalities, of which Port-of-Spain City 
Council was a particularly bad example. The right policy, Sir Cosmo suggested, was 
to work up from the bottom by the development of village councils and community 
social work, run by the people themselves. This was the line on which Professor 
Simey2 was at present working. In this way there was some hope of working up the 
sense of responsibility and citizenship, which was most important in the West Indies 
and which was at present most noticeably lacking. 
At the centre, Sir Cosmo suggested that instead of increasing the powers of 
legislative councils, increased use should be made of leading West Indians on 
advisory boards and committees. 
The declared aim of British policy was however self-government or self-governing 
institutions. Sir Cosmo suggested that this was meaningless in relation to the 
present units of government in the West Indies, apart again from Jamaica, which was 
1 Under a new Jamaican constitution subsequently introduced in Nov 1944, the lower house, now known 
as the House of Representatives, was composed of thirty-two members elected by universal adult suffrage. 
The House elected from its members a speaker and five members to serve as elected members of the 
Executive Council. 
2 Charles Booth professor of social science, University of Liverpool, from 1939; adviser on social welfare to 
comptroller for development and welfare, West lndies, 1941-1945. 
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perhaps large enough to stand on its own feet. It was impossible to contemplate say 
Grenada and St. Lucia being independent self-governing units. They were too small 
to stand on their own. Sir Cosmo, advised therefore, that the development of 
self-governing institutions should be linked up with the question of West Indian 
federation. When he had been asked about federation by unofficials he had always 
agreed that a comprehensive unit would have obvious advantages, but he had 
admitted the difficulties. It could not be imposed from the top. The present very 
considerable diversities in political development, popular feeling and historical 
tradition, made federation impossible as yet. But he felt that this should be the 
declared object of British policy to which constitutional changes in the present 
separate Colonies should be related. He thought it was important to make our 
objective clear and at the same time to promote future federation by developing 
general organisations like the Comptroller's, West Indian conferences and West 
Indian Unified Services. There was already certain popular feeling in favour of 
federation, particularly among the younger Left Wing politicians, and it was 
desirable to encourage this West Indian sentiment. In any event, an essential 
preliminary (which was most desirable for other reasons too) was improved 
communications between the Colonies. 
Sir Cosmo suggested that a despatch should be sent to the Caribbean and 
neighbouring Colonies but not to Bermuda, setting out the difficulty of self-
governing small units, but reaffirming the aim of self-government. The despatch 
might say that though federation is not now practicable, His Majesty's Government 
consider that constitutional advance should be related to the aim of federation. They 
had no desire to enforce federation against the wishes of any Colony and perhaps two 
federations, eastern and western, might eventually be found to be preferable to a 
single federation, while the Bahamas, owing to its geographical proximity to the 
United States, might prefer to remain outside federation. In the meantime, His 
Majesty's Government would wish to advance, as circumstances permitted, unifying 
influences such as West Indian Services, the Comptroller's organisation and joint 
conferences, and simultaneously to foster the growth of citizenship and a sense of 
responsibility through the development of municipal institutions, committee work, 
etc., which would lead to more participation by the people in the work of 
government: so far as constitutional advances was [sic] concerned, this would have 
to depend upon the circumstances and needs of each Colony. 
68 CO 847/23/15, no 19 17 July 1943 
'Proposal for a pan-African conference': memorandum by A B Cohen 
on a Southern Rhodesian proposal to arrange a conference of govern-
ments for the planning and co-ordination of development in South and 
Central Mrica. Minute by Sir A Dawe 
On May 5th, on the motion of Mr. Fletcher, the Southern Rhodesia Parliament 
unanimously passed a motion urging the Government to approach the Union 
Government immediately with a view to arranging a Pan-African Conference of 
Governments for planning and co-ordinating the development of South and Central 
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Africa. 1 No official suggestion has been made either by the Southern Rhodesia or by 
the Union Government to H.M.G. in the U.K. that such a Conference should be held. 
We know, however, that Field Marshal Smuts is in favour of the idea. He has 
discussed it with Lord Harlech but has said that he would only go ahead with a 
Conference if he could be assured of the complete goodwill of the United Kingdom 
Government. Lord Harlech considers that the proposal for a Conference should be 
given general support and has suggested that it should be discussed with Lord 
Swinton when he is in London. It is desirable therefore that the attitude of H.M.G. in 
the U.K. towards the proposed Conference should be defined. 
2. The scope of the Conference is not absolutely clear. The motion of the 
Southern Rhodesia Parliament was worded so as to cover only South and Central 
Africa. This would certainly include Portuguese territories both east and west and the 
Belgian Congo, as well as the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland. Perhaps also it would 
include Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Field Marshal! Smuts has told 
Lord Harlech that he personally is chiefly interested in the west coast of Africa. This 
brings in the four British West African territories and presumably also the 
neighbouring French territories. 
3. It seems clear that at some stage not later than the immediate post-war period 
consultation between the Union and Southern Rhodesia Governments and the 
Colonial Governments further to the north will have to take place on common 
questions of economic policy and communications, and some machinery for such 
consultation will have to be established. This would be in accordance with the policy 
of regional advisory commissions announced by the Secretary of State during the 
Colonial Debate on the 13th July. It would also be in accordance with the views of 
Field Marshal Smuts expressed publicly in the past. But is the holding of a 
Pan-African Conference the proper way of establishing such machinery for consulta-
tion? And is the present time the right one for consulting? 
4. The question turns largely on the relations between the Union Government 
and the Governments of the tropical African territories within the responsibility of 
the Secretary of State. Would the holding of such a Conference increase the 
influence of the Union in the northern countries, and would such an extension of 
influence be desirable at the present time? The interest of the Union in the territories 
of East and Central Africa is no new thing but the war has provided many 
opportunities for giving practical expression to that interest. The Union played a 
most prominent part in the defence of East Africa and the conquest of Abyssinia. 
Large numbers of troops have either passed through the territories or been stationed 
in them. Road communications have been improved and air communications 
speeded up. Close consultation has taken place in matters of supply, and the Union 
Government has helped the northern territories out of immediate supply difficulties. 
The contact between white labour in the Union and Northern Rhodesia has become 
closer as a result of the large numbers of Union citizens who have gone to work on 
1 Initial CO reactions to this proposal came from Dawe and Seel. Dawe minuted (19 June): 'It is just 
another example of the serious lack of co-ordination in H.M.G.'s policy for Africa which, to my mind, 
needs urgent attention if grave damage to British interests is not to result in future.' Seel minuted (26 
June): ' . . . it serves as a reminder that events are moving in Africa even more rapidly than we had 
supposed, and that while we are on the one maturing plans for African social and economic development 
we may, if we are not careful, find that the opportunity of applying them is slipping away from us' (CO 
847/23/15). 
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the Copperbelt during the war. A significant development is the Trade Union 
Congress about to be held, for the first time, at Johannesburg at which representa-
tives from Northern and Southern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo will be present. 
Meanwhile, Field Marshal Smuts has maintained and increased his personal contact 
with the East and Central African territories and has let it be known that he favours 
closer co-ordination of policy between their Governments and the Union Govern-
ment by means of some form of regional consultation. Behind Field Marshal Smuts 
are the great financial interests on the Rand, who provide him with much of his 
political backing in the Union and who would be glad to see the political influence of 
the Union extended, so as to give them new fields for development, particularly in the 
rich mining areas of Northern Rhodesia and the Katanga. If the election goes as is 
confidently expected, Field Marshal Smuts' influence in the Union itself will have 
been increased and his pan-African ideas are likely to gain strength at the expense of 
the "little South African" policy of the Nationalists. Field Marshal Smuts may expect 
that South Africa's active part in the war should be recognised at the time of the 
peace conference by the agreement of the United Kingdom Government to an 
increase in Union influence in South and Central Africa. If such an increase of 
influence were agreed to, the fundamental difference between the United Kingdom 
and Union attitudes towards native policy would almost certainly create difficulties 
even while Field Marshal Smuts, with his Liberal ideas, was in control of Union 
policy. But after he had retired and perhaps been replaced by a Nationalist Prime 
Minister, these difficulties would be immensely increased. 
5. The question which now arises is the extent to which the holding of a 
Pan-African Conference would be likely to increase the influence of the Union in the 
north. Field Marshal Smuts has informed Lord Harlech that he is not interested in 
native policy or in constitutional questions in the tropical African territories but that 
he is interested in trade contacts, communications and the co-ordination of 
development activities. But can economic policy and development be dissociated 
from administration, politics and constitutional matters? There have been increasing 
signs during the war of the growth among the European communities of East and 
Central Africa of what may be called an African consciousness. This is a natural 
development, paralleled in other parts of the British Empire, of the desire of English 
people settled abroad to manage their own affairs, without interference from 
London. In a slightly different form this African consciousness has shown itself in the 
recent motion of the Southern Rhodesia Parliament. Southern Rhodesia has 
self-government and the motion seems to have been the result of the desire of a small 
Colony to increase its importance by associating itself with the development of a 
much larger block of territories. A Pan-African Conference would presumably be held 
in the Union and the influence of Union ideas would dominate it. Can it be doubted 
that in this atmosphere, however narrowly the terms of reference were tied down to 
economic policy and communications, in actual fact the discussions would spread 
out to cover such larger questions as native policy, labour relations and the future 
machinery for co-ordination-the questions in which the delegates would be most 
interested. The Conference would deal with the machinery for future co-ordination 
and would thus be led on to regional grouping and constitutional changes. To show 
what subjects the delegates might wish to bring up, it is interesting to note the topics 
suggested for discussion at the Conference by the originator of the motion in the 
Southern Rhodesia Parliament. They were defence, communications, including 
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railways, the co-ordination of native policy, the Congo Basin Treaties, the supply and 
distribution of native labour, the co-ordination of industrial development, the 
co-ordination of the distribution of agricultural produce, taxation policy and the 
co-ordination of the development of Africa on a large scale. 
6. It seems clear that it would be impossible to confine any Conference to 
discussion merely of economic questions and communications. The Conference 
would almost certainly range over a much wider field and the discussions and 
resolutions might well prove in that event most embarrassing to H.M.G. in the U.K. 
This would be particularly unfortunate at a time when the most active consideration 
is being given in London to the political, constitutional and economic development 
of East, West and Central Africa. Agreement by the United Kingdom Government to 
participate in a Conference would, moreover, provoke suspicion and criticism in this 
country on the part of those who would believe that the Conference could only lead 
to a compromise with the Union Government on questions of native policy. Such 
criticisms would not be easy to counter, since the Conference could hardly lead to 
any other result than an increase of Union influence in the tropical African 
territories. It will be suggested below that the present is a particularly unfortunate 
time for arousing suspicion of this kind in the United Kingdom since policies for East 
and Central Africa are under consideration, which for their acceptance will require 
that the attitude of the United Kingdom Government towards native policy is above 
suspicion. 
7. From the timing point of view the holding of a Pan-African Conference in the 
immediate future would, it is suggested, be entirely contrary to the interests of 
H.M.G. in the U.K. Schemes are now being considered by the Secretary of State for 
closer co-ordination of policy and administration in West Africa, East Africa and 
Central Africa. As far as West Africa is concerned, the co-ordination is likely to be 
achieved without constitutional changes, and in any case no question of native policy 
is involved. In East and Central Africa the position is very different. Constitutional 
changes are under consideration, which, if they are acceptable to H.M.G., can only be 
put into effect if they are also accepted by the European communities of East and 
Central Africa and if in addition they provide adequate safeguards for native interests 
so as to obtain the agreement also of opinion in this country. The main argument for 
these schemes, both for East and for Central Africa, is that they provide the only 
constitutional solution which will secure the necessary safeguard for native interests 
and at the same time satisfy the aspirations of the European communities. It will be 
particularly unfortunate if, before these schemes, if approved, are announced 
publicly, the suspicion is created, however unjustly, that H.M.G. in the U.K. are 
prepared to compromise with the Union Government on native policy. On the other 
hand, it will be equally unfortunate if alternative, and, from the point of view of 
H.M.G. in the U.K., less satisfactory ideas are put forward at a Pan-African 
Conference and obtain the approval of the European communities. Even if no such 
ideas were put forward, the mere increase of Union influence, with the expectation of 
a still greater increase at a later date, might well induce the European communities 
to take a stronger line and make larger demands in any discussions with the local 
Governments or with H.M.G. on proposals put forward from London for constitu-
tional developments. The fact that a Pan-African Conference would almost certainly 
cut across the constitutional schemes now being considered in London seems to be 
the strongest argument against holding such a Conference at the present time. 
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8. There is another important point connected with the European communities 
of East and Central Africa. Both in Kenya and Northern Rhodesia the Europeans 
aspire to greater political responsibility. These aspirations have been canalised 
during the war by including on committees which in both countries exercise a most 
important influence on policy, leading European unofficial members of the Legisla-
tive Councils. The desire for an unofficial majority on the Legislative Council both 
of Kenya and Northern Rhodesia, as a post-war aim, remains nevertheless as strong 
as ever. It would be impossible to exclude the unofficials of these two territories 
from the delegations which would attend a Pan-African Conference, and it would 
create considerable embarrassment for the future to include them, at a time when 
their post-war relationship with the Governments of the two countries remains 
unsettled. 
9. If the schemes now being considered for closer co-ordination in tropical Africa 
are put into effect, three British blocs will be created in West Africa, East Africa and 
Central Africa. These units will have much greater resources and importance than 
any one of the tropical African territories. They will be in a much better position to 
make their influence felt with the Union Government. In any Conference held now 
the Union Government would predominate by virtue of the numerical superiority of 
the Union and its much greater development, economic resources and military 
strength. The creation of blocs among tropical African territories would go some way 
towards redressing the balance. It seems much better therefore that the setting up of 
machinery for co-ordination of policy with the Union should, if possible, await the 
creation of these blocs. H.M.G. in the U.K. would thereby have been placed in the 
advantageous position of having already put into effect Field Marshal Smuts' general 
ideas on regional consultation. They would, moreover, have done this in their own 
way and not in any way which may be suggested by the Union Government or by 
other interests in Africa and which may be regarded in London as less satisfactory. 
10. There is a further practical consideration which cannot be disregarded. There 
is little use in holding a Pan-African Conference or any other regional conference in 
Africa until the tropical African territories have made much further progress in 
working out their schemes for post-war development and their material require-
ments for carrying out these schemes. Committees to consider the problems of 
demobilisation have already been working in most, if not all, territories and 
preliminary consideration has been given to other post-war problems. In most 
territories, however, machinery has not yet been built up on an adequate scale for 
the full consideration of post -war policy. The form which this machinery should take 
is now under active consideration in the Colonial Office and it may be expected that 
much progress will be made during the next twelve months. The position of the 
tropical African territories in any conference to be held in the immediate future 
would be greatly weakened by the fact that planning has so far only reached a 
preliminary stage. 
11. To sum up, there appear to be the following objections to the suggestion that 
a Pan-African Conference or a South and Central African Conference should be held 
in the immediate future:-
(a) The holding of such a Conference would certainly increase the influence of the 
Union Government in the tropical African territories and, in view of the 
fundamental difference between the United Kingdom and Union views on native 
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policy, this might create serious embarrassment in the future, especially if Field 
Marshal Smuts retires. 
(b) Agreement by the U.K. Government to the holding of such a Conference would 
provoke suspicion in this country that they were compromising with the Union 
Government on native policy. 
(c) The discussions at such a Conference would cut across the schemes now being 
worked out for constitutional development in tropical Africa and would prevent 
the acceptance of such schemes both by creating the suspicion mentioned under 
(b) and by hardening the attitude of the European communities in East and 
Central Africa. 
(d) The necessity of including officials from Kenya and Northern Rhodesia in the 
delegations for such a Conference would create serious difficulties. 
(e) It would be much better to await the formation of regional blocs in tropical 
Africa before setting up any machinery for co-ordination with the Union. 
(f) Post-war planning has not yet made enough progress in the tropical African 
territories to enable them to participate successfully in the discussion of economic 
matters for Africa (or South and Central Africa) as a whole. 
12. If the above views are accepted, it remains to consider what reply should be 
given to Field Marshal Smuts and to the Southern Rhodesia Government. As far as 
the latter are concerned, Sir Godfrey Huggins has himself provided the reply by 
stating in the debate that in his view the holding of such a Conference now would be 
a little premature. The reason he gives is that the United Nations have not yet settled 
the economic and financial framework within which the post-war problems of Africa 
will have to be considered. In addition to this it can be stated that, as suggested 
above, the African Governments themselves have not worked out sufficiently their 
own domestic post-war problems. How much further it will be possible to go in 
confidential conversation with Field Marshal Smuts himself and also possibly Sir 
Godfrey Huggins in describing the ideas which are now under consideration in 
London for the grouping of territories in West, East and Central Africa will depend 
on the extent to which these ideas are acceptable to H.M.G. in the U.K. But the fact 
that a Pan-African Conference has been suggested underlies the growing desire of 
Europeans in Africa to work out their future and emphasises the urgency of reaching 
decisions on policy in London if the ideas of H.M.G. in the U.K. rather than those 
worked out in Africa itself are to prevail. 
Minute on 68 
.. . I see the reasons which might make H.M.G. reluctant to reject this proposal. But 
I am sure that it demands a fairly ruthless and realistic analysis before a conclusion is 
reached. There is always the danger that we may be deluded by the ephemeral 
magnetism of General Smuts's personality into taking a step which would have grave 
consequences to our long-term interests in Africa. 
Personally, I hope very much that it will be decided to reject the proposal. It has 
been evident for a long time that, as the war moves away from Africa, that continent 
is going to become the scene of a great contest for power. I do not think it is going 
too far to regard this suggestion as being the opening shot by South Africa to secure 
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leadership and to establish a predominance over territories to the north. Such a 
development contains obviously the seeds of great danger to the interests of this 
country and to the policies for which we have stood. 
The proposed conference is evidently to cover foreign territories as well as British. 
It is easy to understand the materialistic motives for which South Africa would like to 
bring in the foreign territories: and they are very different from the high-minded 
gloss which would no doubt be put on the proposal by General Smuts. The 
Portuguese, Belgian and French authorities are, with reason, very apprehensive of 
the Union's motives. I should have thought that this was not the moment to 
approach these foreign authorities with any suggestion that they should come into a 
conference of this kind. This might give a legitimate ground for our throwing a jet of 
cold water on the whole scheme. 
I cannot gauge how far it would be politic to tell General Smuts frankly that 
political feeling here on native policy makes us hesitate to accept the suggestion. But 
I should have thought in any case that it might well be argued that it would be 
impolitic to moot the idea of the Pan-African Conference while we are awaiting 
reactions to the Secretary of State's recent announcement of H.M.G.'s views on the 
possibility of establishing Regional Commissions.2 
A.J.D. 
17.7.43 
2 CO fears were temporarily allayed when Smuts, at a meeting with Stanley on 19 Nov 1943, agreed that 
the timing was not yet right to hold such a conference (CO 847/23/15, no 58/60, outward tel no 47181 to 
Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and East Mrican Governors' Conference, 25 Nov 1943). 
69 CO 847/23/15, no 21 22 July 1943 
[Pan-African conference and policy for East Africa]: letter from Lord 
Cranborne to Mr Attlee [Extract] 
... Perhaps I might send you some very brief conclusions to which I came after the 
first meeting of the Africa Committee. 
First, about the African Conference envisaged by Harlech. 1 We are all, I think, in 
sympathy with this proposal in principle. The only divergence of view is as to timing. 
He, I understand, would like it to be called now. I, like you and Oliver Stanley, feel 
that to do that would be premature. There are obvious embarrassments in a 
conference between belligerents and neutrals in the middle of a world war. We 
should want to take certain steps to aid our war effort. This must cause difficulties for 
a nation like Portugal, whose collaboration would be necessary in any international 
set-up. There is also the difficulty for us that, in my view at any rate, an essential 
feature of our 'post-war African policy must be to weld our East African and West 
African colonies into two great blocks. To attempt to enter into international 
negotiations before that stage had been completed would be to put the cart before the 
horse, and might tend to perpetuate the present unsatisfactory position. Finally, 
there is the difficulty of providing first class personnel for such a conference under 
1 See 68. 
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war conditions. I feel therefore that, while we must in no way pour cold water on 
Field Marshal Smuts' proposals, as transmitted to us by Harlech, we should stave it 
off till after the war. 
The second question we discussed was that of East Africa. I am sure that we must 
find some means of amalgamating Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda into one block. 
The present litter of territories is entirely out of keeping with the modern world. 
What form the new confederation or Dominion should take is still for consideration, 
and no doubt presents very real difficulties . But, while there must clearly be adequate 
safeguards for the black population, I would not personally rule out the idea of a 
white controlled self-governing administration under a Governor-General. I fully 
recognise your preoccupations, which I know are shared by numbers of people in your 
party and other parties too. But we have to face hard facts. The white people of Kenya 
and Tanganyika are already extremely restive under Whitehall Government. They 
will not stand it permanently, and we shall, I am convinced, be unable to coerce 
them, even if we wish to do so. If we allow the relations between the home and local 
governments to reach a deadlock we shall be beaten as we have always been beaten in 
the past. Already, Kenya and Tanganyika have moved a considerable way along the 
road to responsible government, under the guise of machinery set up ostensibly to 
aid the war effort. It will be impossible to reverse that tendency now, without 
completely alienating white opinion in the territories concerned, and pushing them 
towards the Union, which would, from the point of view of the black population, be a 
disastrous development. I am, therefore, personally in favour of examining sym-
pathetically the possibility a white controlled responsible government for the two 
territories of Kenya and Tanganyika, though some other arrangement would have to 
be devised for Uganda, the three being linked together under a Governor-General. 
Some form of safeguards would clearly have to be devised for the African population. 
This would no doubt be difficult, but it should not prove insuperable. I have not 
attempted to sketch out the nature of the new constitution. That is a matter for 
Oliver,2 and not for me. But I do hope that we shall not, on the Africa Committee, 
rule out the possibility of some development on the above lines .... 
2 Oliver Stanley. 
70 CO 554/132/20, no 11 July 1943 
'Constitutional development in West Africa': memorandum by 0 G R 
Williams. Appendix 
[In an earlier memo written at the beginning of the year, Williams (head of the West 
Africa Dept) had urged the need to frame 'a definite plan' for West Africa in anticipation of 
demands likely to be made by educated Africans before the end of the war that they should 
be given an opportunity of playing a much fuller and influential part in the administra-
tion of their own territories. Discontent on the part of the intelligentsia would have a 
corrosive effect on the whole community, especially if, as anticipated, West Africa had to 
pass through a period of post-war economic hardship. Williams did not envisage 'serious 
and widespread disaffection'; instead he feared 'a widening breach between the European 
and the African' as the latter became more educated. Success in raising living standards 
in the widest sense was said to be dependent upon the extent to which the African could 
be associated 'as an active, intelligent and enthusiastic collaborator in the task of his own 
betterment'. Action, according to Williams, was required along three main lines: (i) the 
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provision of greatly increased educational facilities (said to be 'fundamental to all the 
rest'), (ii) greatly increased employment of Africans in public administration and 
municipal government, (iii) progressive education of the African in the handling of public 
affairs, whether in municipal councils or in legislative councils (this was said to be 'the 
most difficult problem of all' and Williams argued that African political progress should 
be made more closely dependent on (i) and (ii) than had been the practice in the past). 
Williams suggested the appointment of a small committee within the CO to prepare in 
outline a planned policy for West Africa. His memo, dated Feb 1943, in CO 554/132110, no 
1 (together with minutes of approval by Dawe, Gater and Stanley in the same file) are 
reproduced in BDEEP series B, vol 1, R Rathbone, ed, Ghana, part I, 12.] CO planning for 
West Africa merged with the recommendations of Hailey's reports on Native administra-
tion and African political development, 1940-1942.] 
These notes are based very largely on the four confidential reports by Lord Hailey to 
the Secretary of State on Native Administration and African Political Development. 
References to these reports are indicated as follows:-
The Report on Nigeria = A 
The Report on the Gold Coast = B 
The Report on Sierra Leone = C 
General Report on Native 
Administration and African 
Political Development = D 
The numbers following the reference letters are of paragraphs of the respective 
reports. 
Lord Hailey's reports are not easy to summarise satisfactorily as they deal with a 
very complex problem and his recommendations, where he makes any definitely, are 
necessarily couched in cautious and qualified terms. 
A good idea, however, of his general attitude and conclusions may be gathered 
from the following passages from his General Report on Native Administration and 
African Political Development. 
D.149 'There are forces both at home and in the dependencies which will exert 
increasing pressure for the extension of political institutions making for 
self-government, and for the fuller association of Africans in them. The 
strength of this pressure is likely to be largely enhanced as the result of the 
war. Unless we have a clear view of the constitutional form in which 
self-government is to be expressed, the answer to this pressure will be 
ill-coordinated, and may lead to the adoption of measures which we may 
afterwards wish to recall'. 
D.l75 'But there are already advanced sections in some dependencies which look for 
the satisfaction of African ambitions in the wide extension of native repre-
sentation in the Legislative Councils and the concession of an unofficial 
majority in them. They are, in effect, unable to read the future in any other 
terms than the expansion of Parliamentary institutions of the normal type'. 
D.135 'Practical considerations demand that the Africans' participation in the 
political institutions of Government and in the central responsibilities of the 
administration must be,developed pari passu with the progress of the native 
authorities in the sphere of local government. Participation in such activities, 
otherwise than through the native authorities would not, as has sometimes 
been urged, prejudice the position of the latter. Given a clear recognition that 
their position is to be that of agencies of local government, it will be obvious 
354 CHAPTER 3 (70) 
that they have an expanding field of action within which their traditional 
authority should be unimpaired, and should indeed in some cases be 
enhanced'. 
D.139 'It is in our readiness to admit Africans to such posts (i.e. posts in the 
Administrative Service) that they will see the test of the sincerity of our 
declared policy of opening to them the road to self-government. That indeed 
is a view that is constantly taken by newspapers in West Africa'. 
D.140 'If a territory can only attain cohesion through the presence of an alien 
bureaucracy, then it is clearly better that it should continue to remain under 
external control rather than attempt to manage its own affairs'. 
An admirable summary of his general conclusions is contained in the concluding 
paragraph of Lord Hailey's general report: 
D.188 'Measures for improving the physical and social conditions of the people must 
now have a claim on our attention which should take precedence over other 
considerations. It is no disparagement of those whose chief interest lies in 
furthering political advance, to say that the satisfactions of the ambitions of 
what is still a small minority of Africans can be no substitute for the 
expenditure of the protracted effort and the considerable financial sacrifice 
which may be needed to meet the more elemental needs of the great majority 
of the people. But the two conceptions are fortunately not mutually exclusive; 
the situation only demands that we should not allow our pursuit of political 
ideals to detract from the attention which must be given to the pre-eminent 
needs of social advance. In the political sphere, the most important of our 
immediate problems is to interest Africans in measures designed to further 
social and economic developments, and to secure their full cooperation in 
them. The solution suggested in this Memorandum is, on the one side, a 
resolute development of local institutions, combined with progressive admis-
sion of Africans to all branches of the government services, and on the other, 
a policy of caution in political matters which, while leaving an opening for 
advanced opinion to play its part, would keep the substance of power in the 
hands of the official government, until experience has shown us under what 
constitutional forms the dependencies can move most securely towards the 
final stage of responsible government'. 
The suggestions with regard to constitutional policy tentatively put forward in 
these notes make two assumptions:-
(!) That it is agreed to be most important that political advance should proceed as 
far as possible parallel with economic and social development and should, as far as 
possible, be made to be dependent on that development. Social development is 
intended to include (a) advance in primary, secondary and higher education and 
(b) progressive measures for the training and employment of Africans in posts at 
present held largely or wholly by Europeans. It is not unlikely that considerable 
pressure will be brought to bear upon HMG to make substantial political 
concessions in advance and quite independently of any such material or social 
development. To make such concessions, however, might have most deplorable 
results, particularly in West Africa where there is such an enormous gulf between 
the small group of politically-minded Africans with varying degrees of European 
culture living for the most part in towns and the vast bulk of African cultivators 
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living under tribal conditions, even though those tribal conditions are themselves 
becoming more and more deeply affected by direct or indirect European in-
fluences. 
The difference between these two sections of the community is far greater than 
that between urban and agricultural workers in this country or between the most 
highly educated class of people in this country and the rest of the community 
either urban or rural. 
Indeed in West Africa the differences might be more truly expressed as one of 
kind rather than of degree. 
0.187-8 (In this connection see Lord Hailey's General Memorandum 187 and 
188, especially the latter). 
The difficulty of the task in present circumstances must be realised. In Lord 
Hailey's words (General Memorandum paragraph 162) 
'It is indeed doubtful whether we are justified in attempting to plan the political 
future of these populations when we have still so much to learn about their 
reaction to the new environment which circumstances are creating for them and 
when we have as yet made so few experiments in placing the African in situations 
where he must exercise initiative and final responsibility. At the best we can for the 
moment only indicate certain lines of advance which existing circumstances make 
possible to us.' 
(2) The second assumption is that when considering what to do in West Africa, no 
regard need be had to possible reactions in East Africa. It would be very difficult, if 
not impossible to defend any policy which resulted in retarding the political 
development of West Africa merely because such development would not be in line 
with what, for quite other considerations, was regarded as the policy to be followed 
in East Africa. 
For the purpose of discussion a very rough tentative plan of political development 
is sketched in the appendix to these notes. As regards the earlier stages they are 
largely based upon Lord Hailey's recommendations or suggestions, the only 
important variation being that some suggestions are made for further development 
of Legislative Councils which Lord Hailey would prefer to see kept as they are until 
some success has been attained in the development of the Regional Councils which 
he recommends. The difference is merely a matter of degree and not of principle but 
I think it will be probably found expedient to make some concessions in the sphere of 
the Legislative Council while the other changes are in progress and not wait until 
they have themselves reached a later stage, provided that those changes are not such 
as to seriously embarrass the Government in its future plans. 
It is very important that the educated politically-minded Africans who, although 
few at present, will be steadily growing in numbers with the advance of education, 
should not be antagonised by a misunderstanding of the intentions of His Majesty's 
Government. It is important therefore to be as definite as possible in stating those 
intentions and also to explain frankly that it is at present impossible to be definite 
about the later stages of the programme. Lord Hailey's views as to the importance 
during what must necessarily be an experimental period of avoiding irrevocable 
commitments and preserving room for as much elasticity as possible seem to me to 
be eminently sound but the success with which they can be put over will depend a 
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good deal upon the confidence which we succeed in inspmng in the minds of 
educated Africans. If our plan should contemplate no development at all in the 
Legislative Councils during the earlier stages we should be running the risk of 
arousing opposition to the whole of our schemes for constitutional advance. The 
problem is to devise such development in the Legislative Councils as will not 
compromise our general plan. 
It will be noticed that the tentative plan in the appendix contains no reference to 
Executive Councils. This is because there does not appear to be any room for 
development in that sphere until stage 5 of the plan has been reached. It seems 
probable that if H.M.G. had been in a position to point to a plan of constitutional 
development on some such lines as is sketched in the appendix, it would have been 
found possible to avoid the premature introduction of unofficial members into 
Executive Councils. This subject has been forced upon us in West Africa by 
precedents elsewhere and considerations of immediate political expediency in West 
Africa itself. It is indeed a good illustration of the need for a plan to avoid further 
concessions which might prove to be more embarrassing. 
It should perhaps be stated that the tentative plan in the appendix is intentionally 
made very general in character and takes no account of the obvious fact that the form 
of the problem as presented in the different West African Dependencies will call for 
considerable modifications in the attempted solution as between one Dependency 
and another; for example the problem of the Gold Coast is differentiated from that in 
Nigeria in many ways, not least perhaps by the fact of the entirely different character 
of the Native Administrations in Nigeria and in the Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti. 
Appendix to 70: Tentative plan for constitional development 
References to 
Hailey 
B. 148 
c. 15. 
D. 117. 158. 
The plan has been divided for convenience into stages but it 
will be appreciated that these stages will not be reached 
simultaneously in all four Colonies, that they tend to merge 
into one another and to overlap so that in some places two 
stages might be developing at the same time, and above all that 
there can be no question of finding a uniform solution for all 
four Colonies. 
Stage 1 
(a) Municipal Councils. Increased African representation on 
existing Municipal Councils, in some cases by elected mem-
bers, in others by nominated. 
Aim would be African-elected majorities on the councils 
based on an increasingly liberal franchise and also more liberal 
qualifications for membership. 
Parallel with the above developments, an increasing degree 
of responsibility to be developed upon Municipalities. 
While the above developments are going on, new Municipal 
Councils would be formed as opportunity offered in suitable 
areas at present not enjoying any Municipal rights. 
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A. 16. 43. 96. 
B. 127. 139. 
D. 39-65. 109. 
33-5. 163. 
A. 97. 
B. 167-9. 
D. 166 
B. 170. 
(c.f. A. 97.) 
A. 91. 
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(b) Gradual modernisation of Native Authorities. This will 
involve the introduction of younger and better-educated mem-
bers in an increasing proportion and the gradual replacement 
of authoritarian regimes, where they exist, by forms of author-
ity reflecting more fully and actively the will of the commun-
ity. This will of course need very careful handling of conserva-
tive minded authorities like the Northern Nigeria Emirs, who 
may need a good deal of persuasion before they accept any 
changes. 
(c) Parallel with (a) and (b) the development of Regional or 
Group Councils. These would, in the first instance, be purely 
advisory, would mainly consist of Africans and, so far as 
possible, would be drawn from, or otherwise linked closely 
with, the various Native Authorities within the region. 
Broadly speaking, the Regional Councils would cover agri-
cultural areas, including any other areas which for special 
reasons could not be treated as Municipalities. 
(d) Development of African representation in Legislative 
Council. This could be done in two ways, (1) in the case of 
elected members; by broadening the franchise and by substi-
tuting where practicable election for nomination as regards 
existing membership, and (2) by the addition to the council of 
further African nominated members to represent more ade-
quately various African interests or sections of the community. 
Special measures to be taken on lines advocated by Sir B. 
Bourdillon, to enable the African members to play a more 
active and effective part. 
It should be emphasised here that the aim of this develop-
ment is not the substitution, under existing constitutional 
forms, of an African majority, but a council more fully 
representative of the various African interests involved in the 
complex makeup of the community. 
At the same time it may be necessary to reconsider the 
representation on the council of interests other than African, 
e.g. those of the European merchants and mining companies. 
There is also the special and difficult case of the Syrians. 
Stage 2 
(a) Municipal Councils. The widening of the franchise and the 
progressive elimination from Municipal Councils of all ele-
ments elements except those of an elective character. 
The gradual increase in the scope and responsibility of the 
Council's functions. 
The gradual contraction of the Governor's overriding 
powers. 
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B. 171. 
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D. 168. 
B. 171. 
D. 168. 
D. 176-179. 
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(b) Regional Councils. The gradual devolution upon the Re-
gional Councils of functions other than advisory. These would 
include, in the first place, minor legislative or rule-making 
powers, the scope of which could be extended in the light of 
experience, and if the experiment should be successful might 
enable a good deal of legislation at present passing through 
Legislative Council to be devolved upon Regional Councils. 
(One of the problems will, of course, be to do this without 
introducing tiresome variations of detail as between one region 
and another; and also to differentiate satisfactorily the func-
tions of the Regional Councils from those of Native Authorities 
which will not necessarily be constituent parts of such 
Councils.) 
(c) Legislative Council. The gradual transformation of African 
representation on Legislative Councils (except in the case of 
municipal areas) by the substitution of representatives of 
Regional Councils (either elected or nominated in some way 
acceptable to local opinion) for representatives of various 
African interests or communities on the present basis. 
Stage 3 
Regional Councils. The gradual transfer of certain more 
important legislative powers from the Central Legislature to 
Regional Councils. 
This is obviously a matter which will call for very careful 
handling. The choice of subjects to be transferred and the 
nature of the safeguards under which the new powers are to be 
exercised will present difficult problems and may take a long 
time to work out satisfactorily. 
Stage 4 
Legislative Councils. The introduction of African unofficial 
majorities, whether partly or wholly elected. 
It is very questionable whether there should be any stage 4. 
Experience elsewhere suggests that unofficial majorities do not 
afford an education in self-government but merely a training 
in irresponsible opposition to Government. Paramount powers 
would have to be reserved to the Governor to ensure that 
irresponsible majorities did not wreck the administration and 
the exercise of these powers would be a frequent source of 
violent controversy both locally and in this country. 
Stage 5 
Towards self-government 
1. With the progress of education should go the progres-
sive Africanisation of the higher posts of the Colonial adminis-
trations. 
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2. These factors are bound to lead to an increasingly 
impatient demand for self"government. 
It is obvious that it would be very unwise to attempt to 
foreshadow now the form which self-government is likely to 
take in West Africa, or the method by which it is to be 
acquired. It is suggested, therefore, that all that can be said 
about stage 4 [? stage 5] at the present time is that any further 
developments in the direction of self-government should be 
preceded by conferences of all the African interests involved 
with representatives of the British Government. Whether these 
Conferences should take place in Africa or in this country is a 
matter which would have to be considered nearer the time. 
There are arguments in favour of either procedure. 
Such Conferences would afford an opportunity to make clear 
to the Africans what is involved in self-government, i.e. its 
responsibilities as well as its privileges. No country can be 
really self-governing if it has to depend on some external 
authority for financial grant-in-aid or is unable to maintain law 
and order within its own boundaries. In a place like West 
Africa, it would be obviously absurd to think of all the existing 
Colonial units as being equally fit for self-government. The 
conferring of self-government upon a 'Federation' of all four 
territories is a possible conception but great practical difficul-
ties are involved. 
So long as His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom 
remain ultimately responsible for what goes on in West Africa, 
there would have to be certain rigidly reserved powers and 
subjects. 
3. African opinion, unless it profits to a surprising extent 
by its probationary training during the first three stages, is 
likely to press for the fulfilment of its aspirations in ways which 
would be unlikely to be in the true interests of African 
communities. Parallel with the constitutional development 
tentatively outlined above, there would of course be, it is to be 
hoped, a considerable material improvement in the conditions 
of life for the bulk of the community and a progressively 
widespread increase in education. 
4. A good many years (perhaps a good many generations 
though it would be impolitic to say so openly) must elapse 
before the possibilities of stages 1, 2 and 3 have all been at all 
fully exploited, but while this process is going on there will 
presumably be an insistent demand for quickening the pace 
and for the handing over to the African communities of some 
degree of responsibility for their own affairs. This would be a 
natural and healthy development but it will raise problems of 
great difficulty. 
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71 CO 554/132/20, no 12 29 July 1943 
'Constitutional development in West Africa': CO note of a depart-
mental discussion 
[Central to CO thinking about constitutional development in West Africa was the need to 
avoid encouraging what officials described as 'power without responsibility' by the too 
early concession of unofficial majorities in central legislatures. Precedents for unofficial 
majorities either existed (eg in the Windward Islands) or were about to be created (eg in 
Jamaica) in a number of West Indian colonies but the CO was anxious that West Africa 
should not follow the same path. When Sir A Burns raised the issue in the context of the 
Gold Coast, Dawe minuted that unofficial majorities encouraged 'petty criticism at the 
expense of constructive ideas and are the worst form of educating native peoples in the 
management of their own affairs' (CO 96/770/4, minute by Dawe, 12 Jan 1943, 
reproduced in BDEEP series B, vol1, R Rathbone, ed, Ghana, part I, 10). Experience in 
India suggested the need for caution in experimenting with unofficial majorities and CO 
officials were equally concerned with possible repercussions in East and Central Africa if 
such majorities were granted in West Africa. This concern, mirrored in Hailey's reports, 
was reflected in Williams's memo on constitutional development (see 70) which formed 
the basis of the departmental discussion in the note reproduced here. The memo and the 
discussion were intended as a briefing exercise for Stanley who was scheduled to become 
the first secretary of state to visit West Africa in the autumn of 1943. Rathbone, ed, op cit, 
documents the manner in which the Gold Coast subsequently acquired much sooner than 
anticipated an unofficial majority in its Legislative Council (see also above, p liv).] 
The Secretary of State referred to the paper prepared by Mr Williams on constitu-
tional development in West Africa, which he thought provided an admirable basis for 
long-term planning. The paper was based on Lord Hailey's Memorandum on Native 
Administration and African Political Development and the Secretary of State said 
that he would be very interested to hear Lord Hailey's views on the proposal. Lord 
Hailey said that he was in general agreement with the proposals, which, he observed 
went further than his own suggestions. He had two main points which he wished to 
make. 
In the first place he referred to the difficulty of getting the educated West Africans 
to understand that H.M.G. sincerely intended in the long run to grant a real measure 
of political responsibility. These people were inclined to distrust the reality of our 
intentions and it was most important not to antagonize them by anything that was 
said about future progress in the development of political responsibility in West 
Africa. Lord Hailey thought that an opportunity should be taken of obtaining 
recognition of an abiding character for the steps which were to be taken. He 
mentioned the statement of 1917 about self-government in India. The Secretary of 
State asked whether that had convinced politically-minded Indians. Lord Hailey said 
that the trouble had been that Indians had felt that we had not moved fast enough 
since. Sir George Cater asked whether Lord Hailey meant that the statement should 
be general or should relate to West Africa alone. Lord Hailey said that it might form 
part of a statement on general policy. Sir Arthur Dawe said that the intention behind 
the memorandum had been that the issue could be confined to West Africa and that a 
statement of H.M.G.'s intentions covering West Africa might be made. Sir Hubert 
Stevenson had suggested something of the kind in his recent discussion with the 
Secretary of State. 
Lord Hailey said that what he had in mind was a full-dress statement by H.M. 
Government which would bring Parliament in. The reason why he was so anxious for 
such a statement was that the steps which could actually be taken to grant further 
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responsibility to West Africa were necessarily slow and tentative. In order to carry 
West Africans with us it would he felt be most helpful if the affirmation of Parliament 
could be obtained for the ultimate aim of responsible self-government. The Secretary 
of State said that the difficulty was that the only practicable course to take in 
Parliament would be to obtain a resolution by the House of Commons supporting the 
policy which H.M.G. proposed to carry out. Any statement covering the grant of 
political responsibility in West Africa must necessarily look forward a long way into 
the future and be in very general terms. Parliament would not be likely to accept 
anything but concrete proposals affecting the immediate or near future. The 
Secretary of State also suggested that white papers on African policy had not always 
been successful in their effects in the past. He would therefore prefer that any 
announcement which were made should take the form of the publication of a 
despatch to the West African Governors setting out the policy to be adopted. 
Turning to his second point, Lord Hailey asked whether we were going effectively 
far enough in creating the beginnings of self-government in West Africa. What the 
memorandum proposed to do was to develop representative institutions, to encour- · 
age the development of local government to the maximum possible extent and to 
increase the numbers of Africans in the Administration. All this was excellent, but he 
wondered whether we should not go further and bring the unofficials into the 
Government itself. He suggested that the conception of the Governor-in-Council 
should be made into a reality as a beginning of the development of self-government. 
At present the Executive Council of the Governor in the West African territories was 
advisory and not really executive. What he suggested was that unofficials, who would 
mainly be Africans, should be made into heads of groups of departments and should 
sit as such in the Executive Council. They would not of course be ministers but if and 
when the stage of full Parliamentary government was reached they could be turned 
into ministers. What Lord Hailey felt that we ought to avoid was the extension of 
Parliamentary responsibility by enlarging the powers of the legislature before we had 
the basis on which to build such responsibility. We did not want to bind ourselves to 
the development of normal political institutions and then to have to think again as 
we had had to do in India. The proposal which he had just made would have the 
advantage of associating Africans more closely in the Government and enabling them 
to learn how to govern without committing us immediately to any line of political 
development. 
Lord Hailey thought that such a step which might be taken immediately, would 
not involve too violent a departure at the top and that it would be combined with 
building up from below by the development of local government. Reliance on the 
development of local government alone would be very disappointing to educated 
West Africans. Lord Hailey thought that if nothing were done on this line they would 
very soon begin to resent the fact that their representatives were in a purely advisory 
capacity on the Executive and Legislative Councils. 
The Secretary of State asked whether it might not be difficult to find people with 
sufficient capacity actually to play an effective part in the running of departments or 
groups of departments. The scheme could hardly work if the men appointed were 
merely token heads of departments who contributed nothing and indeed were 
handicapps [sic]. It was pointed out also that it would be important to consider the 
attitude of the European officers in the Service to such appointments. Lord Hailey 
thought that it would be found that such heads of departments would in fact 
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contribute something to the work of the departments under them. They would of 
course require to be properly handled, but this had not proved impossible in India. 
Lord Hailey quite agreed that the standard of development was more advanced in 
India than in West Africa but he did not think that this should prove a fatal obstacle. 
He pointed out that all important measures would have to come before the Executive 
Council. In India it had been found very rare for completely impossible proposals to 
be put forward by Indian Ministers. 
In answers to a question, Lord Hailey said he would have no hestitation in 
suggesting than an Emir or other Chief should be appointed to one of the posts he 
had in mind if a suitable man could be found. The Secretary of State asked whether it 
would be easy to find someone who would command support throughout the 
territory in Nigeria, but Lord Hailey thought that this difficulty need not be regarded 
as too serious. The idea of a single man representing Nigeria as a whole as opposed to 
a particular part of it or a particular tribe or group of tribes admittedly did not exist 
at present, but would inevitably grow up. 
The Secretary of State said that he felt serious doubt about the appointment of 
puppet heads of departments and that he would prefer that as a first step Africans 
should be attached to departments or groups of departments as ' advisers, such 
appointments carrying with them automatically a seat on the Executive Council. If 
this arrangement was a success, it might be possible to proceed later to the actual 
granting to such, unofficials of responsibility for departments or groups of depart-
ments. Lord Hailey agreed that it might be advisable to proceed gradually as the 
Secretary of State suggested. The important point was that there was an enormous 
gulf to be bridged between the present state of affairs and any form of political 
responsiblity. What was wanted was education in responsibility. At present educated 
Africans had no responsibility except in a few cases where they held senior official 
posts. If no steps were taken, the leading educated Africans would develop into a 
chartered opposition and suddenly administrative responsibility would be thrust 
upon them without their being ready to assume it. His suggestion was designed to 
avoid this situation. The Secretary of State said that it was important that Africans 
should learn to defend unpopular measures to their own people. He thanked Lord 
Hailey for the suggestions which he had made and said that it would be necessary to 
consult the Governors on the ideas put forward in the memorandum and also on any 
suggestion for bringing Africans more closely into the administrative machine in an 
advisory capacity. 
The Secretary of State then referred to paragraph (b) in stage 1 of the tentative 
plan for constitutional development put forward in the memorandum. He asked how 
the gradual modernisation of Native Authorities could be achieved. Lord Hailey said 
that this was being worked out gradually in the Gold Coast by a natural process. In 
Nigeria educated Africans were being brought onto the Councils of Native Author-
ities, and it was desirable to encourage this to the maximum possible extent. In other 
parts of Africa the same process was taking place. The difficult area would be the 
Northern Provinces of Nigeria where educated men had practically no place in the 
working of the Native Authorities and where the Youth Movement had no hold. The 
Secretary of State asked how educated Africans were brought into the Native 
Authority machine in Western Nigeria. Lord Hailey said that one of the principal 
methods was by bringing in representatives of the Town Councils who were usually 
elected. Public opinion was itself insisting that Native Authorities should take 
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educated men on to their Councils. In Eastern Nigeria there was no serious difficulty 
as the Native Authorities were small and had developed little and in many cases 
themselves welcomed the assistance of educated men. The object to be aimed at was 
the conversion of native Authorities into local Government bodies with members 
elected by the people. At present in most cases members of Councils were chosen by 
the Native Authority himself. 
72 CO 822/108/20, no 29 5 Aug 1943 
'Closer union in East Africa': CO note of a discussion between Mr 
Stanley, Mr Attlee, Lord Cranborne and Mr Hall1 
[In accordance with Cranborne's directive (see 62), Sir H Moore was summoned to the UK 
for discussions at the CO in Sept 1942. Agreement was reached that the Civil Defence and 
Supply Council should be reconstituted as an East African Production and Supply Council 
and brought into more definite subordination to the East African Governors' Conference. 
The governor of Kenya withdrew from the council and a new chairman was appointed. 
During the discussions, Moore outlined a scheme for a closer union of the Four East 
African territories and he was invited to submit a memo explaining his ;Jroposals. Arguing 
the economic case for closer union, Moore rejected a federal approach and suggested a 
unitary scheme. His plan provided for an unofficial majority in the central legislature, but 
a majority so composed that it could only out-vote the government if representatives of 
the Europeans, Indians and Africans voted together. The governor-general would have 
powers of certification and veto. Africans in the legislature would be represented by 
nominated Europeans until suitable Africans became available. Below the central 
machinery the existing territorial governments would disappear, local government being 
entrusted in the towns and 'settled' areas to elected municipal boards and district 
councils, and in the 'native' areas to local native councils under the supervision and 
control of a chief native commissioner in each territory. Stanley, who succeeded 
Cranborne at the CO in Nov 1942, rejected Moore's scheme on the grounds that the 
balance of political power would lie with the European minority to at least the same 
extent as it already did in Kenya. Equally, a unitary scheme on these lines would be 
unacceptable to the UK parliament. Matters, however, could not be allowed to rest there 
for, as Stanley put it, 'the policy of stonewalling ... is no longer feasible'. Further delay in 
deciding a course of action in East Africa would increase the possibility of friction 
between the home government and the settlers in Kenya who were becoming more 
powerful. The destiny of Tanganyika had to be settled, as did the place of the Indian 
community in the East African political system after the war. If the UK did nothing the 
initiative might pass to South Africa. Accordingly, at Stanley's request, G F See!, head of 
the East Africa Dept, sketched the outline of a federal plan for East Africa which provided 
for an official majority in the federal legislature but an unofficial majority in the Kenya 
territorial legislature. The federal authority would be responsible for defence (including 
internal security), transport and communications, currency, trade and customs, post-
secondary education, and scientific and industrial research. The division of financial 
powers would be a matter for discussion, but in principle it was suggested that the federal 
authority should impose and collect customs duties, and meet its expenditure from that 
source; all other sources of revenue would remain with the territorial governments (CO 
822/108/20, no 23, memo by See!, 3 Aug 1943). This new version of a federal scheme 
formed the basis of discussion at Stanley's meeting with Attlee, Hall and Cranborne on 5 
Aug, the record of which is reproduced here.) 
1 Cranborne was present for the last part of the discussion. George Hall MP (Lab) was parliamentary 
under-secretary of state for the colonies, 1940-1942; financial secretary to the Admiralty, 1942- 1943; 
parliamentary under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, 1943-1945; secretary of state for the colonies in 
the Attlee government, 1945--1946. Also present: the Duke of Devonshire, Sir A Dawe and G F See!. 
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Colonel Stanley explained that he had circulated a memorandum with a view to 
discussion of this question because he felt convinced after a good deal of study that it 
would not be practicable to defer much longer some attempt to reach a decision. 
Largely owing to the war, many things had been happening in East Africa, and there 
was now a virtually centralised directing machine as regards war supply and 
economic affairs generally. The local people had seen the advantages of this and 
would not want to let it go. Further, there was a definite tendency for the Colonial 
Office control in this part of the world to slip away. 
If we wanted to secure a satisfactory agreement for the post-war period which 
would retain for us the power to carry out our general Colonial policy in East Africa, 
he thought we ought to be laying the foundations now; and his advice was that as far 
as the European settlers were concerned, it was probable that we should find the 
general attitude more moderate now than in a few years' time with the influx of new 
men after the war. Another factor was the emergence of the Union as an African 
power. Any question of attempting to coerce Kenya would, according to present 
indications, lead to her invoking the assistance of South Africa. 
As he saw it, the objective was to provide a solution which would preserve the 
advantages of central administration while giving the fullest opportunity for Africans 
to participate as and when they became capable of doing so. Sir Henry Moore had 
recently submitted proposals as a result of his discussions with Lord Cranborne last 
year but, for the reasons which he himself had briefly indicated in the note 
circulated, he did not feel confident that these would secure acceptance in 
Parliament. The alternative suggestions he had made for a federal solution were 
intended purely for discussion. He was hoping for advice from his colleagues as to 
the way in which some positive solution could best be attempted and no-one would 
be committed by anything which might be said at this stage. 
Major Attlee said that he had so far failed to see any adequate case made out for 
closer union, especially if, as he understood, the vast bulk of the Africans were not 
homogeneous. He suggested that West Africa was getting along without anything of 
the kind. Colonel Stanley pointed out, however, that this was not so and that after 
the war we should certainly want some kind of coordinated central organisation for 
West Africa. Mr. Hall said that he was attracted by the idea in the suggested federal 
scheme of preserving an official majority at the centre, but he would want to see an 
extension of the powers proposed for the central authority by the inclusion for 
example of labour legislation. Major Attlee expressed the view that if any scheme of 
this kind were now accepted, it would not be long before there would be a new 
demand from the settlers for a [?non-]official majority which it would be found 
impossible to oppose. Mr. Hall thought that on the whole a case could be made out 
for some coordination of the existing Governments, and that he was inclined to 
prefer a federal plan of some kind to that suggested by Sir Henry Moore. A possible 
alternative might be to make a beginning with centralising machinery for economic 
development, perhaps on the lines of the Stockdale Commission in the West Indies, 
which would enable the political difficulties to be avoided for the time. Colonel 
Stanley, however, doubted whether we could brush the political difficulties aside. 
Anyone who had the responsibility for the administration of East Africa would have 
to face it. One of the chief difficulties was, what would happen if the people in Kenya 
decided to link themselves to the Union. Major Attlee doubted whether if it came to 
the point anything of the kind would be practicable, seeing that the Europeans in 
[72] POLITICAL CHANGE AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 365 
Kenya were so few in number; but it was pointed out that they were the only effective 
power at the moment and practically every branch of activity was in their hands. Mr. 
Hall said that if this argument were accepted, there might be a similar threat from 
almost any Colony, e.g. Ceylon, Cyprus or Northern Rhodesia. Colonel Stanley 
repeated that any possibility of Kenya going into the arms of the Union would create 
a most difficult situation and one which we must avoid if we can, especially if we were 
in earnest in wanting to preserve our own native policy in East Africa as against the 
native policy of the Union. 
Reverting to the discussion of the tentative suggestions for a federal arrangement, 
Mr. Hall said that if he were satisfied that the federal legislative council, with its 
official majority, would be sufficiently strong to assert itself, it would appeal to him 
more than anything else. It might have a beneficial influence upon the general 
direction of policy in Kenya itself. Major Attlee expressed doubts whether a 
satisfactory division of finance between the central and the territorial governments 
would be practicable. It was suggested that it might be better for an arrangement 
leaving the customs revenue to the local governments to be devised but it was 
pointed out that customs unification was essential to any central system and was 
already in force. There was some discussion as to where the seat of the federal 
authority would be and it was mentioned that Arusha in Tanganyika had been 
suggested, though this question would admittedly present certain difficulties. Mr. 
Hall observed that the point about the Mandate would certainly have to be cleared up 
before any definite action could be taken. Major Attlee enquired whether the 
non-official majority which was contemplated in the Kenya Provincial legislature 
would be a settler majority. It was agreed that this was the position. Major Attlee said 
that he did not think his party would be able to accept that. 
Mr. Hall again mentioned that it would be essential from his point of view that the 
functions of the central authority should include the initiating and carrying out of 
labour legislation, as regards which the attitude of the Kenya Government had not in 
the past been very progressive. It was thought that it might not be impossible to 
secure acceptance of this. Mr. Hall also mentioned that he would like to see direct 
taxation included within the scope of the central authority. As regards membership 
of the federal legislature, it was explained that this had not been considered in detail. 
Mr. Hall said that the hope would be that as a result of the introduction of some 
such federal scheme the position in other territories would be advanced to bring it 
into line at least with that reached in Uganda now. The legislature in the separate 
territories would provide a medium for the development of participation by Africans 
in local self-government and pave the way for eventual participation in the 
government at the centre. 
Major Attlee enquired as to the position in Uganda at present. Sir Arthur Dawe 
explained that there was a Protectorate Government in Uganda on the usual Colonial 
model and that in the Buganda Native State (which included about 1,000,000 out of 
the 4,000,000 Africans) there was a fairly well developed African Government under 
the Kabaka, with a Parliament and ministers who dealt with exclusively native affairs, 
but subject to the central government and under the terms of an Agreement obliged 
to take the advice of the central government on any matter in which it was offered. 
(At this stage Lord Cranborne joined the meeting.) 
Lord Cranborne observed that from the description in Colonel Stanley's memoran-
dum of the plan put forward by Sir H. Moo re, it seemed to him to have a considerable 
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attraction. It was apparently regarded as containing certain difficulties and he would 
like to hear more about these. He was somewhat perturbed by the suggestion that it 
was necessary to go for the plan which was thought to have the best chance of 
general acceptance. He thought that we should aim for what would be the best 
solution in itself. Colonel Stanley said that it seemed to him most desirable to try and 
achieve some measure of agreement amongst parties here and not to go on with 
anything which might become a matter of political contention. His object in the 
present discussions was not to find some means of throwing back on to the 
Governors the responsibility for propounding a solution but to see if we could give 
them guidance as to the kind of solution which would secure permanent acceptance 
here and ask them to elaborate it so that it would be put forward. 
Major Attlee said that it seemed to him that we must be clear what our ultimate 
objective was. He repeated that his party would be unlikely to look at any suggestion 
for a non-official majority in Kenya. Colonel Stanley said that the danger was that if 
we continued to drift, we might find ourselves with a fait accompli. Already last year 
we had had a most difficult situation in which we had been faced with the alternatives 
of trying to reverse tendencies which had developed or to throw the settlers into the 
arms of the Union. 
Major Attlee repeated his fear that once anything of the nature now proposed was 
acceded to, there would be a drive for a non-official majority and the extension of 
settler control over the whole area. If it were possible to find some way for the 
position achieved in Uganda to remain unaffected, that might help in presentation 
from the Labour party's point of view. 
Colonel Stanley said that if the position was that there was no chance of the 
Labour party agreeing to anything in the nature of local self-government for Kenya, 
he doubted whether it was any use going on with any proposals. Lord Cranborne 
agreed, and expressed the fear that the result would be that after an interval the local 
Europeans would have built up a system giving themselves the virtual control. He 
appreciated the difficulty of devising any parlimentary system to suit the circum-
stances in East Africa, which were quite different, for example, from those in India. 
One special feature in East Africa was that there was a very small immigrant minority 
who were capable of taking part in a parlimantary system, while the vast bulk of the 
population were definitely not so fitted. 
After further discussion it was agreed that copies of Sir Henry Moore's memoran-
dum should be circulated with a view to further discussion in the following week as 
to whether the line of approach it suggested offered a possible alternative to a federal 
system. 
73 CO 318/453/18 13 Jan 1944 
[Federation of the West Indies]: minute by P Rogers1 on the 
'increasing urgency' of the question of West Indian unity [Extract] 
[The circular despatch advocated by Parkinson (see 67) was, for a time, put on hold in the 
CO. Stanley and a number of officials, most notably Sir C Cater, felt there was no 
urgency. Cater saw three reasons to delay the despatch: first, to allow time for the 
1 See 67, note. 
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investigation into the proposed federation of the Leeward and Windward Islands (this had 
been delayed owing to the resignation of Sir D Jardine, governor of the Leeward Islands, 
and the appointment of D Freeston as his successor); secondly, to allow time for the new 
Jamaican constitution to come into operation; thirdly, to allow time to gauge reactions to 
the proposed system of British West Indian conferences2 which had been suggested as a 
means of enabling UK, representatives to agree a common line in preparation for the 
Anglo-American West Indian conferences (CO 318/453/18, minute by Cater, 9 June 1943). 
For the reasons explained in this extract from the minute reproduced here, neither 
Rogers nor H Beckett (assistant secretary, head of the West Indian Dept) felt that these 
were sufficient reasons to delay the despatch. The question of unity had become one of 
'increasing urgency'; accordingly the despatch was circulated on 25 July 1944.) 
... both Mr. Beckett and I feel that events have made the question of West Indian 
"unity" or federation one of increasing urgency. The Secretary of State's statement in 
the House in the Spring of last year about Regional Councils, and subsequent public 
pronouncements by prominent figures such as General Smuts have increased public 
interest greatly in the particular question of "regionalism" in the Colonies. It seems 
probable that we may be faced very soon with demands for a more detailed and 
explicit statement of Colonial policy in this respect and for action to be taken in this 
field. In the meantime in the West Indies the pressure of events over such matters as 
supplies, aviation and agricultural research, to name only a few, have brought the 
West Indies into increasingly close touch with their neighbours and in particular 
with the U.S.A. Both for internal West Indian reasons and for external reasons, which 
I will try to develop later, it is becoming increasingly important that the West Indies 
should show a more united front. 
The present position is broadly as follows in international affairs. The Anglo-
American Caribbean Commission has now been in existence nearly two years and is 
showing a very fair promise of results but it is obviously handicapped in dealing with 
so many administrations speaking with so many different voices and we are 
perpetually in danger of being dragged along in the wake of the Americans partly 
because our interests there have a much more ill-defined focus than theirs and partly 
because of our inevitable handicaps in men and materials. An announcement has 
been made about the system of West Indian Conferences, which are to be British and 
American only to begin with, but to which Canadian representatives almost certainly 
and Dutch representatives possibly will be invited at an early stage. It will probably be 
some time before representatives are invited from Cuba, Santo Domingo and Haiti 
and still longer before they are invited from the Central American Republics but that 
is a likely even if a long-term development and indeed it is to my mind essential if the 
area is to develop much beyond its present extremely backward stage. At present the 
leading impulse in the international sphere is undoubtedly American even though I 
think we may justly claim that some of the most progressive work internally is being 
done in the British Colonies. From the international point of view these develop-
ments seem to me to make it increasingly important and urgent that the British 
West Indies should play a more prominent part if their own interests are not to run 
the risk of suffering from the economic predominence of their greater neighbours 
and this they can only do if they show a greater unity than in the past so that they can 
speak on occasion with one voice. 
In the internal British West Indian sphere there have also been developments. The 
2 See 77 for the governors' responses to this proposal. 
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Comptroller's organisation has expanded somewhat and is inevitably developing 
more and more as a focal point in West Indian affairs (e.g. in connection with 
communications, recruitment of labour for U.S.A., Santo Domingo, etc.) . The 
proposed West Indian Conferences, though international, should have some affect in 
increasing a sense of West Indian unity. In addition there are proposals for a West 
Indian Administrative Service and a West Indian Medical Service, though so far they 
have not got very far. In addition there have been Conferences of West Indian Labour 
Officers and the Jamaica Supply Conference. There are the proposals for the 
federation of the Windward and Leeward Islands and also for a West Indian Colonial 
Advisory Council on agriculture, animal health and forestry. Most of these are in 
embrio but together they should in the next year or so have a considerable effect in 
encouraging West Indian unity. We do not want that feeling to be frustrated by being 
backward on the political side, particularly since, in my view, the younger and more 
politically minded section of the West Indies is strongly in favour of some form of 
federation in principle (though I have no doubt that they would quarrel about the 
form which it should take). The development of international regional bodies is 
doubly suspect to that section of opinion, both because of fears of American 
domination and because of fears that it may be used by the British Government as an 
excuse for delaying the grant of self-government to the British Colonies. I feel it is 
most important that we should do nothing which would give currency to this latter 
fear but equally I do not myself regard it as practicable to make the West Indian 
Colonies in their present form fully self-governing units (possibly with the exception 
of Jamaica). The inevitable result of that would be that they would be economically 
overwhelmed and politically overshadowed by their greater neighbours. The only way 
in which they can develop, again in my view, is as one (or possibly two) West Indian 
federations which would be of a size to enable them to have an effective voice in 
Caribbean affairs. 
Political jealousies and difficulties of communication are such that I should not 
regard any form of West Indian federation or joint Government as immediately 
practicable. Further I feel that political jealousies are such that a federation is not 
likely to develop of its own accord within a reasonable space of time and I suggest 
that continued pressure by H.M.G. to bring about a federation is essential. 
Both Mr. Beckett and I feel that we are, as it were, working against the clock in the 
West Indies. Apart from the pressure of international opinion to which I have 
referred, the pressure of West Indian political opinion is growing greater. Through 
no real fault of our own we have been unable to give full effect to the C.D. and W. 
policy because the men and materials are not there and local suspicion of our 
intentions is not diminishing. Sir F. Stockdale has told us more than once that 
feeling is such that there is only [a] comparatively short period within which we 
must achieve substantial results from our policy if it is to be effective. In these 
circumstances it is open to question whether the draft despatch originally prepared 
now goes far enough .... 
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7 4 CAB 98/41, CMB(44)3 14 Jan 1944 
'Future constitutional policy for British colonial territories in South-
East Asia': memorandum by Mr Stanley for War Cabinet Committee on 
Malaya and Borneo 
1. The policy which should be adopted as regards the political organisation of 
British and British-protected territories in South-East Asia after the termination of 
the present Japanese occupation has been under consideration in the Colonial Office. 
The administration of the territories immediately after the expulsion of the Japanese 
will, of course, be a matter for the military authorities and plans are already under 
consideration on this basis. In particular a Chief Civil Affairs Officer for Malaya has 
already been selected, and under him the nucleus of the future Malayan military 
administration is in course of assembly at the War Office. A similar nucleus 
administration to cover all British-protected territories in Borneo is also in process 
of assembly. 
2. The planning must, however, be from the outset conditioned by the arrange-
ments which His Majesty's Government decide upon as regards future constitutional 
and administrative systems. The time has come for such general decisions to be 
taken. It is further important that, in so far as those decisions may represent a 
change from past policy, the military authorities should be satisfied that any steps 
which they take in conformity with those arrangements will be supported by His 
Majesty 's Government in the face of possible opposition from any quarter. For 
reasons set out below it is also necessary to consider future plans for Malaya with 
some reference to those for British territories in Borneo. Proposals for the area as a 
whole are therefore included in this memorandum. 
3. The territories concerned comprise the Colony of the Straits Settlements 
(Singapore, Penang and Malacca in Malaya, Labuan off the north coast of Borneo, 
and Christmas Island and the Cocos-Keeling Islands to the South of Java); the 
Federated Malay States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang in the Malay 
Peninsula; the Unfederated States of Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu and Perlis 
in the Malay Peninsula and Brunei in Borneo; and the States of North Borneo and 
Sarawak in Borneo. (It is not necessary in this memorandum to refer to the future 
position of Hong Kong.) 
4. The Malay Peninsula, as organised under British control, consists, as ex-
plained, of a British Colony and of nine Malay States under their Malay Rulers, four 
of them being joined in a Federation. Until the seventies of [the]last century it was 
the policy to restrict British control to the three Settlements comprising the Colony 
and to discourage penetration into the Malay States. These States were at that time 
essentially reverine communities, each under their own ruler and isolated to a large 
extent by mountains and jungle. Even by 1870, however, the States were subject to 
disturbances occasioned by bands of pirates and by the impact on Malay society of 
traders and miners from the outside world, particularly Chinese. The resulting 
anarchy led to requests from the Rulers of the four States, which were later included 
in the Federation, for assistance in administration from the British Government. 
This assistance was embodied in Treaties providing for the appointment in each State 
of a British officer whose advice was to be asked and acted upon in all questions other 
than those concerning Malay religion and custom. Similar treaties were concluded at 
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later dates with the other five States outside the Federation. In the Federated States 
these officers were styled British Residents, in the others British Advisers. It is, 
however, important to realise that from the legal point of view these Treaties 
involved no derogation from the position of the Rulers as sovereign princes, nor did 
they confer any jurisdiction on His Majesty in the Malay States. 
5. The introduction of this system in the 1870s was followed by a rapid 
development of the resources of the States concerned (mainly by immigrant capital 
and labour), which resulted in the breakdown of their previous physical isolation. It 
was natural that this process should have led to proposals for administrative 
machinery for closer union and in fact the States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan 
and Penang [Pahang] did agree in 1895 to the formation of a Federation. 
Paradoxically enough the existence of the Federation proved an obstacle to further 
unification of the Peninsula. For the rapidity of the country's material development 
had outstripped the advancement in education and administrative capacity of the 
Malays, and the British Residents found themselves compelled in fact to take over 
more or less direct control of the administrative system in the Federated States. As a 
result there emerged a highly centralised bureaucracy based on the Federal capital, 
and the Rulers of the States outside the Federation fought shy of the loss of power 
which they felt they would suffer in the administration of their States by joining the 
Federation. In the cases of Kedah and Perlis the British Agreements of 1923 and 1930 
respectively include, in fact, a Clause by which His Majesty's Government have 
undertaken not to merge or combine these States with other States, or (in the case of 
Kedah) the Straits Settlements, without the written consent of the Ruler in Council. 
The attitude of the Malay Rulers was also coloured by the fact that in the main the 
penetration of Malay communities by immigrant races had gone further in the 
Federated than in the Unfederated States. 
A further obstacle to the unification of the Peninsula lay in the divergence of 
economic interest between Singapore, which as a great entrepot was essentially 
mercantile in character, and the mainland of the peninsula which was mainly 
producing for export and which feared that in any closer union its interests would be 
sacrificed to those of Singapore. 
6. Some attempt was made in the period between the two wars to meet the 
grievances of the Rulers of the Federated States by the policy of decentralisation, i.e., 
by the gradual transfer of many governmental functions from the Federal to the 
State Governments. It is important to realise however that this policy was regarded 
as an essential preliminary step for the achievement of a longer term policy, viz., the 
promotion of closer co-operation between the constituent parts of Malaya as a whole, 
by removing the deterrent which the existing Federation constituted against the 
closer association of the Unfederated States. 
7. Such administrative co-ordination as existed throughout the territories under 
discussion both in the Malay Peninsula and Borneo up to the date of Japanese 
occupation was achieved by the exercise by the Governor of the Straits Settlements of 
the additional functions of High Commissioner for the Malay States and British 
Agent for Borneo. As Governor of the Straits Settlements he was in direct charge of 
the Colony's administration: on matters pertaining to the Federated Malay States, as 
High Commissioner, he controlled the Federal Government through the Federal 
Secretary at Kuala Lumpur and the State Governments through the four British 
Residents; on the business of the Unfederated States, again, as the High Commis-
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sioner, he controlled the State Governments through the British Advisers in each 
State. Finally as British Agent for Borneo he was the channel of communication 
between His Majesty's Government and the Governments of Sarawak and North 
Borneo, but apart from the emergency appointment in 1940 of a Defence Liaison 
Officer for Sarawak he had no direct representative in either territory. 
8. In the novel conditions which will exist in our return to Malaya there will be an 
opportunity to achieve closer co-operation between the constituent parts of the 
territory as a whole without going through the lengthy process which the sponsors of 
the decentralisation policy had to envisage. 
Experience has shown that the interests of efficiency and security require closer 
integration of both the legislative and administrative arrangements in Malaya. United 
action in the past required separate action by ten Governments, a process which, 
without taking into account the opportunities it presented for local disagreement 
and the development of differences, did not conduce to speedy administration. On a 
longer view, too, the pre-war system does not seem capable of adjustment to the 
promotion of broad-based governing institutions in accordance with our proclaimed 
purpose in Colonial policy. There are important non-Malay Asiatic communities in 
the country which have substantially contributed to its development and have 
acquired permanent interests therein. But the Malay Rulers have always set their 
faces against any proposals to recognise as their subjects any persons not of Malay 
race or Mohammedan religion. The relaxation in due course of British official control 
over the Rulers would therefore, on the basis of the pre-war constitutional system, 
not be likely to provide the other communities with adequate prospects of 
participation in the government of the country. 
9. It is advisable that the function of co-ordination and direction should not be 
entrusted to an officer already burdened by detailed administrative responsibilities in 
any particular territory of the group. The appointment is therefore envisaged of a 
high British Authority (for convenience styled here a "Governor-General") for the 
whole area, viz. Malaya and British Borneo, without any direct administrative 
functions within any of the territories concerned, but with direct supervisory control 
over the chief officers of all those territories. This officer would have his own 
secretariat and a staff of expert advisers to assist him in supervising the political, 
economic, and social development of the territories and he could also be concerned 
with the representation of the interests of His Majesty's Government in the United 
Kingdom in any regional Council which may eventually be set up by the United 
Nations in that area. He would in any event have particular duties in securing due 
co-ordination on the civil side of all measures relating to the defence of the area. The 
headquarters of the Governor-General could conveniently be placed at Singapore, 
which is the natural centre of communications with all the British territories 
concerned and with neighbouring foreign administrations. 
Malaya 
10. Within Malaya considerations of dynastic pride and local particularism 
militate against the emergence within any foreseeable future of a union of the 
existing Malay States under a native Ruler; nor, for reasons explained above, would 
the emergence of a united Malay monarchy for the whole province be acceptable to 
other non-Malay communities with substantial interests in the country. The British 
Crown alone provides the common link of loyalty which will draw the separate 
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communities together and promote a sense of common interest and the development 
of common institutions. It is therefore necessary that, as a first step, the old situation 
in which His Majesty has no jurisdiction in the Malay States should be remedied. The 
legal view is that our present Treaties with the Malay Rulers are at present to be 
regarded as still operative (though for practical purposes in suspension owing to 
enemy occupation of the territory). A fresh treaty, therefore, with each Ruler should 
be concluded as soon as possible after reoccupation under which such jurisdiction 
would be ceded to His Majesty as would enable him to legislate for the States under 
the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, notwithstanding, in the case of Kedah and Perlis, the 
Clauses mentioned in paragraph 5 above. Thereafter it will be possible to proceed to 
create a new constitution for Malaya by Order-in-Council under statutory powers. 
This will involve fresh legislation in the United Kingdom Parliament in respect of the 
Straits Settlements. 
11. Our constitutional scheme should be designed, first and foremost, to provide 
for a union of all the Malay States and the settlements of Penang and Malacca. A 
central authority representing these States and Settlements should be created, and at 
its head there should be a Governor with an Executive and Legislative Council. The 
seat of Government of this Malayan Union would be conveniently at or near Kuala 
Lumpur, the capital of the present limited Federation. Subject to the new central 
authority, the several States and Settlements would be empowered to deal with such 
local affairs as may be devolved upon them by the central authority. These local 
authorities would be so constituted as to be representative of the principal 
communities and interests in the State or Settlement concerned. 
12. It is desirable that the Island of Singapore should not be included in the 
present conception of the Malayan Union. Its inclusion might adversely affect the 
Malay attitude towards the proposals for the Union of the States, which is the first 
and foremost object of our policy and the necessary basis for any more extensive 
Union. The basis for a separate organisation for the Island of Singapore already 
existed in the Municipality of Singapore, but the appointment of a separate Governor 
or Lieutenant-Govrenor for the Settlement will be desirable. There will, of course, be 
many matters of administration, e.g., Posts and Telegraphs, on which the closest 
collaboration will be required between the authorities at Singapore and the rest of 
the Peninsula, but these can be the subject of particular agreements. Nevertheless, it 
should be made clear that His Majesty's Government has no desire to preclude or 
prejudice in any way the fusion of the two Administrations in a wider Union at any 
time should they both agree that such a course were desirable. 
13. Separate consideration is required for the extra-peninsular portions of the 
Straits Settlements not mentioned above, i.e., Labuan, Christmas Island and the 
Cocos-Keeling Islands. Labuan can most conveniently be considered in connection 
with the British-protected territories in Borneo. The remote Christmas Island and 
the Cocos-Keeling group hardly raise any questions of constitutional principle. Their 
sole links with other Malayan territories are with Singapore and they should for 
administrative purposes be subject to the direct authority of the Governor of 
Singapore. 
14. It is recognised that this programme will require the sacrifice by the State 
Rulers of some part of the authority and jurisdiction hitherto exercised by them. The 
interests of Malaya as a whole clearly require such a sacrifice. But there is no 
intention that the Rulers should lose their personal position as the natural leaders of 
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their Malay people within their State territories. Indeed, the association of their 
territories in the Union will give the Rulers an opportunity to play their part in a 
wider sphere of affairs, for it is intended to devise means to associate the Rulers 
personally with the machinery of the central authority, possibly as an advisory body 
to the Governor in respect of Malay and Mohammedan affairs. In any event, our past 
obligations will require that the elaboration of the new constitutional arrangements 
should have regard to the political, economic and social interests of the Malay race. 
15. The complete details of the application of this policy and in particular the 
detailed measures to be designed for the creation of self-governing institutions can 
only be worked out on the spot after reoccupation in the light of the prevailing 
conditions. It is, however, necessary that a general directive on future policy should 
be issued for the guidance of the officers concerned with planning for the period of 
the military administration. The draft of a directive for this purpose in respect of 
Malaya is submitted as a separate paper (CMB (44) 4) . 
Borneo 
16. To turn now to the territories concerned in northern Borneo, these 
comprise:-
(a) The State of North Borneo, administered as an independent State under 
British protection by the British Borneo (Chartered) Company, in which all rights 
of sovereignty are vested. The State is by agreement under His Majesty's protection 
and its foreign relations are subject to the control of His Majesty's Government; 
(b) The island of Labuan, a detached part of the Colony of the Straits Settle~ents, 
lying off the Western shore of the State of North Borneo; 
(c) The State of Brunei, a Malay State, subject to the terms of a Treaty on the 
general lines of those concluded with the States in the Malay Peninsula; and 
(d) The State of Sarawak, a Protected State under the sovereignty of Rajah 
Brooke. This State, like North Borneo, is under His Majesty's protection, but His 
Majesty's Government has no right to intervene in the internal administration. 
17. The primary object of our policy in regard to these territories should be to see 
that, for the future, their machinery of government is of such a character as will 
conduce to their social and political development in conformity with our general 
Colonial policy. 
18. So far as the State of North Borneo is concerned, this will involve the removal 
of the limitations inherent in a system of government by a Chartered Company. This 
matter is the subject of a separate memorandum (CMB (44) 5), and all that need be 
said here is that, on the transfer of the Chartered Company's constitutional authority 
in the territory to His Majesty, the union of North Borneo with Labuan under a 
single Governor with a local Executive and Legislative Council is envisaged. 
19. As regards Brunei, His Majesty possesses (but does not exercise) a certain 
limited jurisdiction in the State. It is now desired that the Sultan of Brunei (like the 
Rulers in Malaya) should be invited to cede such jurisdiction to His Majesty as will 
enable him to legislate for the State under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act to the fullest 
extent. 
20. As regards Sarawak, however, it is most desirable that His Majesty's 
Government should be placed in a position to exercise effective control over the 
administration. To this end it is proposed that the Rajah (like the Malay Sultans) 
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should be invited to cede such jurisdiction to His Majesty as will enable him to 
legislate for the State under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. 
21. The territories in Borneo under discussion are still comparatively un-
developed, and they have few racial or other affinities. At this stage the basis for 
closer union hardly exists, but community of policy can be assured by the 
subordination of the Governor of North Borneo and Labuan, and of the resident 
British Advisers in Brunei and Sarawak, to the authority and direction of the 
Governor-General at Singapore. 
22. The draft of a directive on future policy in respect of the four territories in 
Borneo for the guidance of the officers concerned with planning for the period of the 
Military Administration is submitted in a separate paper (CMB (44) 6). 
75 CO 795/128/45104/1944, WP(44)19 16Apr 1944 
'Closer union between Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland': joint War Cabinet memorandum by Lord Cranborne and 
Mr Stanley. Appendix 
The time is coming when it will be necessary to reach a decision as to the policy 
which His Majesty's Government are to adopt with regard to the question, which was 
under active discussion before the war, of the future relations between the Rhodesias 
and Nyasaland. 
2. This matter formed the subject of the Report of a Royal Commission issued in 
March 1939.1 The Report advocated measures of closer co-operation and association 
between the three Territories, to be achieved through the creation of an inter-
territorial Council which would help to co-ordinate the Government Services of the 
Territories and to frame development plans. On the question of actual amalgamation 
the Commission considered that community of interest would eventually lead to 
political unity and that the United Kingdom Government should declare themselves 
in favour of amalgamation in principle although this conclusion was qualified in 
notes appended to the Report by three of the Commissioners. The conclusion was 
evidently based on the view that the establishment of a solid bloc of British Territory 
in Southern Central Africa was an objective which should be steadily pursued as 
conducive alike to the stability and security of the Empire and to the progressive 
well-being of both Europeans and natives in this part of Africa. The Commission 
admitted, however, that there were certain serious difficulties which would have to 
be overcome before the ultimate objective of amalgamation could be achieved in 
practice, the principal difficulty being the divergence of native policy between 
Southern Rhodesia on the one hand and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland on the 
other. 
3. Owing to the oubreak of war it was impossible for His Majesty's Government to 
come to a decision on the question. In 1940 Lord Hailey, who was visiting other 
African Territories to study the system of native administration, was asked to advise 
whether there were such divergencies between the policy of Southern Rhodesia and 
that of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland as to present an obstacle to amalgamation. 
1 cf 54. 
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Lord Hailey's conclusion was that, while the position as to the provision of services 
for the welfare of natives in Southern Rhodesia compared not unfavourably with that 
in the other Territories, the limits which Southern Rhodesia imposes on the 
employment of Africans in industry and in the administrative services and which it 
would propose to apply to their association in the political institutions of the country 
would weigh strongly against a policy of amalgamation. 
4. Lord Hailey's note has not been published, and it was stated in the House of 
Commons on the 5th March, 1942, that, as it was impossible for His Majesty's 
Government of the United Kingdom and for Parliament to give the necessary 
consideration to the amalgamation issue in present circumstances, it had been 
agreed with the Government of Southern Rhodesia that publication of the note 
should be deferred until due consideration of the problem of amalgamation became 
practicable. Though Sir Godfrey Huggins seems to have accepted this as meaning 
that the matter should be left in abeyance during the war, he stated publicly in May 
1943 that he thought that "as soon as the embarrassment caused by the war departs 
we should, as a Colony, definitely put up a big fight for immediate amalgamation 
with the Northern Territories." As Sir G Huggins will be visiting this country shortly, 
he will no doubt expect to enter into preliminary confidential discussions on the 
subject. 
5. When Sir Godfrey Huggins speaks of amalgamation, he has in mind the 
creation of a State embracing the existing Territories of Southern Rhodesia, 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland governed by a Cabinet and by a single Legislature; 
the laws would be applied by an expanded Rhodesian Civil Service and the actions of 
the Government, except in relation to foreign affairs, would be subject to no greater 
control from without than that now exercised in respect of Southern Rhodesia by the 
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs through the power to veto Southern Rhodesia 
Bills which discriminate against natives. This veto has, in fact, never been used. 
6. There are certain serious objections to the amalgamation of the three 
Territories. Such a course would be strongly opposed by African opinion, both in 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and elsewhere, and by a large section of opinion in 
this country. In Southern Rhodesia native employment is limited by the provisions of 
the Industrial Conciliation Act, which, in effect, constitute a colour bar. The colour 
bar has no place in the African policy of His Majesty's Government in the United 
Kingdom. It does not exist in Nyasaland, nor is it recognised by the Government or 
countenanced by the law of Northern Rhodesia. In the latter Territory, however, 
there is in practice a colour bar on the railway, and the European mine workers have 
profited by the war-time need for maximum production and the avoidance of 
industrial disputes to make some progress, without any recognition from the 
Government, towards securing one on the Copperbelt. The majority of the unofficial 
European population of Northern Rhodesia would favour the introduction of 
legislation on the lines of the Southern Rhodesia Industrial Conciliation Act. An 
amalgamated Territory with responsible Government, as desired by Sir G Huggins, 
would be governed in accordance with the wishes of the Europeans of Southern and 
Northern Rhodesia; a colour bar would be established; and the new Government 
would not subscribe to the general policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to 
the development of the native population of tropical Africa. For His Majesty's 
Government to hand over control of two Territories predominantly native to a 
Government, the aims of whose native policy would be so largely at variance with 
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those of His Majesty's Government itself, would clearly be open to the most serious 
criticism. 
7. Moreover, it is clearly very doubtful whether the 70,000 Europeans in 
Southern Rhodesia, assisted by not more than 15,000 Europeans in the Northern 
Territories, could produce the men, either in Parliament or in the Civil Service, 
capable of successfully accomplishing the task of governing a greater Central African 
State containing over 5 million African natives. It would no doubt be possible to 
obtain recruits for the service from outside the new State, but the ability of a newly 
elected Government to persist in this practice is doubtful, and there might soon arise 
an outcry against the appointment of imported officials to posts of which the 
occupants must give decisions in disputes where the interests of white and black are 
opposed. Generally, it may well be doubted whether, given the conditions likely to 
prevail, the amalgamated three Territories could ever develop into a self-supporting 
and powerful British Dominion, which is what the advocates of amalgamation claim 
as their objective. The new State might find itself before long in difficulties, which 
would compel the United Kingdom Government to assume responsibility, financial 
and administrative (as has happened, for other reasons, in the case of Newfound-
land), or, more probably, it would gravitate into the Union of South Africa, which 
would thus be extended to the borders of Tanganyika. 
8. If amalgamation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland as an immediate solution is 
rejected, there will no doubt be a demand from some quarters in Southern Rhodesia 
for the incorporation of Southern Rhodesia in the Union of South Africa, since, 
although this suggestion was rejected by a referendum held prior to the grant of 
responsible Government in 1923, the Southern Rhodesians might feel obliged to 
turn to the Union if they thought that their approach to the North was definitely 
barred. This, however, does not seem to be a course which it would be desirable for 
His Majesty's Government to encourage. There are cogent arguments which have 
been urged for the view that the incorporation of Southern Rhodesia in the Union 
would adversely affect the interests both of the Europeans and natives in Southern 
Rhodesia as well as those of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and of the United 
Kingdom. These may be summarised as follows:-
(1) Southern Rhodesia as a whole would be involved in the racial strife of the 
white peoples of the Union and saddled with the Union problems of the poor whites 
and urbanised natives; the development of Southern Rhodesian secondary indus-
tries might be neglected and immigration from overseas closed. 
(2) African tenure of land now within the reserves and native areas of Southern 
Rhodesia might be menaced by politicians anxious to settle whites on new farms. 
Moreover Southern Rhodesia would be uniting with a country where racial tension 
is greater and outbreaks of public violence more frequent. 
(3) Great Britain might lose control over an important source of raw materials. 
(4) The spread of Union influence northwards would greatly strengthen those 
forces in Northern Rhodesia and also Nyasaland and the East African Territories 
which are opposed to His Majesty's Government's policy of political, economic and 
social advancement for the African populations in partnerships with the immi-
grant communities. 
9. It is therefore clearly desirable that strong efforts should be made to avoid the 
development of a straight choice between the amalgamation of Southern Rhodesia 
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with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland on the one hand and its incorporation as a 
fifth province in the Union on the other. We feel that our policy should be (1) to 
encourage the maintenance of Southern Rhodesia as a State independent of the 
Union and (2) while ruling out amalgamation at this stage, to foster closer 
connection between it and its two Northern neighbours. It would certainly be most 
undesirable for His Majesty's Government to take up a purely negative attitude on 
the question of closer union in Central Africa. Such an attitude would indeed be 
inconsistent with the policy which led up to the appointment of the Royal 
Commission in 1938, and the fact that consideration of the proposals of the 
Commission has been postponed since the beginning of the war and that the 
Southern Rhodesia Government have refrained from embarrassing us by demands 
for a decision makes it all the more desirable that His Majesty's Government should 
be ready with a statement of such a nature as to meet and as far as possible forestall 
such demands. Refusal to consider any form of closer connection would cause 
intense disappointment and dissatisfaction among the European population of the 
two Rhodesias. In Northern Rhodesia it would almost certainly put an end to 
co-operation with the Government on the part of the elected European representa-
tives, thus impeding the development of the Territory as a whole and particularly the 
development of the native services. There is thus a strong case for an attempt to give 
effect to local aspirations in so far as this can be done without departing from the 
general policy of His Majesty's Government regarding the development of tropical 
African territories. There is little doubt also that such an attempt would have a 
greater chance of success if it were initiated by His Majesty's Government. 
10. With this end in view we should be prepared with concrete proposals. The 
existing Inter-Territorial Conference should be strengthened and put on a perma-
nent basis in the form of a standing Council. Its precise constitution and functions 
would be matters for discussion with the Governments concerned, subject to the 
understanding that it would only be an advisory and not an executive body. The 
Appendix contains the outline of a scheme which might be considered. In general, it 
should be the function of the Inter-Territorial Council to promote the closest contact 
and co-operation between the three Governments and their administrative and 
technical services, one form of which would be the loan of specialist officers from one 
Government to another when required. The present Inter-Territorial Secretariat, 
which was set up during the war in order to assist in the co-ordination of the war 
effort of the three Territories, should be placed on a permanent basis. Apart from 
their political advantages, these measures would be of material benefit to the 
administration of the three Territories. 
11. It must be admitted that it is doubtful whether a scheme of this kind, limited 
to creating machinery for increased co-operation between the Territories, would 
satisfy the views of the majority of the Europeans in Southern and Northern 
Rhodesia. In Northern Rhodesia it would be helpful if an unofficial majority in the 
Legislative Council could be granted. In Southern Rhodesia there has been some 
tendency lately to envisage as an ultimate step a form of federation of the States of 
Southern and Central Africa. It is clear that a federation, in the ordinary sense, of 
Territories in entirely different stages of constitutional development is not a 
practicable proposition, especially as the position of neighbouring foreign countries 
inevitably arises. The suggestion no doubt has its origin in the general conception of 
regionalism which has been much discussed lately. The Committee on Preparations 
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for the Meeting with the Dominion Prime Ministers is considering the possibility of 
bringing before the meeting proposals as to consultative machinery in Colonial areas 
and, if it is decided to constitute such a body for Central and Southern Africa, this 
might go a considerable distance to satisfy Southern Rhodesia. 
12. In conclusion, it may be added that it has recently been suggested that, if the 
amalgamation of Southern Rhodesia with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland is 
rejected as an immediate solution, it would be of great help towards preventing 
dissatisfaction in Southern Rhodesia if His Majesty's Government could accord some 
advance of status to the Colony by its promotion in the councils of Empire, i.e., by 
admitting its representatives as full members and not merely as observers at Empire 
discussions. This is a matter which can be further explored and it should no doubt be 
possible to do something to help in this direction at least in regard to Conferences on 
economic or technical matters. It does not appear that there is as yet any idea in Sir 
Godfrey Huggins's mind of full Dominion status or of a demand to control relations 
with foreign countries or to appoint representatives abroad, and he seems rather to be 
thinking of the position of Southern Rhodesia in relation to international economic 
policy. We understand that the invitation extended to him to attend the forthcoming 
meeting of Prime Ministers when questions affecting Southern Rhodesia are under 
discussion has had a great effect as an indication that the work which he feels he has 
done in building up a Southern Rhodesia devoted to the British connection is 
appreciated in this country. 
Appendix to 75 
1. The Council would consist of the Governor of Southern Rhodesia as Chairman, 
of the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Prime Minister of 
Southern Rhodesia and one other member from each Territory. In the case of 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland the second member would be appointed for each 
session (not meeting) of the Council by the Governor and would be one of the 
Governor's principal advisers, i.e., either an official or an unofficial member of the 
Executive Council. It would be made clear in any announcement that the unofficial 
leaders in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would be closely associated with the 
work of the Council and its committees (see Paragraph 3 below). 
2. The function of the Council would be to discuss matters of common interest to 
the three Territories. These would include communications (road, rail and air), 
economic relations, industrial development, labour, education, agricultural, veterin-
ary and medical matters, currency, research, and such other matters as might be 
agreed between the three Governments. 
3. Permanent standing committees of the Council would be set up to deal with 
communications, industrial development, research and such other matters as might 
be agreed upon. In addition ad hoc conferences would be held under the <egis of the 
Council to deal with technical and special subjects. Unofficials from Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland would be included in the membership of these standing 
committees and would attend the ad hoc conferences.2 
2 Huggins and his Cabinet colleagues in Southern Rhodesia received the proposal of a Standing Central 
African Council as 'a very mixed blessing' but accepted it in principle. Huggins wrote to Cranborne: 'It was 
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finally decided that, unless we adopted a co-operative attitude in this matter, we should soon find 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland absorbed into East Africa and ourselves absorbed by the Union of South 
Africa. Hence the final decision'. In the same letter, the Southern Rhodesian prime minister referred to 
the question of African opinion and commented that 'neither you nor we know what the natives of 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would decide if they could be consulted. If we undertook propaganda 
and among other things promised not to increase their hut tax, or even to reduce it, I think we could buy 
their vote. In the mass they are quite incapable of expressing a considered opinion on any issue greater 
than a reduction of hut tax' (Huggins to Cranborne, 8 Aug 1944, CO 795/128/45104/1944, WP(44)521, 15 
Sept 1944, Appendix A). An announcement about the creation of a Central African Council was made in 
Oct 1944 and the council met for the first time in Apr 1945. 
76 CO 822/114/7, no 18 7 Dec 1944 
[Closer union in East Africa]: aide-memoire by Mr Stanley for Sir P 
Mitchell1 on a proposal to establish an East African High Commission 
[Two days before he left to assume office as the new governor of Kenya, Mitchell discussed 
his plan for an East African High Commission with Stanley. The latter then forwarded 
this aide-memo ire to Mitchell in Nairobi. Before the discussion, CO officials warned that 
the appointment of the governor of Kenya as high commissioner was likely to revive 
suspicions of Kenyan domination (CO 822/114/7, minutes by Dawe and Steel, 4 Dec 1944, 
and by Cater, 5 Dec 1944).) 
I have discussed with you the present constitutional position in the East African 
territories (Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika) with particular reference to the 
administration of the various services common to the three territories. 
2. You told me that you accepted my view that for various reasons closer union 
was not practicable in existing circumstances. It was clear, however, that the present 
system of administration of the common services under the Governors' Conference 
was ineffective and unpopular; there was no public confidence in it, and no 
opportunity of marshalling public opinion behind it; and its complete breakdown had 
in fact been avoided only because exceptionally able officers had been available to run 
it. Under the present arrangements there was no opportunity for effective public 
debate in any legislature of the Conference administration, and a system under 
which identical legislation on matters affecting the common services had to be 
forced upon three separate legislatures could no longer be justified. In your opinion 
radical reforms were essential, but you thought that this could be achieved without 
raising controversial issues or stirring up racial friction. You emphasised, above all, 
that the time had come when a definite decision one way or another must be taken 
and announced by His Majesty's Government and that no further commissions or 
enquiries would be tolerated by public opinion in East Africa. 
3. You then indicated to me the nature of the reforms you yourself had in mind, 
and these can, I think be summarised as follows:-
(a) The Governor of Kenya should be appointed High Commissioner for all 
1 KCMG, 1937; served in Nyasaland, 1912-1919 and Tanganyika, 1919-1935 (chief secretary, 1934-1935); 
gov of Uganda, 1935-1940; deputy chairman, East African Governors' Conference, 1940; political adviser 
(on conquered Italian territories in Africa) to Field Marshal Wavell, 1941; British plenipotentiary in 
Ethiopia and chief political officer to GOC-in-C, East Africa, 1942; gov of Fiji and high commissioner for 
Western Pacific, 1942-1944; gov of Kenya, 1944-1952. 
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common or joint services and subjects. The Governors of Uganda and Tanganyika 
might be appointed Deputy High Commissioners, if desired, and one or other 
should act in the absence of the High Commissioner. The Governors of Kenya and 
Uganda would cease to be Joint High Commissioners for Transport. 
(b) The following Departments should become High Commissioner's Depart-
ments, and such separate directorates as exist should be amalgamated:-
Railways and Harbours, Customs, Posts and Telegraphs, Income Tax (and 
cognate revenue), Defence, Research, Immigration, Publicity and Broadcasting, 
Civil Aviation, Currency Board. 
The amalgamation of the two Railway directorates would not necessarily mean the 
complete fusion of the two Railway systems. 
(c) The Secretariat of the Governors' Conference should become the High 
Commissioner's Secretariat. 
(d) An East African Legislative Council should be established for the High 
Commission, with 6 (or 8) official members and 18 unofficial members. The 
official members should be the Chief Secretary, the General Manager of the 
Railways, the Controller of Customs, the Postmaster-General, the Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue, and the G.O.C., with possibly a Legal Adviser and a member for 
commerce, finance and banking. 
The unofficial members should consist of 6 Europeans, 6 Asiatics, and 6 
Africans. The European and Asiatic members should be elected by the European 
and Asiatic members of the three territorial Legislative Councils, acting as joint 
electoral colleges respectively for Europeans and Asiatics. If the three Legislative 
Councils would not combine to form electoral colleges each could send 2 
Europeans and 2 Asiatics, but electoral colleges were to be preferred. The African 
members should be appointed in the first instance, 2 for each territory, by the 
Governors, and should be Africans, unless a Governor certified that he could not 
find suitable candidates, in which case Europeans or Asiatics might be substituted. 
(e) The High Commissioner should preside over the Legislative Council, at any 
rate in the first instance. Power of certification might be given to the High 
Commissioner, or to the three Governors jointly, although you hoped that it 
would never be required. Legislation should require the assent of the three 
Governors or, if they failed to agree, of a majority. 
(0 The High Commission budget should consist of the revenue from Posts and 
Telegraphs, Customs, Income Tax, etc. Railway revenue should, however, be 
excluded, and the Railways would continue to be operated on the existing 
self-accounting system. The High Commission expenditure would, of course, fall 
far short of the revenue and the balance of revenue should be paid over to the 
several territories as at present. 
(g) If these arrangements were adopted the Governors' Conference would become 
redundant and could be abolished, together with such of its ancillary bodies as 
could not be fitted into the new organisation. 
4. I told you that the scheme which you had outlined appeared to me to merit 
most careful consideration and to offer a means of securing more effective 
administration of common economic and other services without raising the 
controversial issues of political fusion. I noted that under your proposals certain 
services such as Public Health, Education, Labour, and Native Policy generally, 
[76] POLITICAL CHANGE AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 381 
which most nearly touched members of the public, would be left to the territorial 
Governments, and this, I thought, might make the plan more generally acceptable. It 
was clear, however, that your scheme would require much closer investigation and 
elaboration before any decision could be reached. 
5. As regards finance, it appeared that, under your proposals, the great bulk of 
East African revenues would be raised by the central legislature, and that the 
territorial legislatures, although left with the responsibility for social and other 
essential services, would be largely dependent for funds upon what the central body 
remitted to them. You pointed out that, with certain exceptions, the expenditure 
falling on the High Commission would consist of the ascertainable administrative 
cost of the Departments, and that the transfer to the territorial budgets of any 
revenue in excess of this would be largely automatic, and you suggested that, if 
necessary, it might be laid down that the central legislature should not retain more 
than a given proportion of the revenue without the consent of the territorial 
Councils. 
I said that in my opinion it would be essential that there should be adequate 
safeguards to prevent the central legislature from being in any position to 
concentrate funds upon its own services, for instance, research or civil aviation, at 
the expense of those which should be made available for the territorial Governments, 
and that the financial aspect, in particular, of your proposals would require much 
further elaboration. 
6. I said that the proposal for equal representation of races and territories in the 
central legislature would probably commend the scheme in many quarters, and I 
agreed that equal representation should be aimed at if the proposals were pursued. It 
appeared doubtful to me, however, whether unofficials in East Africa, and especially 
in Kenya, would be content with what you proposed. You appreciated this, but you 
thought that responsible opinion in East Africa would realise the impossibility of 
securing any meticulously proportionate division of seats, and would be prepared to 
accept the proposal for equal representation for the sake of the scheme as a whole. 
You added that you had introduced the idea of electoral colleges in order to make the 
plan more acceptable. 
7. I referred also to your suggestion that Bills enacted by the central legislature 
should require the assent of all three Governors. You agreed that, in the event of a 
difference of view between the Governors, the usual procedure as regards reference 
to the Secretary of State would be appropriate, and you suggested that it might be 
necessary to provide that in such a case the Bill in question should be reserved. In 
any event you contemplated that there should be the fullest consultation between the 
three Governments before any Bill of importance was introduced, and you saw no 
reason to fear any serious differences of opinion. 
8. I suggested that main roads should be included in the common services to be 
transferred to the High Commissioner, especially in view of their close connection 
with Railways, and you agreed. I suggested also that High[er] Education, and 
particularly Makerere, should be included in the services to be transferred, and you 
undertook to consider this. You said, however, that you yourself contemplated that 
Makerere should ultimately be completely autonomous. 
9. You told me that you saw no reason why the fact that Tanganyika was 
administered under mandate should cause any difficulty in the operation of your 
scheme, and you agreed that it would be one of the High Commissioner's 
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responsibilities to ensure that the principles of the mandate were observed in 
connection with the activities in Tanganyika of the Joint Departments. 
10. In conclusion, I informed you that, without committing myself in any way at 
this stage, I agreed that you should discuss your proposals in the first instance with 
the Governors of Uganda and Tanganyika. It would not be possible for these 
discussions to take place until Sir John Hall and Sir William Battershill2 had had 
time to acquaint themselves with conditions in their respective territories, but the 
interval could be employed by you in further consideration and elaboration of the 
financial and other aspects of your scheme. I wished it to be clearly understood, 
however, that the proposals should not be regarded in any way as a first step towards 
the political union of the East African territories, but simply as a scheme whereby 
certain immediate problems relating to the administration of the common services 
could be solved. I added that I would now await the Governors' views before 
considering whether I could put before the War Cabinet a scheme on the lines you 
had proposed, and that, until that point had been reached, no steps should be taken 
to obtain the views of the local legislatures. I agreed that it would be necessary for 
you, in the further consideration of your proposals, to consult a few senior officials in 
East Africa, for instance, the Chief Secretary to the Governors' Conference and the 
Commissioner of Income Tax, but for the time being you should not disclose the 
details of the scheme to private individuals in view of the obvious risk of premature 
disclosure. 
11. I shall communicate copies of this aide-memoire to Sir John Hall and Sir 
William Battershill. 
2 Sir J Hall, gov of Uganda, 1944-1952. For Battershill, see 35, note 2. 
77 CO 318/453/18, no 98 14 Dec 1944 
'Federation of the West Indies': memorandum by P Rogers on the 
governors' replies to Mr Stanley's draft despatch 
On the 25th July, 1944 the Secretary of State wrote semi-officially to all Governors in 
the Caribbean area stating that he was inclined to the view that the time was now 
ripe for a declaration of our policy in respect of federation. He fu lly realised that 
there was strong opposition to the idea and he did not regard it as politically or 
administratively feasible at present. If however the Caribbean Colonies were to 
develop politically, it must be in relation to some wider system than the existing one 
and since federation was not likely to come about by itself, the Secretary of State felt 
that a lead was now required. He therefore proposed that a despatch in the terms of a 
draft enclosed in his letter should be addressed to Governors, published and laid 
before the local Legislatures. 
He further suggested that a separate British West Indian Conference System 
should be set up in addition to the Anglo-American West Indian Conference, 
constituted on the same lines and meeting as a rule before the main conference, so as 
to enable the British delegates to reach general agreement as to the line to be taken 
at the main conference. 
The draft despatch enclosed in the letters began by re-affirming the aim of 
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self-government in the West Indies but stating that in view of the difficulty of small 
units of government maintaining real independence under modern conditions, it was 
desirable that political progress in the individual Colonies should have in view the 
aim of federation (as recommended by the Royal Commission). The Secretary of 
State considered that the existing historical, social and political differences between 
the Colonies at the present time, combined with the administrative difficulties of 
federation until communications were greatly improved, would make it impractic-
able to set up immediately a federal organisation. Further H.M.G. would not wish to 
enforce federation against the wishes of any large section of the community but they 
considered that the aim of British policy should be the development of federation at 
such time as the majority of the inhabitants of the various Colonies were in favour of 
a change, and when the development of communications made it administratively 
practicable. It might be that two federations, one of the Eastern and one of the 
Western Groups would eventually prove to be preferable to a single federation while 
the Bahamas might prefer to remain outside any federal organisation but these were 
questions which should not be pre-judged. 
In these circumstances the Secretary of State regarded it as desirable that a lead 
should be given by H.M.G. in favour of federation and that British policy should aim 
at fostering a sense of West Indian unity and making the utmost possible use of every 
unifying influence such as the development of joint West Indian services, confer-
ences, etc. 
Political developments in each Colony should be related, as far as individual 
circumstances permitted, to the wider aim of federation and local government 
institutions, especially Village Councils, should be developed as much as possible in 
the meantime, in order to foster a growth of citizenship and a sense of responsibility. 
Finally the Secretary of State proposed that the despatch should be published and 
arrangements made for Colonial Legislatures to debate the issue. 
The replies to the Secretary of State's letter are as follows:-
Trinidad 
(1) Sir Bede Clifford1 
(a) The Governor considered that there would be strong opposition by the 
commercial section to federation because this might involve a surrender of the real 
independence enjoyed by that group, and because Trinidad as the richest Colony, 
might stand to lose financially by federation. 
(b) On the other hand the newly formed West Indian National Party which had 
had considerable political success, had made West Indian federation one of the major 
planks on its platform and there were indications that several West Indian Civil 
Services and some of the Trade Unions would also favour it. To sum up Sir Bede felt 
that all the Caribbean Colonies wanted to be politically independent and self-
governing within the Empire but that they closed their eyes to the fact that there 
could be no genuine political autonomy unless they were economically self-
supporting. (By this presumably Sir Bede meant financial independence.) 
(c) On balance Sir Bede felt that federation was so desirable a goal, and that local 
difficulties might be so great, that it might be desirable to give an even stronger 
lead than that proposed in the despatch, and put forward more definite proposals if 
1 Gov of Trinidad, 1942- 1947. 
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the policy of federation were to be effective. If this were agreed the despatch might, 
he suggested, begin by pointing out the degree to which unified action in the British 
Caribbean had already been achieved e.g. in defence matters and by B.W.I.A., and go 
·on to detail the many fields where unified action could be extended with advantage 
e.g. by the establishment of a West Indian meteorological service, the adoption of the 
same quarantine code and a uniform currency, etc., and by the establishment of a 
unified Caribbean service. The despatch might then suggest the actual type of 
federation which could be considered e.g. retaining Imperial control over foreign 
policy and defence and proposing a federation on the lines of the Australian system 
under which the powers of the central government would be definitely prescribed. 
It would be particularly important in his view to win over the Civil Services. 
Finally some reference should be made to the measures necessary to secure 
financial self-sufficiency in a federated Caribbean, particularly by ensuring the 
markets for agricultural produce. 
(d) If however this line of approach were not felt to be practicable at present, Sir 
Bede agreed with the draft despatch. He made two comments on its text but did not 
suggest that it should be amended because of these. The first point was that the 
statement in the despatch that a sense of West Indian unity should be fostered would 
appear to back up the West Indian National Party and would discomfort its 
opponents. The second point was that the reference to the development of local 
government and institutions would in Trinidad be read in the light of the very 
unsatisfactory record of the Port of Spain City Council. 
Comment. Sir Bede's views at (a) to (c) above are in the main an appreciation of the 
situation, which seems to me a very sound one on the whole, and do not I think call 
for particular comment. The point about the financial self-sufficiency is one to which 
many Governors refer and it is clearly of great importance. It is referred to in the 
general section of this memorandum, at its conclusion. 
The only two matters calling for particular comment are I think those in 
paragraph (d). The first comment is admittedly true but I do not see how it could be 
otherwise, i.e. any despatch favouring federation would clearly favour the West Indian 
National Party at the expense of its opponents. As regards the second comment the 
Port of Spain City Council has certainly a very bad record (as has the Kingston and 
St. Andrew Corporation) but on the other hand the San Fernando Council has quite a 
good record and I see no escape from the conclusion that local government 
institutions, especially those on a very small scale such as Village Councils, must be 
encouraged if there is to be to any reality in West Indian citizenship. 
(2) Mr. Wright, the Acting Governor 
(a) Mr. Wright made much the same points as Sir Bede regarding the absence of 
any strong support locally of federation, and the financial objections to it in Trinidad, 
though he attached rather less importance to the success of the West Indian National 
Party in this respect than Sir Bede. He agreed that federation was a most desirable 
aim and that it could only come about through a strong lead from H.M.G. He agreed 
with the proposals for a British West Indian Conference System. 
(b) He suggested that adoption of federation might be facilitated if H.M.G. could 
undertake the rearrangement of the government structure of the West Indies and 
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assume the cost of the appointments of Governors and official members of Executive 
Councils. 
Comment. Only (b) above calls for separate comment. I agree that the idea is 
attractive but it seems to me impracticable at present unless there is a prospect of it 
being adopted for the Colonial Empire as a whole, and I therefore do not suggest that 
it should be pursued. 
Leeward Islands 
(a) Mr. Freeston2 makes the same point as Sir Bede Clifford about the importance 
of financial stability as a pre-requisite to political independence. 
(b) He suggests that unless the timing of the federation despatch is carefully 
arranged it may take the wind from the sails of the proposals at present under 
discussion for the federation of the Windward and Leeward Islands and suggests 
some reference to this in the despatch, in order to cover this point. 
(c) He agrees to the proposal for a B.W.I. conference but suggests it should not be 
linked up to the Anglo-American Conference, particularly as there were no 
indications of a cleavage at the last conference between the British and American 
representatives. 
(d) Finally he suggests that a Conference of West Indian Governors should be 
revived. 
Comment. (a) above is admitted. As regards (b) I agree that we shall have to cover 
this point, to which Sir Arthur Grimble also refers, and I suggest that a specific 
reference to the desirability of proceeding in the meantime with the federation of the 
Windward and Leeward Islands should be made in the despatch. 
As regards (c) I agree that for these reasons and those given later by the 
Comptroller, any B.W.I. conference should not be linked to the present conference 
system. 
As regards (d) it is possible that the Governors' Conference might have some 
advantage but it would be politically most suspect in the West Indies, where it would 
be regarded as a retrograde step, and the subjects which it could usefully discuss 
seem to me so few that I doubt if it is worth the administrative inconvenience which 
it would cause by adding to the already over large number of conferences. 
Bahamas 
H.R.H.3 agrees with the draft despatch and to the proposal for a B.W.I. conference 
but considers that the Bahamas will prefer to remain outside the federation, at any 
rate for some time. 
Comment. This agrees with the views expressed here though I think we should try 
and carry the Bahamas along as far as possible. 
Barbados 
(a) Sir Grattan Bushe4 considered that there was no positive demand in the West 
In dies for federation, that such support as it would obtain would come from the more 
2 (Sir) B Freeston (KCMG 1945), gov of Leeward Islands, 1943-1948. 
3 The Duke of Windsor, gov of Bahamas, 1940-1945. 4 See 56, note 4. 
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responsible elements of the mercantile community and a few liberal minds among 
the coloured professional class. Opposition, in some cases bitter, might well be 
offered by many of the white planter class, who would see their present large 
measure of independence being lost in the wider sphere of a federal West Indies. 
(b) Nevertheless Sir G. Bushe agreed that the time was ripe to present the 
advantages of federation and that a strong lead from H.M.G. was desirable, 
particularly if the West Indies were to hold their own politically, economically and 
above all culturally against American influence. He made the same point as many 
Governors about financial independence. 
(c) Sir G. Bushe doubted whether the lead given in the draft despatch was 
sufficiently positive and suggested that the despatch should propose a British West 
Indian Conference to consider ways and means of federation, which might perhaps 
be held in London towards the end of 1945. He also suggested that more positive and 
detailed guidance should be proposed regarding the powers of the federal legislature 
and its finance. 
(d) He agreed with the proposal for a separate B.W.I. Conference. 
Comment. The only point which calls for special comment here is the proposal for a 
more positive lead and that a definite scheme of federation should be put forward. I 
comment on this in the general section of the memorandum. 
British Guiana 
(a) The Governor5 entirely agrees that the time is ripe for a declaration of policy 
by H.M.G. He considers that such a declaration should avoid precise discussion or 
definition of any particular form of federation and he considers that the draft is very 
properly general in its terms. 
(b) He adds some comments on the question of federation of the Windward and 
Leeward Islands which are now out of date in view of the proposals for federation 
under discussion elsewhere. 
(c) He considers that there is substantial support for federation in all the Colonies 
among the so-called progressive and labour groups, though there may be consider-
able opposition from the dominant interests, especially white planter groups, in 
other Colonies. 
(d) British Guiana is in a very different position from the West Indian Colonies 
proper e.g. it has Roman-Dutch law, completely different physical characteristics, a 
continental position and a real aboriginal population. There is not likely to be 
generally strong opposition in the Colony to progressive federation of the Caribbean 
except perhaps among the East Indian groups, some of which look to the future of 
the Colony as a dependency of India. 
(e) He agrees in principle with the proposal for a B.W.I. Conference but points out 
that these conferences throw a heavy strain on administrations and handicap their 
work locally. 
(f) He advocates strongly the real unification of the Caribbean Government 
Services and the development of inter-Colonial communications .... 6 
Comment. It is particularly interesting that Sir G. Lethem, who has had the longest 
5 Sir G Letham, gov of British Guiana, 1941-1947. 
6 Point (g), on Letham's suggestions about the phrasing of the draft despatch, omitted. 
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experience of the West Indies of any of the present Governors, and who has a 
particularly acute political sense, should not only agree that a declaration of policy is 
called for but should also consider, contrary to the view expressed by some 
Governors, that it would be a mistake to put forward any precise discussion or 
definition of any particular form of constitutional federation. This question is further 
discussed in the general section of this memorandum. 
The differences between British Guiana and the West Indies proper are rightly 
underlined and must clearly be taken into consideration. This is clearly bound up 
with the matter referred to in the preceding paragraph. 
As regards (e) we must clearly take into account the burden on administrations 
which is caused by these conferences and I refer to this in the general section 
below .... 
Jamaica 
(a) Sir Humphrey Huggins7 points out that the Colony is at present preoccupied 
with the new constitution and is therefore unlikely in the immediate future to pay 
much regard to the possibility of federation. 
(b) Nevertheless he agrees that if the Caribbean Colonies are to develop politically 
it must be in relation to a wider system and if it is felt for reasons of high policy that 
H.M.G. should give publicity to the question at this stage, he agrees that it should be 
done on the lines of the draft despatch. 
(c) He agrees with the proposal for a B.W.I. conference, subject to the burden 
which this would throw on administrations and agrees particularly that the British 
view at the Anglo-American Conferences should be expressed with all possible 
unanimity. 
Comment. It is clearly the case that Jamaica will be preoccupied with its new 
constitution for a time and the timing of the actual publication of any despatch about 
federation must clearly have this in view. It is to be hoped however that the 
excitement over the new constitution will diminish a little as experience of it is 
gained and the question of federation seems to me sufficiently urgent to justify 
pressing on with the preparation and issue of an acceptable despatch now, 
consideration being given to the actual timing of release when it is generally agreed. 
Comptroller 
(a) Sir Frank Stockdale agrees that a definite lead on the question should be 
given. 
(b) He suggests that the despatch might have a more favourable response from a 
wider section of West Indian opinion if it were not confined almost exclusively to 
the political aspects of federation and if it could consider the need for federation on 
economic and administrative grounds. He suggests particular economic matters 
which could advantageously be dealt with on a West Indian basis. 
(c) He is hesitant about the proposed B.W.I. Conference system owing to the 
burden on administrations and in any event suggests that it should not immediately 
precede the Anglo-American Conference as it might prejudice the friendly relations 
established at the first conference. cf. also the similar point made by Mr. Freeston. 
7 Gov of Jamaica, 1943-1950. 
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Comment. The suggestion for emphasising the importance of federation on econo-
mic and administrative grounds seems to me very sound and in the general section 
below I have suggested adding to the draft despatch accordingly. 
I comment on the conference question in the general section below. 
British Honduras 
(a) Sir John Hunter8 considers that there will be bitter opposition from certain 
commercial interests and from elements which pretend cultural relations with 
Central America. There would be particular objection to any proposal for the 
abandonment of dollar currency (i.e. the British Honduras dollar is equivalent to the 
U.S. dollar) and to any suggestion of subordination to Jamaica. 
(b) Nevertheless the Governor agrees with the Secretary of State's views and the 
draft despatch but considers that the issue should be forced by some concrete 
proposal, such as the summoning of a special conference as suggested by Sir G. 
Bush e. 
(c) He agrees to the proposed B.W.I Conference though he still favours the 
Governors' Conference as does Mr. Freeston. 
Comment. Local opposition is to be expected in British Honduras in view of its 
existing trade relations and the fear of subordination to Jamaica based on the 
Colony's previous association with it. Nevertheless it seems to me so clear that 
British Honduras could only develop as part of a larger organisation, which would 
incidentally greatly improve its standing in relation to the Central American 
countries and Guatemala in particular, that I have no doubt that the issue should be 
pressed. 
As regards (c), I have already commented on the proposal for a Governors' 
Conference in considering Mr. Freeston's comments. 
Windward Islands 
(a) The Governor9 agrees with the aim of federation and to the publication of the 
despatch setting out that aim and inviting public discussion of it. 
(b) He considers that the proposal for the federation of the Windward and 
Leeward Islands is in no way incompatible with the wider federation, particularly as 
the latter is a long term measure. Further the smaller federation will improve the 
standing of the smaller island communities in any larger federation. 
(c) He suggests verbal alteration in the draft despatch where it refers to "the 
majority of the inhabitants ... being in favour of federation" since he suggests that 
the majority of the inhabitants are in fact little interested and that there should be 
substituted such phrase as "the balance of responsible opinion". 
(d) Like other Governors Sir A. Grimble draws particular attention to the 
question of finance and to the need of any Caribbean Federation for sufficient 
revenue for its maintenance. Unlike all the other Governors however he does not 
suggest that the federation, to be politically independent, would have to be 
financially self-sufficient; but suggests instead continuing subsidy from H.M.G., 
apparently without any conditions attached. 
8 Gov of British Honduras, 1940-1947. 
9 Sir A Grimble, gov of Windward Islands, 1942-1948. 
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(e) He emphasises the need for unified West Indian services. 
(f) He agrees with the proposed B.W.l. Conference. 
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Comment. Sir A. Grimble's views on the question of federation of the Windwards and 
Leewards in relation to the wider federation seem to me very sound and as 
mentioned in the comment under "Leeward Islands" I suggest a specific reference to 
this matter in the draft despatch. 
As regards (d) I am strongly opposed to the Governor's view and I think that, as the 
other Governors suggest, it is most important that we should lay down the necessity 
of financial self-sufficiency as an accompaniment to political independence. I have 
commented in a separate minute and draft on the issue raised by the Governors in 
this particular connection. 
The remaining points call for no comment. 
Conclusions 
(1) There is considerable difference of opinion between the Governors as to the 
desire locally for federation. Broadly however it seems that there is likely to be 
support among considerable sections of the coloured intellegentsia for it, while the 
white commercial and planting community will on the whole tend to be against it. 
This issue does not however apply throughout e.g. Jamaica, in addition to being 
preoccupied with the new constitution, may not be in favour of federation, as the 
P.N.P.'s somewhat cool reply recently to an approach from the W.I.N.P. tends to 
show. 
(2) All Governors are however agreed that federation must be the aim of our 
policy in the West Indies and that a strong lead by H.M.G. is required. Further all are 
agreed that the time is now ripe for such a lead, except the Governor of Jamaica, in 
view of the new constitution in that Colony, and he would be quite prepared to 
acquiesce. 
I think therefore it is clear that we should now go ahead with the declaration of the 
aim of federation, particular consideration being given later, when the draft is 
agreed, to the timing of its issue in relation to the state of opinion in Jamaica. 
(3) Sir Frank Stockdale draws particular attention to the desirability of emphasis-
ing in the despatch the need for federation not only on political but also on economic 
grounds. This seems to me most important, particularly in view of the recent 
resolution by the Associated Chambers of Commerce in favour of "economic 
federation" and I suggest that we should add to the despatch as the Comptroller 
proposes. 
(4) Some Governors favour the general but vague declaration on the lines 
proposed in the draft despatch, others press for a stronger lead from H.M.G. It is I 
think clear from the correspondence that we should now give as strong a lead as 
possible but I am myself of the opinion that it would be unwise to put forward any 
detailed proposals as to the form of a federal constitution as some Governors have 
suggested. The existing differences of historical and political development and social 
conditions are such that I doubt if a federal constitution would be immediately 
acceptable e.g. it may be that we shall have to work first through a B.W.l. Conference 
with advisory powers only and a strong secretariat (which is I think particularly 
important) and then possibly develop that into a federal legislature with restricted 
powers. The important thing seems to me to press the aim of federation now, and get 
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Colonial Legislatures to commit themselves to it-it will I think be difficult for them 
to declare themselves opposed to the aim (just as the Jamaica Legislature in 1938 
voted in favour of universal suffrage although nearly all of the individual members 
were in private opposed to it). Once Legislatures are committed we can I think 
advance a step further. 
I therefore suggest that the present line taken in the despatch should be 
maintained with the addition, on the lines proposed by Sir G. Bushe, that the 
Secretary of State should propose that if Legislatures declare themselves in favour of 
the aim of federation, a B.W.I. Conference should be held, perhaps towards the end of 
1945, either in London or in the Caribbean, to consider ways and means of achieving 
that aim and whether any immediate steps towards its realisation are practicable. 
(5) As regards the relation of West Indian federation to the federation of the 
Leeward and Windward Islands, I agree that it is particularly important that the one 
should not prejudice the other and that we should therefore insert in the despatch a 
particular reference to the latter proposal, as suggested by Sir A. Grimble and Mr. 
Freeston. 
(6) Certain verbal amendments in the despatch are proposed by Sir G. Letham 
and Sir A. Grimble. Subject to my comments under the individual sections above, 
these seem to me acceptable. 
(7) Finally, on the question of federation, there is the issue of Dominion status 
and financial self-sufficiency. I suggest that the despatch should refer to the aim of 
any federation which is established having full internal self-government (i.e. not 
Dominion status) at such time as the federation is financially self-sufficient. 
(8) All Governors and the Comptroller agree in principle with the proposal for the 
setting up of a B.W.I. Conference system but the Comptroller and some Governors 
are doubtful about its immediate advisability because of the heavy additional work 
which is thrust upon over-taxed Colonial Administrations by such conferences. In 
addition the Comptroller and Mr. Freeston suggest that if any such conference 
system is set up it should not bear such an obvious relationship to the Anglo-
American West Indian Conference. 
The reasons given in relation to the latter view seem to me convincing. As regards 
the question of setting up a conference system at all I feel that Colonial Governments 
will have more than enough to do to put into effect any of the recommendations of 
the first Anglo-American West Indian Conference within the next few months and 
that for this reason it would be premature to propose setting up a British West Indian 
Conference System just yet. I therefore suggest that the matter should be deferred 
until we have the reactions of Legislatures to the proposal to hold a B.W.I. 
Conference to consider federation. If such a conference is agreed and is held, it might 
develop into a regular conference system if no further step towards federation is 
immediately possible. I doubt if in any case it will be practicable to hold a B.W.I. 
Conference much earlier than here suggested and I do not think that any damage to 
our relations with the Americans on the joint West Indian Conference would result 
from the delay. 
(9) To sum up I suggest that an airmail despatch revised as proposed above 
should now issue together with a letter from the Secretary of State to Governors, 
commenting on the particular points raised in their letters as proposed in the 
separate Colony sections above, adding that it is proposed not to set up a B.W.I. 
Conference system until the outcome of public debate on the federation despatch can 
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be considered. If it should so happen that public debate is not in favour of federation, 
and the Secretary of State hopes that this will not be the case, then it will be possible 
to think again about the setting up of such a conference system. 
? So proceed. 10 
10 The draft despatch was revised to incorporate the points made by the governors and Sir F Stockdale on 
financial stability, regional co-operation, the desirability of proceeding with the federation of the Leeward 
and Windward Islands, the development of local government where it had proved itself, and closer 
association. A new despatch was circulated to governors on 14 Mar 1945 which stated (para 3): 'One 
important responsibility of any federation would, therefore, be to show that federal administration can be 
carried out without recurrent financial assistance from outside.' The despatch was published as being laid 
in the library of both houses of parliament and by a statement in reply to a parliamentary question on 13 
June 1945. It was subsequently included as Appendix I to the White Paper on Closer Association of the 
British West Indian Colonies (Cmd 7120, May 1947). 
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[Closer union in East Africa]: letter from Sir J Hall1 to Mr Stanley 
expressing Ugandan suspicions about the influence of the Europeans 
in Kenya 
On my way through Nairobi in December I had a brief talk with Mitchell and 
Lockhart2 about the former's scheme for the unification of certain services common 
to East Africa, which was embodied in the Aide Memoire enclosed with your Secret 
and Personal letter of 11th December. Since then I have had a further discussion on 
certain aspects of the scheme with Lockhart when he visited Entebbe a few weeks 
back, and he passed on my criticisms to Mitchell, who intends to spend a night with 
me here· next month. We shall then, I hope, have an opportunity to discuss the 
project in greater detail. Naturally nothing approaching finality can be reached until 
Battershill has arrived and settled himself in the saddle. In the meantime you may 
care to know what are my provisional conclusions. 
Firstly as to political background; I find among the unofficial community, 
European and Indian and, where there is political consciousness, African also, a great 
suspicion of and a certain bitterness towards Kenya. The suspicion is perhaps more 
marked in the case of Indians than Europeans, but it is present in both. They fear 
that union with Kenya or any move in that direction would operate to the 
disadvantage of Uganda and the Indians particularly are convinced that despite all 
safeguards that could be devised, the European settlers of Kenya would in practice 
control policy and its application. The whole dog would in fact be wagged by its tail. 
Suspicion and bitterness have been given a new impulse recently because although 
the wartime controls, centred and in practice largely controlled by Kenya, have on 
the whole worked very satisfactorily, in the matter of supplies-particularly piece 
goods and ironmongery, agricultural implements etc.-both the control of supplies 
and the control of prices have recently operated unfairly towards Uganda. For Indians 
also there is the burning question of immigration in regard to which the influence of 
Kenya Europeans must always be suspect. 
It is difficult to speak of African opinion in Uganda with any confidence or without 
1 See 76, note 2. 2 Sir C Lockhart, chief secretary, East African Governors' Conference. 
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risking giving an over coloured and misleading impression. Their opinion is largely 
unformed or concerned with domestic or purely local issues and for the reasons 
explained in my secret letter to Creasy of 2nd February we know at present precious 
little about it. This ignorance I hope very shortly to remedy. But it would not be an 
exaggeration to say that in Buganda, and in a lesser degree elsewhere, political 
consciousness, so far as it exists at all, has in recent years been developing -on 
anti-European lines. This was very apparent in the recent disturbances.3 It repre-
sents a not unusual stage of national development and I hope that I shall succeed in 
diverting the political impulse which lies behind it into healthier channels. But I 
think that it can safely be said that any measure that would seem to concentrate 
control of policy in Kenya, which to the politically minded African of Uganda would 
mean putting more power in the hands of Kenya Europeans, or anything suggesting 
the thin edge of the wedge of Union, would be viewed with the utmost suspicion by 
educated Africans in Uganda. 
Consequently if there is to be any further measure of unification it is, I suggest, 
important to avoid giving the impression that control will be exercised in and by 
Kenya, and to do everything possible to demonstrate that control will in practice as 
well as in theory be truly inter-territorial. To this end I suggest the following three 
modifications of Mitchell's scheme for the control of joint services:-
(!) Not the Governor of Kenya alone, but the three Governors jointly should 
constitute the High Commission for common services and subjects. 
(2) The proposed East African Legislative Council should not be presided over by 
the Governor of Kenya, but should have its own Speaker, who might be an 
ex-Chief Justice or some other distinguished person without any territorial 
affiliations; and 
(3) the East African Legislative Council should meet alternately in Nairobi, 
Dar-es-Salaam and Kampala (where I hope all meetings of the Uganda Legislative 
Council will in future be held). Mitchell is prepared to accept the first two of these 
suggested amendments-although as regards the first he points out that with 
many years' experience of joint authorities, he is by no means enamoured of them; 
and he has not yet pronounced on the third to which I myself attach considerable 
political importance. 
As regards the composition of the proposed East African Legislative Council, I 
suggest that it would be incongruous to have an unofficial majority- and a large one 
at that-while retaining official majorities in the territorial Legislative Councils, also 
that as many if not most of the matters to be referred to the East African Legislative 
Council will be fiscal or financial, the official members should include the three 
territorial Financial Secretaries. In order to avoid an unofficial majority, unofficial 
3 A reference to the riots in Buganda in Jan 1945 which were an expression of increasing popular antipathy 
towards the chiefly hierarchy and the British policies which sustained them. This in turn was accentuated 
by economic discontents arising partly from the impact of the war and the stringent policies of the British 
Protectorate government (peasant producers were receiving much less than the export value of their 
crops), and partly as a reaction against the tight grip of non-African commercial organisations over the 
processing and marketing of African peasant-grown cotton and coffee crops. See Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances which occurred in Uganda during January 1945 (Entebbe, 
1945). Further disturbances took place in 1949. 
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members should, I suggest, be reduced to nine, i.e. one European, one Asiatic and 
one African to be delegated by each territorial Legislative Council. 
There are a number of other points, mainly of detail, affecting the proposed new 
inter-territorial organisation which require further consideration, but I do not want 
to trouble you with these until I have had an opportunity to discuss them with 
Mitchell and Battershill, to whom I am sending copies of this letter.4 
4 The constitution which emerged in Feb 1945 after discussions between Mitchell and his Tanganyikan 
and Ugandan counterparts provided for a joint High Commission of the three governors for control of the 
common services outlined in Mitchell's original proposals (see 76). The assembly had an unofficial 
majority (nine officials, twenty-two unofficials), the latter consisting of six from each of the three 
territories (each one sending two members for each race) plus four commercial representatives. The 
common services were to be financed by the proceeds of customs, excise and income tax provided by the 
three territories. Differences then emerged over two central issues-the financial arrangements and the 
basis of racial representation. The CO argued that the proposed scheme gave the High Commission too 
much control over the finances of the individual governments. Mter much discussion it was decided to 
retain unchanged the sources of High Commission revenue but to allow the local governments to vary the 
rates of taxation within their own borders. On the issue of representation the CO insisted on modifications 
as a safeguard against domination by European unofficials. The 6:6:6 basis of representation was kept but 
the four commercial representatives were renamed 'nominated unofficials', immigration policy was 
removed from the assembly's control, and the official side was strengthened with the appointment of an 
extra official from each territory. With Cabinet's approval the proposals were published in Dec 1945 as a 
consultation document (Inter-territorial Organization in East Africa, Col191). Col191 met with a mixed 
reception in East Africa. The Asian community supported the proposals; Mrican opinion was divided; 
settler opinion in Kenya was hostile. The three governors and AB Cohen (the new head of the CO East and 
Central African Department) wanted to avoid a head-on clash with the settlers. Their advice was to proceed 
with the administrative reforms and abandon the new assembly but this was rejected by Labour ministers 
as a surrender to sectional opposition. A compromise was reached when Cohen and Arthur Creech Jones, 
the parliamentary under-secretary of state at the CO, visited East Africa in Aug 1946. They were persuaded 
by Mitchell that there could not be an assembly unless it was acceptable to European opinion. Unofficial 
representation was reduced to thirteen members: one member of each race from each territory, one Arab, 
plus one unofficial selected by each of the three territorial legislative councils voting as a body. The four 
nominated members were dropped. The principle of racial parity was maintained but the three extra 
members now gave Kenya two European members, one Asian and one African. As a counterbalance, the 
territorial legislatures were given more control over the revenues of the High Commission which were 
now to be financed by annual block votes for each service from each territorial legislature. In effect, 
therefore, although the Kenyan Europeans dominated at the centre the centre's powers had been 
emasculated. The revised proposals were published as Col210 in Mar 1947. Predictably the opposition now 
came from the non-officials but the East African High Commission was established, on an experimental 
basis for four years, on 1 Jan 1948. For background, see BDEEP series A, vol 2, R Hyam, ed, The Labour 
government and the end of empire 1945-1951, part Ill, 199. Subsequent developments are documented in 
series A, vol 3, D Goldsworthy, ed, The Conservative government and the end of empire 1951-1957, part 
11, 281-283, 288, 289--291. 
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